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                                                      Abstract 
The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus believed that our metaphysics determines our 
state of mind: a correct view of the nature of human and worldly existence brings inner 
peace and tranquillity; an incorrect view, inner turmoil. More recently, Australian 
philosopher John Bigelow lamented that, despite over 2000 years of theorizing, 
philosophers have yet to reach consensus on a correct metaphysics. This thesis posits the 
source of this metaphysical discontent to be the Platonic/Aristotelian conception of essence 
(or form) as a purely immaterial, male preserve, thereby reducing woman to the material 
source, (Logical) properties and (sexual) demise of man‟s essential being; this 
phallocentric misconception impelling a history of further misconceptions of essence, and 
of the metaphysical theories and binary logic based upon it. Through the construction of a 
genealogy and critique of various historical (re)conceptions and permutations of essence, I 
theorize the existence of an originary spirogenetic essence that causes, determines and 
motivates the (whole) individual, species, and sexuate form, function, growth, and 
development of every human being, the metaphysical and symbolic denial of this essence 
resulting in, not just inner turmoil, but some forms of mental disorder.  
Empirical research into female self-development and eating disorders yielded support for 
the hypothesis of a spirogenetic essence and essentially whole, subjective (sexual) female 
self, the metaphysically based, familialy/socially imposed denial, (de)construction and 
demonization of which is causing its fragmentation and loss, and the existential need to 
reconstruct this real, „de-formed‟ sexual female self/body into the ideal feminine „form‟ - 
the perfect pretend self - that will earn Paternal recognition, love, approval, and thus, 
ongoing subjective existence. While in modern, pre-feminist times, this perfect self was 
conceived and constructed as the sexual object of male desire, appropriation and control, in 
these post-feminist, post-modern times in which boys/men are reclaiming the feminine, 
girls/women have no option but to do what Plato advised, and „become a man‟. That is, 
they must hide/erase their real sexual female self/body and attain the boyishly perfect 
form/function that promises (limited) imitative access to phallic subjectivities and 
identities.  
Failure to attain or maintain this perfect, pretend (prophylactic) self, and a consequent state 
of existential distress, is resulting in eating and associated disorders, as an inner, self-
adjudicated battle to control, punish, purify, desexualize, defeminize, and thus perfectly 
„re-form‟, the real ('Eve-il') sexual female self, as a means of subjective survival. This 
understanding resituates current discursive approaches to anorexia/bulimia as part of its 
pathogenic origin; resolution of these and associated existential (dis)orders requiring the 
metaphysical/social/discursive recognition of what Plato/Aristotle denied: a sexed, 
spirogenetic essence that is the source of persisting sameness and difference, fixity and 
fluidity, unity and plurality, and thus, of an essentially whole, subjective fe/male self that 
can only fully exist, develop, and be constructed within enduring bonds of unconditional, 
intersubjective recognition and love. It is within this spirogenetic model of human and 
worldly existence - as it frees patriarchal man from his forbidden, feared, feminizing, 
ho(m)mosexual desires - that I glimpse that long-sought Epicurean state of peace, 
contentment, and „ease‟.   
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Section I:                 Metaphysics, Essences, and Sexes 
 
                                                          Chapter 1 
  
                                        Metaphysics and its Discontents 
 
This thesis sets out to present a theoretical argument and empirical support for the 
seemingly counterintuitive proposition that philosophy is making us sick; or, more 
specifically, that our metaphysics is making us mentally ill. While I might like to claim this 
as a totally new and original idea, the possibility was in fact mooted around two and a half 
thousand years ago by the ancient Greek philosopher, Epicurus, who held the belief that 
our metaphysics determines our state of mind: a “correct” view of the nature of reality and 
human existence brings inner peace and tranquillity, an incorrect one, inner turmoil (cited 
in Diogenes, Bk.10, §24).  
 
For the ancient Greeks, an avid curiosity about (and desire to know and understand) the 
nature of worldly and human existence was fuelled by a more pressing need to know what 
in the world was real and enduring (and why), and what was not. According to skeptics 
such as Pyrrho, only if philosophers could correctly identify and separate the real from the 
illusory, and then correctly identify and define real things that have a definite, stable, 
knowable existence, could they ever hope to achieve an accurate and lasting knowledge of 
the nature of that reality. Therefore, for philosophers such as Plato who were wishing to 
counter the skeptics‟ claim that reality is indefinite, immeasurable, undecidable, and 
therefore unknowable, it was necessary to produce a metaphysics that would correctly 
identify and define a fixed, perceivable structure for reality, thus affirming the possibility 
of - and creating - knowledge of that structure. For only an accurate knowledge and 
understanding of human, worldly and cosmic existence would enable the correct 
explanation, prediction and thus control of natural phenomena, thereby removing fear of 
the unknown, and permitting man to happily exist within, interact with, and utilize his 
natural surroundings. And only if abstract entities such as „truth‟, „goodness‟ and „beauty‟ 
could be justifiably conceived as having a real, stable and enduring existence - and thus, a 
nature that was knowable and definable - might philosophers be in a position to formulate 
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and espouse universal moral principles and standards of „good‟ conduct and „right‟ living, 
with the goal of bringing happiness and contentment to all (Guthrie, 1967, p. 17, 90). 
Situated within this context, Epicurus‟ belief that a correct metaphysical account of reality 
was necessary for the successful and harmonious existence of the individual (and thus of 
the socius and polis) begins to make sense.  
 
Furthermore, Epicurus‟ philosophy appears to be as relevant to twenty-first century life 
and philosophical discourse as it was to the lives of the ancient Greeks. As the history and 
discoveries of Western science have shown us, it is through more clearly coming to know 
what, how and why animate and inanimate things exist, what is persisting and immutable, 
and what is transient and changeable, that we are, ideally, better placed to successfully 
interact with and therefore survive and flourish within the world at large. There is just one 
problem, however. As Australian philosopher John Bigelow (2006) laments, despite over 
two thousand years of discussion and debate, metaphysicians have yet to reach consensus 
on a correct metaphysics - whether it concern the general nature of reality, or the specific 
nature of human existence. Whether one is (like Anaximander) a monist that perceives the 
universe as being composed of only one substance, or (like Plato) a dualist who sees it as 
having both immaterial and material components; whether (like Heraclitus) one sees reality 
as being a state of constant flux or change, or (like Parmenides) a state of permanent and 
immutable sameness, modern continental and analytic philosophers have maintained and 
perpetuated the diverse range of seemingly irreconcilable metaphysical viewpoints that 
they inherited from the ancient Greeks.  
 
For example, Anaximander‟s monist view of the world and larger cosmos as primordially 
an infinite, indefinite mass of undifferentiated matter that he calls the “apeiron” (Guthrie, 
1967, p. 27), and that potentially contains the oppositional qualities (such as wet/dry, 
hot/cold) that gave rise to the physical universe, finds contemporary expression in the 
physicalist monism of Ullin Place and Jack Smart. Although Place and Smart focus on the 
relationship of the human mind and brain rather than the larger cosmos, their monism 
follows Anaximander‟s in reducing all things mental to the one physical origin. Place 
(1956, p. 47) uses reductionist analysis in his type-identity theory to assert that the material 
world is all that exists, since non-material entities such as mental processes are simply 
neural processes in the material brain. For Place, in the same way that lightening just is 
electric charges, mental processes just are - and will eventually be neurologically and 
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correlatively reduced to and explained as - physical processes. Smart (1963, p. 88) explains 
this monistic view of the relationship between physical and mental states in terms of 
Gottlob Frege‟s puzzle regarding the (difference in) meaning of the terms „Morning Star‟ 
and „Evening Star‟. In the same way that the Evening Star just is the Morning Star, with 
each term simply conveying a different sense of the same referent (Venus), so mental 
states just are physical states, with each state simply a different sense of the same referent - 
the brain. 
 
Plato‟s dualistic view of worldly and human existence, on the other hand, draws upon the 
Pythagorean idea of the cosmos as shaped and ordered by fixed forms and limits to posit a 
transcendent and eternal realm of perfect immaterial „Forms‟ or „Souls‟ as the one true and 
fixed reality; these Forms finding only imperfect, imitative expression in the transient 
physical world of corporeally confined beings. Thus, for Plato, soul and body are two 
distinctly separate ontological categories – transcendent soul (and mind) being superior to 
transient body, and neither one able to be reduced to the other (Guthrie, 1967). As with 
Anaximander‟s monism, there has recently been renewed interest in the dualistic 
metaphysics espoused firstly by Plato and later René Descartes, as demonstrated by the 
writings of David Chalmers. Chalmers (1996) asserts that, like space and time, 
consciousness is a fundamental component of universal and human existence, and so the 
conscious mind cannot be metaphysically reduced to or explained in terms of physical 
properties. He therefore argues that the reductive physicalist argument of Place and 
Smart‟s Identity theory - that the mind just is the brain and nothing more - leaves the 
mind/body problem unresolved, since there will always be an “explanatory gap” (p. 110) in 
any physicalist attempt to explain the properties (or qualia) of conscious mental states (e.g. 
perceptions, feelings) in terms of the physical properties of the brain and behaviour. There 
will also be a gap in any scientific attempt to explain how the mind affects the physical 
world, since non-material mental processes such as thoughts and colours just cannot be 
perceived or defined as neurobiological or physical entities (Mitchell, 2006, np.). Chalmers 
therefore looks to a science of consciousness that will construct “some new fundamental 
principles, to bridge the gap between neuroscience and subjective experience” (1998, np.).1  
 
                                                 
1
 Chalmer‟s notion of an explanatory gap is contested by Dennett, Jackson and others (see Alter & Walter,   
  2006).   
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This dualistic view of reality espoused by Plato (and later, Descartes and Chalmers) 
countered the metaphysics of Heraclitus (1979), who, in rejecting fixed forms of existence 
or knowledge, had no thought to divide human or universal reality into material and 
immaterial components. While Heraclitus took the monistic view that reality is 
underpinned and ordered by a universal “logos”, a material intelligence that is the 
fundamental organizing principle of the cosmos, notions of (Platonic) permanence and 
immutability of Form find no place in his metaphysics. In fact, the only thing permanent 
about Heraclitus‟ reality is its permanent state of flux or continuous change. For, as with 
the element of fire that symbolizes his view of the world, nothing stays still or the same 
from one moment to the next, the destruction of one thing enabling the creation of another. 
This constant change occurs due to the fact that all material things are composed of 
binarily opposed qualities that, in co-existing within the one thing, are always at war with 
each other, thus denying a fixed, singular form and nature to those things. However, while 
a river may be constantly flowing and thus always changing, this change is the basis of the 
river‟s ongoing existence. Hence, for Heraclitus, the constant flux of opposites (or 
contraries) is the source of life itself (Guthrie, 1967, p. 44). 
 
This belief that reality has no fixed form but is basically pure fluidity has persisted 
throughout two millennia of philosophical thought, and now finds contemporary 
expression within, for example, the deconstructionist thinking of Jacques Derrida, and the 
poststructuralist metaphysics of Judith Butler. Holding to his (Saussurean) structuralist 
roots that posit the interplay of difference as the source of identity and meaning, Derrida 
(1998) claims that the traditional metaphysical view of reality, subjectivity and language as 
having a fixed, singular, and immutable form has been falsely created and perpetuated by 
the logocentrically fixed, oppositional system of binary logic that has structured and 
constrained Western philosophical texts and concepts since the times and works of Plato 
and Aristotle. It is the dichotomous, hierarchical definition of such concepts as self/other, 
presence/absence, mind/body, good/evil, being/nothingness and male/female - in which the 
second term is simply a negative, devalued and excluded version of the first - that Derrida 
sees as falsely and forcibly imposing notions of logical singularity, fixity and determinacy 
on our metaphysical view of reality. He therefore works to disrupt the fixedly oppositional 
structure of metaphysics and language, and to reunite the binary terms into a “systematic 
play of differences” (1981, p. 27), by introducing a third or „hinge‟ term - that is, a term 
that is the „trace‟ or the „undecideable‟ origin of the other two - into the „excluded middle‟ 
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of every dualism. By working to deconstruct the reductive binary logic of our concepts and 
language, Derrida attempts to free up and enable metaphysical theory to view and represent 
reality, being and truth as always diverse, fluidly mutable and „impure‟ entities that 
therefore always defer the possibility of a fixed, singular and determinate knowledge and 
definition of these entities.       
 
Judith Butler (1990) draws on Derridean deconstructionist strategies in order to further 
contest and destabilize traditional humanist and feminist notions of reality and human 
subjectivity as naturally fixed, singular and enduring. She argues that sexed, gendered and 
sexual subjectivity and identity are being constantly produced and destabilized by multiple 
and often contradictory discourses which, through their repressive regulation of libidinal 
desires, construct multiple and always changing subjectivities and identities in every 
seemingly fixed and singularly subjective being. For Butler, any appearance of 
permanence and stability - whether of the immaterial mind or the (sexed) material body - is 
simply the illusory effect of the repetitive, performative enacting and thus “melancholic” 
incorporation of discursively produced, forbidden, and thus repressed (sexual) desires 
(ibid. p. 68). Mind, body and soul are therefore simply the fluid, mutable, discursive 
products or effects of “speech acts that bring into existence that which they name” 
(interview, Osborne & Segal, 1993). For Butler, then, as for Heraclitus, it is the logos 
(whether of discourse or the universe) that constantly constructs and deconstructs the 
material world within an unceasing flow of movement and change. 
 
It seems, then, that while the details may vary, the responses of modern and contemporary 
philosophers to the question: „what is the nature of reality?‟ continue to echo those of the 
ancient Greeks - not only in their content and diversity, but also in their seemingly 
irresolvable dissonance. For to hold a „monist‟ view of reality as either wholly material or 
wholly immaterial is, as Chalmers says, to reach an explanatory gap when attempting to 
reduce the non-material (mind) to the material (body) or vice versa. But to hold a „dualist‟ 
view is to reach a similar impasse when attempting to explain how two ontologically 
distinct and irreducible substances such as the immaterial mind (or soul) and the material 
body are able to connect and interact with each other. If, on the other hand, one views 
(material and/or immaterial) reality as a state of constant flux, with things always already 
becoming rather than being, then this view precludes the conceptual and symbolic 
recognition of any fixed form, and thus, any persisting sameness or identity of being within 
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living things. It also therefore denies the possibility of definite and enduring representation 
and knowledge of the real world, since things must have persisting form and properties if 
they are to be recognized, defined and represented, and thereby become the objects (and 
subjects) of true propositions, and thus, lasting knowledge. This view also overlooks the 
more fundamental question of how change and difference can occur and be perceived, if 
there is no underlying form of enduring sameness against which to measure them. 
Conversely, if one views reality as simply a single, eternal, determinately immutable, 
spiritual substance, then the correspondingly transient, illusory, mutable physical world of 
the senses still remains beyond the grasp of human knowledge, with all forms of 
enduringly same physical existence also denied symbolic representation and definition. 
Thus, despite over two millennia of debate, philosophers have yet to produce a 
metaphysical theory that supports knowledge of - and inclusively, coherently and 
accurately describes - the nature of human and worldly existence.   
 
Hence, if Epicurus was right about the power of metaphysics to beneficially or adversely 
affect our state of mind, then the widely varying and often contradictory contents of the 
philosophical canon would seem to have done very little over a very long time to create or 
foster a state of inner peace and tranquillity within the human psyche. And in fact, a closer 
look at certain metaphysical beliefs and concepts that have subsequently proved to be 
incorrect would suggest that some theories of the nature of human and worldly existence 
may actually have provided the historical and theoretical foundation and justification for 
extensive and ongoing degrees of turmoil and suffering - not only within the human psyche 
(mind), but also its soma (body).    
 
There are numerous researchers, for example, who make a correlation between states of 
psychological depression, dispiritedness and inner turmoil in women and indigenous 
peoples (e.g. New Zealand Māori and Australian Koori), and their hegemonic colonization, 
domestication and oppression by and within European patriarchal cultures (Friedan, 1965; 
Awatere, 1984; hooks, 1984).
2
 Betty Friedan, for example, writes of the depression and 
sense of futility - the suburban neurosis - experienced by the perfectly domesticated (white, 
middle-class) post-war American housewives who yearned for a paid job and a career “as 
                                                 
2
 According to Gramsci (1992), hegemony is the oppressive rule or dominance of one social, cultural or 
political group over another that is not simply imposed and maintained by force, but involves a degree of 
consent by the subjugated group, possibly through its inculcation with the beliefs, ideals and norms of the 
ruling group.    
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they ran the new electric waxer over the spotless kitchen floor” (1965, p. 16). Several 
feminist theorists have then related this oppression of women and minority groups to 
patriarchal language and metaphysical theories that have traditionally situated and defined 
the concepts „man‟ and „woman‟, and „white‟ and „black‟, in hierarchically opposed terms 
that privilege white men, and correspondingly objectify and degrade „women‟, „blacks‟ 
and all those perceived as different to the singularly (white) male subject. Aristotle‟s 
philosophy, for instance, that, 
 
It is the best for all tame animals to be ruled by human beings. For this is how they are 
kept alive. In the same way, the relationship between the male and the female is by nature 
such that the male is higher, the female lower, that the male rules and the female is ruled 
(Politica, 1254b 10-14) 
 
was seen by American first wave feminist, Matilda Joslyn Gage, as having provided the 
ontological basis and justification for the historic and ongoing social, political, religious 
and economic domination and oppression of women within patriarchal cultures. For, as 
Gage wrote in 1893, Aristotle‟s positioning of woman as inferior to man “was accepted by 
the church and all teaching of a contrary character declared heretical” (1980, p. 38). Thus, 
both Gage and American (second wave) feminist philosopher Mary Daly (1991) argue that 
the Christian church‟s subsequent characterization of woman as the source and 
(reproductive) transmitter of „evil‟ and „sin‟ in the world has provided the moral 
justification and the ecclesiastical and state sanction for numerous acts of physical and 
psychological violation, torture, mutilation and incarceration of women (and all things 
female) - whether they be witches, nuns, or simply the wives, mothers, daughters, nieces or 
sisters of men. 
 
It was Simone De Beauvoir (1953), however, who first correlated the social, political, 
religious and economic oppression of women with their philosophical conception and 
definition as the passive, irrational, sexually objectified „Other‟ of the autonomously 
active, rational, free-willed, and thus superior male „Subject‟. As De Beauvoir puts it, 
 
She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; 
she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is 
the Absolute – she is the Other. (p. 16)  
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For De Beauvoir, women‟s subjugation and related oppression are not the result of any 
natural or biologically determined inferiority, but rather, the result of the metaphysical 
definition and social construction of girls into passive, will-less, servile women, perceived 
and valued only as the sexual/reproductive object of male pursuit and possession. On this 
basis, it seems that man‟s traditional metaphysical definition as the wholly autonomous, 
self-determining „Subject‟ of language and philosophy may have served to justify and 
perpetuate (white, heterosexual) men‟s real domination and oppression not only of women, 
but of all those similarly defined as the inessential feminine „Other‟ - whether they be 
“Negroes”, “Jews”, “aborigines” (ibid. p. 17), Māori, homosexuals or otherwise. And if 
this is indeed the case, then it seems that a biased and thus incorrect metaphysical theory 
may have provided the theoretical justification for vast amounts of suffering and inner 
turmoil in women and minority groups, and as such, represents historical and theoretical 
support for Epicurus‟ correlation of an incorrect and thus distorting metaphysics to a 
disturbed and discontented mind. 
 
Other research suggests that it may be possible to extend this correlation between an 
incorrect metaphysics, oppression and a disturbed mind to account for the occurrence of (at 
least some) more severe mental disorders in women and minority groups. Several Māori 
mental health studies, for example, have indicated a strong link between various mental 
disorders experienced by Māori and their colonization and oppression by white European 
processes predicated on oppositional (Subject/Other) logic. A study by Liz Fenton and Te 
Wera Te Koutua (2000) suggests that, for Māori experiencing mental illness, reconnection 
with whanau (extended family) and wairuatanga (spiritual heritage) can set the foundation 
for recovery since “this foundation is missing because the traditional tribal nature of Maori 
culture has been gradually eroded by the effects of colonization and urbanization” (p. 10). 
The separation from traditional Māori ways and consequent “loss of identity” produced by 
cultural imperialism are thus seen as key elements in the causation and curing of disorders 
such as depression and drug/alcohol addiction. And, in the area of women‟s mental health, 
Phyllis Chesler (2005), for one, has proposed a causal link between schizophrenia and the 
“sex-role alienation” (p. 110) that most women experience when faced with familial or 
social pressures to adopt the submissive feminine sex role, especially if those pressures are 
imposed within tyrannically repressive and/or abusive environments (see also Szasz, 1961; 
Laing, 1975). These and similar studies suggest that the already postulated correlation 
between the disturbing, depressive effects of colonization/oppression and the „incorrect‟ 
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metaphysics that binarily defines women and Māori as the inferior, objectified „Other‟ may 
be extended to link at least some serious mental disorders to this illconceived metaphysics.  
 
It is on the basis of this reasoning that I wish to extend the Epicurean theme of this thesis 
to posit a direct link between a biased, confused metaphysics and some forms of mental 
'disorder', and conversely, between a coherent, inclusive metaphysics and mental „order‟. 
For, if it is indeed the case that an incorrect or inaccurate metaphysics is producing an 
inner or psychic disturbance that is at its extreme manifesting as mental disorder, then the 
search for an accurate metaphysical view of worldly and specifically human existence 
takes on a whole new meaning, import and urgency. To this end, then, I undertake (in 
Chapter 2) a genealogical and critical analysis of the metaphysical theories and concepts of 
various philosophers from ancient Greek times up to the present day, with the aim of 
exploring possible reasons and causes for the ongoing absence and elusiveness of a correct 
- or even a coherent - metaphysics. In Chapter 3, I then attempt to address what I identify 
as logical and conceptual inconsistencies or misconceptions within the works of these 
philosophers, in order to prepare the way for a rethinking of metaphysics, or what might in 
popular parlance be called a „metaphysical makeover‟. But before embarking on this 
genealogy, I will firstly narrow the historical and theoretical focus on what appears to be 
the main source(s) of our metaphysical discontent. 
 
The Metaphysical Muddle 
Within the philosophical canon there are several contentious issues that might be seen as 
contributing to this continuing lack of consensus on a „correct‟ metaphysics that gives an 
accurate and coherent account of reality as it is, and as we experience it. Along with the 
already cited dualist/monist, mind/body and fixed/fluid views of reality, the existence (or 
not) of God, the question of free will vs. determinism, and the nature of space and time are 
just some of the major issues that have been the cause and focus of longstanding 
metaphysical debate and disagreement. However, it is the doctrine of essentialism that has 
been one of the most enduringly and vigorously debated issues from the time and writings 
of Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle, right up to the more recent metaphysics of Wittgenstein, 
Foucault, Derrida and Kripke, along with the contemporary feminist essentialist/ 
constructionist debate, this issue continuing to shape and impede both traditional and 
feminist theories of reality, human subjectivity and language.  
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As mentioned earlier, Heraclitus believed that all things that exist within the spatio-
temporal world are always and only ever in a state of continuous flux; that is, they have no 
persistingly fixed, defined form or existence. Like fire, material reality is unbounded, and 
thus unknowable fluidity, movement and change. In contrast, Parmenides viewed reality as 
a single, eternally motionless and immutable being, able to be known and symbolically 
represented because of its enduring, unitary form and definition, but only via the mind‟s 
perception and abstract intellect - not the unreliable and illusory senses. Adopting this 
Parmenidean notion of an eternal, immutable reality, Plato nevertheless argued that, in 
order to be known and defined, reality could not just consist of a single, eternal, immutable 
sameness, but must also contain fixed forms of difference. For something to be known and 
identified as what it is, there must also be something that it is not. Hence Plato‟s - and later 
Aristotle‟s - formulation of dualistic models of reality and its representation is based on the 
premise that the existence and nature of earthly things and natural kinds is caused and 
determined by their essence - an immaterial, soul-like substance and generative principle 
that gives a fixed, unified, self-motivated form (and, for Aristotle, a self-actualizing, 
environmentally adaptive function) of being to otherwise inert, transient, fluidly chaotic 
matter. Further, the meaning or definition of the term representing a set of like things (or a 
natural kind) is fixed and determined by the essence and essential form and properties 
shared by those things, and distinguishing them from other, different things. Thus, explains 
Aristotle, “by „form‟ I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance” 
(Metaphysics VII, 1032b1), and “a definition is an expression indicating the essence of a 
thing” (Topics, VII, §5). 
 
This ancient essentialist belief that the nature of and relationship between things (and the 
meaning of the terms and propositions that represent them) is determined by their essential 
structure and properties finds contemporary expression in Ludwig Wittgenstein‟s early 
work. For example, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961), Wittgenstein describes 
reality and the thought and language that represent it as sharing the same logically fixed 
structure or form. But, where Plato and Aristotle locate that logical form within living 
things, for Wittgenstein, reality is a world “of facts, not of things” (TLP, 1.1), the existence 
and essential properties of things only relationally determined by their position within the 
same logical structure that underlies - and enables the truth possibility and thus the 
meaning of - all human languages. In saying that “the name means the object” (3.203), but 
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“only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning” (3.3), the Tractatus conceives 
an object as a dematerialized, textualized “mirror image” (6.13) that comes into existence 
as a result of the relational properties that are logically predicated of it. Hence, if we can 
decipher how names relate within the logical structure of a proposition, then we can know 
the essential properties of the worldly objects they represent. Since, for the Tractarian 
Wittgenstein, there are no logical objects (such as whole, physical beings or universal 
essences), logical propositions cannot describe the essential nature - the „What is it?‟ - of 
physical things; they can only show us how these things must be logically related and 
defined for language to picture reality in the way that Wittgenstein believes it does.  
 
Similarly, the anti-essentialist view of Heraclitus that things only ever exist in a state of 
fluid impermanence finds contemporary expression in the theories of modern and 
deconstructionist philosophers, such as Foucault (1972) and Derrida (1978), who have 
worked to free our understandings of reality, subjectivity and language from notions of 
(binary) logical fixity, singularity, and determinacy, in order to view subjectivity and 
meaning as always fluidly mutable and multiple. For these philosophers, as for the feminist 
philosophers and theorists (such as De Beauvoir [1953], Moi [1985] and Butler [1990]) 
who have identified essentialist notions of the supposed „natural‟ or „biological‟ inferiority 
of women as forming the basis and justification for their oppression, the term „essence‟ has 
become little more than a dirty word, and the espousal of essentialism a sign of 
philosophical regressiveness. Andrew Sayer (1997) goes as far as to suggest that 
„essentialism‟ has become “a term of abuse which silences or short-circuits arguments, 
being irredeemably tainted by association with racism and sexism” (p. 453). Toril Moi 
(1985a), for example, attacks and dismisses French philosopher Luce Irigaray‟s 
deconstruction and refiguring of traditional („phallogocentric‟) notions of human 
subjectivity on the basis of an alleged deployment of the same form of essentialist logic for 
which Irigaray has previously castigated dominant patriarchal (philosophical and 
psychoanalytic) discourses: 
 
Having shown that so far femininity has been produced exclusively in relation to the logic 
of the same, she falls for the temptation to produce her own positive theory of femininity. 
But, as we have seen, to define „woman‟ is necessarily to essentialize her. (p. 139) 
 
Moi interprets Irigaray‟s attempt to (re)conceptualize a specifically female subjectivity 
(based in and reflecting a specifically and explicitly female sexual morphology) as 
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evidence that Irigaray is simply perpetuating the same biologically essentializing and 
universalizing tactic that patriarchy has historically employed in its oppression of women, 
thereby impeding the poststructuralist refiguring of subjectivity, sexual identity and 
difference as always fluid and diverse. Adriana Caverero therefore appears to be accurately 
describing the experience of a late twentieth century feminist essentialist philosopher 
finding herself in social constructionist company when she says, 
 
[I]f she does not pronounce the magic word „multiple subjectivity‟, she will probably be 
attacked as an across-the-board antiquated, European, essentialist metaphysical thinker. 
Additionally, she knows that she will cut the sad figure of someone not prepared for the 
coming third millennium. (cited in Perpich, 2004, p. 393) 
 
However, (seemingly) essentialist philosophers and theorists have not just taken the 
bullets; they‟ve also fired some of their own. In response to the feminist poststructuralist 
de-essentializing of the female body, Germaine Greer protests that, in denying essentialism 
(whether biological or psychological) in order to claim equality, it seems that women have  
been rendered even more neutered, male-defined, and devoid of female identity than 
before: 
 
Actually I think there is something about being born with a double-x chromosome; I think 
there is something about being a maker of eggs instead of sperm…These constitute 
genuine differences. In the past they‟ve been considered as marks of inferiority. Now that 
you‟re not allowed to consider them as marks of inferiority, you‟re telling me that they 
don‟t signify anything at all. (Wardle, 1999) 
 
Thus, after more than two millennia of often vitriolic debate, whether it concern the nature 
of reality, human subjectivity or language, pro- and anti-essentialist philosophers are 
seemingly still no closer to resolving the problem of essence. Because this issue is so 
closely tied - if not foundational - to several other metaphysical quandaries (in particular 
the monist/dualist, mind/body, and freewill/determinism dichotomies), it appears that the 
notion of a fixed, determinate essence may be the primary obstacle in the ongoing search 
for a correct or accurate metaphysics. But if Plato viewed essence as the source of not just 
persisting sameness, but also difference of form, and if Aristotle originally conceived 
essence as the first cause of not just the unified form, but also the growth, development and 
movement of a living being, then how did the notion of essence come to imply only fixed, 
universal, immutable sameness? This shift in meaning appears to have begun with Plato 
and Aristotle‟s further and androcentric conception of essence as a purely immaterial, male 
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preserve; a conception that reflected the sexism of their patriarchal culture and times, and 
that impelled a trail of further misconceptions of essence, as pro- and anti-essentialist 
(male) philosophers have striven to justify knowledge(s), construct a coherent 
metaphysical theory, and thus retain control, of human and worldly existence.       
 
The explicit androcentrism that pervades the texts of Plato, Aristotle, and much of the rest 
of the philosophical canon has already been extensively documented and critiqued by a 
number of feminist philosophers (De Beauvoir [1953], Lloyd [1984], Fuss [1989], Irigaray 
[1991], Nye [2004]). While some of these philosophers view Platonic, Aristotelian and 
other canonical texts as only extrinsically and thus redeemably sexist (that is, the 
phallocentric bias can be removed without substantially altering the theories), others view 
the texts and their concepts and ideas as intrinsically sexist, and thus needing to be either 
rejected as irredeemable, or revised and reconceptualized in a gender-neutral or gender-
inclusive way (Witt, 1996). Adopting the latter position, I believe the notion of essence 
that we have inherited from Plato and Aristotle to be intrinsically phallocentrically biased, 
since this bias has distorted both our metaphysical understandings of the nature of essence, 
and all related meanings of the term „essence‟. This misconceived essence has then become 
the basis and justification for hierarchical, binarily reductive, and thus distorted 
metaphysical and linguistic representations and definitions of reality which, through their 
role in the construction of subjectivity, have served to disrupt - rather that assist - the 
development of subjective selfhood. For this distorted conception of essence and the 
(binary) structures of metaphysics and language that it underpins, in being based upon the 
lack of recognition and representation of a real, autonomously defined female essence (and 
therefore an essential component of subjective being) are - through their (de)construction 
of girls/women - resulting in the fragmentation and loss of the essential, subjective, female 
self. It is in this way, I believe, that the metaphysical foundations for the development of 
mental disorder in some women (and some men) are currently being laid down in the 
psyches of all Western girls/women (and men).
3
 It is on the basis of these metaphysical, 
linguistic and psychological consequences that I am seeing the phallocentric bias 
underpinning Platonic and Aristotelian understandings of essence as intrinsically sexist, 
and thus, unable to be simply neutralized without altering the structure and meanings of 
                                                 
3
 Explanation as to why only some girls/women might develop a mental disorder when the foundations are 
being laid down in all girls/women is presented in Section II.  
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essence, as well as those of the various philosophical, psychological and linguistic 
discourses it has informed. 
 
Thus, the main premise of this thesis is that the seemingly irresolvable dispute between 
essentialist and anti-essentialist philosophers is based on a metaphysical misconception of 
essence, which originated with Plato and Aristotle, and which has subsequently distorted 
and thus undermined Western philosophy‟s understandings of metaphysics, language and 
the development of human subjectivity. This misconceived notion of essence that underlies 
and has given rise to most (if not all) of the seemingly irresolvable „dualist/monist‟, 
„mind/body‟, „free will/determinism‟ and other debates that continue to divide and derail 
metaphysical discourse, has created a state of inner turmoil and discontent within the 
individual and collective human psyche that, in contemporary times, is manifesting as 
mental disorders such as eating and associated depressive, anxiety, and obsessive-
compulsive disorders. Hence, far from rejecting the (phallocentrically biased) 
Platonic/Aristotelian notion of essence, the aim of this thesis is to uncover and explore the 
origin, genealogy, method and nature of its historical and metaphysical (mis)conceptions; 
to then argue and gather empirical support for the existence of a female (as well as 
individual and species) essence; and finally, to reconceptualize the notion of essence from 
a non-phallocentric, non-binary, sexually differentiated perspective. For it is this 
reconceived essence that may then present the foundation for the construction of a „correct‟ 
- or at least a more inclusive and thus more accurate - metaphysical model of human and 
worldly existence, and thus, for a rethinking of currently dysfunctional models for the 
development, nature and knowledge of the subjective self. On this basis, a reconception of 
essence may hopefully present itself as the metaphysical and linguistic solution - and also 
preventative - for many forms of currently biomedically treated (but unresolved) mental or 
psychosomatic disorders. 
 
The immediate task, however, is to construct (in Chapter 2) a genealogy of various 
metaphysical theories of essence as firstly expounded by the ancient Greek philosophers, 
and as they developed within medieval and Enlightenment thought, and within 
contemporary analytic, continental, and postmodernist theories of reality, subjectivity, 
language and meaning. In this genealogy, I explicate the various pro- and anti-essentialist 
theories using the two notions of essence initially identified by Aristotle (1976) - and later 
reformulated by John Locke (1990) - as the real and the nominal essence. According to 
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Aristotle, the „real‟ (or ontological) essence is the active „soul-like‟ component that causes, 
persistingly forms, and motivates a living thing, thereby defining and actualizing its 
specific nature (or “thinghood”4), whilst the „nominal‟ (or linguistic) essence is the set of 
properties that fixes and determines the meaning of a (natural kind) term, and that thereby 
identifies and groups its worldly referents (as a species or genus, for example). The 
purpose of this genealogy is to provide an account of just how the Aristotelian notion of 
essence as a source of enduringly whole form, growth, movement, sameness and (species) 
difference came to so narrowly (and pejoratively) represent only a fixed, determinate 
sameness of being, with a view to then reconceiving essence in a form that may present the 
foundation for a coherent metaphysical model of human subjectivity.   
 
Having constructed this genealogy, in Chapter 3, I critically analyse and discuss the 
various perspectives on essence in order to gather and present theoretical support for the 
argument that, whether they be pro- or anti-essentialist, theories of metaphysics, language 
and subjectivity have always either explicitly or implicitly depended upon essentialist 
concepts, logic and definitions. Some form of real (and nominal) essentialism therefore 
seems to play a necessary role in our experiences, representations, and theoretical 
understandings of human and other worldly existence, this role reflecting Aristotle‟s 
doctrine that we initially perceive things as whole, unified forms rather than as jumbles of 
sense data. However, these theories have been distorted, undermined and also diametrically 
opposed by their unquestioned assumption and use of a phallocentrically biased 
misconception of essence as a fixed, oppositionally defined, fully determinative property 
of immutable and universal sameness. Therefore, by separating Aristotle‟s „real‟ essence 
from its history of phallocentric misconceptions, I argue for a reconception of essence as 
an originally and inseparably mindbody or „spirogenetic‟ entity that causes, determines and 
motivates the whole individual, species, and sexuate form, function, growth, and definition 
of a living being, thus enabling and co-operating with the sociolinguistic construction of a 
therefore essentially subjective, fixed but also fluid, autonomous but also relational self.
5
  
If this argument for a (non-phallocentric) re-conception of essence can be successfully 
achieved, then it becomes plausible to hypothesize that current sociolinguistic 
constructions of female selfhood, as shaped and generated by an underlying metaphysics 
                                                 
4
 See Sachs‟ (2006, §5) explanation of Aristotle‟s notion of „thinghood‟ as the organized, unified form of a 
living thing. 
5
 A full account of this sexed „spirogenetic‟ essence and essential self is presented in Chapter 3.  
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and language that deny a female essence, may be creating the disrupted, (di)stressed, 
psychosexual foundations for some kinds of psychosomatic disorder or „dis-ease‟.  
 
This hypothesis then forms the basis and justification for undertaking research into the 
nature and processes of development of the female self, and the development in some girls 
and women of the eating disorders anorexia and bulimia nervosa. The aim is to seek 
empirical support for the hypothesised existence of a real female, spirogenetic essence, and 
thus, an essentially whole, relationally subjective, female self that - through familial, social 
and discursive (de)construction - is becoming fragmented and lost to consciousness, 
thereby, and in the face of subjective non-existence, resulting in the occurrence of mental 
„disorder‟, as an ordered form of survival of that self. Thus, in Section II, Chapter 4 
focuses on the disorders anorexia and bulimia nervosa, as situated and explored within 
current biomedical, psychological, and feminist psychoanalytic and socio-cultural 
discourses, and critiques of their perspectives. Chapter 5 presents the theoretical and 
methodological basis for - and data from - research into the stages and processes of 
development of female selfhood, as they are shaped by familial, social and discursive 
influences, and as they may be related to the development of these eating disorders. 
Chapter 6 presents and interprets the results of this research within the theoretical 
framework constructed in Chapter 4, thereby providing answers to the questions: Is there 
empirical support for the existence of an originary spirogenetic essence and essential 
female self, the metaphysically and sociolinguistically imposed fragmentation and loss of 
which is creating the generalized psychosomatic foundations for the development of 
mental disorder in women? If so, what are some of the essential features of this originary 
self? And what are the further conditions under which this fragmentation of self may 
develop into recognized mental disorder? 
 
Chapter 7 brings together the philosophical argument for the recognition of a real essence 
within our experiences, representations, theories and knowledges of reality (Section I), and 
the empirical findings regarding the existence of a real female essence and essentially 
subjective female self (Section II), with a view to reconceptualizing essence from an 
impartial, sexually differentiated perspective. I then explore the implications of this 
reconceived „spirogenetic‟ notion of essence for our current understandings of 
metaphysics, language and meaning, and for current models of the nature and processes of 
development of subjectivity. In effecting a metaphysical makeover, I show how the notion 
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of a spirogenetic essence - through its reshaping of metaphysics and language - dissolves 
longstanding philosophical problems such as the essentialist/constructionist, mind/body, 
and freewill/determinism dichotomies. It also enables a reconception of the development of 
subjectivity as the spirogenetically based essentio-social (and thus inter-textual) 
construction of the psychosomatic self, and in so doing, this reconceived essence presents 
itself as the means to the uninterrupted and therefore successful attainment of sexed 
subjectivity, and thus, the elimination of some (if not many) forms of mental „dis-order‟.    
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                                                            Chapter 2 
 
                                               A Genealogy of Essence  
 
You use names for things as though they rigidly, persistently endured; yet even the 
stream into which you step a second time is not the one you stepped into before. 
(Nietzsche, 1996, p. 52) 
 
Although pre-Socratic thinkers such as Pythagoras and Parmenides had already conceived 
of reality and human „being‟ in terms of fixed, limited, persisting and unchanging forms, it 
is not until the writings of Plato and Aristotle that the notion of essence - or, in Greek, 
ousia - enters metaphysical theory as the soul-based entity or substance that „sub-stands‟ 
and thus unites, defines, and represents these immutable forms and qualities of being. This 
genealogy of pro-essentialist metaphysical perspectives will therefore begin with the 
works of Plato and Aristotle, while the classification of anti-essentialist perspectives will 
begin with Heraclitus‟ view of reality as unbounded fluidity. For it was partly as a response 
to this denial of a permanent, unchanging reality, and the consequent impossibility of 
attaining absolute knowledge of that reality (along with the impossibility of positing 
absolute moral principles to guide human behaviour) that Plato formulated his essence-
based theory of being (Guthrie, 1967, p. 87). 
 
 
                                              Pro-essentialist philosophers 
 
Plato 
Faced with the Heraclitean view of a mind-infused but formless, fluid material world of 
space and time that is therefore never the same or knowable from one instant to the next, 
Plato countered with his dualistic division of reality into fixed, immortal form and 
transient, changeable matter. In this view, true reality is found in a transcendent otherworld 
of perfect, immortal, immaterial, universal „Forms‟, the nature of which is fixed and 
determined by the unique essence or „ousia‟ of each Form of being (Sachs, 2006, §3). The 
immediate, physical world that appears to our senses is composed of a multitude of 
imperfect, ever-changing, material objects that are merely imitations of their corresponding 
Form, and that, as transient appearances, can never be the objects of universal knowledge. 
However, the essence of each immortal Form is not only the first principle or cause of that 
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soul/Form and its imperfect manifestations, but also fixedly delimits and defines them. It is 
therefore the essence or ousia of physical things that, in creating their stable, enduring, 
universal definition, presents Plato with the possibility of fixed truths and certain 
knowledge of reality. For the fixed definition of the essential Form of physical things also 
constitutes and thus fixes the meaning of the term that represents them, thereby enabling 
language to truthfully represent and describe the world. 
 
By conceiving reality in terms of transcendent Forms and base, unbounded matter, Plato 
also reconfigures earlier Greek ideas about the relationship of the rational mind to matter. 
Where Heraclitus had posited a universal logos as the rational principle underlying a 
fluidly mutable material world, Plato separates reason/logos from matter and relocates it 
within the immaterial mind. He then divides this rational, logical mind into two forms - an 
individual and a universal - giving the former a temporary existence within the human 
body, and the latter (as Logos) an immortal existence within the otherworld of perfect 
Forms (Lloyd, 1994, p. 4). In this way, Plato distinguishes and separates the rational mind 
(and its logical principles) from the world of transient matter, and associates it with the 
corporeally imprisoned, immortal soul. For it is only via the highest, most rational 
contemplations of the mind that man‟s soul may sublimate and transcend its physical 
desires and limitations, and thus perceive, know, and ultimately (re)unite with the 
netherworld of perfect Forms. It is this essence-based, dualistically divided view of reality 
that Plato hopes will counter Heraclitean fluidity, transience and thus agnosticism, and 
present the metaphysical grounds for positing a stable, permanent reality, absolute rational 
and moral principles, a true and lasting knowledge of these entities, and also, the 
possibility of immortality for those who realize perfect beauty, truth and goodness.      
 
Plato thus employs the „Allegory of the cave‟ (Republic, 1994) to explain the relationship 
of the transcendent world of fixed and perfect Forms to the lowly world of transient, 
sensible matter. Here he characterizes humans beguiled and held captive by their senses as 
prisoners within the darkened world that is their cave, who believe the fleeting, indistinct 
shadows on the wall to be the true reality, rather than the objects that are causing the 
shadows. To stay within the cave is therefore to remain ignorant of the true nature of 
reality. But to leave and walk outside into the sunlight is to realize that it is the objects and 
not their shadows that are truly real. Similarly, it is by utilizing their mind and higher 
intellect to rise above the darkened world of the senses and glimpse the sunlit world of 
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eternal Forms that enlightened men will realize the latter to be the true reality that is the 
enduring (and thus, knowable) cause of the fleeting (and thus, unknowable) world of the 
senses. Plato therefore exhorts men to come out of sensory darkness and into the 
intellectual sunlight, where they may come to know absolute truth, beauty and goodness. 
For it is only when one raises the transcendent, rational mind above the untrustworthy, 
irrational senses and perceives with the intellect the essential Form of „Man‟, for example, 
that the essential properties of its transitory particular - material man - can be known and 
defined, and thereby provide the fixed, universal and determinate meaning of the term 
„man‟.  
 
With this dualistic view of reality and language, Plato becomes the first philosopher to 
make a distinction between the definition of a non-linguistic entity that is (for him) the 
universal Form or Idea, and the definition of the linguistic term that represents that Form 
and its worldly instances (Witt, 1989, p. 36). True and lasting knowledge of reality (and 
particularly absolute beauty and goodness) can only be attained through the rational mind‟s 
perception (and recollection) of the non-linguistic, essence-based definition of perfect, 
universal forms, not through the „shadowy‟ and unreliable images and impressions of the 
bodily senses. Whilst Plato sees the physical body as capable of evincing great beauty, its 
deceptive sense perceptions and distasteful, lustful desires ultimately render that body a 
hindrance to the higher pursuits of the inspired, wisdom-seeking soul temporarily 
imprisoned within it. As the „wisewoman‟ Diotima is reported to say in the Symposium 
(1951, p. 95), 
 
What may we suppose to be the felicity of the man who sees absolute beauty in its 
essence, pure and unalloyed, who, instead of a beauty tainted by human flesh and colour 
and a mass of perishable rubbish, is able to apprehend divine beauty where it exists apart 
and alone? 
 
For Plato, then, it is through the rational control and sublimation of one‟s unruly senses, 
(sexual) desires and inclinations that man may free his mind to engage in the intellectual 
pursuit, recollection and exchange of knowledge of the real, immaterial, ousiatic (or 
essence-based) world, and thereby attain the ultimate goal of the soul‟s beatific vision of - 
and divinely immortalizing union with - pure wisdom, beauty and goodness.   
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However, Plato does not just confine essences to the immortal, immutable world of souls 
and their perfect Forms of being. As the following passage from the Timaeus reveals, he 
also conceives them as the sole preserve of men: 
         
It is only males who are created directly by the gods and are given souls…In this 
situation, obviously it is only men who are complete human beings and can hope for 
ultimate fulfilment; the best a woman can hope for is to become a man. (90e)  
 
Plato thus associates men and maleness with the essential soul, its rational mind and 
certain knowledge (of its perfect Form), and women and femaleness with soulless, fluidly 
formless (and thus ignorant, unknowable) matter that must depend on man‟s Form for any 
definable, knowable existence (Timaeus, 50d). Whether she is the material aspect of that 
form, or (poorly) imitates its masculine shape and functions, Plato sees the female as 
simply a defective, deformed male.
6
 This sexual characterization and division of 
metaphysical and moral properties is something that Plato inherited from the Pythagoreans 
who associated maleness with light, unity, limit and goodness, and femaleness with 
darkness, plurality, the unlimited, and the bad (Guthrie, 1967, p. 36). However, it is not 
until Plato‟s metaphysical theory and its privileging and exclusive correlation of man with 
transcendent soul/Form that woman comes to be pejoratively conceived as base, 
unbounded, sensually uncontrolled, perishable matter. Denied her own essentially whole, 
enduring Form, „woman‟ is therefore metaphysically denied the capacity to exist and be 
ontologically (and thus, linguistically) defined and known on her own terms, or to know 
for herself the highest truth, beauty, goodness – and also love – that is the aspiration and 
domain of the immortal soul. Thus, when Plato equates the logical definition of the Form 
of a thing with the logical meaning of the linguistic term that represents it, he cannot be 
referring to female things. And when he writes in the Symposium (1951) of the „Love‟ that, 
in its highest form, is the cosmic principle that impels and unites human minds in their 
sublimation of base, physical urges, and the intellectual pursuit of divine wisdom, it is and 
can only be the homosexual
7
 love of and between the minds and bodies of men to which he  
                                                 
6
 In Plato and Sex (2010), Stella Sandford argues that Plato sees sex difference as ontologically equivalent to 
other differences (e.g. long-haired/short-haired men) and therefore not a primary consideration with regard 
to the work capacities of men and women. But it is only because he denies a soul to woman, and casts her 
as a lesser male, that the category of sex then becomes unimportant to Plato, as to those after him.   
7
 In its ancient Greek context, the term „homosexual‟ refers not to the modern identity of a man (or woman) 
as defined in mutually exclusive and pejorative opposition to the term „heterosexual‟, but to the highest 
form of physical and intellectual love (Eros) seen as possible only between noble men, and that, for Plato, 
inspires the common philosophical search for the beatific vision of divine wisdom. 
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is referring. Women, being devoid of an essential soul and rational mind, and thus, of the 
power to transcend physical desires, are (like animals) capable only of a base, physically 
sexual, procreative form of love, as opposed to the spiritually sexual, moral and intellectual 
procreativity that is possible only through the supreme love and „marriage‟ of and between 
the noble minds of men (p. 91). Because he conceives woman as dark, deceptive, soulless, 
formless matter ruled by uncontrollable appetites and desires, and as therefore undefinable, 
unknowable, and symbolically unrepresentable, Plato‟s metaphysics can by definition only 
be about the nature of men and all things (wholly or defectively) male. But, if this is the 
case, then why did he describe the woman Diotima as „wise‟, and especially in matters of 
higher love?  It seems, then, that within Plato‟s metaphysical denial of essence to woman, 
and its consequent conception as a purely immaterial, male preserve may lie the seeds of 
misconception, not only of essence, but also of (paradoxical)
8
 woman; seeds that find 
fertile ground for germination in the thoughts and works of Aristotle.  
 
Aristotle 
Where the main purpose of Plato‟s philosophizing was to argue the possibility of 
knowledge of absolute goodness, right conduct, and therefore, of man‟s ultimately 
transcendent attainment of happiness, Aristotle believed that happiness came with 
knowledge and the fullest (material) actualization of one‟s essential form and purpose. He 
therefore adopted the ideas of his teacher Plato, but then modified them to bring the 
Platonic real world of perfect Forms (and our knowledge of it) into closer relation with the 
natural world of living things. For whilst Aristotle agreed with Plato that things in the real 
world have a definite form that enables humans to achieve a true and lasting knowledge of 
their essential being, his greater interest and concern was to know what causes physical 
objects and natural kinds to exist, to persist identically throughout the changes in their 
existence, and therefore, to be knowable. It was therefore necessary to have a metaphysics 
(and system of reasoning) that would support the possibility and attainment of knowledge 
of the immediate, natural world as perceived by the senses. But Plato‟s netherworld of 
eternal, universal forms did not recognize, and so could not account for, any form of 
persisting, unchanging, and therefore knowable being in the physical, sensible world. For 
what the Platonic dualistic theory could not explain was: i) how the transcendent, 
immaterial Forms might cause or otherwise relate to their physical counterparts; and ii) 
                                                 
8
 This paradox dissolves as the genealogy unfolds. 
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how these immutable Forms might account for the phenomena of persisting unity and 
identity, but also change and motion, that characterize the physical world (Guthrie, p. 128). 
Aristotle therefore looked within - rather than outside of - the physical, sensible world for a 
source of enduringly identical, definite form that would not just confirm the possibility of 
(and enable) certain knowledge of the nature of worldly things and natural kinds, but more 
importantly, offer a coherent causal account and definition of their fixed, persisting and 
identical, but also changeable, motile and adaptable form of being.   
 
Rather than conceiving the real world in terms of transcendent „Forms‟ of which physical 
objects are simply fleeting and imperfect imitations, Aristotle (1994) redefined reality as 
the proximate physical world of living and non-living things, in which body and soul 
continue to be two separately and differently constituted entities, but in which - contra 
Plato - these entities are now united as two parts of the one composite (soul/body) being or 
substance. For Aristotle, it is the soul-like essence of a living thing that provides 
enduringly whole, same, definable and knowable form and function to its otherwise inert, 
unlimited, and thus unknowable matter, thereby enabling that thing to be, become and be 
known and defined as the particular kind of thing that it is. While positing roughly ten 
different categories of being - “Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, 
State, Activity, Passivity” (Topics, I, §9) - it is the category of essence that is, for Aristotle, 
the first principle or cause of, and thus prior to, all the other categories that are predicated 
of it. For, as he says in Metaphysics VII (1994), 
 
Being is said in many ways…for in one way it indicates the “what is it” and an 
individual, and in others it indicates a quality or a quantity or one of the other things that 
are predicated as these are. While being is said in all these ways, it is obvious that 
primary among these is the “what is it,” the very thing which indicates the substance. 
(1028a10-15)        
 
It is the essence that primarily and persistingly shapes and determines the substantial form 
or “thinghood” (Sachs, 2006, §5) of every living thing, and it is the definition of this 
essence that therefore constitutes the answer to the question “What is it?” Thus, while the 
essential nature of a substantial thing may be partly perceived and defined in terms of the 
variously categorized essential properties predicated of it (e.g. two legs, brown etc.), the 
essential form (i.e. a man) that unifies, integrates, and motivates its being is seen as 
separate from, ontologically and epistemically prior to, and always in excess of these 
properties. The essential form - the “what it is” - precedes any quality or quantity - the 
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„how it is‟ - that may be predicated of it (Smith, 2000, §7.3). For it is the essential unity (or 
integrated wholeness) of form of a being that identically persists while accidental 
properties change, and that „holds together‟, organizes, and (re)shapes its essential 
properties (along with their definition) in a determinate and relational way. The essential 
form of a composite substance therefore enables it to have a unity and integrity of being 
that, in causing it to persist through time and change, allows it to be perceived, defined and 
known as a particular individual - an enduringly whole being that stands apart from, and 
maintains a fixed identity within, its everchanging surroundings (Sachs, 2006, §9).  
 
In saying that the essence of a composite thing is the cause of its persistingly whole, 
identical, integrated, and definable form of being, Aristotle is not, however, implying a 
form that is inactive or unchanging. In the same way that a house becomes dilapidated if 
not actively maintained, so is essential being a process of constant activity; a thing must 
always actively maintain itself in order to simply keep on being the very same thing that it 
is. The essence of a thing is therefore not only its first but also its efficient cause - the 
„prime mover‟ that impels the maintenance, growth and functional movement of its 
integrated form. This actively persisting form then becomes the enduring platform for the 
changes that Aristotle sees as necessarily occurring within a thing, due to the constant 
competition between opposite and fluidly mutable states of the qualities, quantities or other 
essential categories of predication (e.g. variations in colour, size and location).  
 
Aristotle‟s essence or first principle of being therefore has primarily an active, causal and 
definitional role, and only secondarily a classificatory role, in the nature and definition of 
living things. In this way, he maintains Plato‟s distinction between the definition of the 
real, non-linguistic essence or form of a living thing, and the definition that signifies the 
linguistic meaning of the term that represents it. However, where Plato sees non-linguistic 
definitions as referring to perfect, universal Forms, Aristotle‟s non-linguistic definitions 
refer to the whole essential form - and also function - of the individual being (or composite 
substance). And his linguistic definitions may be based on this whole form, on (one or 
more) universal essential properties used to classify species into genera or other phyla, or 
else, on properties defined in relation to the perspective and interests of others, rather than 
the essential nature of the thing itself (Witt, 1989, p. 36). In the latter case, the linguistic 
definition of a thing or substance may bear little resemblance to its real essence-based 
definition. It is this distinction between ontological and linguistic definitions that has 
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produced the two most common philosophical understandings of essence - as a „real‟ or 
„biological‟ essence, and as a „nominal‟ or „linguistic‟ essence; understandings which have 
then shaped and informed the discourses of metaphysics and language from Aristotelian 
times to the present day.   
 
In reconceiving essences as existing within the physical body, rather than in an ethereal 
otherworld of Forms, Aristotle raises the bodily senses and desires from their lowly, 
distasteful Platonic status by enabling physical sensations to be more closely related to the 
psychical perceptions, intuitions and thought processes of the immanent, rational 
soul/mind. No longer a hindrance to the attainment of scientific knowledge of the real 
world, the bodily senses are, for Aristotle, the direct observational means by which sensory 
information about the nature of other individual beings may be gathered and then, through 
deductive and inductive reasoning, transformed into universal definitions and principles of 
essential being. To gain knowledge and understanding of the intrinsic nature of a living 
thing is therefore a matter of intuitively grasping and then creating a logically structured 
definition of its essential form and function, based on the (repeated) observation of its 
substantial form and its categorical and self-actualized ways of being, functioning, and 
relating. It is Aristotle‟s logical categories and principles of being and predication (such as 
the laws of „non-contradiction‟ and „excluded middle‟) that determine what can be validly, 
truly and universally said or predicated of the essence of a thing (or its species), as the 
object of scientific observation and knowledge (Smith, 2000).         
 
A further distinctive feature of Aristotle‟s notion(s) of essence is that, while Plato‟s ousia 
or essence causes and defines not only an individual but also a universal form of being (for 
example, the one, transcendent Form of „beauty‟ which is also universally predicated of 
many subjects), traditional interpretations of Aristotle‟s ousia have defined it as only a 
universal or species essence (such as the essence of „man‟ or „horse‟, for example), and not 
an individual essence. As such, its primary function would be to classify and group all 
organisms sharing a particular essential property into species or other genera. However, 
Charlotte Witt (1989) disputes this interpretation, arguing that, because he defines essence 
as the first cause or principle of substantial being, and therefore as prior to the universal 
properties that are always predicated of and cannot exist separately from (or prior to) that 
substantial being, Aristotle‟s essence cannot primarily be a universal property that is 
predicated of and thus unites and classifies the members of a species. It is, in the first 
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instance, an essence that causes, unifies, motivates and defines the individual as a 
persistingly same (but also changing) composite substance, and, in doing so, also 
determines its “species-membership” (p. 175). Further, in response to the argument that 
Aristotle characterizes definitions as not only statements of essence, but also as being 
intrinsically shared by more than one individual, and therefore, as definitions of the 
universal, Witt claims that there is nothing in Aristotle‟s theory that precludes an 
individual definition - such as the definition of the essence of an individual human being - 
from also being the shared, universal definition of any number of human beings (p. 174). 
 
Whilst there may be contention as to whether Aristotle‟s notion of essence is an individual 
or universal essence
9
, one aspect of his theory that can generally be agreed upon is that a 
real Aristotelian essence or form does not cause, inhabit, or motivate the female body. For, 
as well as adopting Plato‟s distinction between the definition of the nature of a non-
linguistic item and the definition that is the meaning of the linguistic term representing it, 
Aristotle adopts and perpetuates the Platonic assumption that essences - be they individual 
or universal, human or animal - are a male preserve. Thus, according to Aristotle, only men 
have an essential soul/form that causes, determinately unifies, shapes, and thus defines 
them as human, as men, and as individuals; women are simply the deformed, undeveloped 
matter that provides the nurturing substrate (or matrix) for the planting, germination and 
actualization of man‟s seed, and thus, his essence. For, as he states in On the Generation of 
Animals (1953), 
 
Now a boy is like a woman in form, and the woman is as it were, an impotent male, for it 
is through a certain incapacity that the female is female…what the male contributes to 
generation is the form and the efficient cause, while the female contributes the material 
(§20)…the female is as it were a deformed male. (§25)  
 
Denied a self-subsisting self-motivating soul/essence of her own, woman (like universal 
properties) cannot have her own, independently defined cause, form or existence. She can 
therefore exist, be defined, and known only as the germinal, material properties or aspects 
of man‟s essential form. Thus, if the transcendent aspect of man‟s soul is male, then its 
(boyish) immanent, material aspect is female. It is on this basis that the term „woman‟ 
comes to be defined only in fixed, posterior, inferior, and asymmetrical opposition to the 
term „man‟, „woman‟ representing the passive, submissive material properties of man‟s 
                                                 
9
 This confusion and apparent contradiction is addressed in Chapter 3. 
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essential being, and thereby installing „man‟ as the sole whole, dominant, active, rational 
subject. Thus, if „man‟ has the (whole) form and identity of „A‟, then „woman‟ is his  „~A‟; 
that is, the defined, controlled, proper „not A‟ or „not-man‟ that fixedly constitutes the 
immanent ousia of „A‟. If „man‟ as „A‟ has the (masculine) property of activity, for 
example, then „woman‟ as his „~A' represents (feminine) passivity. In this way, 
Aristotelian logic denies woman an independently caused, unified, and self-motivated form 
of existence that would allow her to be defined and known in and on her own terms 
(Haslanger, 2007, §4). 
 
Aristotle‟s denial of a real essence to woman further problematizes Witt‟s reading of 
Aristotelian real essences as ontologically primary, and as identical to and defined by the 
universal. For only if there is no sex-based distinction and characterization of the real 
causal essence (man) can it be conceived as: i) an indivisible unity that is thus 
ontologically and epistemically prior and identical to the universal species-essence 
(human), and ii) causative and definitive only of ontological sameness, and not also of 
sex/individual difference. It seems, therefore, that Aristotle‟s conception of essentially 
whole, generational form as an immaterial male preserve, and the consequently 
hierarchical, asymmetrical definition of the ontological natures of man and woman, may be 
the (logical) source of the misconception of essence that I have hypothesized as 
underpinning and disrupting Western metaphysics. However, further exploration and 
discussion of this possibility will be left until Chapter 3, in order to firstly chart the 
historical and theoretical development of three significant features of essence as it figures 
in Aristotle‟s metaphysics. These are - i) the distinction between a „real‟, ontologically 
causal, unifying and determinative essence and definition, and a „nominal‟ or classificatory 
essence and definition which unifies and groups organisms on the basis of shared essential 
properties; ii) the idea that an essential wholeness and persisting sameness of form is a 
necessary condition for existence, movement and change to (be perceived to) occur, and to 
be known; and iii) the idea that truth and knowledge about the essential nature of real, 
physical beings comes to us via the sense-based, intuitive perception and psychic 
representation of their essentially whole, universally same form and function. In now 
turning to the metaphysics of St. Augustine of Hippo, I follow the historical development 
of these key features of the notion of essence. 
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St. Augustine 
 
My form wasted away, and I became corrupt in thy eyes, yet I was still pleasing to my 
own eyes--and eager to please the eyes of men…Still I did not keep the moderate way of 
the love of mind to mind - the bright path of friendship. Instead, the mists of passion 
steamed up out of the puddly concupiscence of the flesh…and they so obscured and 
overcast my heart that I was unable to distinguish pure affection from unholy desire. 
(Confessions, Bk 2, Ch I-II) 
 
As a fourth-century medieval Neo-platonist philosopher, and as a Catholic theologian 
wishing to merge some of the concepts and ideas from Greco-Roman philosophy with 
those of the Judeo-Christian scriptures, Augustine played a key role in introducing Plato‟s 
essentialist metaphysics - as well as the associated sexism - into the biblical scriptures and 
teachings of the Catholic Church. And the main vehicle for the metaphysical and 
theological explication of Augustine‟s version of Platonic essentialism was his 
interpretation of the Genesis story of Creation and the associated (Pauline) doctrine of 
„Original Sin‟ (Mendelson, 2000). 
 
Like Plato, Augustine was mainly concerned with issues of morality, more particularly, the 
notions of good and evil, and how mankind might come to know, control and overcome the 
latter and thus live a good and consequently contented, happy life. He initially turned to the 
metaphysical beliefs of the Manicheans, who conceived of reality in materialist dualism 
terms of a dark, physical force of evil with the power to overcome and imprison the good 
spirit or soul that is composed of particles of light. Disillusioned with this rigorously 
inadequate view of reality that offered little cause for hope that the force for good might 
ultimately prevail, Augustine found both rigour and hope in Plato‟s dualistic view of 
reality and absolute goodness, and also the Judeo-Christian belief in a perfect, omnipotent, 
all-knowing, immaterial God who created the universe and mankind to follow His will, and 
therefore, to be always good, just and purposeful. The appeal of an original, transcendent, 
intentional and authoritative spiritual being that creates and directs man to do only good 
led Augustine to give the Christian God priority over Plato‟s multiplicitous world of Forms 
and their imperfect material manifestations that must strive for knowledge of divine 
goodness through the rational contemplation of (firstly physical, but ultimately divine) 
beauty. For Augustine, it was not enough to think that the powers of reason and higher 
intellect could overcome (and avoid the dangers of) lustful sensual appetites and lead the 
souls of noble men to divine wisdom and immortality. Because a man can choose to act in 
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ways that he knows to be either good or bad, to make the choice to transcend one‟s bodily 
desires (and especially those for „forbidden fruit‟) is, for Augustine, more a case of will 
than of reason. He therefore works to integrate the notions of divine necessity, 
immutability and immortality so vital to the Platonic conception of a logically fixed 
knowledge of reality and goodness with the biblical notions of an authoritative God, 
justice, and divine/human will, along with the failing of will that brings the Fall (and 
possibly the graceful redemption) of the human soul (Mendelson, 2000, §1-5).  
 
In constructing his monotheistic metaphysics, Augustine draws upon Plato‟s dualistic 
distinction between the metaphysically and morally superior, intelligible soul/mind (or 
form) and transiently unintelligible sensible body (or matter), and his assertion of an 
isomorphism between the ontological structure of the (intelligible) world, and the logical 
structure of language. But Augustine also draws on Aristotle‟s metaphysics in positing a 
unitary, thinking God as the ultimate and eternal unity from which all Ideas and living 
beings originate, and in viewing the immaterial soul and material body as two integrated 
components of that one larger reality. However, where Plato and Aristotle perceive the 
soul/essence as the ontologically basic, perfect and immutable cause of the persisting form 
and existence of a living (male) being, for Augustine, it is God - as the origin and creator 
of human souls - that is the ontologically basic being, and as such, the only being to 
possess a perfect, immortal, and immutable essence. For, while the human soul is 
potentially immortal, it is also mutable and therefore capable of being transformed by acts 
of moral goodness or sinfulness. The soul is also conceived as the dominator and ruler of 
the body, and as having entered the body of its own (sinful) volition rather than, as Plato 
suggests, being necessarily imprisoned within it until achieving divine wisdom and release 
from the cycle of reincarnation. Augustine also follows the first century Alexandrian 
philosopher, Philo, in conceiving the soul as having not only a rational mind, but also a 
will and, as its lower, „female‟ aspect, the capacity of sense perception. As Genevieve 
Lloyd explains, it is not a rational or sensory defect, but rather, a weakness of and “loss of 
control” by the will - caused by the mind‟s tempting (feminine) sense perceptions and 
unruly, lustful desires - that brings the Fall of man‟s soul, as recounted in Augustine‟s 
account of the doctrine of Original Sin (1984, p. 33).  
 
It is in this part of the Genesis account(s) of God‟s creation of the earth, its plants, animals, 
and also man that Augustine takes the Platonist and Aristotelian conceptual degradation of 
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the nature of woman - as devoid of soul, ignorant and thus inferior to man - to a literal, and 
thus more damaging, level. For it is a woman in the form of Eve who is first tempted to 
submit to Satan, then similarly tempting Adam to disobey God‟s will and taste the 
forbidden satanic flesh, thereby coming to know both good and evil. Because God 
punishes Adam by thereafter denying him access to the tree of life, it is Eve‟s sin that 
causes the fall of Adam‟s soul from its previous state of divine goodness and immortality 
to a state of wretched mortality, destined thereafter to be constantly tempted by the senses 
and tormented with lust for the „forbidden fruit‟ that is Satan‟s phallus.10 It is „woman‟, 
therefore, who suffers the guilt and shame of bringing sin into the world, a sin thereafter 
involuntarily transmitted to her offspring through the act of procreation, thereby 
predestining men‟s souls to be innately sinful. As Augustine laments, his most grievous sin 
was that: “I polluted the spring of friendship with the filth of concupiscence and I dimmed 
its luster with the slime of lust” (Confessions, Bk 3, Ch 1). He therefore looks to the 
baptismal forgiveness and cleansing of original sin, the Eucharistic (re)union with the 
purifying flesh of Jesus, along with the Platonic pursuit of absolute truth, beauty and 
goodness, to provide the means by which the souls of men may escape Adam‟s fall to the 
(narrowly perceived) physical world of self-rule, sin and mortality. The initial optimism 
afforded by these redemptive strategies fades in Augustine‟s later writings, however, as he 
comes to realize that the universality of original sin dooms the vast majority of humanity - 
the „massa damnata‟ - to a weakened will that (through its separation from Godliness) is 
ultimately unable to overcome its loathsome lusts, and therefore destined to make choices 
that can only ever be more or less sinful (De Civitate Dei, 1972, XXI, 12).  
 
What is significant about Augustine‟s Creation and Fall of Man, is that Eve‟s sin in 
disobeying God, tasting the forbidden fruit, and then tempting Adam does not result in her 
own banishment from God‟s realm and loss of immortality (of soul), as befalls Adam. 
Could this be because Augustine, like Plato, Aristotle, and Philo before him, perceives 
Eve/woman as possessing no soul/essence of her own? Augustine‟s ontological 
pronouncement - that only through her relation to Adam can Eve be said to be made in the 
image of God - suggests this to be the case. The nature of man is Godlike with or without 
woman, but the nature of woman can be Godlike only through her (appropriated) relation 
                                                 
10
 This interpretation of the „forbidden fruit‟ as Satan‟s phallus draws upon the Sanskrit term „phala‟ meaning 
„fruit‟, with the Eucharist representing the divine Phallus (and seed/Logos) that restores and immortalizes 
man‟s soul (Beattie, 1999); this interpretation consistent with the Sanskrit term „linga‟ meaning „phallus‟, 
„word‟, or „sign‟.  
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to man (Lloyd, 1984, p. 30). Thus, it seems that, through his Creation story, Augustine 
dualistically conceives and defines Eve/woman as either the good, chastely subdued, 
material „property‟ of Adam/man‟s soul, or the evil, disobedient, lustful aspect that, in 
luring him from the (enforming) phallic Word of God to the (deforming) phallic flesh of 
Satan, brings imperfection and death to that once perfect soul. If this is the case, then, 
when these philosophers use the terms „woman‟ and „female‟, they cannot be referring to 
an actual, autonomously defined, essential being, but only symbolizing and characterizing 
the lower physical, sensual and sexual aspects of an exclusively male soul; aspects that 
Augustine sees as practically necessary and useful, but also able to incite lust for depraved 
and forbidden bodily pleasures, and therefore needing to be wilfully controlled, punished, 
and subdued.  
 
Hence, when Philo describes the male/female elements of the human soul in allegorical 
terms of the Judaic law that forbids an insubordinate woman from clasping the genitals of 
her husband‟s adversary, saying,  
 
There is in the soul a male and a female element just as there is in families, the male 
corresponding to the men, the female to the women. The male soul assigns itself to God 
alone as the Father and Maker of the Universe and the Cause of all things. The female 
clings to all that is born and perishes; it stretches out its faculties like a hand to catch 
blindly at what comes in its way, and gives the clasp of friendship to the world of created 
things with all its numberless changes and transmutations, instead of to the divine order, 
the immutable, the blessed, the thrice happy (Special Laws, 1929, III, XXXII) 
 
it can be only to a man‟s soul that he is referring when he symbolizes its lowly, sexually 
transgressive element as female. For Philo seemingly cautions man against allowing the 
unruly, sensual, female element of his soul to be drawn to and “take hold of…the 
[forbidden] symbols of procreation and generation” of another man (ibid.). The notions of 
woman and female are being utilized here to signify the untrustworthy sensual element or 
property, both of physical man, and of the God-like soul that can be his alone, and, as such, 
can have nothing to do with an actual, sexual, female being. Similarly, when Augustine 
divides the soul into a dominant, rationally contemplative, male force, and an obedient, 
practically reasonable (but also sexual) female force (Lloyd, p. 29), it can only be the 
properties of a man‟s soul to which he is referring when he oppositionally and 
subordinately characterizes the reasonably practical - but ultimately fatally seductive - 
sensual, sexual element of the mortal soul as „female‟. Hence, as indicated in the 
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epigraphic allusion to Augustine‟s friendships with men, it is a man‟s lust, not for the 
(given) female, but for the forbidden male form that is incited by the submissively 
feminine, sensual element of his soul, and that, in overpowering the will, inevitably brings 
the depraved downfall and death of men, and the eternal suffering of their hell-bound 
souls. For, as „the love of mind to mind‟ descends into a state of „unholy desire‟, man 
„falls‟ into the formless, fluidly feminized, abyssal realm of unspeakable, uncontrollable, 
and thus insatiable desires, as  
 
that vision of eternal things is…withdrawn from the [mind‟s masculine] head himself, 
eating with his spouse that which was forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is gone from 
him. (De Trinitate, 1887, XII, 8)    
 
The „female‟ therefore serves a double purpose in symbolizing not only the lowly sensual 
aspect of men‟s souls, but also the state of irredeemable sinfulness and depravity inhabited 
by all those whose nature it is to be, or who become through weakness of will, devoid of a 
male-dominated and restrained, God-loving, God-fearing soul.    
 
Thus, where Plato denies actual women an essence, and has woman and the female 
symbolize the base, physical, sensual body (to be ultimately transcended if spiritual love is 
to raise men‟s souls to the higher realm of divine wisdom and immortality), Augustine‟s 
philosophical and religious synthesis perpetuates this denial of a female soul/essence, but 
does so by subjugating and imprisoning the symbolic, sensual „female‟ within the soul and 
mind of man. I say „imprisoning‟ because, in making Eve/woman the sinful element of 
Adam/man‟s soul that fatally lures him to the forbidden pleasures offered by the phallic 
serpent, Augustine utilized the combined forces of Platonic philosophy and Judeo-
Christian scripture to cast real, sexual woman into an abyss of guilt, shame, punishment 
and oppression so severe that, despite the two thousand years since, she has yet to escape.  
 
René Descartes 
             
What is sought here is the proper stance for mind to insure the reception of truth and the 
conception of science. To receive God‟s truth, the mind must be pure and clean, 
submissive and open – it must be undefiled and female. Only then can it give birth to a 
masculine and virile science. That is, if the mind is pure, receptive and submissive – 
female – in its relation to God, it can be transformed by God into a forceful, potent and 
virile agent – male – in its relation to nature. (Keller, 1985, p. 38)  
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Just as Plato had wished to refute Greek skeptics such as Pyrrho and Heraclitus, so 
seventeenth century French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes set out to 
refute the medieval skeptics such as Montaigne and Charron who had similarly denied the 
possibility of true and lasting knowledge of reality. To do so, Descartes (again following 
Plato) denied the ability of the bodily senses to provide us with true and accurate 
perceptions of the world, and looked to the powers of the rational mind for the certain 
truths upon which we may build knowledge of the essential nature of reality. But where 
Plato based his bid for epistemic certainty on an otherworld of eternal, immutable Forms 
that could be perceived and known only by the transcendently rational mind, for Descartes 
it is the intuitional powers of the mind that, in clearly and distinctly perceiving the essence 
of physical bodies or objects, provide the simple truths from which to rationally deduce 
more complex truths, and thereby obtain certainty about the physical world (1968, p. 17). 
Descartes‟ process of rational deduction of clear and distinct truths also differs from that of 
Aristotle‟s syllogistic logic, in that it presupposes mind-perceived ideas of the essence of 
things as its starting point, where Aristotle‟s deductive knowledge is based upon abstract 
concepts of essence that are initially intuitively and inductively derived from bodily sense 
perceptions. As Descartes says, “we perceive bodies only by the understanding which is in 
us, and not by the imagination, or the senses…we conceive them in thought” (ibid. p. 112). 
Thus, if the mind‟s eye is to perceive clear and distinct ideas, then the Cartesian subject 
must - like Plato‟s lovers of wisdom - separate himself and his mind from sensual passions 
and other bodily sense perceptions, and assume the dominant position of detached, 
disinterested objectivity. To achieve this position, the mind must submit to and be 
disciplined by a specific method and its rules of deductive reasoning. It is in order to assist 
the rational mind of the knowing subject to detach from all external, sensually 
subjectivizing and thus epistemically disruptive forces and intuitively receive clear and 
distinct ideas, that Descartes strives to formulate his own mathematically influenced 
method and principles of reasoning; a single, universally applicable method that he hopes 
will make certain truths and knowledge of the universe available to all (ibid.).  
 
Descartes wanted the systematically purified intuitive and deductive powers of the mind to  
provide epistemic certainty, not because he wished to deny the possibility of revealed or 
otherwise externally authorized truths, but because he wished to democratize knowledge 
by securing “epistemic authority for individual knowers, who would depend on their own 
resources and not on the imprimatur of those in high places” (Scheman, 1993, p. 151). His 
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newly created logical method was designed to stamp all thinking beings with the epistemic 
authority and means to produce a knowledge of the physical world as objectively accurate 
and certain as that provided by the abstract truths, principles and methods of mathematics. 
Humans may not have the infinite nature and infallible knowledge of God, but by 
disciplining the mind and will to systematically „weed out‟ and reject all external, 
uncontrollable and thus untrustworthy (sense) perceptions, we can be certain that the ideas 
perceived clearly and distinctly are, in fact, true (ibid. p. 152). While Descartes seems, in 
this way, to obviate the need for revealed truths in the pursuit of certain knowledge, he 
still, however, relies on God‟s existence as a perfect and thus non-deceiving being for the 
metaphysical guarantee that his method will indeed produce epistemic certainty.  
 
In order to support his claim that certain knowledge of the essential nature of things can be 
attained via disciplined, objective thought uncontaminated by sensory or sensual input, 
Descartes developed a dualistic view of reality and its essential nature that distinguishes 
not between an immaterial essence-based form and unbounded matter, but between an 
immaterial, essence-based, rational mind and a material, essence-based, mechanical body. 
Thus, where Plato, Aristotle and Augustine saw form and matter as interdependently 
constituting the human (male) being, with the immaterial form being the first principle or 
cause of its enduringly unified existence, Descartes conceives mind and body as two 
distinctly different kinds of substance, each one having (and known by) its own causal 
essence and/or essential attributes, and thus able to exist independently of the other. Or, as 
he puts it in The Sixth Meditation, 
 
I rightly conclude that my essence consists in this alone, that I am a thinking thing, or a 
substance whose whole essence or nature consists in thinking. And although perhaps (or 
rather, as I shall shortly say, certainly,) I have a body to which I am very closely united, 
nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far 
as I am only a thinking and un-extended thing, and because, on the other hand I have a 
distinct idea of the body in so far as it is only an extended thing but which does not think, 
it is certain that I, that is to say my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly 
distinct from my body, and may exist without it. (1968, p. 156) 
 
For Descartes, mind and body can exist and function autonomously, since each has its own 
cause or principle of motion: the soul is the essence (or formal cause) of - and thought the 
essential attribute of - the mind, while mechanical operation is the efficient (not formal) 
cause of - and extension the essential attribute of - the body. And, because each substance 
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has its own stabilizing and persisting essence (and essential properties), it becomes 
possible to know and fixedly define the natures of both mind and body.  
 
However, Descartes‟ main focus is on justifying, enabling and gathering (scientific) 
knowledge of the natural, material body that he conceives as a kind of automaton that 
operates in a machine-like manner, determinately organized by the same physical and 
mathematical laws that govern the entire universe. It is this self-generating mechanical 
structure that differentiates the autonomous Cartesian body from the soul-dependent 
Platonic body. For, where Plato relies on a soul (or Form) to persistingly unify, define, and 
thus enable universal knowledge of the essential nature of living things, Descartes‟ 
mechanical essence allows him to deny a unifying soul/form to animal bodies, but still 
assert the possibility of a priori knowledge of their intuitively mind-perceived essential 
(spatial) properties. Thus, whilst the Cartesian subject may initially perceive the natural 
body as a (sensibly) unknowable source of “wonder”, he is then able to intuitively 
perceive, know, and define its essence as an aggregate of mechanical parts/properties.  
 
Man, however, is viewed by Descartes as having an immaterial soul (or mind) that is 
connected to the entire material body - particularly via the brain‟s pineal gland and its 
„animal spirits‟ - so that both substances are able to connect and interact with each other in 
a way that, because it is contradictory to conceive soul and body as both unified and 
distinct, Descartes says we can experience, but not fully explain (Rodis-Lewis, 1998, p. 
206). Thus, while the external senses and passions naturally influence the mind in the 
course of everyday life, these bodily intrusions can produce distorted and erroneous 
thoughts when the mind is searching for truth, and therefore in need of the clarity and 
distinction that pure, detached, objectivity brings. The physical body and its needs and 
functions are therefore little more than a hindrance to the Cartesian knower, and best left to 
the care and attention of women (Lloyd, 1999, p. 79). For only through the intuitive and 
deductive powers of a disciplined, detached intellect may one transcendent Cartesian mind 
know the essential nature of another, or the essential, extensional properties of the real, 
naturally unknowable body that the objective observer may subjugate, dissect, opposingly 
define and control as his object of knowledge.  
 
While Descartes‟ democratic system of thought and knowledge seems to offer women the 
same opportunity as men to be its rational, knowing subject (as Augustine also seems to 
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do), feminist philosophers have argued that the Cartesian account of reason (as a learnt, 
specialized skill), allied as it is to his mind/body distinction, inadvertently serves to support 
and perpetuate the sociohistorical and discursive identification of reason and the rational 
mind with masculinity, and the unreasonable, sensual body with femininity. As a result, the 
method that Descartes hoped would bring truth and knowledge to all becomes the preserve 
of men only. Susan Bordo, for example, interprets Descartes‟ theory of truth and 
knowledge (as attainable only through an acquired, „pure‟ method of reasoning) as the 
theoretical result of a psychological “flight from the feminine” (1987, p. 5), in which 
cultural anxiety caused by modern science‟s separation of man from nature-as-mother, 
manifests in Cartesian theory as the rational mind‟s desire to separate from and control the 
unruly, impure body that symbolizes (female) nature. For Bordo, then, it is for psycho-
cultural reasons that Descartes‟ concept of reason comes to be seen as masculine in nature. 
Genevieve Lloyd (1984), on the other hand, sees the Cartesian account of reason and 
knowledge as gender-neutral, but as having been deployed within ontological and 
epistemological theories to characterize masculinity as abstractly and transcendently 
rational in opposition to femininity as it is characterized by and symbolizes the (inferior) 
irrational, sensual, emotional and imaginary processes of the mind (and body).  
 
I would argue, however, that the Cartesian methods and principles are not about the 
masculinization of reason, but about the submissive, purifying feminization of an 
ultimately male mind that can therefore belong only to man. For the purpose of the 
Cartesian method is to cleanse the mind of epistemic impurities, and, through detachment 
from potentially unruly passions, open the mind and render it receptive to the will and 
Word of the paternal God as the ultimate disseminator of epistemic authority and truth. In 
this way, Cartesian man‟s mind enacted what had sociohistorically and philosophically 
been seen as the role of the pure, proper girl/woman: to submit to the authoritative will, and 
receive and nurture the seed-bound soul/essence of man. Thus, where Plato had conceived 
of man‟s sensual, sexual body as the lowly, imperfect, female aspect of his being, and 
where Augustine had conceived of man‟s lustful desires as the inferior female element of 
his mind, Descartes conceives both mind and body as female aspects of man, his 
methodically disciplined, virginally pure mind and sensually uncontrolled, impure body 
reflecting the dual „good/evil‟ metaphysical and religious conception of „woman'. It is 
therefore not the Cartesian method of reasoning that is masculine in nature, nor able to be 
used to characterize and differentiate masculinity from (irrational) femininity, but the 
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transcendent mind itself. For only a mind that is potentially or actually male can be 
temporarily rendered femininely submissive and receptive by the Cartesian method, as an 
escape from threatening (female) embodiment. And despite his apparent recognition of 
some limited capacity for reason in women, in saying that “even women”11 might be able 
to gain something from his method, Descartes‟ failure to address and challenge the 
Platonic/Aristotelian denial of an essence to „woman‟ means that the rational mind (or 
soul) that submissively receives and dominantly disseminates God‟s truth can but continue 
to be a male preserve.  
 
In her essay “Though This Be Method, Yet There Is Madness in It”, Naomi Scheman 
(1993) views the Cartesian method as expressing and defusing a potential paranoia that is 
not just peculiar to Descartes, but that characterizes - and gives rise to the main theoretical 
problems within - the whole of modern philosophy. Scheman examines Freud‟s analysis of 
the paranoia of (German judge) Daniel Paul Schreber as the homosexual mind‟s 
detachment (or „splitting‟) from the sensual, passionate body, and the purifying projection 
of repressed, forbidden sexual desires and associated feelings of sinfulness and self-hatred 
onto that and other bodies in the external world. For Schreber, the external, physical world 
therefore becomes a hostile, persecutory place in which the paternal “God and his „rays‟” 
(Scheman, p. 149) are out to forcibly penetrate his mind and body; a masochistic fantasy 
that is desired because it signifies paternal (disciplinary) love and the bestowal of phallic 
privilege, but also anxiously feared in risking the „unmanning‟ or castrating feminization of 
the male subject. Scheman therefore (re)interprets Schreber‟s paranoia as arising not from 
the (Freudian) fear and projection of homosexual desires, but from every man‟s fear of 
being feminized through the (cultivated, then forbidden) desire to submit to another male 
subject, a potentially paranoid fear that Descartes controls through what Scheman calls his 
“logic of male homophobia” (p. 150). For, only a mind methodically stripped of its 
forbidden (real) phallic desires will be pure enough to submit to and unite with God the 
omnipotent Father, thereby receiving the divine seed of epistemic privilege, authority and 
truth that guarantees possession and dissemination of certain knowledge (and control) of 
the physical world. Or as Evelyn Fox Keller puts it: 
 
Cleansed of contamination, the mind can be impregnated by God and, in that act, virilized - 
made potent and capable of generating virile offspring in its union with nature. (1985, p.38)  
 
                                                 
11
 As quoted from Descartes‟ „Letter to Vatier‟, 22 February 1638, cited in Lloyd (1984, p. 44). 
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Cartesian dualism, methods and resulting (quantitative, predicative) logic are therefore 
paths to and guarantors of transcendent male subjectivity, safely distancing modern 
heterosexual man from his pedagogically constructed, feared, sinful desire for sexual 
subjugation by projecting that fear/desire onto the (deformed, female) physical world of 
debasedly natural, mechanical bodies, and controlling it through the logical/scientific 
subjugation, dissection, and nominal redefinition of those bodies.      
 
Thus, through his initial bifurcation of the Platonic/Aristotelian notion of a purely 
immaterial essence/soul, and the attribution of a formal essence to man and effective 
material properties to the female object world, Descartes seemingly frees modern man 
from the taint of natural determinacy, whilst also rendering the physical world objectively 
perceivable, universally knowable and controllable by him as sole phallically privileged, 
transcendent subject of language, philosophy and science. But he does so only by 
ontologically reducing real woman and her female body to a naturally impulsive, 
potentially (sexually) uncontrollable collection of mechanical parts, her essential nature 
logically subjugated, defined, controlled and used by modern man as a prophylaxis for his 
potentially paranoid fear of feminization.    
 
John Locke 
 
The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end 
why they chuse and authorize a legislative is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, 
as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society. (Two Treatises, 
1980, Bk. 2, §222) 
 
Although English philosopher John Locke agreed with Descartes‟ dualistic view of reality 
as composed of immaterial mind and mechanical body, he rejected the Cartesian 
assumption that, by transcending the senses, the rational mind of man may intuitively 
perceive and deduce essential truths and certain knowledge of the nature of things. As an 
empiricist philosopher, Locke believed that, although the mind of man has an innate 
capacity for reason, it has no innate ideas. Rather, ideas and knowledge come entirely from 
the (mind‟s) sense perception or experience of the qualities of physical objects, followed 
by conscious reflection on those simple ideas, thereby producing complex ideas that define 
their nature. And while Locke followed Descartes in viewing mind and body as separate 
substances, with each having its own self-subsisting, self-motivating essence or essential 
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properties, his mechanical model of physical bodies differed from Descartes‟ in conceiving 
matter not as infinitely divisible, but as composed of individual atoms and corpuscles, the 
microstructural organization of which is the “real Essence” (1975, p. 418) of the body. 
This atomically-constituted microstructural essence is, for Locke, the causal basis of a 
thing‟s macroscopic primary qualities (of extension, solidity, shape and motion, for 
example), and these essential atoms and corpuscles - through their properties of solidity 
and motion, and their impact on the sense organs - have the powers to produce secondary 
qualities (e.g. colour, smell and taste) in the passively receptive mind of the observer. But 
while these primary qualities and powers may impress themselves on our senses, thereby 
producing simple ideas of them in our minds, the real essence (that is their cause) is unable 
to be directly perceived or known by the mind, due firstly to the insensible nature of 
essence, and secondly to our inability to explain how (insensible, material) states of atomic 
bodies might cause the (immaterial) states of mind that are their secondary qualities. For, 
as Locke writes in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1975), 
 
These mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with those Ideas, they 
produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of 
Body, and any perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can 
have no distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience; and can reason no 
otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise 
Agent, which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions. (Bk. IV, iii, §28)  
 
The nature of the real essence and the operation of its atomic/corpuscular particles being so 
far beyond man‟s perception and comprehension, only God can be the cause and thus have 
divine knowledge of the real essence of things, and the way it operates to allow the 
properties of material bodies to become ideas in the immaterial mind of man.  
 
However, through its passive perception and formation of simple ideas of a thing‟s primary 
and secondary properties, the mind is then - through active reflection and association - able 
to construct a complex idea of the nature of the thing perceived; this idea being the 
nominal essence of the object. The nominal essence (or form) is therefore the sum total of 
the mind‟s perceptions and ideas of the primary and secondary properties of a thing, and 
thus provides the definition of the object, as well as identifying it, along with other like 
objects, as belonging to a particular species. But because it is only a nominal form of 
essence - based primarily on secondary properties that are not resemblances of properties 
in the perceived object - that forms the basis for our knowledge of natural things (their real 
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essence being insensible and thus unknowable), Locke concludes that we can only ever 
have a limited rather than a certain knowledge and understanding of the essential nature of 
natural phenomena (1975, Bk IV, iii, §6).  
 
It is for this reason that Locke criticizes and denies the credibility of an Aristotelian 
metaphysics and epistemology that assume the real, individual essence of a natural kind to 
be knowable and definable, and that therefore use the whole form and properties of this 
essence not only to individually explain “the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it 
is” (1975, p. 417), but also to universally identify and classify things appearing to share that 
form into species and genera. For, Locke argues, if we cannot perceive the atomic essence 
of a thing, then how can we even claim to be able to group, scientifically classify, and 
universally define those things perceived to share the same essential form? Locke‟s 
epistemic solution, then, says that, while we may be unable to know and use the „real‟ 
essence of things as the basis for scientific knowledge and explanation of natural 
phenomena, we can use the abstract general idea – the „nominal‟, mind-constructed 
essence – of a thing to identify, group, classify and name physically same things as 
particular species and genera. In this way, the complex ideas that man‟s mind creates from 
its simple ideas of the qualities of individual things or „substances‟, and to which it then 
adds the appropriate names such as “Man, Horse, Sun, Water, Iron” (ibid. p. 298), provide 
the conceptual basis for the scientific classification and necessarily limited knowledge, 
definition and differentiation of the nature of various species and other natural kinds. And 
whilst both Aristotle and Descartes base the identity of an individual man on his 
enduringly formed rational soul/mind, Locke attaches man‟s personal and species identity 
to neither soul nor body, but to the persisting, remembering (self-)consciousness that 
accompanies the thinking spirit of man; a consciousness that, being grounded in spirit/soul, 
is therefore not shared by animals or other purely material creatures.  
 
In refuting Aristotle‟s notion of a real, knowable, soul-like essence that determines and 
motivates the form and function of natural beings, and Descartes‟ claim to certain, 
intuitively perceived knowledge of the essential properties of physical bodies, Locke‟s 
understanding of essence maintains and perpetuates their denial of an immaterial essence 
to woman, and her reduction to a (male-defined) collection of material properties. For, it is 
only through their denial of a specifically female (immaterial) essence that either the 
Aristotelian real essence of an individual man, or the Lockean abstract, nominally essential 
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Idea of an individual man, might be universalized to serve as the essence that classifies and 
defines the entire human species as it is identified by the name „Man‟, and as it is ranked 
with but also differentiated from the species „Horse‟, for example. Locke makes this point 
very clearly when he says, 
 
Now, since nothing can be a Man, or have a right to the name Man, but what has a 
conformity to the abstract Idea the name Man stands for; nor any thing be a Man, or have 
a right to be of the Species Man, but what has the Essence of that Species, it follows, that 
the abstract Idea, for which the name stands, and the Essence of the Species, is one and 
the same. (1975, p. 415) 
 
Thus, by denying a female essence, the nominal essence and the real individual/species 
essence of Man, can be seen as one and the same. It is similarly only through this denial of 
sexual difference that Locke‟s complex idea of the consciously thinking, willing spirit of 
an individual man might serve as the nominal essence that identifies the spirit of the 
species „Man‟, and thereby serve to differentiate the inspirited species „Man‟ from non-
spirited, brutish, mechanical animals such as „Horse‟ (ibid.).  
 
Thus, despite Locke, in his Two Treatises of Civil Government, attributing a measure of 
rational and social equality to women - an attribution viewed by Andrea Nye (2004) as 
being based on political expediency rather than feminist perspective - both his notion of a 
nominal essence that is the meaning of a (natural kind) term and his notion of a 
consciously rational, propertied subject or self assume an identity or sameness that can 
only be singularly male, and that therefore necessarily excludes woman and all things 
female. For, according to Locke, man as a citizen is, according to natural law, a free, 
autonomous and self-interested individual whose natural right it is to inherit, accumulate 
and protect private property or wealth, while woman and child are, by nature, subservient 
to the “rule” and will of that man as the head of the family and household that is his private 
property (1980, Bk. 2, §82). But, as Nye argues, man cannot be the autonomous agent that 
Locke paints him to be, when his very position and wealth as citizen and property owner 
necessarily depend on woman‟s subordinate and unpaid role (and labour) as wife and 
mother; that is, as his property. It is for this reason that Nye declares,  
 
Locke‟s modern individuals, the individuals who are to be the property owners and the 
citizens in the new modern states, have to be men. They have to be men because they are 
all the same; it is their very separation from the different world of women and the family 
that makes them individuals and the same. (2004, p. 57)   
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It seems, therefore, that whether literally or conceptually, Locke perpetuates the denial of a 
unifying immaterial essence to woman, and thus, following Descartes, conceives her (like 
animals) as a collection of material, mechanical properties defined by and in relation to 
man as sole conscious subject. However, because Lockean knowledge of physical bodies is 
now based on secondary (sense) qualities caused by those bodies, but existing in and 
synthesized by the mind of the observing male subject, epistemic authority in the 
construction and definition of woman‟s nominally essential, universal properties now sits 
squarely with him. Thus, with her real essential nature now seemingly unknowable, Locke 
reduces woman to an object of man‟s reflection. 
 
Immanuel Kant 
 
Kant excludes women from the category of persons or individuals. Women can only be 
property. (Pateman, 1988, p. 171) 
 
By the time Immanuel Kant began his major works, both rationalist and empiricist 
philosophers had failed to provide sound metaphysical and epistemological arguments for 
the possibility (and the limits) of certain and lasting knowledge of reality. For while a 
rationalist perspective could theoretically provide indubitable a priori knowledge of 
universal, immaterial forms or ideas beyond transient, particularized sense experience, it 
could say little with certainty about the nature of the sensible, physical world of everyday 
experience. An empiricist perspective, on the other hand, might justify and enable 
knowledge of the immediately observable, particular, physical world, but - because of 
David Hume‟s denial of the (observable) existence of natural causality or necessary 
connections, and thus, the validity of induction of universal truths - could not account for 
or provide certain knowledge of universal scientific principles and truths, or, therefore, 
claim to make accurate predictions about future events (Stumpf, 1993, p. 301).  
 
Meanwhile, Newtonian physics had enabled scientists to begin unravelling and explaining 
the nature of the physical, mechanically determined universe using precisely the notions of 
causality and inductive inference that Hume had discredited. This scientific knowledge 
presented a further problem for Kant, in that a scientific method that sought to explain 
reality - including human behaviour - in natural, mechanical and deterministic terms, could 
     44  
 
not then accommodate the notions of free will and of an authoritative, intentional God that 
had infused traditional theories of metaphysics and morality (ibid.). Therefore, in his 
Critique of Pure Reason (1929), Kant worked to bridge the gap between rationalism and 
empiricism, and synthesize a metaphysical and epistemological model of reality that would 
fit with the deterministic Newtonian science of his day, but also recognize an immaterial 
God, a subjective self, free will, and universal moral principles, in its account of human 
nature and behaviour. Doing this required the obviation of empirical induction of universal 
truths from sense experience, and of rationalist claims to a priori knowledge of 
metaphysical realities (such as the existence of God) despite an inability to define real, 
sensible, experiential objects. Kant therefore fashioned a new approach to metaphysics and 
epistemology, which he called critical philosophy.  
 
Like Descartes and Locke, Kant viewed mind and body as two different substances: the 
rational mind an essential part of man‟s soul, the sensible body composed of organized and 
fundamentally intelligible matter. Thus, to Kant, the mind of a thinking being was purely 
an “object of inner sense”, while the body was “an object of outer sense” (1929, A357). 
But where Descartes asserted the possibility of man receiving essential truths and certain 
knowledge of (material and immaterial) reality through intuitive and deductive reasoning, 
and Locke asserted that all knowledge comes from sensory experience, Kant agreed that 
knowledge begins with experience, but added: “it does not follow that it all arises out of 
experience” (ibid. B1). For Kant, (outer) sense perception was not a matter of physical 
objects actively impressing themselves upon the passively receptive human senses (as 
Locke and Descartes had thought), but rather, a subjectively controlled process in which 
outer objects exist and are perceived - and then phenomenally and synthetically defined 
and known - only if they fit with the perceiving mind‟s innate faculty of intuition, and its 
various a priori laws, concepts and categories of rational understanding and judgement. As 
he puts it, 
 
If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could 
know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must 
conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving 
such a possibility…For experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves 
understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior 
to objects being given to me…They find expression in a priori concepts to which all 
objects of experience necessarily conform. (1929, B xvii) 
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Kant posits twelve a priori categories of the understanding that roughly correspond to 
Aristotle‟s categories of essential being. He then reconceives and regroups these 
(ontological) categories under the four innate forms or concepts of judgement (i.e. quality, 
quantity, relation and modality) by which the mind perceives, spatiotemporally synthesizes 
as phenomenal objects, and thus constructs a priori knowledge of (the apparent form of), 
external objects (Thomasson, 2009, §1.2).
12
 Thus, man‟s essential, universal knowledge of 
physical bodies comes not from his intuitive perception of their (immaterial) essence or 
form of being (as Aristotle thought), but from the ways in which sensible objects 
perceptually fit with, and are synthesized, defined, and classified by, the logical laws, 
concepts and categories of the active, conscious mind (Brook, 2008, §3.2). It is on the basis 
of the innate existence of these a priori laws and categories that Kant asserts the possibility 
of synthetic a priori judgements and propositions that permit experiential but also 
universal knowledge of the world - not as it essentially is „in itself‟, but as it perceptually 
or phenomenally appears. For, these Kantian categories give a persistingly unified, 
defined, identical, and thus classifiable form to the physical body that Descartes and Locke 
saw as a bundle of mechanical properties, thereby acknowledging the Aristotelian 
requirement of a persistingly whole, same form for the existence and knowledge of 
physical beings. But for Kant, this form is purely apparent. That is, it is a representation of 
an external object, and the epistemic authority and means to knowledge of its nature now 
lie, not outside, but within the conscious rational subject who, in synthesizing an 
undifferentiated mass of sense data into whole, essentially enformed appearances, may not 
perceive or know the underlying essence or “substratum” of a noumenal object “in itself” 
(1929, p. 339), but can have reliable experiential, but also universal knowledge of these 
phenomenal objects, and all of their kind. While Kant therefore recognizes the existence of 
real, essence-based things in themselves, definition and knowledge of these things can only 
be of their apparent or nominal essence as perceived, synthesized, and understood by the 
transcendent rational mind of man. It is on this basis that Kant surmises that the essence or 
soul of “a thinking being in itself” may or may not be different from the “intelligible” 
substratum underlying its apparent, extended, material body (ibid. A360). 
 
In thus denying knowledge of the essential nature of things in themselves, and of the 
existence of (noumenal) metaphysical entities such as the „self‟, the „cosmos‟, and „God‟, 
                                                 
12
The concept of quality, for example, contains and implies the (ontological) categories of „reality‟, 
„negation‟ and „limitation‟ as they function in the logical synthesis, organization and knowledge of 
phenomenal objects.   
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Kant nevertheless views the latter entities as “transcendental ideas” (ibid. p. 315) or pure 
concepts necessarily created by pure reason to give an enduring coherence and systematic 
unity to the various (inner) psychological sensations and processes, and various (outer) 
physical events and causal connections. Not referring to any real experiences, these 
transcendental ideas are implied by and enable metaphysical completion of the theory of 
things in themselves persistently existing (beyond appearances) as systematically unified 
beings. With no real, immortal Platonic/Aristotelian soul (or Lockean microstructural 
essence) to posit, perceive, or know as the first cause and prime mover of physical beings, 
Kant‟s idea of a perfect, immortal, self-subsisting God underwrites the persistingly whole, 
unified existence and nature of noumenal bodies, and, therefore, the correspondingly 
ordered unity (and thus, knowledge) of their phenomenal representations. And, while a 
real, soul-based self cannot be empirically known to exist, the transcendental idea of this 
self arises from the perception of wholly and persistingly existing phenomenal objects, 
including one‟s (apparent) self. This idea then implies and necessarily underwrites the 
persisting, unified existence of a rational - and therefore free-willed, moral - subject who, 
in imposing logical categories of the understanding onto jumbled sense data, makes 
possible the known, defined, controlled existence of otherwise naturally aggressive, 
potentially transgressive, sensual, desiring bodies - including his own. Kantian acts of 
virtue are therefore those dutifully performed by this rational subject in accordance with 
universally acceptable moral principles, and that require his wilful, reasoned restraint of 
aggressive, immoral desires and inclinations, so that the existence, status and (property) 
rights of all moral agents be respected and maintained, and perfect goodness (summum 
bonum) and immortality be ultimately achieved (Kheel, 1993).  
 
Apart from having the (free) will and innate means to subordinate personal interests/desires 
to those of the moral and therefore „civilized‟ community, the other thing that uniquely 
characterizes Kant‟s rational, moral self is its singular maleness. For, as feminist 
philosophers such as Pateman (1989), Herman (1993) and Kheel (1993) have widely noted, 
the Kantian unified self is a moral agent (or member) firstly, because he is rational, and 
secondly, because he owns property, and is therefore entitled to engage in binding 
agreements with other proprietary agents. But because Kant denies women the same higher 
capacity for reason that he grants to men, seeing the former as ruled by their bodily senses, 
inclinations and appetites, he therefore denies women metaphysical status as rational, free-
willed, moral agents and active, propertied citizens. Thus, while Kant does grant woman a 
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mind of her own, it is devoid of higher reason, strength of will, and awareness of the 
sublime, and so, driven by the senses, must act in obedience to the will of man. As Kant 
explains in Of the Beautiful and Sublime (1960), “[Woman‟s] philosophy is not to reason, 
but to sense” (p. 79), and she can therefore attain a measure of moral and civil standing 
only as the wife of the male subject; 
 
In matrimonial life the united pair should, as it were, constitute a single moral person, 
which is animated and governed by the understanding of the man and the taste of the 
wife. For not only can one credit more insight founded on experience to the former, and 
more freedom and accuracy in sensation to the latter; but also, the more sublime a 
disposition is, the more inclined it is to place the greatest purpose of its exertions in the 
contentment of a beloved object. (ibid. p. 95-96) 
 
Because (beautiful) woman does not possess (sublime) man‟s faculty of the understanding, 
she cannot be said to possess the a priori categories that are the precondition for the mind‟s 
synthesis, judgement and knowledge of the phenomenal forms of things in themselves. 
Thus, whilst she may have knowledge of the senses, the higher, logic-based knowledge of 
the forms and properties of phenomenal minds and bodies is reserved for man alone. In this 
way, Kant denies women the epistemic authority and means to construct, define and know, 
not only themselves as perceiving subjects, but also their own phenomenal objects.  
 
Thus, as the Kantian (male) subject gains a logical mastery and control over the outer 
object world that the Cartesian subject could only have dreamt of, woman, as man‟s 
logically defined physical and conceptual property, is reduced to his purely and fixedly 
defined, known object of appearance. Unappropriated, however, she remains unseen and 
unknowable within the realm of sensually (and disdainfully) unrestrained, natural „bodies 
in themselves‟. Within Kant‟s metaphysics, ethics and epistemology, then, the 
transcendently ideal, unified „man-in-himself‟ becomes the sole creator, knower and 
(moral) owner of his essentially defined phenomenal objects. As one of those objects, 
„woman‟ can exist within the Kantian moral community only as a depersonalized, (literally 
and conceptually) objectified „means‟ - never an „end‟. On this basis, Kant‟s categorical 
imperative to “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person 
of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means” (2002, p. 46), 
cannot have been addressed or referring to women. It can, therefore, only be an imperative 
that men not treat themselves or other men as mere „means‟, or in other words, as passive 
(female) objects.  
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Seen in this light, Kant‟s (1991) efforts to rethink marriage in terms that avoid the 
disgustingly depersonalizing objectification he sees as an inevitable consequence of 
existing forms of sexual activity concern the moral standing of the husband, not his wife. 
For only as the ruler in a sacred union that abstains from non-procreative sex, and in which 
woman‟s naturally seductive sexuality submits to and obeys man‟s rational will, might the 
male subject be protected from his own immoral passions, and thus be seen and judged by 
others as a morally self-restrained and honourable subject (Nye, 2004). Hence, the only 
immoral sexual activity can be that which reduces a man or „end‟ to a sexually objectified 
„means‟. Or, in other words, that perceives and treats a man like a woman. Could it be, 
then, that Kant‟s reduction of real bodies to male-perceived, essentially synthesized, 
defined, known, and controlled appearances - thereby further separating the sublimely 
transcendent subject from the perceptionally veiled world of real sexual female bodies - is 
simply a more acute expression of Cartesian man‟s fear of feminization? If so, then his 
addition of a logically fixed, unified, definable form to Locke‟s nominal essence may 
simply be a further amelioration of that fear. 
 
Edmund Husserl 
 
[T]he phenomenology of the perception of spatial things is not a doctrine about external 
perceptions that either factually occur or empirically can be expected; rather, it sets forth 
the necessary system of structures without which it is not possible to think a synthesis of 
manifold perceptions as perceptions of one and the same thing. (Phenomenology, 1927,  
p. 17) 
 
Despite seeming to offer the metaphysical and epistemological means to experientially 
derived, logically defined and generalized knowledge of the phenomenal world, Kant‟s 
theory was discredited when it was realized that his rational, free-willed, moral subject and 
creator of phenomenal knowledge must have at least some knowledge of the noumenal 
world of things-in-themselves in order to assert that such a world even exists (Philipse, 
1995, p. 271). And, if we can know that things-in-themselves exists, then why can‟t we 
also know other features of their supposedly unknowable nature? Further, Kant‟s assertion 
that phenomenal objects are „representations‟ constructed from sensible data received as 
the affects of things in themselves on the body‟s sense organs meant that the supposedly 
transcendent subject could not, therefore, be viewed as existing above and beyond the 
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external physical world, and might even be simply a manifestation of and dependent upon 
it. Edmund Husserl therefore criticized Kant for implicitly presupposing a real, external 
world an sich (in itself) to which the conscious, constituting subject belongs, but cannot 
know (1970, §28). For these reasons, Kant‟s assertion that the natural sciences could only 
study and limitedly know the „phenomenal‟ and not the „real‟ world went unheeded, and 
scientists continued to inductively extract seemingly certain knowledge from a natural 
world assumed to be real, despite having no philosophical justification for that assumption. 
In its success, however, scientific discourse was threatening the very existence of the 
metaphysical subject, with its claims to be able to explain both conscious mind and 
physical body in purely physical terms. For if this was the case, then the immaterial soul or 
spirit of man - seen by Plato and Aristotle as the first cause, form and motivator of his 
being, and the source of logical definition and knowledge of the material (female) world - 
could not only become irrelevant to the quest to know that world, but perhaps even be 
subsumed by it. For Husserl, this meant the unthinkable: the omnipotent Cartesian subject 
might be absorbed into the very world of physical laws, objects and sciences that he had 
transcended, mechanized, and controlled, because his primacy had not been recognized and 
preserved within an independent, self-defining “science of the spirit” (1935, §8). It was 
therefore this absence of a universal science of the spirit - and its consciousness - that 
Husserl identified as the cause of a loss of philosophical direction and purpose, and thus, a 
state of crisis and distress, within modern European culture.  
 
His project, therefore, was to create the conditions for a philosophical science of the spirit 
that would be totally separate from the physical sciences, and that would revive and 
radically reinstate the Cartesian rational, thinking self or conscious ego as the sole source 
of (and justification for) truth and knowledge - not of external physical objects, but of 
phenomenal objects that the conscious subject creates for and by himself. Husserl therefore 
worked to bring elements of Cartesian rationalism together with aspects of Kantian 
phenomenal subjectivity, constructing what he called the science of transcendental 
phenomenology. The epistemological aim was to present the ontological grounds and the 
phenomenological method by which the conscious self might justify and generate universal 
knowledge of the phenomenal world from his own lived experience. While Husserl begins 
his science of the spirit with the Cartesian assumption of the knowable existence of a self-
conscious, rational subject, he rejects Descartes‟ dualistic reconception of reality as two 
ontologically separate, independently constituted, and self-motivated substances, a 
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reconception that he saw as having caused the demise of (Platonic) rationalism and thus the 
crisis within modern philosophy and culture.  
 
Husserl bases his transcendental phenomenology on a monistic view of human subjectivity 
and its reality as being founded upon, and constituted, perceived, and known by one 
essential substance: consciousness. Hence, his first principle of existence and knowledge is 
the consciously thinking, experiencing subject who can be sure of his existence because he 
experiences himself, not as a disembodied ego „that thinks‟, but as an actively embodied 
ego that is always constructing and constituting phenomenal objects, and therefore always 
thinking or intending something. Thus, for Husserl, the essential attribute of consciousness 
is its intentionality, the conscious subject always intending (i.e. sensing, desiring, willing, 
acting etc.), and thus giving his own subjective meanings to, the objects he constructs 
(Ideas I). In this way, Husserl‟s conception of the intentional subject draws upon Kant‟s 
notion of the transcendentally conscious, knowing subject that categorically constitutes - 
and can therefore know - his own phenomenal world. However, in doing so, he rejects 
Kant‟s notion of the transcendent thing-in-itself as an externally existing, but unknowable 
object. For, in Husserl‟s eyes, both Descartes and Kant erred in tying the conscious subject 
to an external, objective reality with its own essential nature, thereby creating a further 
need to justify the possibility of knowledge of the existence of a real world external to 
subjective phenomenal experience. Husserl‟s main concern, therefore, is to establish an 
absolute and indubitable foundation for knowledge, something he sees as achievable only 
if the reality of the conscious subject or ego is limited to a phenomenal reality that the 
subject himself logically creates, experiences, and thus, knows. His method, then, for 
establishing this absolute foundation for knowledge, is to firstly perform a 
phenomenological epoché – a reductive procedure in which, examining his intentional 
thoughts, he then proceeds to separate out and “bracket” (1931, p. 108) all object-directed 
(or noematic) aspects of those thoughts, thereby suspending all metaphysical assumptions 
and judgements as to the existence (or not) of an external, object world.
13
 In this way, 
Husserl avoids the „natural‟ scientific attitude that assumes the (foundational) existence of 
the physical world, as well as seemingly avoiding the Cartesian and Kantian mistake of 
tying the existence of the conscious, knowing subject to an external reality (Intro. to 
                                                 
13
 Herman Philipse (1995) describes Husserl‟s „epoché‟ or „bracketing‟ of all assumptions and judgements 
about the existence and nature of the external, object world as being “akin to Cartesian doubt” (p. 240). 
Only by conceptually bracketing off the sensible (female) aspects of mind and body can certain knowledge 
of the existence and nature of Descartes‟ rational or Husserl‟s conscious subject be justified and attained.  
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Husserl, 1964). For, what remains of that intentional thought, once its object-directed 
aspects are bracketed, is the pure transcendental consciousness of the intentional “I” that is 
the active, self-conscious subject, creator and knower of his own ideal world of objective 
facts, (whole) essences, and meanings. His certainty of the prior, independent, essence-
based existence of this pure, conscious ego, along with its ability to intuitively know the 
essences of intentional (animate or inanimate) things or noemata, seemingly presents 
Husserl with the rational justification and foundation for experience-based - but also 
universal - knowledge of phenomenal reality as constituted by that subjective ego.  
 
From the premise that consciousness is the base reality that gives rise to an „ideal‟ life-
world of subjectively constituted phenomena, Husserl proceeds to construct his theory of 
transcendental idealism, described in Ideas I as a “reversal” (§50) of the naturalist 
ontology that situates the physical as the foundational principle of all being. Husserl‟s 
theory presents an ontology of consciousness, describing it as a continuous, unified stream 
of sensations, perceptions of intended objects, and motivating intentions (such as beliefs, 
desires, judgements or actions) as subjectively experienced and known by the ego. While 
„consciousness‟ is conceived as an ontological unity with its own essence, it also gives rise 
to and co-exists with the regions of „matter‟ and „spirit‟, each with their own essence, and 
all involved in the constitution of living beings. Hence, each living (human) being may be 
conceptually divided into a plurality of „abstracta‟ or essential attributes which Husserl 
identifies as: the „physical body‟, the „living (ensouled) body‟, the „spirit‟ (social aspect), 
and the pure or transcendental „ego‟ or „I‟ that is the subject/creator of his own 
phenomenal “life-world” (1970, §§62-67). Each of these attributes is a perfect instance or 
“exemplar” (1997, p. 93) of its own species essence, as these essences are instantiated in 
every conscious human individual, with each attribute depending on those below it (e.g. 
„living‟ depends upon „physical‟ body). While animals and other infrahuman creatures are 
denied (human) spirit and consciousness, they nevertheless wholly and irreducibly exist 
and are defined and known as a sensing, thinking body inseparable from its soul. This 
Husserlian model of human/animal existence therefore rejects the Cartesian view of the 
living body as a collection of mechanical, material properties, taking the Aristotelian view 
of real beings as wholly integrated soul/body composites and applying it, in a pluralized 
form, to phenomenal objects as the basis for their logical constitution, perception, and 
knowledge by the self-conscious, transcendental subject.  
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Thus, as the focus of intentional acts of thinking, believing, judging and desiring, 
phenomenal (living) bodies are consciously constituted from raw sensations as essentially 
whole, substantial beings, existing, motivated and defined according to Aristotle‟s laws 
and categories of being (e.g. form, quality, quantity, relation, etc.). As such, contra Kant, 
Husserl‟s phenomenal objects do not represent any „external‟ world of objects in 
themselves. For Husserl extracts Kant‟s essential but unknowable „thing in itself‟ from the 
external world, and relocates it within the phenomenal world as the (essentially unified) 
intentional correlate of a cumulative process of complete and adequate perception. The 
thing in itself is (and can be logically known as) the “ideal limit” of the phenomenal object, 
its essential form known in the moment when the object is “wholly and fully given” to the 
perceiving subject (Philipse, 1995, p. 274). Although these phenomenal objects are 
constituted by and within the conscious mind, they are nevertheless perceived as existing 
outside of - and thus transcending - that mind. Herman Philipse (1995) accounts for this 
subjective externalization of phenomenal objects using the “theory of projection” (popular 
in the 19
th
 century) which hypothesizes that, in grouping and ordering sensations as a 
particular object, the conscious subject projects the object to a place outside of his own 
locality, the object thereby assuming the illusory appearance of an independent, 
transcendent existence (p. 266). The conscious subject then perceives and comes to know 
the nature of these projected objects via three modes of intuitive perception: i) their factual 
nature is perceived gradually via “empirical intuition” (sensory perception); ii) their 
essential nature is perceived in an instant via “eidetic intuition”; and iii) the way objects 
are intentionally given in experience is perceived via conscious reflection on that 
experience by the pure “I” or “ego” (Ideas, 1931, §3). It is in perceiving the essential form 
of a human or animal exemplar that the conscious subject is able to know the universal 
essence of its species/kind. 
 
By reconceiving essences and their perception in this pluralized and hierarchical way, 
Husserl seemingly provides strong ontological argument against attempts by the physical 
sciences and materialist philosophy to reductively know and define the conscious (human) 
mind in terms of the physical body. For his monistic view of (structured) reality not only 
does away with Cartesian mind/body dualism, but also separately and uniquely 
characterizes the various essences of phenomenal things in themselves so that no one 
(physical, spiritual or conscious) essence may be known or defined in terms of another. 
However, in rejecting Cartesian dualism, it appears that Husserl perpetuates another kind 
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of metaphysical dualism through his science of consciousness. For, where the essences of 
body, soul, and spirit may be found in all phenomenal beings, pure, essence-based 
consciousness, as the sole knowable reality, exists prior to and independently of the objects 
intended, constituted and projected by it. Or, as Husserl says in Ideas (1931), 
 
no real thing…is necessary for the Being of consciousness itself (in the widest sense of 
the stream of experience).  
Immanent Being is therefore without doubt absolute in this sense, that in principle nulla 
„re‟ indiget ad existendum [it needs nothing else to exist]. 
On the other hand, the world of the transcendent “res” is related unreservedly to 
consciousness, not indeed to logical conceptions, but to what is actual. (§49) 
    
But this pure, subjective consciousness - the pure “I” or “ego” that pre-exists, synthetically 
creates and intuitively knows the essential nature of the phenomenal life-world - is not 
simply and solely human, as Husserl theorizes. It is also, as he reveals, solely male:  
 
[The] transcendental subjectivity which for want of language we can only call again, “I 
myself”, “We ourselves”, cannot be found under the attitude of psychological or natural 
science, being no part at all of the objective world, but that subjective Conscious life 
itself, wherein the world and all its content is made for “us”, for “me”. We that are, 
indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the world, are therefore, “appearances” unto 
ourselves, parcel of what “we” have constituted, pieces of the significance “we” have 
made. The “I” and the “we”, which we apprehend, presuppose the hidden “I” and “We” 
to whom they are “present”. (Phenomenology, 1997, p. 189) 
 
Thus, the supposedly monistic, purely immaterial consciousness actually resides in a male 
body. And, since the conscious subject‟s empathetic recognition and knowledge of other 
similarly conscious subjects depends on recognition of a shared physical, psychological 
(and therefore conscious) sameness, the bodies of those subjects must all be male in order 
for this epistemology of consciousness to cohere. Hence, as with Aristotle‟s notion of an 
originary soul/essence, Husserl‟s pure consciousness presumes and depends upon male 
sameness - both between individuals and between the individual and the universal - and 
therefore cannot recognize (sexuate) difference within conscious, embodied subjectivity 
without fatally undermining its own foundations. 
 
And so, although Husserl grants to woman an essentially unified form and existence, it is 
only as an appearance constructed within, and as the logically (and opposingly) defined 
property of, the conscious male mind. By then bracketing off and dis-qualifying any form 
of defined external/real existence, Husserl relegates real, natural woman to formless non-
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existence, thereby imprisoning fabricated „woman‟ within man‟s phenomenal life-world, 
and re-presenting her essentially unified appearance as her reality; a reality known in the 
moment that she is „bodily given‟ to the male subject. Small wonder, then, that Theodor 
Adorno describes Husserl as preferring “puppets” to real women (1982, p. 219), the fate of 
these mind-bound, controlled objects of male consciousness revealed in Husserl‟s words:   
 
Consciousness, considered in its “purity”, must be reckoned as a self-contained system of 
Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which 
nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-
temporal system. (Ideas I, §49) 
 
But if consciousness is self-contained and has no spatio-temporally defined exterior, then 
what the conscious, knowing subject cannot explain is the source or cause of the constant 
stream of bodily sensations from which phenomenal objects are constituted. In bracketing 
all questions as to the existence (or not) of an external world, but still acknowledging 
bodily sensations and sense-data as the base matter from which phenomenal objects are 
essentially formed, Husserl is left with no alternative but - like Locke and Berkeley - to 
assume “the existence of a “divine” Being beyond the world” (ibid. §58) as the first cause 
of these sensations. In Husserl‟s hands, then, the conscious (male) subject of Cartesian and 
Kantian theory seems to become even more solipsistically isolated and self-absorbed in the 
creation, definition and control of his own world of essentially whole, and thus, fully 
knowable objects. For Husserl‟s conscious subjects - the “I” and “we” - are now hiding 
behind their own impenetrable, logically defined world of seemingly real „appearances‟, in 
a further bid, perhaps, to escape the seemingly inescapable  „unlawful‟ sensations, passions 
and desires of their own real sexual bodies.  
 
Saul Kripke 
 
The idea that philosophy should be relevant to life is a modern idea. A lot of philosophy 
does not have relevance to life…The intention of philosophy was never to be relevant to 
life. (Kripke interview with Saugstad, 2001) 
 
As an analytic philosopher wishing to establish a sound metaphysical basis and 
justification for truth and knowledge about the real physical world, Saul Kripke (1981) 
rejects the empiricist/subjective idealist view that we initially perceive physical objects as 
bundles of properties or sense data then synthesized, nominally defined and only 
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phenomenally known by the mind as complex objects, thereby countering idealist doubt as 
to the existence of external objects. He does this by taking the Aristotelian view that we 
can know of the existence and essential nature of external objects, firstly, because we 
initially perceive and identify them as persistingly whole objects (not a number of 
properties), and secondly, because, as such, they give the fixed content to our thoughts, and 
meaning to our names and descriptive propositions that make logical, truth-functional 
language and knowledge possible. What determines the form, identity and properties of a 
physical object is its atomic/genetic microstructural essence; an essence that, because 
perceivable, serves to identify the referential object with its name in all possible worlds. 
Thus, the names that we use to represent reality do not refer to (Lockean) complex ideas, 
or (Husserlian) phenomenal essences, or a (Fregean/Russellian) „bundle of qualities‟, but 
to real whole, physical objects. For, as Kripke says in Naming and Necessity (1981),  
 
What I do deny is that a particular is nothing but a „bundle of qualities‟, whatever that 
may mean…Philosophers have come to the opposite view through a false dilemma: they 
have asked, are these objects behind the bundle of qualities, or is the object nothing but 
the bundle? Neither is the case; this table is wooden, brown, in the room etc. It has all 
these properties and is not a thing without properties, behind them; but it should not 
therefore be identified with the set, or „bundle‟, of its properties, nor with the subset of its 
essential properties. (p. 52) 
 
Kripke‟s whole objects are therefore initially identified and related, not on the basis of 
their primary or secondary properties, but, according to his causal theory of reference, 
through an ostensive, original „baptismal‟ naming which thereafter necessarily links a 
natural kind object with its name, the meaning of that name now determinately defined as 
its referential object. This original name becomes the „rigid designator‟ that will always 
and in all possible worlds refer only to its baptismal object, and all those within a linguistic 
community are thereafter entitled to use the name to refer to its original referent because of 
what Kripke calls a causal “chain of communication” which links all subsequent users to 
the original naming (ibid. p. 91). While a descriptive proposition may also designate an 
object, a description is, for Kripke, only a non-rigid designator, since it may not apply to 
the object/kind in all possible worlds. To demonstrate this rigid/non-rigid distinction, 
Kripke uses the example of a piece of yellow metal that was originally named „gold‟. 
Hence, the name „gold‟, as its rigid designator, refers to that object necessarily. The 
descriptive property „a yellow metal‟, however, is a non-rigid designator in that it may not 
refer to gold in all possible worlds; it may, for example, be describing iron pyrites, 
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otherwise known as “fool‟s gold” (ibid. p. 124). The proper name „Benjamin Franklin‟ is 
also a rigid designator that necessarily refers to the boy/man baptized Benjamin Franklin, 
while the description “the inventor of bifocals” is a non-rigid designator in that it correctly 
describes Franklin in this world, but may, in another world, describe someone else (ibid. p. 
145). Kripke is therefore suggesting a form of nominal essentialism that necessarily fixes 
the meaning of a name not to the perceived, descriptive properties of an object, but to the 
object itself, along with other seemingly identical objects of the same species. In this way, 
Kripke‟s referentialism brings a fixed and universal determinism to notions of (nominal) 
meaning, identity and truth that Locke‟s sense-based, nominalist definitions, and Russell‟s 
logically ordered, but subjectively sense-based descriptions could not achieve.  
 
For in viewing descriptions of an object or kind as non-rigid designators, Kripke infers that 
there are no sensible properties by which a name can be determinately defined, or its 
referent fixed and identified. Just because an animal might match the description “large 
carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny yellow in colour with blackish transverse stripes 
and white belly” does not in itself determine that animal to be part of the extension of the 
name „tiger‟ (1981, p. 119). What will identify the animal as a tiger, however, is the 
scientific discovery of its “internal structure” or essence; that is, the molecular or genetic 
structure that it shares with others of the same kind (ibid. p. 120). Similarly, the internal 
structural essence that necessarily determines the extension of the name „gold‟ is the 
atomic number „79‟.14 But, because the essential nature of an object/kind is microstructural 
and therefore only to be established scientifically, Kripke argues that it is not just a priori 
truths that can be seen as necessarily (and thus, universally) true, but also certain a 
posteriori facts, such as gold‟s atomic number. If so, then the real, microstructural essence 
of physical objects that was, for Locke, insensible and therefore unknowable, has now, 
thanks to the microscopic observations of modern science, become Kripke‟s indubitable 
foundation for certain knowledge – not only of the fixed, enduring meaning of names, but 
also of the originally fixed, microstructurally determined nature of the objects they 
represent. For, while it is possible that a piece of gold not have the qualities „yellow‟ and 
„metal‟ and still be gold, if it does not have the essential, atomic microstructure of 79 
protons per atom, then it cannot be gold. The atomic structure is therefore the real essence 
that universally determines, identifies, and classifies the essential, phenomenal properties 
                                                 
14
The atomic number of a chemical element such as gold is the number of protons in the nucleus of an atom 
of that element.  
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of all instances of gold. Similarly, although a substance may look, taste and feel like water 
(in having some or all of the properties by which water was originally described), if it is 
found to have a molecular structure other than H2O, then it cannot be water. That water is 
H2O is a statement of identity that, if true, is necessarily and a posteriori true (1981, p. 
128). If this is the case, then such statements would seem to provide the long sought 
metaphysical and empirical foundation and justification for knowledge of the essential 
nature of the external physical world. 
 
Whilst we may now know the real microstructural nature of objects/kinds, however, their 
essential, macrostructural nature can only be phenomenally and fragmentedly known via a 
Russellian definite description of phenomenal properties that may be identified as essential 
(and thus universally knowable) only insofar as these qualities are intuitively perceived to 
follow from the microstructure of the object (and its species). With regard to the properties 
„yellow‟ and „metallic‟ for example, Kripke says:  
 
to the extent that such properties follow from the atomic structure of gold, they are 
necessary properties of it, even though they unquestionably are not part of the meaning of 
gold and were not known with a priori certainty. (1981, p. 125) 
 
For Kripke, then, it is only through an original (whole) perception, naming, and the 
subsequent scientific identification of the real microstructure that we can fix the meaning 
of a name, logically identify and describe the essential phenomenal features of its 
referential objects, and thus produce and guarantee knowledge of the external world. And 
on this basis, it would seem that Kripke has been able to justify the possibility of, and 
present the means to objective, universal knowledge of the essential nature of a species or 
kind, from the observation of one particular. There are reasons, however, to think that this 
may not be the case.   
 
Firstly, it is unclear as to why the perception of an object as a whole should make its 
existence any more real or certain than the perception of that object as its various 
(secondary) properties. In both cases the object is an object of perception, and when its 
microstructure is scientifically defined and held up as justification for certain phenomenal 
properties to be marked as essential, this microstructure is also an object/property of 
subjective perception. How, then, can it be seen as somehow more „real‟ than, and thus a 
guarantee of the essentiality of, other phenomenal macro-properties, and therefore, of 
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universal knowledge? Further, it is unclear why an object‟s immediately unobservable but 
original and persistingly identical microstructure should be chosen as guarantor of its 
logically (i.e. binarily) derived, necessarily intuitively identified, essential properties, over 
and above the immediately observable, perceptually identifiable, original and persistingly 
identical form of the object. If the response should be that the whole macro-form of an 
object/kind is (as Plato says) always transient and mutable, whereas its genetic/atomic 
microstructure is fixed, immutable and fully determinate (and therefore a source of 
essential/epistemic certainty), then this response may be disputed for the following 
reasons.    
 
Firstly, as the case of identical twins tells us, a fertilized egg might have genetic material 
identical to that of another (its twin), yet we would not say that the essential 
properties/nature of the individuals that develop from those eggs will also be identical 
(Feinstein & Church, 2010). Neither could we expect to determine either the identities or 
the differences in their essential natures by microscopically observing the identical genetic 
material within cells taken from the body of each individual. Secondly, scientific research 
(e.g. McClintock, 1929; Jaco et al, 2008) has shown that the chromosomes within each cell 
of a living body exchange genetic material as well as mutating, thereby causing cells 
within the same body to appear and function in non-homologous ways. Thus, while the 
number of chromosomes remains uniformly the same, other aspects of the genetic structure 
of an organism are constantly changing. There is, therefore, no fixed, uniform 
microstructure with which to identify and confirm phenomenal qualities as essential. Other 
research into the possibility of linking a particular gene to a phenotypic trait such as sex or 
(homo)sexuality, for example, indicates that the mechanism by which genes interact to 
produce a particular phenotype may be so complexly multi-layered as to make the 
correlation of specific genes to phenotypic traits doubtful or even impossible.
15
 And 
thirdly, it seems that the order and function of genetic material is not only affected by the 
extra-nucleic protoplasmic material of each cell, and the position of a cell in relation to the 
overall form of the body, but, as cell biologist Bruce Lipton (2001a, b) contends, is also 
controlled and coordinated by the conscious mind as it correlates not just with the brain, 
                                                 
15
 See Anne Fausto-Sterling (1999) “Sexing the body: How biologists construct human sexuality”; Vernon 
Rosario (lecture): “From Hermaphrodites to SOX9: The molecular deconstruction of sex.” Dept. of History, 
University of Auckland (August, 2005); and Mustanski, Dupree, Nievergelt, Schork & Hamer (2005) “A 
genomewide linkage scan of male sexual orientation”.  
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but with the entire organism.
16
 Thus, to reduce (identification of) the essential immaterial 
and material features of an object/kind to its purely material, supposedly fixed, determinate 
genetic/atomic property not only cannot be justified, but also appears to contradict 
Kripke‟s very own critique of Type-identity theory‟s reduction of mental states (e.g. 
„pain‟) to purely physical states (e.g. brain „C-fibres‟). Because Kripke (1981, p. 155) 
argues here that mind and body are differently constituted and therefore irreducible 
entities, his reduction of the essential nature of an object/kind to a number of phenomenal 
properties intuitively defined in relation to its microstructure makes sense only if that kind 
is conceived as a purely physical female object of appearance, constructed, projected, 
named and defined by and in proper relation to the conscious male subject. And indeed, 
such an interpretation concurs with Butler‟s (1993) critique of Kripke‟s essentialism as 
phallocentrically assuming man as its only baptismal subject, his traditionally patrilineal 
and “patronymic” appropriation, naming, knowledge, and inheritance of the female object 
world dependent upon the permanence of his own proper name/identity, and the fluidity of 
woman‟s name/identity; her supposedly essential, phenomenal traits actually fixed and 
defined only in relation to man (p. 153). Hence, Kripke‟s causal theory of reference simply 
perpetuates woman‟s incarceration as a phenomenal object constructed by and within 
(Husserlian) man‟s conscious, intentional mind. In grounding her nominal definition in a 
fixed, material essence, however, Kripke adds the final touch that turns her male-fabricated 
form into a seemingly predetermined reality.       
 
For Kripke attaches a real, knowable, material essence to the bundle of properties that 
Plato attributed to „woman‟ as the opposingly and asymmetrically defined, controlled 
(potentially uncontrollable) material aspect of man‟s immaterial essence/form, thus safely 
dissociating the rigidly-designated paternal subject from his own feminine projections, and 
most importantly, from the now invisible realm of fluidly de-formed, unnamed, 
demonically natural female bodies. It is this metaphysical dissociation and solopsistic 
isolation of the conscious, transcendent, rational subject from his projected, female 
material world of bodies, senses, desires and emotions - a separation that began with the 
Platonic/Aristotelian conception of a male-owned, immaterial essence, and thus a fixed, 
binary logical view of reality based on the „man/woman‟ dualism - that anti-essentialist 
(male) philosophers from ancient times to the present day have worked to overcome.    
                                                 
16
 Lipton's research is backed by recent epigenetic research suggesting that gene expression is regulated and 
even inheritably altered by psychological and environmental factors (Feinstein & Church, 2010; Gottlieb, 
2000).  
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                                      Anti-essentialist philosophers 
 
Heraclitus of Ephesus 
 
Heraclitus rebukes the author of the line „Would that strife might be destroyed from 
among gods and men‟: for there would be no musical scale unless high and low existed, 
nor living creatures without female and male, which are opposite. (Aristotle, Eudemian 
Ethics VII.1, 1235a25)   
  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, prior and in contrast to Plato‟s dualistic view of reality as 
divided into an immaterial realm of perfect Forms, and a material world of transient, 
imperfect objects, Heraclitus held to the monistic view that reality is underpinned by a 
universal “logos” or material intelligence, likened to an eternal “cosmic fire”, that is the 
fundamental cause and organizing principle of the material universe (Guthrie, 1967, p. 46). 
This universe, however, is devoid of any permanent and immutable forms, each animate 
and inanimate thing just a bundle of binarily opposed qualities that, in their constantly 
seesawing battle for ascendancy, keep all things in a permanent state of flux. For 
Heraclitus, reality is nothing but the unceasing ebb and flow of life in which, as their 
properties vie for supremacy, things come into and then pass out of existence, never 
„being‟ but always „becoming‟, as the destruction of one thing brings the creation of 
another. It is this constant conflict and movement between opposing qualities that is the 
very basis and generator of life itself, as things (continue to) exist as what they are, only by 
constantly changing. This seemingly paradoxical notion can be better understood if we 
examine Heraclitus‟ epigram: “On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and 
other waters flow” (B12, cited in Graham, 2007). Here Heraclitus is (interpreted as) saying 
that a river is and continues to be the same river, only because of the constant and 
everchanging flow of the water that is its content; while those stepping into the river 
maintain the same identity as they and their watery surrounds change from one instant to 
the next (ibid. 3.1). It is therefore because the opposing properties of a thing are always in 
warring, seesawing flux that it can, for a time, attain a unified and knowable state of 
harmonious equilibrium. For, as Heraclitus says: “In change is rest” (1889, §83), but “A 
mixture separates when not kept in motion” (ibid. §84). It seems, then, for this pre-Socratic 
philosopher, that eternal flux is the essence of life.  
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Whilst any ideas of Platonic permanence and immutability of form within the natural 
world are, for Heraclitus, simply illusions of the senses, his conception of movement and 
change as the basis of the existence and identity of things has much in common with 
Aristotle‟s notion of an essential form that, through constant inner activity and movement, 
continues to be what it is. But where, for Aristotle, it is the essentially whole, immaterial 
form of a thing that causes its existence, movement, growth and change, for Heraclitus, it 
is the (rational) material co-instantiation of pairs of opposing but transformative properties 
that produces the unified form of a thing. And where both philosophers conceive of such 
non-essential, oppositional (qualitative, quantitative, and relational) properties as „hot/ 
cold‟, „wet/dry‟, „tall/short‟ and „high/low‟, for example, as fluidly and alternately co-
instantiating within the one living thing, Aristotle then looks to the essential/substantial 
form, function, and various fixed, non-opposing categories/properties of a thing, for the 
perception and knowledge of its essential nature. For, without stable, persisting, unifying 
form, says Aristotle, both existence and knowledge are impossible. Although Heraclitus 
also valued perception, experience, and the information they could give us about the 
natural world, it was not knowledge but comprehension of the underlying logos that he 
valued most, and encouraged men to pursue, when he said: „Those who hear and do not 
understand are like the deaf. Of them the proverb says: “Present, they are absent”‟ (1889, 
§3). That is, perception is useful only if accompanied by understanding of the rational 
principle underlying the shifting and multi-layered meanings of language and the world. 
Nevertheless, in common with Aristotle‟s epistemology, Heraclitus finds a measure of 
stable and persisting unity of being, and thus, a semi-stable foundation for (the possibility 
of) knowledge of reality, in his recognition that the constant flux of opposites creates (and 
exists within) a whole, transiently unified being that can therefore be perceived and known 
as such (Graham, 2007, §5). Thus, both philosophers recognize some kind of enduringly 
same, rationally ordered form - or logos - as integral to the existence and knowledge of the 
natural world. 
 
However, as we have already seen, for Aristotle, this immaterial form belonged only to 
man, with woman therefore conceived and defined only as the (proper/improper) material 
aspects of his essential being. As a result, his originally logically non-opposed, co-existent 
categories of being (e.g. activity, passivity), as well as fluidly connected essential and 
accidental opposites (e.g. light/dark, rational/irrational, good/bad and dominant/subord-
inate) became separated and hierarchically affixed to the asymmetrical terms „man‟ and 
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„woman‟ as the seemingly logically prescribed descriptions of their respective ontological 
natures. Although Heraclitus did not recognize man as having an originary, self-subsisting, 
immaterial soul, as the epigraph indicates, he preceded Aristotle in conceiving „male‟ and 
„female‟ as hierarchically opposed qualities that, because ascribed only to „man‟, and not 
„woman‟, were also contiguous. Like the opposites „high‟ and „low‟, „male‟ and „female‟ 
do have a middle, and can therefore coexist within the one living thing, perhaps with 
“strife” and change, but also without contradiction (1889, §46).  
 
However, Heraclitus recognizes not just one kind of logos, but two: a material logos that is 
the source of fluidity, and an immaterial Logos or (male) God that bestows fixed, whole 
(immaterial) form onto fluid materiality.
17
 And so, while „male‟ and „female‟ may coexist 
within the one unified, soul-fired being, it seems that that being, through his exclusive 
connection to the universal male soul, God or Logos, is, and can only be, a man. For, as 
with the other philosophers mentioned so far, it is only to men that Heraclitus is speaking 
and referring when he says of the unified souls produced through the conflict of opposites: 
 
[W]hile wars and battles seem to us terrible, to God they do not seem so. For God in his 
dispensation of all events, perfects them into a harmony of the whole. (1889, §61) 
 
And, 
 
War is father of all and king of all; and some he has shown as gods, others men; some he 
has made slaves, others free. (On Nature, 1979, LXXXIII) 
 
And finally, 
 
        A man, when drunk, is led by a beardless boy, stumbling, not perceiving where he is 
going, having his soul moist…A gleam of light is the dry soul, wisest and best. (ibid. 
CVI, CIX) 
 
It seems, then, that it is only men who may, with divine assistance, ascend from a moist, 
material (female) state of conflicted and disunified existence, to an ultimately transcendent 
(male) state of perfectly whole, ensouled (and thus knowable) being. For, in all the 
aphorisms attributed to Heraclitus, not one recognizes woman as a unified, autonomously 
defined or ensouled living being.
18
  Instead, he either objectifies the female in comparing a 
  
                                                 
17
 As a material principle, the logos is the source of constant flux (of opposites), but, in its transcendent 
immaterial form, the „Logos‟ is the male God or divine soul that is the source of man‟s emergent soul/form.   
18
 Heraclitus‟ sole philosophical work „On Nature‟ did not survive; fragments of it are to be found, however,  
    as quotations in the writings of others such as Diogenes, Cratylus, and Sextus Empiricus.   
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„maiden‟ to an „earthen pot‟, when Plato, paraphrasing Heraclitus, says, 
 
You are ignorant, my man, that there is a good saying of Heraclitus, to the effect that the 
most beautiful of apes is ugly when compared with another kind, and the most beautiful 
of earthen pots is ugly when compared with maidenkind, as says Hippias the wise. (On 
Nature, 1889, §99)19 
 
Or else, he mythically dematerializes and irrationalizes woman with a disdainful reference 
to the „bacchanals‟ - the frenzied, often irreverent followers of Dionysus, the feminine god 
of wine, nature and phallic fertility - when Clement of Alexandria says of Heraclitus,  
 
Against whom, indeed, does Heraclitus of Ephesus prophesy? Against night-roamers, 
Magians, bacchanals, revelers in wine, the initiated. These he threatens with things after 
death and prophesies fire for them, for they celebrate sacrilegiously the things which are 
considered mysteries among men. (ibid. §124)  
 
Under the intoxicating spell of the beautiful Dionysus, and wielding the thyrsus, the 
wooden, cone-tipped phallus symbolizing his fluid, wildly uninhibited sexuality, his 
companions - the once domesticated, but now wildly mountain-roaming, wine-drinking 
Bacchae women - were often driven to states of violent, orgiastic ecstasy that, at its climax, 
brought regenerative union with Dionysian divinity. Those bacchanals, however, who 
refused to recognize and worship the divine phallus of Dionysus, engaging instead in their 
own sacrilegious rituals, he accursed with madness, forcing them to participate in the 
ritualized killing and dismemberment of their children, other humans, and animals (Atsma, 
2000). Thus, like the prophetically raving Sibyl, the maenadic woman was possessed by 
either god or demon, the (Cumaean) Sibyl‟s refusal to submit to Apollo dooming her to a 
tortured, withered, disembodied existence as his eternal (female) voice. 
 
Thus, while Heraclitus (contra Plato/Aristotle) makes no attempt to define the natures of 
„man‟ and „woman‟ in terms of logically fixed, mutually exclusive opposites, his 
metaphysics is actually even more negative, in denying real woman any kind of defined, 
recognized, material existence at all. For nowhere is the term „woman‟ mentioned in the 
writings of Heraclitus, and it is this symbolic non-recognition and non-existence of real 
woman (even as the material/maternal property of man) that is the prerequisite for the 
qualities of male and female, masculine and feminine, mind and body, heterosexual and 
                                                 
19
 Plato criticized the „wise‟ sophist Hippias for being ignorant of his ignorance, and for valuing imitation over    
    truth. 
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homosexual to be seen as fluidly (though hierarchically) coexisting within the one 
(Dionysian) man/god. As his immanent logos/Logos, pure, proper woman is reduced to and 
represents the fluid material/maternal origin, the emerging (Paternally bestowed) phallic 
form/soul, but also, the sexually improper, de-formed demise, of the Heraclitean male 
subject. For if a light, dry, unified (ultimately immortal, male) soul is something that only 
the wise man shares with (and submissively receives from) God/gods, it seems that, for 
Heraclitus, as for Plato and his followers, it is the formless fluidity of the real, natural 
sexual female body that not only gives birth to, but also threatens the death (or Fall) of, 
men‟s „moist‟ souls.20 As Heraclitus says,  
 
For souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth, but from earth 
water is born, and from water soul. (B36, cited in Graham, 2007) 
 
 
Although the dry, fiery soul of the Dionysian man/god may be male and/or female, 
masculine and/or feminine, heterosexual and/or homosexual, what it cannot safely be, is 
wet. For, whilst Heraclitus tells us that “It is delight, not death for souls to become moist” 
(1979, CVIII), the sexually moist, femininely submissive soul risks the de-forming, 
castrating wetness - the female fluidity - that would mean ignominious death to a once dry 
phallo-logical soul. Could it be, then, that Scheman‟s logic of male homophobia - relieving 
the fear of feminization/death - originated not with Descartes, but with the seemingly fluid, 
pluralist, pre-essentialist philosophy of Heraclitus? A look at Heraclitean aphorisms 
regarding the god Dionysus and his mysterious phallic rituals suggests so. A key but 
obscure part of the Dionysian myth concerns his watery descent into Hades to retrieve his 
dead mother Semele, and his meeting with the shepherd Prosymnus who guides Dionysus 
through the Hadean lake in return for the promise of sexual favours. Dionysus agrees, but 
on returning, finds that Prosymnus has died. Keeping his promise, Dionysus fashions a 
phallus out of figwood, and ritually sodomizes himself on Prosymnus‟ grave (Atsma, 
2000). It is this ritual, then, that inspires the secret, mysterious initiation rites of men, and 
the frenzied sacrilegious, phallic festivals of which Heraclitus so disapproves, and that also 
explains why Dionysus is associated with wine, fertility, unrestrained desire, darkness, 
death, but also rebirth. In desiring and enacting his own sexual subjugation, and thus, 
                                                 
20
 Feminist philosophers such as Irigaray (1985a, b) and Kelly Oliver (1995) have argued extensively for the 
psychoanalytically driven association of woman (as threatening mother and evil temptress) with water and 
fluidity (and particularly the sea/„mer‟) in the writings of various male philosophers e.g. Plato (1994), Kant 
(1834), Nietzsche (1961). It is also significant that Zeus‟ mortal (submissive male) lover Ganymede served 
as his water-bearer and (ultimately immortal) mead-bearer. 
 65 
castrated, feminized death, the bi-gendered Dionysus is also able to rebirth himself via his 
passive reception of the ambrosial seed/form from the life-giving thyrsus. But, while the 
divine wine and soma of the gods promised immortality to Dionysus and his followers, for 
his cousin, King Pentheus, who denied Dionysus‟ godliness and despised (but also desired) 
his feminine appearance, penetrating feminization by the angry god brought only 
dismemberment and death at the hands of Pentheus‟ similarly doubting, and thus 
maddened, maenadic mother (Wohl, 2005, p. 144).
21
 It is the perpetuation of these 
punitive, redemptive, and regenerative sexual practices by Dionysian cult followers that 
Titus Livius describes in his History of Rome: 
 
From the time when the rites were held promiscuously, with men and women mixed 
together, and when the license offered by darkness had been added, no sort of crime, no 
kind of immorality, was left unattempted. There were more obscenities practiced between 
men than between men and women. Anyone refusing to submit to outrage or reluctant to 
commit crimes was slaughtered as a sacrificial victim. (1976, Bk. 39.13) 
 
Thus, sexual submission to the divine god/father promises ambrosial immortality, but 
submission to an (evil) other means death, for “Dionysus, in whose honor they rave in 
bacchic frenzy, and Hades are the same” (1889, §127), his Phallus signifying eternal form/ 
Logos/rebirth, or deformed fluidity/madness/death. Viewed within this context, the original 
Platonic/Aristotelian misconception of „essence‟ as the immaterial source, form, and 
guarantee of man‟s immortality, of „woman‟ as the logically defined, controlled material 
property that constitutes and ensures his earthly existence, and the subsequent history of 
essentialist misconceptions of both, appear to be no more than the philosophical subject‟s 
ever more fearful bid to escape the fatal consequences of his own phallic obsessions.  
 
Arthur Schopenhauer 
 
Our existence has no foundation on which to rest except the transient present. Thus its form 
is essentially unceasing motion, without any possibility of that repose which we continually 
strive after…In such a world, where…no enduring state is possible, where everything is 
involved in restless change and confusion and keeps itself on its tightrope by continually 
striding forward…happiness is not so much as to be thought of. (1970, p. 52) 
 
As the essentialist genealogy has shown, Western philosophers in search of a fixed, 
coherent metaphysics and thus a stable base and method to attain universal knowledge of 
                                                 
21
 See Euripides‟ play, „The Bacchae‟, at http://records.viu.ca/~Johnstoi/euripides/euripides.htm  
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human and worldly existence continued to remain faithful to the Platonic/Aristotelian 
notion of essence and principles of binary logic, despite a persistent need to rely on the 
existence of a non-deceiving God, or on the unquestionable authority of a transcendent 
rational subject, to overcome the epistemic limitations (and feared temptations) of the 
sensual, subjective body. But, as we have seen, this essentialist allegiance led only to the 
fearful solipsistic isolation of the conscious male subject, in his failure to construct a 
coherent, universally accepted metaphysics. Arthur Schopenhauer attempted to free this 
subject from his isolated and obsessive pursuit, by envisioning what Nietzsche later 
announced as the death of God, of truth, and thus, of the transcendent, knowing subject. 
 
Schopenhauer (1966) began from the Kantian epistemic model of the conscious subject 
that logically constructs and knows his own world of phenomenal objects. But he rejects 
Kant‟s assertion that the transcendent subject can know the nature of phenomenal objects 
but not that of the noumenal „things in themselves‟ that cause those phenomena, arguing 
that this assertion results from the mistaken (essentialist) separation of the subjective mind 
from its body. As conscious subject, Schopenhauer argued that he could not only 
objectively perceive his own body as a phenomenal object, but also subjectively experience 
it as a “thing-in-itself” (p. 172), with its own impulses, desires, sensations, and emotions. 
Thus, the phenomenal object/body and the thing-in-itself are not to be seen as separate 
entities, with the latter causing the former, but as two coexistent aspects of the one thing - 
two sides of the same coin - with neither aspect causing the other, and both able to be 
understood (Wicks, 2007, §4). Further, if Schopenhauer could experience his own body as 
inseparably objective and subjective, then, by analogy, he could assume other like bodies to 
be similarly experienced. And, as the title of Schopenhauer‟s The World as Will and 
Representation (1966) tells us, the subjective side of a living body (that is, the thing-in-
itself) is its original, irrational, fluidly indeterminate „Will‟, and the objective side is its 
„Representation‟ - the phenomenal objects or ideas that manifest that will. For 
Schopenhauer, this will is the „Will to Live‟ which he sees as the fundamental principle of 
human and worldly existence; a natural impulse towards knowledge, control, and 
persisting existence. Devoid of reason, the will to live, says Robert Wicks, is “an endless 
striving and blind impulse with no end in view, devoid of knowledge, lawless, absolutely 
free, entirely self-determining and almighty” (2007, §4). Fragmented into transient but 
nevertheless perceivable and comprehensible objects of its desires, the will endlessly re-
shapes its own phenomenal self and world, as the means to its survival. 
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As a modification of the Aristotelian/Kantian categories of being and knowledge, 
Schopenhauer posits his four-fold “principle of sufficient reason” and its four different and 
parallel modes of reasoning as the basis and justification for (comprehension of) the 
existence and nature of four different kinds of phenomenal objects: material objects, 
abstract ideas, mathematical concepts, and motivations (1966, p. 15). Thus, an object exists 
and is understood only if sufficient reason (or cause) can be given for its existence/nature, 
that reason being based upon relations between objects of the same kind. The idea of God, 
for example, cannot be employed to justify or explain the existence or nature of material 
objects. While the Will-to-Live constantly manifests as phenomenal objects (as situated 
within space/time, and determined by natural law), it also, at a metaphysical level, 
manifests as timeless, universal objectifications (akin to Platonic Ideas) that are the 
singular patterns for transiently and multiply individuated material objects. Unaware of 
these universals, however, man strives to impose his own en-forming objectifications upon 
the unruly Will of the natural world, thus creating a world of never-ending violence and 
suffering where individuated beings struggle against and destroy themselves and each 
other in the drive to dominate, accumulate, consume, and thus persist. Since men‟s desires 
must inevitably conflict, and can never actually achieve a fixed, satisfied existence, 
material existence offers only endless and unavoidable strife, sin, guilt and misery. Thus, 
for Schopenhauer, as for Augustine before him, man‟s bodily desires are “originally and in 
their essence sinful and reprehensible, and the entire will to live itself reprehensible” 
(1970, p. 63). Because men are destined to be driven and consumed by their own sinful, 
insatiable will and desires, Schopenhauer concludes that earthly life has no purpose, 
meaning or pleasure, offering nothing but restlessness and suffering to those trapped within 
a Godless world of fleeting objects for which they feel only frustrated, painful, guilt-ridden 
desire, or bored, unfulfilled satiety. For, as he says in Essays and Aphorisms (1970):  
 
It is a sufficiently evil place: it is Purgatory, it is Hell, and devils are not lacking in it. 
Only consider what men sometimes inflict upon men, with what ingenious torments one 
will slowly torture another to death, and ask yourself whether devils could do more. And 
sojourn in this place is likewise eternal for all those who obdurately persist in affirming 
the will to live. (p. 186) 
 
Because intellectual comprehension of this state of perpetual suffering only serves to 
intensify it, Man‟s only hope of relief and redemption lies in the denial of the will-to-live, 
through the suppression of the sexual drive that lies at its core. For while sex may be 
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necessary to relieve that drive, and to propagate the essential, generative will-to-live 
(woman contributing the accidental, will-based intellect that disintegrates at death), it is 
only through the transcendence of sinful, lustful desires that man‟s soul may escape its 
tortured embodiment and find immortal bliss.  
 
For Schopenhauer, this transcendence is to be achieved through the pursuit and practice of 
ascetic detachment from desire and the will, and from the earthly objects that it creates and 
devours. And it promises a state of tranquillity in which the soul may perceive and know 
the universal objects or Ideas, not via the higher powers of reason (as Plato and Descartes 
believed), nor the powers of sensory intuition (as Aristotle believed), but via the aesthetic 
perception of the universal Idea manifested by, and imaginatively apprehended within, 
individual objects of perception. Not every man has this ability to aesthetically perceive the 
universal in the particular, however. For, as Schopenhauer explains in The World as Will 
and Idea (1964),  
 
All profound knowledge…is rooted in the perceptive apprehension of things…[a] 
generative process in which every genuine work of art, every immortal thought, received 
the spark of life. …Always to see the universal in the particular is just the fundamental 
character of genius, while the normal man knows in the particular only the particular as 
such, for only as such does it belong to the actual which alone has interests for him, i.e., 
relations to the will. (p. 297) 
 
It is the powers of aesthetic perception, imagination and “reflective” representation found 
only within the artistic genius that enable the ascetic, aesthetically gifted individual to see 
beyond the earthly realm of the Will and its transient, unsatisfying objects and frustrated 
desires, and thus know - and become objectively one with - the pure, universal realm of 
timeless, changeless Platonic Ideas. In this transcendent realm, the „subject/object‟ 
antithesis that is the principle of material existence falls away, earthly duality and 
multiplicity giving way to transcendental unity as the conscious intellect apprehends and 
merges with the realm of perfectly formed, universal Ideas. As Schopenhauer says of this 
unified intellect: “completely severed from its origin, the will, it is now the world as idea 
itself, concentrated in one consciousness” (ibid. p. 298).  
 
This blissful state of transcendent, will-less unity can be seen as the philosophical 
equivalent of the Buddhist state of nirvana, or the Christian ascent into union with God, or 
the Hindu reunification with Brahman (the universal soul), all of which promise escape 
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from insatiable, lustful object-directed desires that threaten the soul‟s existence and its 
immortality through attainment of the perfect (male) form. In each case, only those with 
higher powers of the mind/soul may achieve this state of bliss. The other feature that 
Schopenhauer‟s path to spiritual immortality shares with these religious paths, as with the 
other metaphysical paths traced in this genealogy, is his conception of the conscious 
transcendent subject as exclusively male, and of woman as the fluid material origin, and 
the sinful sexual demise of that subject; that is, as man‟s „will-to-live‟. For, as he says of 
the aesthetic genius: 
 
The fundamental condition [of genius] is an abnormal predominance of sensibility over 
irritability and reproductive power; and what makes the matter more difficult, this must 
take place in a male body. (Women may have great talent, but no genius, for they always 
remain subjective.). (1964, p. 311) 
      
Thus, only those with a male body can be self-cultivated into ultimately transcendent 
subjectivity, albeit one that must objectify, control and overcome its otherwise “sinful” 
bodily Will in order to survive. And, as the higher male intellect is one that has escaped 
“its mother soil, the will” while the normal intellect, forever ruled by unquenchable desire, 
is “still cleaving to its stem” (ibid. p. 309), it seems that, like Heraclitus and the essentialist 
philosophers that followed, Schopenhauer reduces woman to the „sinful‟ fluid source and 
sexual downfall of man, as well as the submissive, always childish property that constructs 
him and protects him from that fall. Thus, from Essays and Aphorisms:   
 
[woman] expiates the guilt of life not through activity but through suffering, through the 
pains of childbirth, caring for the child and subjection to the man…Women are…childish, 
silly and short-sighted, in a word big children, their whole lives long: a kind of 
intermediate stage between the child and the man, who is the actual human being, „man‟. 
(1970, p. 81)  
 
As man‟s originary, phenomenally manifested Will, woman is the wilfully submissive 
property that constitutes, but also constantly threatens to destroy, his embodied 
subjectivity, and on this basis, can be seen, once again, as a projected, controlled 
representation of the desire that is at the core of man‟s will-to-live: his feared, forbidden, 
feminizing desire to submit. It is this repressed, projected, ultimately unfulfilled desire, 
then, that explains heterosexual man‟s hellish, miserably unsatisfied material existence, 
and the need to transcend it. For, in reuniting object with subject, body with its emergent 
mind, and thus, feminine with masculine properties within the previously divided Kantian 
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man, whilst Schopenhauer retains a measure of control of his female aspect by maintaining 
its conception as male-defined, explainable phenomenal objects, their transience exposes 
him to the constant risk of loss of control of the female will (to submit), and thus, his 
feminized extinction. Hence the safer, but solipsistically isolated existence of the Kantian 
subject is replaced with the guilty, miserable, tortured existence of the re-embodied 
Schopenhauerian subject. It is from this abyss of perpetual guilt, misery and suffering that 
Friedrich Nietzsche worked to free modern man, by injecting the revitalizing blood of the 
fluidly and boldly destructive/creative Dionysian textual warrior into his limp, pallid veins.           
 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
Although Nietzsche advocates writing and reading as bloodletting in the manly warrior, 
he forgets about women‟s blood that flows into new life without the knife, without self-
mutilation or the mutilation of others. Perhaps interpretation can be of the body and 
fecund without also being violent. (Oliver, 1995, p. 24) 
 
Nietzsche has been recognized by many, including feminist philosophers Luce Irigaray 
(1981) and Kelly Oliver (1995), as a visionary who glimpsed something beyond the ever 
more fixed, transcendent, God-authorized essentialism of traditional metaphysics and 
language, and who, in proclaiming the death of God, the transcendent subject, and absolute 
truth, opened traditional philosophical discourse to other voices and thus, other 
perspectives and values. Observing what he saw as the hopeless, nihilistic decadence and 
consequent ill health of a modern European culture emasculated and rendered almost 
lifeless by reductive, guilt inducing, logical and ecclesiastical laws and prohibitions, 
Nietzsche found hope in Schopenhauer‟s creative, destructive „will-to-live‟ and his 
attempts to unite the essential dualisms of metaphysics, language and morality. 
 
Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche rejected the Platonic/Aristotelian notion of a real, original, 
immaterial essence/form that can be known, defined and represented according to the rules 
and structures of binary logic, along with the Kantian notion of a transcendent subject who 
logically constructs and knows his own world of apparent objects. For Nietzsche, it was the 
God-authorized metaphysical and linguistic reduction of the world and meaning to fixed, 
mutually exclusive opposites (e.g. male/female, mind/body, good/evil) along with the 
Christian emphasis on suffering and ascetic denial as man‟s only path to redemption, that 
had combined to produce the „disgusting‟ moral weakness and aimlessness - “the great 
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nausea” - of modern man (1976, p. 381). Therefore, following Heraclitus, Nietzsche 
looked to the Greek (feminine) god Dionysus for the cure to what he saw as an 
overabundance of (masculine) Apollonian rational and religious regulation and (moral) 
restraint of overly individualized beings within a weak, apathetic (or what might today be 
called a democratically „dumbed down‟) society.22 What was needed to restore the health 
and vigour of modern man was an infusion of fluid, virile, violent „Dionysian‟ blood, 
sexual passion and destructive creativity, an infusion that Nietzsche sought to deliver 
poetically via the prophetic, hermetic figure of Zarathustra (1969).  
 
In contrast to the miserable Schopenhauerian man, incessantly driven and tormented by, 
and thus needing to ascetically suppress and transcend his sinful will-to-live, the 
Dionysian-willed man, represented by Zarathustra, is a fearlessly embodied, passionately 
sensual “warrior” (ibid. p. 68) driven to fully express his primal, fluidly impulsive will, and 
thus to live, love and (re)create dangerously, whilst cultivating himself to ultimately rise 
above and laugh at the horrors of an earthly life that he thereby accepts and ecstatically 
affirms. But, the will that drives Zarathustra is not the Schopenhauerian „will-to-live‟, but 
rather, the passionate, aggressive “will to power” (ibid. p. 137), an initially submissive, but 
ultimately dominant force that is certainly not to be ascetically suppressed, objectified or 
expiated, but rather, aggressively channelled and sublimated into the highest forms of 
aesthetic creativity, such as great art, poetry or music, in this way permitting the warrior to 
ultimately overcome (though not abandon) his bodily existence. Thus, through Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche also introduces his concept of the Übermensch. The “Superman” (ibid. p. 103) is 
the non-transcendental, spiritual ideal to which the aesthetic warrior aspires by overcoming 
his phallic will to dominate, consume and recreate the material world, thereby attaining the 
enlightened state of unity and wisdom from which to create his own life-affirming values. 
It is this figure of the Dionysian-willed Zarathustrian warrior that Nietzsche wishes modern 
man to embrace and become - the fully embodied, „hard‟, red-blooded, courageously 
creative warrior that, wielding pen rather than sword, writes with his own blood as he 
constantly destroys, recreates and reinterprets the meanings, metaphors and texts with 
which he constantly reconstructs and reinscribes his own and other bodies. Hence, it is to 
become this “brave, unconcerned, mocking, violent” (1976, p. 153) destructive creator of 
always fluidly multiple truths, meanings and values through the sublimated expression of 
                                                 
22
Apollo was the Greek god of the sun, light, manly beauty, order, individuality, and reasoned self-restraint, 
while his brother Dionysus was the phallic god of wine, chaos, unrestrained passion, intuition, and the 
earthly, feminine cycles of fertility and eternal rebirth. 
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his own phallic „will to power‟ that Nietzsche is exhorting weak, aimless, emasculated 
modern man, when he says, 
 
And if your hardness will not flash and cut and cut to pieces: 
how can you one day - create with me? 
For creators are hard… Only the noblest is perfectly hard. 
This new law-table do I put over you, O my brothers: 
Become hard! (1969, p. 231) 
 
In this way, Nietzsche uses the figures of the modern warrior and Übermensch to 
destabilize and deconstruct the Platonic/Cartesian notion of essence and its fixed, 
hierarchically opposed dualisms that had led to the lifeless petrifaction of traditional 
notions of reality, truth, meaning and subjectivity. For Nietzsche, the transcendent, 
omnipotent God (with his prohibitive, guilt-laden, punitive morality), and the transcendent 
philosophical subject (with his logically fixed metaphysics, language, and universal truths), 
having led modern man to the brink of nihilistic emptiness and solipsistic isolation, are 
now dead. What is needed, if he is to avert the fall, is a new metaphysics and language that 
replaces these essentially fixed, divided forms with a (Dionysian) playful fluidity and 
plurality of existence, language and meaning, and a new religion based on an earthly, 
embodied spirituality, and thus, new ways of constructing, perceiving, representing and 
valuing his self and world that inspire and invigorate. Nietzsche‟s strategy for this 
reconception is to firmly reunite the singular philosophical and religious subject with his 
female „other‟ - the sensual, desiring, wilful, natural body and its fluidity, multiplicity, and 
difference of forms, meanings and representations. 
 
For Nietzsche, as for Heraclitus and Schopenhauer, there is no originary, essentially fixed 
form to life or language. The material body and its will to power are the naturally driven, 
fluidly chaotic source of a conscious, dominant, subjective self that, by creatively 
cultivating, sublimating and overcoming its will and desires, shapes, limits, and gives 
mutable (but ultimately spiritually unified) form to its immanent being. Within this subject, 
the dualities of (Apollonian) mind and (Dionysian) body, of male and female are (albeit 
hierachically) united in a way that permits the (Zarathustrian) subject to construct and 
express himself and his world in a controlled but also playfully varied way. To permit this, 
Nietzsche works to free language and logos from its logically fixed, referential structuring, 
by creating a playful synthesis of poetry with theory, metaphor with literalism, and parody 
with seriousness. For Nietzsche, the seemingly essentially fixed, referential meanings of 
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our words and concepts are, as Alan Schrift puts it, “simply congealed metaphors, 
figurative descriptions whose metaphorical nature has been forgotten” (1996, p. 332). That 
is, over time, the mutable, metaphorically figurative content of a concept has come to be 
seen as fixed, immutable, and literal, thereby seemingly enabling the construction of 
universal truths and knowledge. Therefore, as textual warrior, Nietzsche endeavours to 
separate language, meaning and truth from notions of (male) singularity, objectivity, 
determinacy and universality, linking them instead with (female) plurality, fluidity and 
relativity through his bold, bloodied, and playfully unconcerned use of metaphor, 
interpretation and perspective.  
 
For example, in his writings, Nietzsche variously employs the concept of „woman‟ as 
metaphor for man‟s “wisdom” (Genealogy), “Life” (The Dance Song), “truth” (The Gay 
Science), his “most dangerous plaything” (Zarathustra, 1969, p. 91), “bitch Sensuality” 
(ibid. p. 81), “shadow”, and most alluringly, his “eternity”. For, only in her guise as 
„eternity‟ would Zarathustra want to marry „woman‟: 
 
                      Never yet did I find the woman by whom I wanted children, 
                        unless it be this woman, whom I love: for I love you, O Eternity! 
                        For I love you, O Eternity! (1969, p. 245)   
 
Having utilized Apollonian and Dionysian imagery to unite the modern subject‟s rational 
mind with his sensual body, Nietzsche‟s use of „woman‟ as metaphor might appear to be 
further opening subject-centred philosophy and language to its female „other‟. But, in using 
this term to represent the various psychological, physical and sexual properties or aspects 
of male subjects such as Zarathustra, the warrior, and the Übermensch, Nietzsche denies 
real woman any fixed, defined material (or phenomenal) existence whatsoever.    
 
For, it is as passive, predicated, metaphorical object that Nietzsche appropriates and 
incorporates woman and the feminine into his writings, and, in so doing, he turns her into 
what Irigaray calls man‟s bloodless, lifeless “language-body” (1991, p. 65). Thus, as 
Irigaray‟s Ariadne laments to her beloved Dionysus/Nietzsche, “Something red was 
lacking, a hint of blood and guts to revive the will, and restore its strength” (ibid. p. 79).23 
                                                 
23
As Ariadne, the forlorn lover of Dionysus/Nietzsche, Irigaray complains that, having appropriated the 
feminine/maternal, he cannot love her/woman, but sees and loves only himself and feminine projections of 
that self.    
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For, in using „woman‟ to constitute man‟s subjectivity, even her real reproductive function 
is assumed by the self-overcoming Zarathustra who, as the “manly mother”, usurps his 
mother‟s procreative power and thereafter gives birth not only to art and culture, but also - 
in his “eternal recurrence” - to himself. Thus says Zarathustra, 
 
For the creator himself to be the child new-born he must also be willing to be the mother 
and endure the mother‟s pain. Truly I have gone my way through a hundred souls and 
through cradles and birth-pangs. I have taken many departures, I know the heart-breaking 
last hours. (1969, p. 111) 
 
It seems, then, that Zarathustra‟s sexual, self-rebirthing „will to power‟ is both dominantly 
male and submissively female. As such, it would explain the saintly man‟s need for self-
mortifying rituals that control and atone for the “torrential passion” of his “bitch 
Sensuality” (ibid.), the Zarathustrian warrior‟s need for „hardness‟ and the courage to 
overcome, and his desire to sublimate that potentially fatal will so that, like other „higher 
men‟, he may reach the ecstatic, ambrosial (duality- and object-free) state of spiritual 
oneness. In which case, like Heraclitus, Nietzsche conceives the natural sexual female 
body is the unbounded, fluid source, but also (as his feared, lingering desire to submit) the 
potential death of the warrior/higher man, hence explaining Zarathustra‟s need to fly over 
life, far from the watery depths where the “dark monster” (ibid, p. 175) lies. If this is the 
case, then Nietzsche seemingly frees traditional theories of subjectivity, language, meaning 
and truth from a Platonically fixed, binarily logical essentialism only by maintaining an 
underlying ontological essentialism that conceives the natural male body as having an 
enduringly whole, purposeful, cultivable form, and the natural female body as completely 
devoid of form or properties, and therefore as incapable of cultivation into subjectivity. 
Hence Irigaray‟s description of Nietzsche‟s woman: 
      
[I]n the eternal recurrence, she [woman] attends your wedding celebration, she takes part 
in it, but you yourself are bride and groom. She keeps hold of the thread, anchors the 
harmony, sings the tune. An accompaniment that is necessary to you while remaining 
fundamentally reactive as long as you do not also allow her her self. (1991, p. 32) 
 
In other words, the Nietzschean embodied male subject can now be (hierarchically) 
masculine and feminine, mind and body, (cultivated) appearance and reality, only at the 
expense of the (de-formed) subjective and symbolic non-existence of real woman, and thus 
the perpetuation of the „man/woman‟ dualism through the (unexplained) granting of a 
material and ultimately spiritual form to man, but not woman. It was this metaphysical 
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dualism that Jacques Derrida set out to deconstruct and rethink in a way that may finally 
obviate man‟s need for this “logic of male homophobia” (Scheman, 1993, p. 150). 
 
Jacques Derrida 
    
“Woman” needs the castration effect, because without it she would not be able to  
seduce or stir desire. But obviously she does not believe in it. (Spurs, 1979, p. 362) 
 
Analyzing various Western philosophical texts, Derrida argues in Of Grammatology 
(1998) that traditional notions of an essential, autonomous, transcendent subject who 
searches for self-evident universal truths and thereby gains objective knowledge of the 
essentially fixed nature of reality are not autonomous or self-evident notions at all, but 
have, under the rules of Platonic logic, implicitly depended for their (fixed) meaning upon 
the repressive exclusion of their opposing and subordinated „other‟. Philosophical concepts 
of „mind‟, „truth‟ and „essence‟, for example, historically and metaphysically conceived as 
having a pure, self-evident form and definition, are actually the privileged positive terms 
within a binary pair in which the secondary term - „body‟, „untruth‟ and „appearance‟ 
respectively - is the lacking or negative and thus contradictory version of the primary term. 
While both terms are therefore necessarily identified and defined in terms of (difference 
from) the other, the privileged “self-presence” (1998, p. 98) granted by patriarchal 
metaphysics to all primary terms has depended upon the absence of the secondary terms 
from that and other dominant discourses (e.g. science, religion), a privilege and 
dependency that the primary term or “logos”24, and “logocentric” discourses and 
knowledges have been unable to accept or acknowledge (ibid. p. 8). Whilst remaining true 
to the Saussurean structuralist premise that we cannot step outside the difference-based 
dualistic order that has historically structured language and meaning, Derrida‟s aim is to 
force metaphysical theory to acknowledge its reliance on false dualisms, and to then 
deconstruct, displace, and thereby subvert these rigidly reductive, hierarchical structures, 
replacing them with a pure fluidity and multiplicity of meaning. But in contrast to 
Nietzsche‟s use of metaphor, perspectivity and textual interpretation, Derrida employs 
what he calls methods of “deconstruction” (ibid. p. 14) and “displacement” (ibid. p. 37) to 
dismantle and unite binary logic‟s fixed, mutually exclusive opposites, thereby bringing 
                                                 
24As stated earlier, the „logos‟ is the rational principle that orders the universe. For Heraclitus, the material 
logos is the originary female principle of flux, whereas, for Plato, the immaterial Logos is the immanently 
female, ultimately transcendent, male principle of fixed, whole, rationally ordered Form or soul.  
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the inferior, absent feminine „other‟ into traditional metaphysics, language and theories of 
subjectivity. 
 
Derrida (1981, 1998) begins his deconstruction of logocentric binary logic by reversing 
and thus challenging the fixed, privileged position of the primary term. Taking the mind/ 
body dualism, for example, Derrida argues that, because the secondary term „body‟ could 
just as easily be the primary, present term of the pair, with „mind‟ as its negative, absent 
„other‟, neither term can be seen as necessarily superior to the other. Having thereby 
destabilized the previously fixed hierarchy of value of its opposing terms, Derrida then 
further disrupts the binary structure by arguing that the absent, repressed term actually has 
primacy over the dominant term, since it is the lack of the former that produces the latter 
(Grosz, 1990, p. 93). Within the „sameness/difference‟ binary, for example, „difference‟ 
should be privileged over „sameness‟, since, although repressed, it is never completely 
absent from conscious thought, and through the repeated appearances of its textual or 
material trace - or what he calls its “differance” - produces the dominant term as its effect 
(1998, p. 23).
25
 Similarly, the repression of the negative term „body‟ leaves a series of 
“material traces” or “textual marks” which produce the term „mind‟ (Grosz, 1990, p. 95). 
Because of the gaps and differences between these traces and marks, however, the meaning 
of the term „mind‟ is never fixed or singular, but always shifting and therefore, always 
deferred. Derrida‟s next move is to displace the suppressed negative term, and thrust it, as 
Elizabeth Grosz says, “into the very heart of the oppositional term” (ibid. p. 97), thereby 
uniting the two terms within consciousness, and creating the possibility for their mutual 
expression within speech and discourse. The final deconstructive move is the creation and 
inclusion into the united binary of a third term - a “hinge” (1998, p. 69) word such as 
„trace‟, „differance‟, „pharmakon‟, and „hymen‟- in which the iterative residue of the 
„other‟ becomes the (previously logically excluded) middle term; the „undecidable‟ origin 
that is the precondition for the emergence of always fluidly contiguous and playfully 
ambiguous terms. The “hymen”, for example, is the „hinge‟ term that Derrida uses to 
disrupt what he sees as the logocentric/phallocentric binary logic of discourses such as 
Husserl‟s phenomenology of consciousness, and Lacan‟s linguistic theory of subjectivity.26 
As the blank folds of paper on which the pen/phallus leaves its trace,  
 
                                                 
25
 The term „differance‟ therefore means neither sameness nor difference, but contains the rudiments of both.  
26
 In phallocentric texts, the phallus plays the role of the central, privileged, authoritative signifier that the 
logos (God, reason) plays within logocentric texts.  
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the hymen is neither confusion nor distinction, neither identity nor difference, neither 
consummation nor virginity, neither the veil nor unveiling, neither the inside nor the 
outside etc. (Positions, 1981, p. 43) 
 
Neither one term nor the other, the (intact) „hymen‟ is the fluid source and condition of 
both. As the undecidable origin of ordered language and meaning, the hymenal folds trap 
phallic disseminations (ibid. p. 44), and prevent the seeding of truths that are not also 
untruths; of terms that are not simultaneously their opposites. It is via this three-fold 
deconstructive “feminine operation” (1979, p. 49) that Derrida seeks to reconceive the 
binary logical structure of language, and thus enable the linguistic (re)construction and 
representation of reality in terms of fluid and multiple forms of identity and difference, 
rather than binarily fixed, reductive forms of specularized sameness.  
 
Like Nietzsche, Derrida locates the „man/woman‟ dualism as the foundation for Plato‟s 
essence-based, binarily structured metaphysics and epistemology, and therefore applies his 
deconstructive techniques with a view to replacing its fixed, hierarchically opposed, 
„middle-excluding‟ structure with one permitting a fluidity, multiplicity, and therefore a 
constant deferral and uncertainty of meaning, identity and subjectivity. The secondary, 
negative term „woman‟ (or „female‟) is therefore retrieved from the unconscious, its textual 
trace becoming the hinge term from which the playful, sometimes contradictory male-
female continuum of meanings arises. In bringing „woman‟ back to consciousness, Derrida 
variously employs the term as metaphor for „truth‟ and „untruth‟ (1979, p. 51), for “style” 
(ibid. p. 57) as opposed to the lack of style in logocentric texts, for truth‟s “dissimulatress” 
(ibid. p. 97) and for “the abyss of distance” (ibid. p. 49). However, in using „woman‟ and 
her sexual parts as the metaphorical tools with which to deconstruct the essential, 
transcendent male subject and then reconstruct him out of the whole/parts of his repressed 
feminine „other‟, Derrida seems only to further divide and more deeply inscribe the 
man/woman dualism as, with his use of woman as metaphor for style, he thrusts not word 
but sword into the heart (and hymen) of woman as real sexual female subject. 
 
As „style‟, „woman‟ symbolizes more than just the traces, gaps, gestures, silences and other 
feminine features within text, speech and other systems of symbolic exchange. As Derrida 
reveals in Spurs (1979, p. 41), „woman‟ as “style” is also the “spur”, the pen/sword that 
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draws on its tautly veiled “apotropaic power”27 to parry with and successfully “spurn” that 
of the evil adversary - the “menacing form” - that threatens (feminizing) castration and 
death. Hence, having been previously conceived as the phenomenal/metaphorical objects 
with which Schopenhauerian/Nietzschean man constructs his immanent subjectivity, 
„woman‟, in her Derridean unification with „man‟, becomes the metaphorical feminine 
phallus/pen that inscribes and protects man‟s „becoming woman‟; a phallic pen that - like 
an “umbrella” (ibid.) - is neither parrying, perforating weapon, nor imperforate, hymeneal 
veil, but both at once. As Derrida‟s veiled „style‟, „woman‟ effects the (symbolic) auto-
castration that, in rendering the phallic body undecidably masculine and feminine, initiates 
“a suspension of the relation with castration” (ibid. p. 59). In which case, for the Derridean 
heterosexual male subject, the masquerade that signals his „becoming feminine‟ need no 
longer hold the fear of submissive desires, castration and death as previously controlled by 
fixed, binary definition or sublimation. Armed with his feminine phallus/pen, his 
unforgettable, impenetrable „umbrella‟, the Derridean warrior repeatedly pierces the 
hymen of real woman, projecting his own submissive desires and, in dismembering (and 
appropriating the sexual parts of) her body, reducing her to non-existence in order to 
construct and secure his exclusive subjectivity and place as sole creator of meaning and of 
the textual universe. In this way metaphorical „woman' serves to ameliorate the “apotropaic 
anxiety” (1979, p. 41) of the embodied Derridean subject who may now boldly inscribe 
and cultivate his mind, body and world with fluidly bi-gendered qualities, meanings, and 
identities, seemingly safe from feminization, and secure in the knowledge that the 
undecidable „hymen‟ hides a very decided dualism that persists beneath.  
 
For, in using „woman‟ and her sexual parts as the metaphorical source and constituents of 
fluidly embodied phallic subjectivity, Derrida not only perpetuates the Platonic 
„man/woman‟ dualism that he purports to replace, but even more deeply and violently 
entrenches it, by using his feminine phallus to slice, dice, and destroy real woman, thus 
safely consigning her to fluid non-existence. This means that it is only the real, persistingly 
whole, phallic male body that he is and can be constructing into Derridean subjectivity, the 
non-existence of real sexual woman being the very condition of that construction. Derrida 
confirms this view with his comment that it is only if one is not a woman that the very idea 
or process of „becoming woman‟ makes sense (cited in Grosz, 1990, p. 102). He is 
therefore attributing to „man‟ an essentially whole, self-motivated, and therefore 
                                                 
27
 The „apotropaic power‟ of an object or symbol is its capacity to ward off evil. 
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constructible material form (or referent), but denying one to „woman‟; a denial made clear 
when, reiterating Nietzsche, Derrida says, 
 
There is no such thing as the essence of woman because woman averts, she is averted of 
herself. Out of the depths, endless and unfathomable, she engulfs and distorts all vestige 
of essentiality, of identity, of property…There is no such thing as the truth of woman, but 
it is because of the abyssal divergence of the truth, because that untruth is „truth‟. (1979, 
p. 51)  
 
It seems, therefore, that Derrida‟s anti-essentialist deconstruction of language, meaning 
and subjectivity implicitly and necessarily relies upon the ontologically essentialist 
assumption that a male anatomy pre-destines one for symbolic construction and 
representation as subject, while a female anatomy precludes it; an assumption based on the 
same bias that moved Plato to grant a soul/essence to man, but not to woman. In both 
cases, woman constitutes the (phallically fixed but also fluidly mutable) immanent female 
form of man‟s ultimately transcendent, divinely unified, male essence. For, as the 
(resewable) feminine phallus that man cannot lose, Derrida‟s „woman‟ is the material-
linguistic essence (logos-Logos) that ensure exclusive self and symbolic (re)construction, 
recognition and representation of his organically whole phallic body into fixed but also 
(hierarchically) bi-gendered, multiply identified subjectivity. It is perhaps for this reason 
that Derrida (and other deconstructionist/poststructuralist theorists) would want to insist 
that there is no extra-symbolic material reality, no fixed, persisting essence, and no 
singularly enduring philosophical subject and creator of language, meaning and text. For, 
to admit as much would reveal the necessary essentialism underpinning his metaphysics, 
language and subjectivity. He remains safe in that deception (and its precariously 
suspended castration) however, only so long as real sexual woman remains fragmentedly 
non-existent. Only so long, that is, as she does not return from the distant (hellish) abyss of 
formless, fluidly uncontrollable will and desire, to be and represent herself as an essentially 
wholly enformed, integrated subject, thereby claiming „woman‟ as her name.          
  
In arguing that Derrida‟s anti-essentialist view of language and subjectivity necessarily 
relies on a metaphysical essentialism that grants an essence to man but not to woman, this 
genealogy of pro- and anti-essentialist theories comes to an end that (like the mythic 
serpent) reconnects with its beginnings in Platonic and Aristotelian essentialism. For, 
despite its problematic association with notions of biological determinacy and universality, 
it seems that even anti-essentialist theorists continue to implicitly assume and rely on some 
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kind of essence that underpins and enduringly forms reality and our constructions and 
representations of it. Could it be, then, that our metaphysical, epistemological and 
linguistic theories simply cannot do without some form of essence if they are to accurately 
and coherently represent the nature of reality, subjectivity, language, truth and knowledge? 
If so, then it is not the notion of essence per se that is precluding this coherence, but its 
historical misconception and misuse. In the next chapter, I examine the ways in which 
Plato and Aristotle‟s conception of essence was shaped and distorted by the patriarchy of 
their time, and the ways in which this misconception becomes further distorted by (and 
distorting of) subsequent metaphysical theories as the genealogy unfolds. I then relate this 
misconceived essence to recent, seemingly irreconcilable feminist pro- and anti-essentialist 
theories of metaphysics, epistemology and subjectivity, in order to argue finally for the 
existence of and need to recognize a real, sexually differentiated spirogenetic essence, in 
order to construct accurate and coherent models of subjectivity, language and knowledge. 
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                                                  Chapter 3 
 
                                 Rethinking Essence and Subjectivity 
In the preceding genealogy that traces the philosophical development of the notion of 
essence in relation to pro- and anti-essentialist theories of reality, knowledge and language, 
I argued that, since anti-essentialist theory appears to assume and depend upon a form of 
metaphysical essentialism (albeit biased and distorted), it seems that our metaphysical, 
epistemological and linguistic theories simply cannot do without some form of essence. 
Thus, what is impeding the construction of an accurate and consensual metaphysics is not 
the notion of essence per se, but rather, its history of misconception. In this chapter, I 
outline the source, the means, and the various manifestations of that misconception, before 
then attempting to reconceive Aristotle‟s notion of essence in a way that remedies that 
misconception, thereby creating the basis for a more accurate and coherent theory of 
reality, subjectivity, language and knowledge. 
 
Deconstructing Essence 
In proposing a dualistic view of reality as composed of two separate substances, both Plato 
and Aristotle posited a fixed immaterial essence or form as the first cause of the existence 
and nature of living beings, this essence also providing the fixed meaning of the linguistic 
term representing that being and its natural kind. It was the perceivable, knowable, 
definable presence of this immaterial essence that therefore provided the metaphysical 
foundation for the logical inference of universal knowledge of the nature of reality, 
including, for Plato, notions of absolute beauty, truth and goodness. But where Plato 
posited perfect, immaterial, otherworldly Forms, to be known only by the pure, 
transcendently rational minds of men, and of which material beings are simply the 
transient, imperfect, shadow-like copies, Aristotle saw that Plato‟s theory was unable to 
explain, firstly, how these fixed otherworldly forms cause not only the fixed, persistingly 
same existence, but also the self-motivated movement, growth and change of living beings, 
and secondly, how we can have knowledge of distant immaterial Forms but not of 
proximate material objects. Aristotle‟s solution to these problems was to reconceive 
immaterial essence/soul and material body as one substantial unity, with the whole, 
immutable essence being the first, efficient and final cause of the therefore essentially 
motivated form and function of otherwise inert, fluidly unbounded matter. The Aristotelian 
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essence is therefore primarily a life producing essence of the individual (man) that also 
manifests the universal (species) essence (Man). 
 
The essential form of a thing is not only the first cause of its being and becoming, but is 
also its primary mode of presentation to the gaze of another. For, as Aristotle states, it is 
the persistingly unified substantial form (ousia) of a living thing by which it is perceived 
and known for what it is (Metaphysics VII, 1028a). Therefore, any essential properties 
employed to identify, classify and define individuals as members of a species must always 
be seen as secondary to, dependent upon, and thus always defined in relation to the whole 
essence/form that is metaphysically, linguistically and epistemically prior to them. It is 
through the (repeated) observation of the whole, substantial form and self-actualizing ways 
of being, functioning, acting and relating that one may intuitively perceive, define, classify, 
and thus know the essential, logically structured form and function of the individual and its 
species according to Aristotle‟s logical categories of being (e.g. form, quality, quantity, 
relation, place, time, position, etc.). This means that, for Aristotle, things are not and 
cannot be initially perceived as disorganized bundles of properties or sense data, to be then 
synthesized into a whole form/idea by the consciously intuitive, rational mind (as Locke, 
Kant, Husserl, and Russell theorized). Rather, the observer immediately perceives a living 
thing as a persistingly unified, organized organism that, in „keeping on being what it is‟, 
stands out from its surroundings as the immediately and persistingly whole object of 
attention (Sachs, 2006, §9).   
 
Sally Haslanger (2000, §4) identifies some other key features of Aristotelian essences and 
their substantial forms when she says,  
 
one of the traditional characteristics of substances is that substances do not have 
opposites, i.e., there is no opposite of horse (non-horse does not count as an opposite) 
This is in contrast to many qualities: long/short, inside/outside, loud/quiet. …[As a 
substance] you are a member of the kind or not and there is no middle ground: you are a 
horse or you aren‟t. (Because there is no opposite or contrary to horse, the only negative 
option a contradictory.)  
 
Essential substances or natural kinds such as „horse‟ or „man‟ can have no opposite or 
contrary, in the way that „long‟ is opposed to „short‟, and „inside‟ to „outside‟, for example. 
Their only negative alternative is the contradictory „non-horse‟ or „non-man‟, each 
denoting the set into which all things that are „not a horse‟ and „not a man‟ are placed 
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respectively. Thus, whereas opposing (or contrary) properties - such as „tall/short‟, 
„dark/light‟ or „rational/irrational‟ - are connected by a middle that allows their fluidly 
alternating expression, under Aristotle‟s law of the excluded middle, a natural kind (A) and 
its contradiction (~A) have no middle ground: one is either a „man‟ or a „non-man‟. All 
substantial beings placed in the contradictory category of „non-man‟, however, must 
(according to logical law) have their own positively defined, essential form and function. 
Thus, „Horse‟ and „Tiger‟, for example, as contradictories of „Man‟, also have - and are to 
be recognized and known by - their own self-subsisting essential form/categories of being 
and becoming, therefore situating Aristotelian essence as the source not only of fixed 
persisting sameness, but also of fixed universal difference of form.  
 
The epistemological advantages of Aristotle‟s metaphysical and linguistic essentialism can 
now be summarized. Firstly, his unification of form and matter within the one composite 
substance (seemingly) presents an empirically based, rationally ordered method for the 
attainment of knowledge about the essential (individual/universal) nature of real human 
and non-human beings. Secondly, his notion of an essence-based substantial being allows 
the physical world to be conceived and perceived as having an enduringly fixed, integrated 
structure, but also, as always fluidly moving, developing, and adapting, and therefore able 
to undergo non-essential change due to either self-imposed, sociolinguistic, cultural or 
other environmental influences and inscriptions. Thirdly, because the essential form of an 
individual is identical to (and defined by) that of its species, the essentially whole, fixed 
sameness within a species produces the essential difference between species that makes 
recognition, classification, and knowledge of that sameness possible. And finally, 
Aristotle‟s logical requirement that things be perceived and defined in the first instance as 
essentially whole forms means that, whatever nominal properties are subsequently ascribed 
to a thing (or its species) must be based upon the definition of its essential form (and 
function) in order to count as knowledge of that thing. Further, whatever essential property 
may be predicated of a thing (thereby grouping that thing with other similarly predicated 
things), the nature of that property can be truly defined and known only in relation to the 
whole form and other essential properties of that thing. There are, however, several 
anomalies within this Platonic/Aristotelian conception of essence that also mark it as the 
first in a trail of misconceptions.   
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The Metaphysical Misconception of Essence 
As stated in Chapter 2, both Plato and Aristotle deny a soul/essence to woman, conceiving 
her as simply a soulless, will-less “deformed male” (1953, §25); the fluid matter into which 
„active‟ man plants the seed (or essence) that passes to his son. Because existence requires 
enduring form, woman‟s only real existence can be as the material, female aspects or 
property of man‟s prior, wholly self-subsisting (phallic) being, and, as such, she is defined 
as the negative, inferior, objectified side of a „male/female‟ opposition that installs man as 
its sole essential subject, and divides his essential and accidental properties between these 
hierarchically valued, mutually exclusive opposites. Or, as de Beauvoir puts it, 
        
Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she 
is not regarded as an autonomous being…she is simply what man decrees; thus she is 
called “the sex,”…For him she is sex - absolute sex, no less. (1953, p. 16) 
 
With woman reduced to his passive, submissive, sexual property (or „Other‟), man 
achieves seemingly autonomous existence and definition as the only whole, ensouled, 
transcendently rational, human subject. But what de Beauvoir fails to recognize, however, 
is that this Platonic/Aristotelian conception of „man‟ as transcendent subject depends upon 
„woman‟ being dually conceived as either the proper, pure, passively controlled - or the 
improper, unbounded, and thus demonically uncontrollable - material aspect of man‟s 
immanent soul. As such, she cannot be constructed as subject. For, as revealed in the 
genealogy, the (improper) unrestrained, sinfully sexual female body represents the dark, 
watery depths of forbidden, feared concupiscent desire that, for pro- and anti-essentialist 
philosophers alike, threatens the loss of phallic form, and thus the downfall and death of 
man‟s soul, and that must therefore be repressively subdued or sublimated. And it is only 
because real woman is conceived as formless fluidity that real man can be conceived as 
alone capable of active transcendence of that lowly female realm (Lloyd, 1984, p. 101). 
Real, whole woman simply is the dark, sexually unrestrained, potentially feminizing realm 
of „not-man‟ - the clingy, fearfully engulfing “holes” and “slime” (Sartre, 1976, p. 782) - 
that rational „man‟ must escape and transcend, in order to achieve enlightened, eternally 
enformed subjectivity.  
 
This asymmetrical, hierarchically opposed definition of the natures of „man‟ and „woman‟ 
was not simply a product of Platonic/Aristotelian imagination however, but rather, 
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reflected the beliefs, myths, social values and material reality of the patriarchal culture in 
which they lived. For example, as we have seen, Greek mythology associates the 
masculine god Apollo with light, order and restraint, and the feminine god Dionysus with 
the wildly unrestrained sexuality that, refusing godly possession and control, leads to 
(demonic) „maenadic‟ madness.28 In addition, the Pythagoreans, Heracliteans, and 
Manicheans before them associated maleness with light, unity, limit and goodness, and 
femaleness with darkness, plurality, the unbounded, and the bad (Guthrie, 1967, p. 36). 
Viewed within this context, it is not surprising that Plato associates man with perfectly 
pure, immaterial Form, and woman with the dark, deceitful senses and lustful desires that 
man must subdue and transcend so that his soul may become enlightened. But there are 
other, more tangible reasons for this asymmetrical conception of „man‟ and „woman‟. For, 
as Joe Sachs explains, in the ancient Greek socius (as now), what was seen as permanent or 
enduring in a man - what made him “a man of substance” - was his permanent property or 
“real estate”; property that is not consumed, but that, under man‟s ownership and control, 
“breeds new wealth with no expense to itself” (2006, §3). As his wife, mother, daughter or 
slave, „woman‟ represented the permanent (female) property that constituted and, for little 
or no cost, (re)productively augmented man‟s enduring material wealth. It was the Greek 
term for this permanent, accumulated wealth that was the measure of the substance of a 
man - his „ousia‟ - that Plato and Aristotle co-opted to signify the immaterial essence that 
gives enduring form to man‟s substantial being.29 And so, just as she had literally been the 
(virginal, maternal) property that constituted and augmented Greek man‟s enduring 
physical ousia, so did „woman‟ figuratively become the material property or aspect that 
constitutes and augments Platonic man‟s enduring metaphysical ousia or essence (the soul 
incarnate). And, because the (unappropriated) sexual female body has almost universally 
been seen as the demonically and fatally seductive downfall of man, it is understandable 
that Plato would take unappropriated „woman‟ to signify man‟s dark, uncontrollable lustful 
desire that threatens impurity and death to his otherwise pure, perfect, immortal soul.
30
 It is 
this dual (proper/improper) conception of „woman‟, however, that is the source of the 
misconception of essence that I have posited as underpinning and undermining Western 
philosophy‟s understandings of metaphysics, epistemology, language and subjectivity.  
 
                                                 
28
 See pages 63-65 and 71 of this thesis for the myths of Dionysus and Apollo. 
29
 See pages19 and 26 for reference to Plato and Aristotle‟s metaphysical use of the term „ousia‟. 
30
 In Misogyny: The Male Malady (2001), anthropologist David Gilmour argues that almost all human 
cultures have perceived the sexual female body as the source of evil, impurity, disease and/or death for 
man. 
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For, in order to present a metaphysics that would support the possibility of knowledge of 
the existence and nature of particular forms from that of their universals (Plato), or of 
universal forms from the perception of their particulars (Aristotle), individual, sexuate, and 
species forms had to be identical. That is, the individual form („man‟) had to be identical to 
the universal Form („Man‟). This meant that „woman‟ could not have a form/essence 
equivalent but different to - and thus contradictory of - man‟s, but must necessarily be 
conceived as formless, fluid matter „efficiently‟ caused, shaped and defined only by and as 
part of „man‟. For this to be possible required that „form‟ be further conceived as purely 
immaterial and (actually) male, and „matter‟ as fluidly formless and female, and therefore 
requiring definition as the (passive, purified) feminine properties of man - defined in 
subjugated opposition to his masculine (e.g. active, rational, dominant) properties - in order 
to exist. In this way, all (whole) contradictory forms within the set of „not-man‟ (including 
horse, sheep, tree, etc.) are similarly denied their own essentially defined existence, 
dissolving (alongside „woman‟) into what Marilyn Frye calls the “infinite, undifferentiated 
plenum” (1996, p. 1000), thus explaining why woman (and nature) has thereafter been “so 
easily associated with disorder, chaos, irrationality and impurity…There are no categories 
in not-man; it is a buzzing, booming confusion” (ibid.). The only existential hope for living 
things within that realm is to receive ordered, controlled definition as the subjugated, 
purified property of the sole human, male subject. In conceiving essence and matter in this 
way, Aristotle must disregard the (Heraclitean) possibility that matter may have its own 
ordered, intelligible logos, and consequently, the possibilities that woman may have her 
own sexuately and individually differentiated essence, and that essence may therefore be 
an immaterial and material source of individual and sexuate difference, as well as 
sameness. To do so, he defies his own logical law that contradictories (within „not-man‟) 
must have and be defined by their own essential form, along with his laws regarding 
essential categories and opposites.   
 
In reducing real, whole woman to a fixed set of opposingly defined female properties of 
the essentially whole form of man, and by misapplying the law of excluded middle, 
Aristotle hierarchically and mutually exclusively opposes what were his originally non-
oppositional causes and categories of being (such as formal vs. material causes; active vs. 
passive categories), under the falsely opposed subheadings of „male‟ and „female‟ 
(properties). Further, as Haslanger (2000, §4) notes, he attaches normally fluidly opposed 
essential properties such as „rational-irrational‟, and coexistent essential properties such as 
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„rational‟ and „emotional‟ to these subheadings, thereby fixedly, hierarchically, and 
mutually exclusively defining them in what is a further contradiction of the rules of 
Aristotelian logic. It is not just essential causes, categories and properties that are 
illogically misconceived, however. For the (mis)opposed concepts of „male‟ and „female‟ 
become even more tightly locked into mutually exclusive, gendered, property-based 
definition through the separation of nonessential opposites or contraries that are - but 
should not logically be - fixedly and hierarchically divided by an excluded middle that 
should lawfully apply only to the definition of whole substances. Thus, normally 
nonessential, fluidly contiguous properties such as „superior/inferior‟, „light/dark‟, and 
„pure/impure‟ are reconceived as essential, hierarchical and mutually exclusively opposed 
properties of male and female, thus completing the transformation of these originally non-
opposing terms into two hierarchically and mutually exclusively defined bundles of 
properties. With these transgressions of his laws of binary logic, Aristotle misconceives 
essence in a way that installs man as sole perceiving, knowing subject now equipped with 
the (il)logical binary definitions with which to perceive, appropriate, define and control the 
otherwise fluidly impure realm of formlessly female bodies.  
 
For, in denying woman her own essence, and reductively and dually conceiving her as the 
(proper) good, male-defined, or (improper) evil, unbounded material aspect of man as the 
only essential subject, the rest of the physical world becomes defined and thus exists only 
in perceptual relation to, and as the fixed material properties of, his essential form. Thus, 
whilst the active formal, final and effective causes of man‟s essential being are conceived 
as male, woman and the natural world are its passive material cause, man thus being the 
origin, designer, and motivator of woman/nature‟s passively subjugated existence. For, as 
Aristotle says, “the female, as female, is passive, and the male, as male, is active, and the 
principle of the movement comes from him” (1953, §21). In this way, man‟s originally 
whole essence becomes fixedly and illogically divided in a way that prepares it for 
numerous further divisions and methods for the perception and knowledge of its 
immaterial form and fixed material properties. And, as the material aspect of that essence, 
woman‟s nature becomes dually (and morally) misconceived as either a fragmented bundle 
of its virtuously restrained, material properties, or else, as its dark, chaotic, naturally 
determined, (demonically) uncontrollable fluidity.  
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By (mis)conceiving essence in this way, Aristotle seemingly achieves the conditions and 
justification required for knowledge of its individual and universal form. For, with 
woman/nature only an aspect of man‟s essence, the essential form of individual „man‟ 
becomes identical not only with that of all „men‟, but also with that of the entire human 
species „Man‟, thus conferring on this essence the universal, homogenized (male) 
sameness that justifies and enables the (intuitive) perception and knowledge of a universal 
essence through the (sense) perception of its individual instances. This does not mean, 
however, that Aristotle does not recognize the differences that distinguish one individual 
man from another - Callias from Socrates, for example. He does, but then attributes these 
substantial differences to variations in the material (female) aspect of man‟s essential 
nature (Witt, 1989, p. 178). In this way, Aristotle therefore preserves the identity between 
the whole, individual essence of „man‟, and the whole essence of the entire human species 
„Man‟, thereby completing his misconception of essence as a (fixedly divided) source of 
individual, sexuate, and species sameness. But, despite these misconceptions, this notion of 
essence retains its capacity to not only fixedly determine the essential form and properties, 
but also motivate the existence, growth, change, and movement of a substantial (male) 
being. For even fixed, enduring sameness of form requires constant activity to maintain it, 
as Aristotle notes when he says of the motivating soul, 
 
Hence the psychic power which we are now studying may be described as that which 
tends to maintain whatever has this power in it of continuing such as it was, and food 
helps it to do its work. That is why, if deprived of food, it must cease to be. (On the Soul, 
1941, Bk.II, Pt.4)  
 
Hence, it is not the notion of essence per se that is the source of universal sameness, 
natural/biological determinacy, and fixed, unchanging properties, but rather, the various 
misconceptions outlined above that have characterized essence as an immaterial, male 
preserve, and reduced woman/nature to its fixed, subordinate (potentially demonic) female 
aspect. It is not essence, therefore, but this dualized (pure/impure) misconception of 
„woman‟ that has underpinned and justified her historical subjugation and oppression, a 
justification that Aristotle reinforces when expressing the need for man‟s „pure‟ seed to 
purify woman‟s sexually „impure‟ menstrual blood, 
  
For the catamenia are semen not in a pure state but in need of working up, as in the 
formation of fruits the nutriment is present, when it is not yet sifted thoroughly, but needs 
working up to purify it. Thus the catamenia cause generation mixture with the semen, as 
this impure nutriment in plants is nutritious when mixed with pure nutriment. (1953, §20) 
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As impure fluidity, woman‟s only hope of purity and goodness lies in her appropriation 
and oppositional definition as the purified, passive, material aspect of man‟s essential 
being. But, as such, woman became an obstacle not just to knowledge, but to man‟s very 
existence, that philosophers since have struggled to overcome. For what Aristotle could not 
explain was how the perception of man‟s fixed but also changeable material, female 
properties might ensure knowledge (and existence) of his essentially fixed, whole, 
immaterial individual/species form and properties. As a result, Aristotle‟s misconception 
of essence - as an immaterial, male preserve fixedly divided into opposing bundles of 
properties - spawned a trail of further misconceptions that, via problems such as the 
mind/body, monism/dualism, and essentialism/constructivism debates, have shaped and 
obstructed traditional and feminist philosophies. It is by following this trail that I hope 
ultimately to dissolve these problems through a reconception of the notion of essence. 
 
The Trail of Misconceptions 
With Aristotle‟s splitting of man‟s substantial being into two hierarchically opposed, 
mutually exclusive bundles of (male/female) properties, his notion of (immanent) essence 
came to resemble Plato‟s in being a male preserve, and having a higher rational, male 
aspect, and a lower female, material aspect or set of properties. Similarly, it is the highest 
male aspect - the prime or unmoved mover - that signifies immortal, immaterial perfection 
(of form), while the lowest female aspect - the fluidly de-formed, (sinfully) sexual body - 
signifies material imperfection, impurity, badness, and even non-existence. This 
misconceived essence was therefore the perfect metaphysical answer to St. Augustine‟s 
prayers, in appearing to offer the metaphysical and epistemic means to know and overcome 
evil and procure absolute goodness and immortality for the soul. For it permitted and 
supported the logical recognition of an omnipotent, intentional, authoritative God as the 
transcendently and immutably perfect and thus immortal (male) form of man‟s immanent 
soul, with woman logically reduced to its „proper/improper‟ material aspect, and the 
serpentine Satan threatening the fatally feminized „Fall‟ of that soul. With these 
ingredients, the soul‟s attainment of a perfect, immortal form became a matter of 
controlling and ultimately transcending its (dual) female, material aspect - its weak will 
and (potentially sinful) carnal appetites - so as to achieve union with, and to receive and 
embody the Logos of, the eternal and omnipotent Father. For, to succumb to „Eve-il‟ lust 
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for Satan‟s phallic fruit meant the deforming, feminizing fall of that soul into the fires of 
Hell (akin to Greek mythology‟s Hadean realm of Tartarus), there to melt into formless 
fluidity within the torturous flames of depraved but insatiable desire.
31
  
 
             
      
    Figure 1:            La Face Cachées des Fesses  [The Hidden Side of the Bottom]              (Pochon, 2009) 
 
This ecclesiastically embellished, moralized, misconception of man‟s essence as innately 
sinful and imperfect, redeemed only through baptismal purification, naming, and ongoing 
eucharistic submission (or penance) to an immaterial, pedagogical Father, set the 
foundation for subsequent (pro- and anti-essentialist) reconceptions of essence, as outlined 
in the genealogy. This Augustinian understanding of essence may be diagrammatically 
represented as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
Tartarus is the lowest region of Hades – the underworld of the dead. Crossing the river of death, it is to this 
fiery realm that sinful souls are banished, to be eternally tantalized with unattainable objects of desire. 
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 Figure 2:           The Essence of Man 
 
 
In this diagram, „God‟ represents the highest (immortally male) aspect, and „Satan‟, the 
lowest (fatally feminized) aspect of Man/Adam‟s essence, while the dually conceived 
„Woman/Eve‟ represents its ambivalently female, material will and desires. That is, her 
pure, proper, rationally restrained aspect represents man‟s virtuous desire to (spiritually) 
bow to the (phallicizing) will and Word of God; her impure, improper, uncontrolled aspect 
representing his forbidden desire to (physically) bow to the (feminizing) will and sexual 
body of Satan. It is this diagram, then, that also dissolves the paradox of Diotima.
32
 For, 
whilst (sinful) Eve represents its impurely sexual, material aspect, Diotima is the pure, 
chaste, rationally receptive, immanent soul/mind of man that, in receiving God‟s 
knowledge of absolute truth, beauty, and goodness, ultimately ascends to and assumes His 
perfect, immortal form. Thus, only as man‟s rational soul (or Psyche) may woman be 
wise.
33
 Using this explication of Augustine‟s further (and now God-ordained) 
                                                 
32
 See page 21 for Plato‟s reference to the „wisewoman‟ Diotima - an apparent paradox in that Plato denies a 
soul to woman, thereby denying her the ability to know or be wise. 
33
 The femaleness of man‟s immanent mind/soul finds further mythological support in the Greek figure of 
Psyche, the female personification of the immanent human soul, and Sarasvati, the Hindu (father-born) 
goddess of wisdom.  
     92  
 
misconception of essence, it is now possible to show how subsequent, even more distorting 
reconceptions follow from it.  
 
In what Bordo calls a “flight from the feminine” (1987, p. 5), Descartes seeks to radically 
separate the innately sinful Augustinian soul/essence from the source of its seemingly 
inescapable imperfection - its (dual) sensible, material (female) aspect - in order to present 
the mind as the indubitable foundation for knowledge and thus control of the physical 
world. In reconceiving mind and body as distinct substances, each motivated by its own 
essence, Descartes conceives the human body as a machine that, like a “well-made clock” 
(1968, p. 163), is a naturally ordered, instinctively driven, unfeeling assemblage of 
essential parts that may, however, become disordered (due to its unruly senses), causing 
disturbing passions to arise in the mind. To avert this threat, the pure, femininely 
submissive mind must open itself to receiving (divine) a priori knowledge of the essential 
(spatial) properties of the natural body, thus ascending to a transcendent state of “forceful, 
potent and virile” masculine subjectivity (Keller, 1985, p. 38) from where to project and 
subdue his dangerous passions via the penetrating subjugation, dissection, and logical 
definition of the natural (female) body. For the transcended Cartesian subject, then, the 
unfettered natural body that (at first sight) presents as an unknowable source of wonder 
must be reduced to the (femininely) subjugated object of his possession, knowledge and 
control (lest demonic passions erupt). Thus, with his bifurcation and purification of 
(immaterial, male) essence, Descartes seemingly reinforces the Platonic/Augustinian „logic 
of male homophobia‟, thereby defusing the Cartesian subject‟s fear of feminization. The 
problem with this further misconception, however, is that the male subject‟s seemingly 
safe, autonomous, wholly formed existence actually depends upon his certain knowledge 
and constant control of a natural (demonically female) realm which therefore continues to 
threaten that existence, especially with Descartes‟ failure to explain just how the 
immaterial mind might even act upon a material body. Hence, with his subsequent failure 
to produce the scientific knowledge required for control, it became the urgent quest of the 
now solipsistically isolated philosophical subject to found, justify and obtain 
knowledge/control of the natural female realm, for his own survival. Along with the 
mind/body problem, the other problems impeding that quest (e.g. other minds; freewill vs. 
determinism; monism vs. dualism; physicalism vs. spiritualism) can be seen to result from 
Descartes‟ misconception of essence.     
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For, with the Cartesian subject isolated not only from the natural world but also from other 
(possibly demonic) male minds, knowledge of the existence of the latter becomes a matter 
of assumption based on identity. Because only men have a mind, he can only assume that 
all other men have minds too. And, because his soul is characterized by free will, and his 
ontologically distinct body naturally determined, it becomes inconceivable to Cartesian 
man that free will and determinism might be able to coexist within one unified being, 
without contradiction. Similarly, the questions underlying the unresolved „monism/ 
dualism‟ and „physicalism/spiritualism‟ debates - Is reality composed of one substance or 
two? And, if one, is it physical or spiritual? - assume the Cartesian view of mind and body 
as distinct substances, with each one therefore incapable of manifesting the other. For, only 
if the transcendent (male) mind, finally purified of its material (female) properties, is 
conceived as incapable of manifesting even a trace of materiality, can reality be logically 
conceived as either one substance or two, and not as always (and non-contradictorily) 
both. With these problems hampering the attainment of knowledge of real physical bodies, 
it is unsurprising that Locke, Kant, Husserl and Kripke would look to Descartes‟ 
opposingly and objectively (re)defined phenomenal objects as their basis and justification 
for knowledge.   
 
Within their empiricist and subjective idealist theories, Descartes‟ (knowable) natural, 
mechanical essence - reconceived as Locke‟s real microstructural essence, and later, as 
Kant‟s thing-in-itself - becomes unknowable, as the solipsistic subject takes Aristotle‟s 
efficient/spatiotemporal categories and properties of being out of the real, natural world 
and into his own conscious mind. Here he uses them to logically construct, nominally 
define, know, and thus control phenomenal objects (or appearances) as the „proper‟ 
manifestations of his sensible perceptions, intentions and „improper‟ desires. With 
Husserl‟s relocation of the external (essential) thing-in-itself into the conscious, 
intentionally perceiving mind, to be the knowable ideal limit of its logically synthesized 
appearances, these phenomenal objects and their nominal essences attain a seemingly real 
existence, albeit only within the Husserlian subject‟s mind. With his subsequent projection 
of these realized appearances outside the limits of the conscious mind that enformed them, 
and Kripke‟s later grounding of their essential phenomenal form/properties in a (Lockean) 
real, perceivable, microstructural essence, the solipsistic subject seemingly achieves the 
essential basis and justification for knowledge and control of apparently real phenomenal 
bodies needed to ensure his (divinely authorized) subjective existence. This foundation is 
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undermined, however, by the inescapable need to use sense data as the base ingredients for 
phenomenal objects, thus thwarting the transcendent subject‟s complete escape from 
actually real, fearfully unrestrained, natural (female/feminized) bodies. It is this now twice 
bifurcated real/phenomenal essence, as it fixedly subjugates and defines his/the feared, 
alienated, natural female body, that the (supposedly) anti-essentialist subject reclaims so as 
to escape his solipsistic isolation, but in a way that also averts the demonic Fall. 
 
Schopenhauer‟s first move in reclaiming his real/phenomenal physical (female) properties 
is to reunite the Kantian logically defined phenomenal object with the real, natural thing-
in-itself; appearance and object are just two sides of the same coin, and that coin is the 
fluid, originary thing-in-itself - the conscious subject‟s irrational, blindly impulsive, sexual 
„Will-to-live‟ that is the fundamental principle of existence. Because it is the Will of the 
(male) subject that unceasingly creates and unsatisfyingly consumes his natural/ 
phenomenal (female) object world, subject and object are one, man‟s only escape from the 
torment of (forbidden or unsatisfying) phenomenal objects being through ascetic 
detachment from, and aesthetic transcendence of his lustful will. And, for Schopenhauer, it 
is „woman‟ that symbolizes this natural, fluidly primordial, but also “sinful, reprehensible” 
will that, as for Heraclitus, is the (impure) source, the (purified) objectified form, and also 
the fluid demise of the consciously (re)embodied male subject. Thus, in effecting this 
reunification of the (male) mind and his (female) body, Schopenhauer marks the Cartesian 
natural, mechanical body as male (woman being its fluid, maternal source), and unites it 
with its Cartesian mind-subjugated and opposingly redefined phenomenal properties, so 
that man‟s naturally impulsive, sinfully sexual (childishly female) body/will gives rise to, 
and is then subjugated into artificial (feminine, object) form by, his transcendently male 
mind/soul.     
 
While miserable Schopenhauerian man strove to ascetically suppress and spiritually 
transcend his unruly female will to ensure the soul‟s immortality, Nietzsche sought instead 
to actively and aesthetically sublimate this will through the passionately embodied use of 
poetry, parody, and metaphor and their always fluid meanings to construct and reinscribe 
the natural (male) body with ever-changing forms of subjectivity and identity. In this way, 
the Cartesian boy‟s femininely submissive will manifests as the metaphorical objects with 
which the Zarathustrian warrior/man aesthetically expresses, cultivates, controls, and 
ultimately transcends this always threatening will (finding unity and immortality in the 
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soma of the gods), Nietzsche thereby perpetuating Schopenhauer‟s fusion of (Cartesian) 
apparent and natural (female) essences.
34
 
 
Derrida, however, seeks, not transcendent, but earthly immortality, to be achieved through 
the „stylish‟ cultivation of the boyishly submissive body/will into phallically fixed, unified, 
bi-gendered subjectivity, thereby shielding himself - as parrying, penetrating, self-
rebirthing textual warrior/subject - from the threat of castrated feminization and death. As 
the feminine phallus/logos that is the creator and protector of that subjectivity, it is 
„woman‟ and her chaste female/feminine body that are to be Derrida‟s soma, the following 
reworking of Derrida‟s (1998) and Grosz‟ (1990) explication35 of his deconstructive 
strategies revealing the fixed phallic essentialism achieved via these supposedly anti-
essentialist steps: Derrida uplifts the (Cartesian) bundle of essential, opposingly defined, 
feminine properties (the subjugated body) and thrusts it (back) into the heart of the whole, 
masculine mind, taking the virginal hymen (not the impure will/woman) as the fluidly 
„undecidable‟ source of metrosexual man‟s (hierarchically) bi-gendered subjectivity, and 
making (pure) „woman‟ metaphor for the veiled „style‟ - the imperforate feminine phallus - 
that constructs and protects that enduringly unified subjectivity, and that cannot be lost.
36
 
Now without male-defined existence or representation, pure, hymeneal girl/woman is both 
the formless, fluidly undecidable, female source (the material logos) from which, and the 
feminine phallus/style (the immaterial Logos) with which, man is textually/seminally 
(re)constructed and qualified into perfectly unified, hierarchically bi-gendered, self-
immortalizing subjectivity, whilst impure, sexual woman, repeatedly penetrated and 
destroyed by his phallic sword/pen, has no existence whatsoever. As such, she can no 
longer threaten as man‟s very „decidable‟, fatal, will to submit. In thus reuniting the 
essentially whole, dominant Cartesian mind with its phenomenally subjugated, nominally 
redefined body, with the real, virginal female being the (female) source and (feminine) 
components of that seemingly real phallic subjectivity, „woman‟ comes full circle back to 
her original Aristotelian definition as the proper/improper material aspects of man‟s 
essential being. The difference being that Descartes and Derrida recognize an element of 
natural order/structure within the vast, fluidly formless (female) plenum (an element 
recognized by Heraclitus, but ignored by Aristotle), with Derrida claiming that element as 
                                                 
34
 In Sanskrit, Soma is the purifying, unifying, immortalizing semen/ambrosia/wine of the gods.  
35
 See page 76 of this thesis. 
36
 See page 77 for explication of Derrida‟s (1979) use of „woman‟ as metaphor for the „style‟ that is the 
veiled, phallic pen/sword that disseminates (and thus protects the warrior subject from) feminizing desires, 
thereby allowing him to safely „become feminine‟.    
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the pure material essence (logos) of the body that therefore possesses the only whole, self-
motivated, and thus constructible form: the phallic male body. Hence, with his 
reappropriation of the subjugated, simulated feminine, and his violent dissection and 
annihilation of the natural, sexual female, Derrida even more deeply and damagingly 
engraves the „man/woman‟ dualism onto the notion of essence, and therefore onto real 
sexual (female) bodies, as his supposedly anti-essentialist strategies retain and perpetuate, 
in a now utterly distorted form, the (Aristotelian/Cartesian) bifurcated misconception of 
essence.    
 
Having traced the Aristotelian phallocentric misconception of essence through its ever 
more distorting permutations, it becomes clear why feminist philosophers such as Luce 
Irigaray (1985a) have worked with such urgency to conceptualize and thus re-present an 
embodied, female subject within language and discourse. For Irigaray realizes what other 
anti-essentialist feminist theorists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler and Donna 
Haraway do not. When theorists such as Nietzsche and Derrida conceive of the 
sociolinguistic and self construction of fluidly embodied subjectivities and identities, just 
as when Plato conceives of the cultivated ascendence of the noble soul to transcendent 
perfection (of Form), they assume and depend upon the material and symbolic non-
existence of woman as female subject. That is, their metaphysical and epistemological 
theorizing requires that the term „woman‟ function not as a name referring to a real 
subjective being, but only as a symbol or metaphor, its meanings gleaned only in (inferior, 
propertied) relation to the name „man‟. This is why Irigaray initiates a 
(re)conceptualization of „woman‟ as embodied, thinking, feeling, desiring, female subject, 
thereby creating the foundation for a model of subjectivity and language based in real 
sexual difference, rather than what she sees as the “hom(m)osexual” (1985b, p. 43) 
sameness of traditionally phallocentric language, discourse, and theories of subjectivity. 
Because it is the visible presence of the singular, erect phallus that has traditionally 
determined and defined the male subject, Irigaray looks to the female morphology, 
specifically the plurality, tactility and incompleteness of the vaginal “two lips”, as the basis 
for a fluidly mutable, symbolically and self-constructed female subjectivity (1985a, p. 24). 
Irigaray describes the development of this always-embodied subjectivity as a “sensible 
transcendence” that requires the cultivated restraint and refinement of base, bodily 
instincts, drives and impulses to achieve a self-limiting, but also fluidly transforming, 
always incomplete state of divinely spiritualized subjectivity. This sexually differentiated 
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subjectivity therefore rejects essentialist notions of an original, essentially fixed, complete, 
autonomously defined form, its fluid female forms shaped only in relation to, and as 
different from, the sexual morphology and function of the male body. Drawing upon 
Heidegger‟s construction of the natural world as a place/dwelling of human being (or 
Dasein), Irigaray conceptualizes the female subject as an “uncircumscribable volume” 
(Hirsh & Olson, 1996, np.), her fluid female body a site of “natural belonging” (2004, p. 
xii) that she constructs and limits as a subjective being or dwelling from which to go forth 
and engage with the male subject, with each one being a „place‟ for but not appropriating 
the other. For, as she says, “Why is setting oneself up as a solid more worthwhile than 
flowing as a liquid from between two [lips]…My life is nothing but the mobile flexibility, 
tenderness, uncertainty of the fluid” (1992, pp. 18, 28).  
 
However, in maintaining pro- and anti-essentialist associations of real (sexual) woman 
with unbounded fluidity, and the anti-essentialist denial of a (material/immaterial) real or 
linguistic essence, Irigaray seems to simply accept and perpetuate the various 
misconceptions of essence that necessarily depend upon the uncultivable fluidity (i.e. the 
formless non-existence) of real woman as the basis, and to provide the pure 
(material/metaphorical) properties, for their conception and cultivation of an essentially 
male subjectivity. In addition, she seemingly ignores the Derridean/Foucauldian 
assumption of a (Cartesian) natural, essentially ordered and motivated male body, and 
Derrida‟s use of „woman‟ and her (chaste) female body as the condition and means for 
cultivating what can only therefore be a male subject. In which case, it is not the denial of 
essence that may enable the metaphysical conception and real/linguistic construction of 
woman as female subject, but rather, its recognition and reconception in a form that 
precludes the original Platonic/Aristotelian misconception, and the ever more phobically 
distorted logic that followed; a logic that may also now be termed the „logic of survival‟ of 
the phallic male subject. 
 
A Reconception of Essence 
Recall that Aristotle originally conceived essence (or ousia) as an immaterial soul that is 
the first cause of: i) the existence, ii) the enduringly whole, definable, knowable form, and, 
iii) the functional capacity for self-motivated change, movement, and thus, the adaptive 
self-actualization of all living things (or composite substances). Without essence, matter is 
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simply an inert, fluidly undefinable mass, and it is this (primary) essence that gives form to 
the individual substance (e.g. „man‟) that also corresponds to the (secondary) essence that 
gives form to the species (e.g. „Man‟). But there is a further key feature of Aristotle‟s 
essence that then becomes obscured when he denies an essence to woman, and conceives 
her as the (pure/impure) material aspect of man‟s ousia. That feature appears in On the 
Generation of Animals (1953), when Aristotle says of the sexuate differences that enable 
reproduction, 
 
Male and female differ in their essence by each having a separate ability or faculty, and 
anatomically by certain parts; essentially the male is that which is able to generate in 
another, as said above; the female is that which is able to generate in itself and out of 
which comes into being the offspring previously existing in the parent…Clearly, then, the 
distinction of sex is a first principle. (§2) 
 
As Georges Duby et al. (1994) argue, Aristotle all but says here that sex (and thus, sexual 
difference), as an almost universal condition for procreation, is an essential form and 
function; both male and female have their own „first principle‟ or essence, and thus 
contribute equally to the generation of the offspring. Having come this far, however, 
Aristotle quickly retreats from the metaphysical and linguistic recognition of sexuately 
different essences by deftly turning the qualitative differences between male and female 
morphologies into quantitative differences (ibid. p. 67). A female, says Aristotle, is simply 
a deformed, undeveloped male; she has the same seminal blood as man, but because her 
body is cold, her blood cannot develop into mature, seed-bearing semen. Or, as he puts it, 
“females are weaker and colder in nature, and we must look upon the female character as 
being a sort of natural deficiency” (1953, §6). In this way, Aristotle‟s metaphysical and 
epistemological requirement that a genus or species essence be based on the reproduction 
of one individual essence is met by denying the distinct sexuate differences, and the mutual 
capacity for generation, that he had earlier asserted. When it comes to explaining the fixed, 
enduring differences between individual (male) substances, and also between individual 
(male) essences, however, he is unable to perform the same sleight of hand, and in fact has 
little to say on the matter.  
 
Charlotte Witt (1989, p. 178) interprets Aristotle as supposing the differences between one 
individual essence and another to be due to differences in the (posterior) composite 
(form/matter) substances of the two (male) individuals, whilst differences in the composite 
substances are put down to differences in the matter of each substance. However, this 
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interpretation, if accurate, contradicts Aristotle‟s definition of the nature and relation of 
form and matter, in that it makes matter indirectly responsible for differences between 
individual essences, thereby making both composite substance and matter prior, in this 
respect, to essence. But if essence is the first cause of the existence, form and function of a 
composite substance (and its species), as Aristotle suggests, then neither substance nor 
matter can be prior to it in any respect whatsoever. This relationship is further complicated 
when, in attributing the unity of a substance (e.g. “cloak”) to the putting of form (“round”) 
into matter (“bronze”), Aristotle (1994, Z1045a, §26-35) seemingly assumes a prior, 
identifiable structure to matter as a condition - but not an equal cause - of that unity. In 
light of these anomalies, it appears that Aristotle inclined towards but resisted recognition 
of not just essential sameness - but also difference - of individual, sexuate, and species 
form(s), and a not just immaterial, but also material essence; a resistance that, in light of 
contemporary scientific advances, can seemingly no longer be justified.    
 
Biological science has shown matter to indeed be a source of determinate form and 
function, that source indicating that if Aristotle conceives the members of a species as 
defined and united by a common essence/form, then he should arguably do the same for 
members of the same sex. That is, we now know the matter of living organisms to be 
largely composed of cells containing genetic material that passes from one generation to 
the next, with both male and female parents contributing equal amounts of genetic matter 
to their progeny. This recombined genome holds the code or „blueprint‟- the (potential) 
essential form, one might say - for the development and actualization of the enduringly 
whole, autonomously definable individual (Pai, 1984). Because it causes and motivates not 
just the persisting sameness but also the growth, change, and thus difference of form, this 
genetic code can be seen as the source of persisting sameness and difference in individual, 
sexuate and/or species form. For, whilst human cells typically have 23 pairs of 
chromosomes, only around 98% of that genetic material is identical in man and woman, 
the other 2% accounting for the differences not only between man and woman, but also 
between individual men, as well as between individual women. Compared with the 98% 
similarity, this 2% difference in male and female genetic codes may seem insufficient to 
warrant the recognition of sex (and sexuate difference) as essentially determined. This 
conclusion is challenged, however, by the further recognition that the human genetic code 
appears to differ from that of the chimpanzee, for example, by somewhere around 2% 
(Page et al., 2003). Hence, if a 2% difference in species genomes is enough to impel 
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Aristotle‟s recognition of a species-specific essence, then it is not implausible to suggest 
that a 2% difference in sex genomes can support recognition of a sex-specific essence.   
 
On the basis of this argument for the association of genetic material with essence, one 
might conclude (as Kripke does) that it is purely the genetic material of an organism that 
determines its essential form and/or properties. However, as the findings of cell biologist 
Bruce Lipton (2001a) and other epigenetic research indicate, not only does genetic material 
direct and motivate the development of mind and body, but mind also directs and 
motivates the operations of every cell in the living organism, and particularly the 
operations of its genes.
37
  As Lipton says in Mind over Genes: The new Biology (2007), 
 
Earlier in my career…I actively supported the perspective that the human body was a 
biochemical machine „programmed‟ by its genes. It is now recognized that the 
environment, and more specifically, our perception (interpretation) of the environment, 
directly controls the activity of our genes…This new perspective of human biology does 
not view the body as just a mechanical device, but rather incorporates the role of a mind 
and spirit. 
 
Thus, neither mind nor body nor spirit of a living being can justifiably be seen as capable 
of a separate existence, nature, or function; neither can one be conceived as prior or 
superior to any other. Soul/spirit, mind and body are inextricably entwined aspects of the 
essentially whole, integrated form of a living being, as it manifests an inextricably material 
and immaterial essence. On this basis, Aristotle‟s phallocentric notion of a perfect soul-like 
(male) essence that gives fixed, motivated form to otherwise inert, fluidly unbounded 
(female) matter can be seen as ontologically misconceived, its immateriality simply 
enabling the subsequent denial of that essence to woman, and her appropriation as its 
(pure, submissive) material manifestation. Thus, to reconceive essence as always 
(im)material means that all living beings, whether male or female (or both), whether 
human or non-human, must be seen as having, and as being caused, enformed, motivated, 
and thus inter-textually constructed by, their own (individual, sexuate, species) essence, an 
essence that, in recognizing its essential (im)materiality, may be seen and metaphysically/ 
epistemologically rethought as a „spirogenetic‟ essence.  
 
                                                 
37
 See Szyf M, Weaver I, & Meaney M. (2007), Whitelaw (2006), and other epigenetic references listed on 
page 59.        
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Like the Aristotelian soul, the self-subsisting spirogenetic essence/form of man and woman 
may be conceived and defined according to his original laws of logic. As the first cause of 
the persistingly whole form, function, growth, movement, and thus existence of a living 
thing, the metaphysical and linguistic definition of this individual/universal essence is 
governed by the laws of „non-contradiction‟ and „excluded middle‟. Both boy and girl are 
defined as spirogenetic subjects, and so, as girl/woman‟s contradictory „other‟,38 boy/man 
has his own essential, autonomously - but also relationally - defined subjective existence, 
and vice versa. And with the body being always already subjective, the development of 
male subjectivity can no longer be conceived as the Paternally approved, inscribed 
ascension from base, naturally unbounded, fluidly female embodiment to divinely 
transcendent, perfectly unified, enformed male subjectivity, to be thereafter protected from 
submissive desires through the (il)logical control/destruction of the natural female body. 
Rather, both boy and girl, as spirogenetically whole, integrated subjects, originally, 
unconditionally, and intersubjectively exist, and are therefore free to mutually perceive, 
recognize and love the (im)material - and thus sensibly expressible, knowable - essence/ 
form of the „other‟. And, because this spirogenetic essence operates at individual, sexuate 
and species levels, it can be conceived as being defined with diminishing specificity as the 
level of (whole) definition ascends from individual to species, the essential differences 
between individuals, for example, being overlooked in order to recognize sexuate identity, 
and the essential sexuate differences then overlooked to recognize species identity. At all 
levels, the spirogenetic essence exists as a primarily whole, real form/function, to be 
(inter)subjectively constructed, expressed, perceived, known and defined according to its 
various (now indivisible) Aristotelian categories and properties of being, with the 
cell/genetic structure of each living thing specifically related to its form. As such, it 
presents the metaphysical/logical foundation for a rethinking of the principles, methods 
and limits of traditional epistemology. 
 
Spirogenetically reconceived, the essential nature of a living thing need no longer be seen 
and known as the real object of rational contemplation, intuition, or clear and distinct 
ideas, or as the mind-constructed, controlled phenomenal object of man‟s fears, intentions 
and desires, or even as unknowable because imperceptible or fluidly undecidable. Because 
it is always (im)material and subjective, the universal definition and knowledge of this 
                                                 
38That is, under the „law of noncontradiction‟, one can be a woman or a man, or a horse or a tiger, but not 
both. 
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essence becomes simply a matter of allowing all essentially same - but also different - 
subjects to express, recognize and represent their own essence and essential qualities as 
experienced, expressed, and conceived firstly by their own mindbody, and only in relation 
to themselves. In this case, the universal definition of „woman‟, for example, becomes the 
self-identified spirogenetic (female) form and qualities that unite, are shared by, and reflect 
the essential selves (and matching self-concepts) of all women. And, in this way, all real, 
whole, essential beings become knowable, not as male-constructed, subjugated, dissected 
(real/apparent/metaphorical) objects or properties, but as originally essentio-socially 
constructed, self-knowing, self-articulating spirogenetic subjects of their own lives, thereby 
freeing the sole, solipsistic male subject from his phobic veil of pretence, to perceive a 
currently unimaginably different and more diverse world of living beings as they real-ly, 
essentially are.       
 
Thus, having concluded from the (Ch. 2) genealogy of pro- and anti-essentialist theories 
that our metaphysics, language, and epistemology cannot do without some form of 
essence, and having then traced the historical distortions of what I have argued to be the 
illogical Aristotelian misconception of essence, I conclude, for the moment, this 
reconception of essence as a spirogenetic entity that shapes and motivates individual, 
sexuate and species form/function. In so doing, I am aware that I have not yet explicated 
just how the immaterial and material aspects of this essence may interrelate. Apart from 
seeing the (fixedly and fluidly) immaterial mind/soul as essentially connected with every 
part of the (fixedly and fluidly) material body,
39
 I leave further exploration of this aspect 
until the final section of the thesis, in anticipation that the research in Section II will shed 
further light on the issue. This research is motivated by the possibility that, if this 
reconception of essence is plausible, then our current metaphysical and epistemological 
views of reality and of the development of subjectivity are distorted in a way that, through 
their construction and inscription of the developing mindbody, may be causing a 
fragmentation and loss of the originally whole essential self. Because this fragmentary loss 
might be expected to be much more severe in those currently conceived and constructed as 
the (essence-less) material, apparent, metaphorical, or otherwise non-existent aspects of the 
(heterosexual) male subject, it may be that this misconceived essence and distorted 
                                                 
39
 This conception of the mind being connected with every part of the body (rather than confined to the brain) 
draws on: i) epigenetic theory and research (see p. 59 & 100); ii) research suggesting that, in some (heart/ 
liver) transplants, aspects of the donor‟s personality are transferred to the recipient (Pearsall, 1998); and iii) 
scientist Charles Birch‟s view that the smallest element in the physical universe may be a “feeling” or 
“event” (1995, p. 85).  
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metaphysics are creating the conditions for mental or psychosomatic disorders to occur in 
some girls/women. In Section II, therefore, I hypothesize and seek practical support for the 
existence of an originary spirogenetic essence and essential female self that, through its 
metaphysically-based familial, social and discursive (de)construction, is becoming 
fragmented and lost to consciousness, thereby creating a state of existential (di)stress in 
girls/women that, under certain further conditions, is resulting in eating and associated 
disorders. 
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Section II:      Is there a Spirogenetic Essence and Essential Female Self? 
                                 
                                                     Chapter 4 
 
                                       (Re-)Conceptions of Anorexia                                                      
In Section I, I postulated that a possible reason for the ongoing inability of Western 
philosophers to reach consensus on a correct metaphysics is that pro- and anti-essentialist 
metaphysical (and therefore epistemological) theories since the time of Plato and Aristotle 
have perpetuated, and become gradually more distorted by, the latter‟s illogical 
misconception of essence as a wholly immaterial, male preserve. Because these theories 
seemingly rely on some kind of im/material essence, I hypothesized the existence of an 
originary spirogenetic essence and essential self, that is the source of the persisting 
sameness - but also difference and growth - of (whole) individual, sexuate and species 
form/function. I further hypothesized that the metaphysical, linguistic and discursive non-
recognition, non-representation, and therefore, (de)construction of this essence is, under 
certain further conditions, resulting in some forms of mental disorder in girls/women. 
 
In search of empirical support for this hypothesis, I carried out (at least two) in-depth 
interviews with ten women, five of whom presented as having experienced no (clinically or 
self) diagnosed mental disorder, the other five as having had previous experience of the 
eating disorders anorexia, bulimia or orthorexia nervosa.
40
  The aim was to record the 
interviewees‟ experiences and interpretations of their own infant/adolescent processes of 
development of female selfhood, looking specifically at the ways in which the 
(concept/image of) self - particularly the sexual self - was shaped by and within familial, 
social and discursive relationships, and in particular, the mother/daughter relationship. The 
further aim was to then see whether and in what ways the interviewees perceived these 
processes of development of the sexual female self (and associated changes in self-
concept/percept) as being related to the onset of their eating disorder. Empirical data 
indicating the development and socio-linguistic construction of the sexual female self to 
have been (experienced as) a process of degradation, fragmentation, alienation, or other 
                                                 
40
Orthorexia was first defined and diagnosed in 1997 by Steven Bratman M.D. as the fanatical and unhealthy 
obsession with the preparation and eating of healthy foods, an obsession that socially isolates the 
individual, and in which food is eaten, not for pleasure, but for virtue. 
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form of loss of a previously whole, integrated, subjective being (along with associated 
motivations, functions and abilities) were taken as evidence for the existence of an 
originary female (spirogenetic) essence and essential self; a self that, in being denied 
metaphysical/symbolic recognition and representation, becomes divided, fragmented, and 
possibly destroyed by its socio-symbolic (de)construction.  
 
This research was motivated by the fact that, despite it being around 150 years since the 
clinical recognition and classification of anorexia nervosa as a nervous disorder, and 
despite the plethora of theories concerning its genealogy, etiology and treatment, the 
number of girls and women diagnosed with anorexia (and bulimia) has steadily - and more 
recently, rapidly - increased within Western (and westernised) modern and postmodern 
societies and cultures since the nineteenth century.
41
 A review of the recent literature 
shows that, since physicians William Gull and Charles Lasègue classified anorexia in 
the1870s as an hysteria-based disorder of the nervous or digestive systems, it has variously 
been perceived as having a biomedical, a psychological, a psychosexual, a sociological, a 
cultural, and most recently, a biopsychosocial etiology or cause (Bruch, 1974, Brumberg, 
1988; Gordon, 2000; Lyon et al, 2005). Generally perceived as the pathological refusal of 
food over a period of months or years, anorexia is more specifically and currently defined 
in the American Psychiatric Association‟s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) as involving: i) a refusal to maintain normal body weight leading 
to a weight less than 85% of that expected for age and height; ii) an intense fear of gaining 
weight or becoming fat; iii) a disturbed experience of body weight or shape; and iv) 
amenorrhoea (menstrual cessation) for at least three months. Whilst anorexia is commonly 
associated with several other physiological and psychological abnormalities (e.g. endocrine 
disorder, stunted growth, anaemia, reduced immunity, decreased libido, perfectionism, 
distorted body image, depression, and obsessive-compulsive behaviour), as Joan Brumberg 
(1988) notes, the disorder has also historically and generally been associated with young, 
white girls/women within the middle or upper social classes of “developed” Western 
countries (p. 27). Along with the large number and diversity of symptoms and the 
resultingly wide range of theories around the etiology of anorexia, the increasing incidence 
of the disorder has given rise to a “veritable army of health professionals involved in the 
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 Whether there has been an increase in the incidence of anorexia and bulimia during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, or simply an increase in recognition and diagnosis, is a matter of ongoing debate. In reviewing 
the arguments, Gordon (2000, p. 68) concludes that the evidence weighs in favour of an actual and marked 
increase in incidence and also prevalence of the disorders.   
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treatment of eating disorders” (ibid. p. 20) including psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
endocrinologists, neurobiologists, general practitioners, social workers, family therapists, 
dieticians, nurses and carers. The subsequent need to localize and organize this army has 
resulted in the establishment of a number of treatment centres in the United States, the 
U.K., Australia and New Zealand - the Oak House (Melbourne) and Ashburn Clinic 
(Dunedin) being two examples of current residential facilities focused on researching and 
treating eating disorders. However, despite the large amount of resources and personnel 
devoted to researching these disorders, along with the growing array of therapeutic 
methods deployed in their treatment, the reported incidence of anorexia/bulimia has 
continued to grow during the last fifty years to what are now seen by some as epidemic 
proportions (Bruch, 1978; Gordon, 1990; Bordo, 1993). With anorexia having a mortality 
rate of around 15-20% (the risk of successful suicide being 32 times greater than that 
expected for the same-aged population in general
42
), the failure of health professionals to 
stabilize - let alone reduce - its occurrence, along with the general failure to successfully 
treat the disorder (some treatments even being seen to exacerbate it
43
), is producing an 
alarming situation, suggesting current theories of the cause and nature of anorexia to be 
inadequate. It is in order to understand if and why this may be the case that I now review 
the various biomedical, psychological, psychoanalytic, and (feminist) sociological and 
cultural theories of anorexia nervosa.  
 
A Genealogy of ‘Anorexia/Bulimia Nervosa’ 
First described in late nineteenth century medical literature as a nervous disorder affecting 
young women within higher social classes, anorexia nervosa was the term coined by 
English physician William Gull (1874) for what he saw as a form of „hysteria‟ or 
„perversions of the ego‟ in which nervous anxieties were expressed as somatic symptoms 
in which the patient‟s persistent refusal of food led to severe emaciation and cessation of 
menstruation, often accompanied by states of hyperactivity. But, contrary to the historical 
use of the term „hysteria‟ to refer to the mental and physical effects of a „wandering‟ 
(demonically possessed) uterus,
44
 Gull saw the self-starvation of anorexia as the result of 
hysterical mental states caused by a disorder of the central nervous system. Choosing to 
                                                 
42
 See Beumont (2007). 
43
 See Lapp and LeCroy (2006, p. 113) who argue that Cognitive Behavioural Therapy may even exacerbate  
   anorexia by intensifying the anorectic‟s attention on, and thus identification with, her disorder. 
44The term „hysteria‟ originates from the Greek „hystera‟ or uterus, and Hippocrates‟ belief that a „dry‟ uterus  
   could rise up into a woman‟s chest and suffocate her, causing fainting, fits, and madness. 
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focus on medical symptoms rather than mental causes, Gull‟s treatment for anorexia 
required regular feeding of patients by “persons who would have moral control over them”, 
food refusal no longer an option for patients who would, if necessary, be force fed (ibid. 
pp. 22-26). Other physicians of the time, however, recommended not only forced oral 
feeding, but also, failing this, rectal feeds (Silverman, 1997, p. 5). Whilst French physician 
Charles Lasègue (1873) also viewed anorexia as a form of hysteria, he related it to the 
“gastric centre” rather than the nervous system, and interpreted the emotional disturbances 
underlying food refusal as a result of intrafamilial conflict between the maturing girl and 
her parents, rather than an internal psychopathology (p. 265). Pressured to take on the 
prescribed mode of „proper‟, self-restrained femininity in the hope of securing an 
advantageous marriage (thereby enhancing the family‟s position), the anorexic girl‟s 
refusal of food allowed the expression of emotional turmoil in a quiet, reserved, ladylike 
way that “honoured the emotional guidelines governing the middle-class Victorian family” 
(Brumberg, 1988, p. 140), whilst also drawing the attention and concerns of those around 
her. However, whilst Gull and Lasègue listed the primary somatic symptoms and suggested 
their psychological origins, neither could pinpoint an exact and common cause of anorexia, 
a cause that would also explain why the disorder occurred in some girls and not others. 
Thus, as Hilde Bruch (1974) says of the theorizing that followed Gull and Lasègue‟s 
classification of anorexia as a psychological disorder, “The contradiction and confusion in 
the literature that has accumulated during these 100 years is considerable” (p. 217).  
 
In critiquing Gull‟s view of anorexia, obstetrician William Playfair (1888) diagnosed it as 
a kind of “neurasthenia” or nervous exhaustion, a new neurotic disease generated by 
nineteenth century industrialization, scientific progress, and the emancipation of women. 
For Playfair, any treatment of anorexia would fail if it did not include isolation from 
family and social pressures. And so, virtually ignoring etiology, 19
th
 century physicians 
such as Playfair, Silas Weir Mitchell, and Stephen Mackenzie designed and instituted 
treatment regimes for anorexia that uniformly took the gaining of a reasonable weight to 
indicate that the disorder had been cured. While a vast number of therapeutic methods 
were therefore devised to alleviate the primary symptom of emaciation, as Joan Brumberg 
notes, “medical men never sought to explain, from the girl‟s perspective, why she did not 
eat” (ibid. p. 163). A possible reason for this omission may be that feminine sickness and 
debility were the general fashion amongst bourgeois Victorian women; or, as Brumberg 
puts it, “(w)asting was in style” (ibid. p. 171), and feminine beauty meant thinness, frailty, 
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and a visible lack of appetite, whether for air, food or sex. Thus, the most purely feminine 
and thus desirable young woman was she who, through rigid self-monitoring and control, 
was able to rise above carnal appetites, and thus exhibit neither need to consume, nor, 
therefore, need to excrete. Viewed within this cultural context, the behaviours and 
symptoms of anorexia seem somewhat less distinctly pathological, and somewhat more 
related to these normative feminine ideals and behaviours.   
 
At the same time as physicians were diagnosing and treating the physiological symptoms 
of anorexia but making little or no attempt to look for possible psychological - and 
especially emotional - origins and meanings, Sigmund Freud (1953) sought to describe the 
disorder from a psychodynamic or psychoanalytic perspective, examining the life history 
of the individual in order to reveal the emotional or psychogenic origins of her nervous or 
„hysterical‟ disorder. Along with Pierre Janet, Freud was the first theorist to link loss (or 
denial) of appetite to sexuality, or, more specifically, to the psychosexual development of 
the individual. Whilst Freud described anorexia according to convention as a “nutritional 
neurosis”, he also theorized its etiology as “a melancholia where sexuality is undeveloped” 
(ibid. vol.1, p. 200). That is, for Freud, all bodily appetites arose as an expression of the 
sexual drive or libido. And so, viewed within this framework, the anorectic‟s refusal to eat 
could be seen, not as the excessive control of hunger, but rather, as revulsion or disgust - 
and thus a loss of appetite - for food, that was the somatic expression of a repressed 
revulsion for sex, and therefore, a loss of libido (ibid.). Thus, as a form of what Freud 
termed „conversion hysteria‟, anorexia was a neurosis produced when forbidden and thus 
repressed (incestual, oral) sexual impulses and fantasies (along with associated guilt and 
fear) interfered with normal psychosexual development; this feared, repressed sexuality 
finding somatic expression in the refusal of food. Freudian psychoanalytic treatment of this 
disorder therefore focused primarily on the (unconscious) mind rather than body, with the 
aim of assisting the analysand, either through hypnosis, the analysis of dreams, or what 
was called „the talking cure‟, to bring to consciousness previously repressed (traumatic) 
memories, fantasies and emotions, thereby enabling a resumption of psychosexual 
development.  
 
Whilst French philosopher and psychoanalyst Pierre Janet agreed with Freud that anorexia 
was caused by a “deep psychological disturbance of which the refusal of food is but the 
outer expression” (1907, p. 233), Janet viewed the disorder as based not on a revulsion for 
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food, but on the chronic and torturous control of appetite in the face of real and persistent 
hunger. For Janet, it was when a mental or emotional disturbance became an obsessive idea 
or idée fixe - for example, when anxious and shameful feelings about the body and its 
sexuality were expressed as an obsession with size or weight - that anorexic behaviour 
ensued. Janet‟s patient, Nadia, for instance, saw eating as immoral, and fatness as 
degradation, and, with the onset of sexual development, refused food altogether, so as not 
to gain weight or “resemble a woman”, but to “remain always a small girl” (2010, np.). 
Thus, both Freud and Janet viewed anorexia as the symbolic expression of an obsessive 
desire to forestall sexual development and maturity.    
 
While Freud and Janet were developing their psychoanalytic models of anorexia, 
American and British physicians, in search of new methods of treatment of the somatic 
symptoms of the disorder, turned to the emerging practice of organotherapy in which 
hormones extracted from the body‟s endocrine organs and glands were being used to treat 
diseases such as diabetes or a dysfunctional thyroid (Brumberg, 1988). Therefore, when in 
1914 pathologist Morris Simmonds made a clinical connection between emaciation and 
destruction of the pituitary gland, physicians looking for a biological cause were quick to 
classify anorexia as a disorder of the pituitary gland, to be treated with pituitary extracts or 
gland implants (Silverman, 1997, p. 6). Then, in 1930, American physician John Mayo 
Berkman attributed the low metabolic rate symptomatic of anorexia to a thyroid 
deficiency, and thus prescribed the administration of thyroid extract - accompanied by 
increased food intake - as the cure for anorexia. In other cases of endocrine diagnosis and 
treatment, anorexic girls/women were experimentally treated with hormones such as 
insulin, antuitrin and oestrogen. Despite some temporary improvements to the health of 
patients, endocrinologic theories and treatments failed to identify a definitive cause or 
successful treatment for anorexia, and, as a result, were overtaken in the 1930s by a 
resurgence of the psychoanalytic movement, and the consequent emergence of 
psychosomatically focused medical models of the disorder.    
 
Using a more integrated approach to both etiology and therapy that recognized mind and 
body as unified, and thus, the role that mind/emotions played in physiological 
(mal)functions, medical practitioners such as psychiatrist Helen Flanders Dunbar (1935) 
related the serious nutritional changes in anorexia to emotional upsets and neurotic 
mechanisms. Thus, medical treatments that had previously prescribed changes of 
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environment, forced feeding, and hormonal extracts now began to acknowledge 
psychosexual dysfunction as a possible cause of anorexia, therefore requiring 
psychotherapy as an essential component of its treatment. Through a series of interviews 
designed to uncover and explore the intimate personal experiences that underlay her 
neurotic behaviour, the patient was expected to realize her attitudes to food and her own 
body to be the abnormal effect of more deep-seated personality problems. By the 1940s, 
psychiatrists had come to see the anorexic woman as suffering from a serious personality 
disorder characterized by the obsessive-compulsive features of “perfectionism, 
stubbornness, overconscientiousness, neatness, meticulousness and parsimony” 
(Brumberg, 1988, p. 220). The anorectic‟s refusal to eat, however, continued to be 
psychoanalytically described, not only as resulting from psychosexual dysfunction, but 
now, and more specifically, as due to fears of pregnancy and „oral impregnation‟ that 
translated into a fear of food. Once this Freudian association between food and sex had 
become an established part of psychiatric theory and treatment, the period from the 1940s 
to the 1960s saw an elaboration of theories of food refusal based on the association of 
eating with impregnation and obesity with pregnancy. Waller, Kaufman and Deutsch 
(1940), for example, interpreted anorexia as a disgust at and loss of appetite for food 
caused by and symbolic of repressed (familial) fantasies of oral impregnation and 
associated feelings of anxiety and guilt. Thus, while “(t)he normal girl weathers the 
puberty storm and develops into a non-neurotic woman”,  
       
The neurotic, who is tied with inextricable bonds to the family pattern again revives all 
the older conflicts and fantasies, among which may be those of impregnation through the 
gastrointestinal tract…The act of eating is now symbolically equated with sexuality, 
particularly with the fantasy of impregnation. Dependent on the quantity of guilt and 
anxiety associated with the fantasy of pregnancy and with aggressions within the family, 
there may be a complete rejection of eating which is understandable then only in terms of 
its symbolic significance and not of its original biological function. Now we can 
understand why there is more than a mere loss of appetite and actually a feeling of 
disgust. (pp. 6-7) 
 
Conversely, the unconscious fantasy and desire for impregnation and pregnancy finds 
symbolic expression through bouts of “compulsive, ritualistic gluttony”, the associated 
guilt and disgust subsequently leading to food refusal and purification through obsessive 
cleanliness, hand-washing, etc. (ibid.). Thus, the anorexic refusal to eat, and the 
desexualized, childish body that is its result, were seen by psychiatrists as symptomatic of 
a fantasy-driven “repudiation of heterosexuality” (Brumberg, 1988, p. 225), resulting in 
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unsuccessful heterosexual adjustment at both psychic and somatic levels. As a 
consequence of this failure to achieve (submissive, self-restrained) heterosexual maturity, 
psychiatrists viewed anorexic females as delusional, as hysterically exhibitionistic and 
seductive, and as potential prostitutes obsessed with phallic fantasies, while physicians 
turned the microscope on the anorectic‟s sexual anatomy and functions, expecting to find a 
mal-adjustment of the sexual organs that would reflect this psychosexual dysfunction. 
Conducting (sometimes daily) vaginal smears and biopsies, doctors noted underdeveloped 
or „atrophic‟ breasts and genitalia, a devitalized vagina, and “a lag in ovarian activity” 
(ibid. p. 227), interpreting these as physical signs of psychosexual dysfunction and 
infantile regression, rather than of a nutritional deprivation of the entire body.  
 
However, the view that anorexia was caused by a repudiation of heterosexuality, and thus, 
a failure in psychosexual development, was countered by several factors. Firstly, as stated 
earlier, conformity to bourgeois Victorian norms and ideals of feminine beauty, desirability 
and marriageability required that young women exhibit restraint of all bodily appetites, 
whether for food, sex or otherwise. For psychoanalysts to then take anorexic food refusal 
as evidence of a pathological rejection of heterosexuality would therefore seem 
contradictory. Secondly, the repressed fantasies and fears of oral impregnation that 
underpinned the account of anorexia as psychosexual dysfunction were not commonly 
found in the psychotherapeutic accounts of anorexic adolescent females. Furthermore, 
anorexia had by this time also been identified in children, in married, sexually active 
women, and in males. Therefore, the idea of a single, psychosexually-based causal model 
of anorexia was rejected by physicians and psychoanalysts who nevertheless maintained 
the belief that the cause of the disorder was to be found in the patient‟s developmental 
history.     
 
It was the ground-breaking work of psychoanalyst Hilde Bruch that reinterpreted the nature 
and etiology of anorexia in terms that not only distanced it from the Freudian notion of 
repressed oral ambivalence, but that also related the self-starvation (and associated 
bingeing) of anorexia (and bulimia) to what she saw as the pathological overeating 
associated with obesity. Both under-eating and over-eating were, for Bruch, disorders that 
evolved from a misuse of the eating function in order to camouflage or attempt to deal with 
family-related problems that interfered with the normal development of the individual 
(Gordon, 2000, p. 18). In her best known work, Eating Disorders: Obesity, Anorexia 
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Nervosa, and the Person Within (1974), Bruch identifies two types of anorexia: “primary 
anorexia” is characterized by: i) a distorted body image in which the body is delusionally 
misperceived as fat (thus driving the relentless pursuit of thinness); ii) an inability to 
correctly identify internal feelings, needs and emotions (e.g. an inability to recognize 
hunger); and iii) a deficient sense of the self as helpless and ineffective, and as controlled 
by external expectations and demands rather than one‟s own thoughts, feelings and desires 
(pp. 251-255). In contrast, secondary or “atypical anorexia” has as its main symptom, not 
thinness, body image distortion, or a deficit in autonomy, but rather,  “various symbolic 
misinterpretations of the eating function” (p. 236), in which the biological eating function 
is hijacked and distortedly resignified by underlying neurotic or psychotic personality 
difficulties such as, for example, fear of oral impregnation (p. 238). The main diagnostic 
criteria for Bruch‟s primary anorexia can be seen to correspond with the DSM-IV criteria 
listed earlier in this chapter, although the latter‟s behavioural focus sees it excluding 
Bruch‟s notion of a deficient sense of self and associated internal states (Gordon, 2000, p. 
21). Sociologist Richard Gordon suggests that this diagnostic focus on the physical 
components of anorexia has (in part) led to its contemporary biomedical interpretation as 
primarily a physical disorder, with malfunction in the hypothalamic centre of the brain 
which controls feeding and hormonal function, being postulated as the most likely cause 
(ibid.). Bruch, however, gives primacy to the psychological components, by suggesting 
that the self-starvation of anorexia represents the adolescent child‟s struggle for autonomy, 
control, competence, and self-respect in the face of the mother‟s failure to recognize 
his/her independence (1974, p. 337). Failure to achieve autonomy and the associated 
awareness that one‟s thoughts, feelings, emotions and body are one‟s own (and not 
appropriated and controlled by another) results in the anorexic adolescent developing a 
distorted and disconnected view of both internal and external reality. This leads to 
irrational thought, immature, manipulative, resistant, attention-demanding behaviours, and 
anxiety about the developing female body for which Bruch chides the anorexic patient, 
saying, “Why not accept normal healthy womanhood?” “What do you really have to give 
up in order to get well?” (1988, p. 121). Acknowledging that traditional psychoanalysis - in 
which the analyst interpreted the patient‟s repressed thoughts and feelings for him or her - 
had been ineffective in treating anorexia, Bruch reconceives therapeutic treatment as a 
“fact-finding treatment approach” that she calls “the constructive use of ignorance” (1974, 
p. 338). The goal of this treatment is “to make it possible for a patient to uncover his own 
abilities, his resources and inner capacities for thinking, judging, and feeling” (ibid.), and 
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for the therapist to then confirm accurate conceptions and correct errors and 
misconceptions in the patient‟s thinking. In this way the capacity for self-awareness, 
autonomy and effective relations and actions begins to develop, and, as a consequence, the 
anorexic misuse of the eating function gradually wanes.  
 
However, as with earlier psychoanalytic theories (e.g. Waller et al. [1940]) that interpreted 
anorexia as the dysfunctional repudiation of heterosexuality, Bruch‟s interpretation of 
anorexia as expressing a pathological resistance to „normal, healthy womanhood‟ ignores 
the fact that the traditional (heterosexual, middle-class) social and cultural ideals of 
femininity to which those approaching womanhood have been expected to conform have 
demanded the very thinness, self-denial and dependence for which Bruch chides the 
supposedly irrational, immature, resistant, anorexic patient. In other words, within 
patriarchal thought and cultures, the concepts of „normal, healthy womanhood‟ and 
„mature, autonomous self-direction‟ have not been coincident, as Bruch assumes, but 
rather, contradictory (Lester, 1997). It was this realization that became the foundation for 
subsequent feminist cultural approaches to anorexia, such as those of Susie Orbach (1986) 
and Susan Bordo (1993), with both viewing the disorder as a form of protest or resistance 
against the Western (middle-class) cultural imperative that girls/women must be slim to be 
beautiful, and therefore, to have a measure of self-worth. However, as Rebecca Lester 
notes, at the same time, and in opposition to both the cultural and psychoanalytic views of 
anorexia, the psychiatric profession began to move (back) towards a biological cause and 
explanation for anorexia, this time drawing heavily upon “psychopharmaceutical 
management”, in the form of anti-depressant and anti-psychotic drugs, to treat the disorder 
(1997, p. 480). Thus, from the 1980s up to the present day, anorexia nervosa has been 
variously described and diagnosed as a primarily biological, psychological, cultural, or 
biopsychosocial (-spiritual) disorder (Bordo, 1993; Van Wormer & Davis, 2008). This 
widening array of discursive approaches has paradoxically been accompanied by an 
increase in prevalence of the disorder, not only among Western, heterosexual girls/women, 
but also now among boys/men, as well as non-Western, non-white, non-heterosexual 
girls/women of all ages and social classes. It was also during this period that bulimia 
nervosa was first identified in Western adolescents, this disorder involving frequent 
episodes of bingeing and purging that produce symptoms characteristic of anorexia (e.g. 
starvation, amenorrhoea) and/or unique to bulimia (e.g. facial swelling, oral decay). It is in 
order to understand the reasons for this increase in prevalence that I now further explicate 
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and critique the most prominent contemporary discursive approaches to anorexia/ 
bulimia.
45
 
 
Biomedical Approaches 
Biomedical discourses posit a biological cause to anorexia, that cause having variously 
been described as: i) a serotonergic disorder of the hypothalamus (Russell, 1977); ii) 
neurological disorders (Laessle et al., 1989); iii) sensory disturbances and cognitive 
malfunctions; iv) brain tumours (Price et al, 2004); v) seasonal changes or the associated 
lack of sunlight; vi) genetic factors (explaining the inheritability of the disorder [Rumney, 
2009]); vii) endocrinal disorders; and viii) dysfunction in the limbic region of the brain 
(associated with appetite and emotion) (Cummings & Mega, 2003). An example of recent 
American biomedical thought on anorexia can be found in the words of Dr. Thomas Insel 
(2006), Director of the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health: 
 
Research tells us that anorexia nervosa is a brain disease with severe metabolic effects on 
the entire body. While the symptoms are behavioural, this illness has a biological core, 
with genetic components, changes in brain activity, and neural pathways currently under 
study. Most women with anorexia recover, usually following intensive psychological and 
medical care. 
 
This neurobiological approach can therefore be seen to perpetuate the neurological 
approach of Gull in the 19
th
 century, and the endocrinal approach of Simmonds and 
Berkman in the early 20th century, though none of these physicians was as optimistic 
about the recovery rate as Insel, whose claim that “(m)ost women with anorexia recover” is 
challenged by Halse, Honey and Boughtwood‟s (2007) finding that “(f)ive years after 
diagnosis, approximately 50% of sufferers remain clinically ill” (p. 221). Moreover, as 
Joan Brumberg (1988) argues, whilst anorexia is certainly associated with severe 
physiological abnormalities (e.g. emaciation, endocrine disorder, amenorrhoea, low 
metabolic rate, malnutrition, anaemia, hypotension, and hypothermia), proponents of a 
(isolated) biological cause cannot answer the questions: Why do 90-95% of cases of 
anorexia occur in those with female bodies? Why has anorexia historically been largely 
confined to the (white) middle and upper classes of Western or so-called „developed‟ 
countries? And why, during the past forty years, has there been such a dramatic increase in 
                                                 
45
 Because bulimia is seen as closely related to anorexia, with several theorists (e.g. Russell, 1979) viewing 
the former as a development of the latter, this explication focuses primarily on anorexia, referring 
specifically to bulimia only when a distinction is required.      
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the incidences of both anorexia and bulimia, crossing race, class, age and sexual divisions? 
(See also Young-Bruehl, 1998; Malson, 1998; Beumont, 2007).   
 
Psychological Approaches  
In contrast to the biomedical approach, the contemporary psychological approach to 
anorexia can be seen to have followed on from Hilde Bruch‟s (partly Freudian) 
psychoanalytical understanding of the disorder as an individual, family-related 
psychopathology, caused by the inhibition of „normal‟ adolescent psychological 
development (of accurate body image, percepts and concepts), and resulting in a failure to 
achieve mature, logical, autonomous womanhood. By refusing food, the anorectic controls 
her body when she has little control over her life, and also eludes (hetero)sexual 
maturation. Bruch‟s (2001) clinical reports also indicate that, contrary to Freud‟s notion 
that the (sexually repressed) anorectic is disgusted by food and thus has no appetite, the 
anorexic adolescent in fact has an inordinate interest in food, and is constantly aware of, 
but denies gratification to, her hunger. For Bruch, it is not sex but fat that the anorectic 
fears and escapes through self-starvation. Following in this vein, contemporary 
psychological models of anorexia have variously positioned it as: i) an isolated and 
pathological response to the developmental crises (of individuation, autonomy and sexual 
development) that are part of normal adolescence (Brumberg, 1988); ii) a contemporary 
form of classic obsessive-compulsive disorder in which preoccupations with food, calories, 
exercise, and weight come to dominate the mind and everyday practices (Rothenberg, 
1990); iii) a blocking of normal processes of individuation due to dysfunctional 
intrafamilial relations, often involving abuse or maternal conflict (Minuchin & Fishman, 
2004); or iv) a dependence disorder or „addiction‟ (similar to drug/alcohol addiction) in 
which the anorectic becomes addicted to the psychological and/or physiological effects of 
starvation (Szmukler & Tatum, 1984). While various therapies have been created to treat 
anorexia as it is characterized by these psychological models (e.g. Minuchin has developed 
a Structural Family Therapy centre), like the biomedical model, the psychological model 
fails to account for the historical sex/gender, class and race specificity of anorexia, as well 
as the increase in (reported) incidence of eating disorders during the past fifty years 
(Gordon, 2001). It is for this reason that several contemporary feminist theorists have 
proposed a cultural approach to anorexia (and bulimia) which sees patriarchal ideals of 
femininity, and in particular, the white, Western, middle-class cultural imperative that a 
girl/woman must be slim to be beautiful (and therefore, desirable), as the cause of the 
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obsessive dieting that is increasingly resulting in the development of eating disorders 
(Bordo, 1993; Orbach, 1986; Brumberg, 1988; Chesler, 1972).  
 
Cultural Approaches 
Feminist theorists Susie Orbach and Susan Bordo were amongst the earliest proponents of 
this cultural approach to anorexia. Contrary to its biomedical and psychological 
interpretation as an isolated, individual pathology or disease, both view the disorder as the 
extreme manifestation of, and a form of (unconscious) protest or resistance against, 
popular culture‟s objectification and normative inscription of the female body according to 
dominant ideologies, norms and ideals of femininity. That is, from an early age, weight and 
dieting become an obsession for at least 75% of Western girls and women, as they are 
bombarded with and learn from social and media images and cues that their (self) worth 
depends upon, and rises or falls in inverse relation to, their body size and shape.
46
 
Following Bruch, Orbach (1986) interprets anorexia as “a metaphor for our age” (p. 4), a 
psychological response to the “contradictory” feminine roles inscribing women in recent 
times, in the same way that hysteria was a psychosomatic response to the “imprisoning” 
feminine role imposed upon women in Victorian times. For Orbach, it is the confusing and 
contradictory social and cultural demands on late 20
th
 century girls - to be not only 
autonomously self-determining but also pleasing to and nurturing of others - that 
occasionally produce anorexia by preventing separation (from the mother), and thus 
precluding the attainment of selfhood. Just as hysteria was a protest against feminine ideals 
of self-denying passivity, frailty, purity, dependency and sequestered domesticity, a protest 
that manifested as “the exaggeration of ideal womanliness” (ibid. p. 6), so too anorexia 
protests (through exaggeration) a contemporary social context in which expanded feminine 
ideals and roles – in offering the added option of entry into the paid workforce - have 
exacerbated the requirement for visible restraint and denial of female needs and desires. 
However, where Bruch (2001) views the increasing and contradictory social roles offered 
to women as a reason for the anorectic‟s repudiation of femininity, Orbach argues that it is 
not women‟s equality, but their ongoing inequality, that fuels anorexia. For this new, 
apparently liberated role within the paid labour-force that seemingly offers (and requires) 
independence and autonomy in fact demands women‟s acceptance of an ongoing 
                                                 
46
 The statistic of 75% is quoted by both Bordo (1993, p. 154) and Gordon (2000, p. 122) and based on a 
1984 poll of American women by Glamour magazine. A survey commissioned by Top Sante magazine in 
2000 indicated that 85% of U.K. women are obsessed with their body size and shape, with 86% having 
dieted at some time, while the U.S. Dept of Health (2007) reports that, on any given day, 50% of American 
women are dieting. 
     118  
 
inequality of opportunity and remuneration, along with acceptance of and compliance with 
the masculinist concepts, values and practices on which the public sphere has historically 
been founded (Orbach, 1986, p. 9). Thus, within contemporary Western society and 
culture, the slim female body has become a requirement not only for (and symbolic of) 
feminine beauty and desirability, but also - as an androgynous symbol of intelligence, 
autonomy and control - for woman‟s entry into, and (limited) success within the 
(masculinist) public and professional sphere. For, whether a girl enacts (feminine) 
dependency or (masculine) autonomy, she must be self-restrained in order to gain 
recognition and approval. And in Western culture, self-restraint equates with slimness. The 
anorexic woman, then, is desperately striving/starving for success, love and approval, 
while her body - “woman‟s ticket into society” - becomes the “mouthpiece” via which she 
unconsciously protests (as a „hunger strike‟) these conflicting ideals of femininity that 
cause “discomfort with oneself”, the separation of self from body, and, at their extreme, the 
anorexic “denial of selfhood” (ibid. p. 28).  
 
Feminist theorist Susan Bordo also takes a socio-cultural approach to anorexia, albeit of a 
different form. Whilst recognizing the biomedical and psychological aspects of anorexia, 
Bordo (1993) emphasizes the connection between cultural beliefs, practices, norms and 
images, their shaping and signification of the female body, and the occurrence of female 
disorders such as hysteria, agoraphobia and anorexia. She therefore theorizes from a 
feminist postmodernist but also materialist perspective, interpreting these disorders as 
“pathologies of female protest” (p. 159) that are the “complex crystallizations” (p. 35) of 
wider, socio-historically specific norms and deviancies of gender (and also race, class, age, 
etc.) as they construct and constrain, normalize and pathologize the real - but also 
culturally mediated - female body. Thus, whilst seeing anorexia as a multidimensional 
disorder influenced by familial, perceptual, cognitive and (possibly) biological factors, 
Bordo also relates it to the “increasing emphasis that fashion has placed on slenderness” (p. 
140). She therefore attempts to discover “why our culture is so obsessed with keeping our 
bodies slim, tight and young” (ibid.), in order to demystify and understand the origins, 
processes and meanings of anorexia. For Bordo, anorexia is an unconscious protest at 
what Kim Chernin (1983) calls “the tyranny of slenderness”, a physical revolt that occurs 
when a variety of cultural currents that variously equate slimness with purity, control and 
transcendence converge at once on the female body. Anorexia is therefore simply “a 
remarkably overdetermined symptom of some of the multifaceted and heterogeneous 
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distresses of our age” (Bordo, 1993, p. 141), cultural distresses that become manifest on or 
through the anorexic body when it is inscribed by specific cultural currents or “axes of 
continuity” (ibid. p. 142). Because Bordo‟s approach to anorexia has had a major influence 
on subsequent theories and forms of treatment, and because she too situates the disorder 
within a metaphysical context (but in a way that I later argue to be problematic), it is useful 
to examine Bordo‟s axial model of anorexia in more detail.  
 
The three main axes of continuity that Bordo sees as converging in the cultural production 
of anorexia are: the dualist axis, the control axis, and the gender/power axis. The dualist 
axis situates anorexia within the dualistic heritage of Western thought and cultural practice 
that originated with Plato, was developed by Augustine, and that found its most concrete 
expression in Descartes‟ conception of human existence as “bifurcated” into two realms: 
the immaterial (or the soul/mind), and the material (or the body). As reflected in the 
genealogy in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Bordo describes this mind/body dualistic logic as 
depicting the sensual body as alien to, as a source of confinement and limitation of, and as 
the enemy of, the reason-based soul/mind/self that is imprisoned within and corrupted by 
what Augustine calls the  “slimy desires of the flesh” (Confessions, 2.2). For these 
philosophers, says Bordo, the hungering, desiring, lusting, unruly body is “the locus of all 
that threatens our attempts at control” (1993, p. 145). All three therefore endeavour to 
provide the philosophical, religious, intellectual and/or physical means to subdue, 
transcend, and thus exist independently of the hungers, passions and desires of the fleshly 
body - whether that means be the Platonic pursuit of Ideas of absolute beauty, goodness 
and truth, or the Cartesian method for receiving God‟s truth. As Augustine is haunted by 
his (sinful) sexual desires, so the anorexic woman is haunted not only by her desire for 
slimness, but also by her gnawingly irrepressible hunger. Thus, says Bordo, hunger is 
experienced as an alien invader, a feared desire that, like the body, is experienced as a 
threat coming from outside of the self, the dread of hunger exceeded only by the dread of 
fat. Because the restraint of hungers and desires only serves to make them more powerful, 
total freedom of mind can ultimately be achieved only through their annihilation. And so, 
just as Augustine describes his struggle to control lustful desires as a battle between “two 
wills”, that of the (good) spirit and that of the (evil) flesh, so may anorexia be experienced 
as a battle between the (good) mind and the (evil) body, thinness signalling the “triumph” 
of mind over body, and transcendent purity over corporeal (sexual) impurity (ibid. p. 147).  
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In locating anorexia on the second axis of continuity, the axis of control, Bordo relates the 
anorectic‟s relentlessly self-disciplined pursuit of thinness - and thus, spiritual perfection - 
through compulsive jogging or other exercise to the contemporary Western bourgeois 
obsession with physical exercise and „extreme‟ sports. Rather than exercising simply to 
attain physical fitness and health, the obsessive runner or body-builder pushes his/her body 
to its limits and beyond in the quest to attain and exhibit perfection, purity and strength of 
spirit, mind and will. As for the young men of Plato‟s „Gymnasium‟, the greater the (show 
of) discipline, athleticism and muscular definition, the greater the strength and control of 
mind/will over the appetites of the body. Thus, like the anorectic, the contemporary female 
body-builder strives for total mastery of her body, the deliberate re-shaping of the body to 
fit an ideal image giving a sense of control and accomplishment when other aspects of their 
lives seem out of control (ibid. p. 152). More than just a feeling of mastery over life, this 
“contemporary body-fetishism” also expresses the desire for mastery and defeat of death. 
However, while the compulsively exercising anorectic may - like the elite body-builder 
and marathon runner - gain a sense of mastery through extreme control, Bordo notes that it 
is not power but powerlessness that is the main feature of anorexia.  
 
The third axis of continuity - the gender/power axis - relates the distorted body image 
associated with anorexia to the more general misperception of, and obsessive 
dissatisfaction with, body shape and weight amongst 75 percent of American women, as a 
result of the contemporary „tyranny of slenderness‟ (Bordo, 1993, p. 154). For, as the ideal 
female body shape (as presented via fashion, media and advertizing) has become steadily 
leaner since the 1970s, anxiety levels have risen as even constant dieting, purging, and 
laxative use amongst young women fails to reduce their actual body size/shape to fit the 
current cultural ideal of slenderness. This contemporary obsession with thinness therefore 
results in a constant war between the pure, controlling mind (perceived as male) and the 
impure, uncontrolled (female) body, a battle that the anorectic aims to win by erasing her 
body and becoming pure, perfect, male mind. Thus, for Bordo, the main reasons for the 
anorectic‟s attempted disembodiment are firstly, a “fear and disdain for traditional female 
roles and social limitations”, and secondly, a deep fear of the archetypal image of the 
voraciously devouring, sexually insatiable “Female” (ibid. p. 155). As a result, anorexic 
girls express a fear of mature, rounded, reproductive womanhood, wishing instead, like 
“Peter Pan”, to remain a child forever; a wish that Bordo interprets as the anorectic‟s wish 
to escape her female body and be a boy forever. It is no surprise, then, that anorexia 
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usually begins around the time of puberty, when the very visible development of breasts 
and pubic hair and the onset of menstruation signal that it is time to begin preparation for 
entry into the submissively feminine roles of marriage, domesticity and motherhood. As 
„Aimee Liu‟ says of her anorexic reaction to pubertal development: “I grab my breasts, 
pinching them until they hurt. If only I could eliminate them, cut them off if need be, to 
become as flat-chested as a child again” (Liu, cited in Bordo, 1993, p. 156). For Bordo, as 
for Orbach and other feminist cultural theorists, this anorexic reaction parallels the hysteria 
of the late nineteenth century in expressing an unconscious feminist protest by intelligent, 
creative and independently minded girls/women against the constraints and contradictions 
of the traditional feminine role, and a rebellion against following her mother into a life of 
subjugated, isolated domesticity.  
 
Bordo further notes that the other gendered impetus for anorexia - the mythology and 
archetypal image of the devouring, insatiable, uncontrollable „Female‟ - seems to flourish 
at times of “gross environmental and social crisis” (1993, p. 161), and particularly in those 
historical periods (such as the rise of first and second wave feminisms) when women are 
seeking social and political equality and independence. Witchcraft, for example, was said 
to arise from insatiable carnal lust, which, said the witch-hunters‟ handbook, would drive 
such possessed women to “consort even with the devil”.47 The image of the dark, 
dangerous, evil female has therefore served as justification not just for the torture and 
murder of (non-conforming) women as witches, but for variously fashionable forms of 
reductive, immobilizing physical restraint; whether it be the „hourglass‟ or „S-curve‟ 
corsets of the Victorian era (sometimes requiring rib removal), or the sleek, stilettoed 
Manolo Blahnik shoes of today (sometimes requiring toe removal). For only as a model of 
suitably reshaped and restrained femininity might a woman escape the degradation and 
punishment reserved for the „evil‟, voraciously desiring female, and achieve the rewards 
and admiration reserved for „good‟, fashionably restrained, subjugated female bodies. In 
this way, the archetypal image of the uncontrollably desiring, polluted „Female‟ has 
historically served to deter women from thoughts of independence and autonomy, by 
reinforcing heterosexual norms and requirements of feminine dependency and immobilized 
passivity. But, whether slavishly succumbing to these culturally imposed forms and 
stylized expressions of self-restraint, or protesting and rejecting them via anorexia, these 
                                                 
47
The witch-hunters‟ handbook is the Malleus Maleficarum written in 1487 by Heinrich Kramer and Jacob 
Sprenger, as a guide used for the identification, interrogation and conviction of medieval European women 
(and some men) as witches.   
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women are perceived by Bordo to be driven by the illusion of power and self-determining 
freedom, whilst at the same time appearing to collude in their own oppression and/or 
destruction (ibid p. 167). It is in order to more clearly understand how the various social, 
cultural and discursive axes of continuity operate to shape, restrain and otherwise construct 
„normal‟ and „pathological‟ forms of female identity that Bordo draws upon Michel 
Foucault‟s analytics of power and subjectivity.   
 
Writing from what may be seen as a poststructuralist perspective on the (pre-modern and 
modern) history of Western philosophical ideas and social practices, Foucault rejects the 
Cartesian notion of a singular, unified and autonomous human subject, comprised of 
immaterial mind in control of a material body, that exists as a „natural given‟ prior to its 
entry into an external world of objects and social relations. Instead, Foucault (1995, 1980) 
sees subjectivity as always fluidly and multiply produced by (pre-existing) social and 
discursive relations, institutions, and technologies of power that shape, discipline and 
inscribe the natural body with the aim of constructing from it a seemingly autonomous, 
socially productive, but also governable subject. This power cannot, therefore, be seen as 
the permanent possession of one dominant individual or group to be wielded over an 
always subordinate „other‟, and therefore only operating repressively from the top down, as 
the „repressive hypothesis‟ or other „grand narratives‟ of overarching gender or racial 
oppression have suggested (Grosz, 1990, p. 88). Rather, for Foucault, power is exercised 
by individuals located within a vast network of social and discursive relations, institutions 
and technologies of power that utilize disciplinary techniques and the (implicit) threat of 
punishment and/or marginalization to repress, reshape, and thus produce the body as 
(sexualized) subject, according to a set of functional norms. As Foucault (1980) puts it,  
 
Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which 
only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody‟s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power…If power were never anything but repressive, if it 
never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? 
(p. 98 & 119) 
 
 
The natural body that is constructed and moulded into subjectivity by and within these 
various relations and technologies of power is a (Cartesian) machine-like body, but not one 
that is simply a collection of mechanical parts. Rather, Foucault (1995) draws upon De 
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Guibert‟s concept of the „natural body‟ as a whole, developing organism, with its own 
internal developmental processes that may be subtly disciplined, rechannelled and 
reshaped into „normalized‟, ensouled subjectivity, through the use of regulatory drills and 
practices. It is this organic body that - as “the bearer of forces and the seat of duration” 
(ibid. p. 167) - provides the (analysable, manipulable) material basis for and enables the 
social/discursive construction of (normal and pathological) subjectivities and identities. For 
only a persistingly whole, identical, self-motivated, growing body may be remoulded over 
a period of time by external forces. Those bodies, however, that have not complied with 
sexual/social norms (overtly homosexual bodies, for example) have historically been 
classified as the deviant „other‟ of the normal „subject‟ and confined to prison, hospital or 
mental asylum, to be subjected to medical, political, spatial and social technologies of 
„normalization‟. In Discipline and Punish (1995), Foucault contrasts pre-modern and 
modern methods of achieving social control; the brutal, public displays of punishment used 
in pre-modern times being replaced in modernity by the hidden, non-physical strategies of 
separation, surveillance, monitoring, regulation and normalization of sexual bodies. Based 
upon the “Panoptic” principle that we may always be subject to observation by a 
disciplinary “supervisor” (ibid. p. 18) who sees but cannot be seen, these strategies of 
normalization constrain and gradually mould individuals to be self-monitoring and self-
restraining in order to avoid punishment through, for example, social exclusion, detention 
(in schools), or physical isolation (in prison). But, because “power creates its own 
resistance” (ibid. p. 73), it is the knowledge and understanding of how these (covert) 
strategies of social control operate to inscribe various and mutable identities and 
subjectivities onto individual bodies (and their desires) that presents the possibility of 
resistance to one‟s dualistic social/discursive identification or interpellation as the 
abnormal, abject „Other‟.  
 
One of the main strategies of social control in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has 
been the medicalization and pathologizing of the female body, and, in particular, its sexual 
and reproductive functions. It is in locating the anorexic body within this context that 
Bordo and several other feminist cultural theorists (Moi, 1985b; Malson, 1998; 
McWhorter, 1999; Halse et al, 2007) have been able to interpret anorexia and other 
gender-related disorders or deviancies as not only socially and discursively produced, but 
also as (potential) sites of protest against the imposition of socio-historically specific, 
dualistically defined ideals and pathologies of feminine „Othering‟. For Foucault (1970) 
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rejects the classical, hierarchically dualistic conception, definition, and construction of 
subjectivities and (sexual) identities as „male/female‟, „heterosexual/homosexual‟, „normal/ 
deviant‟ and „good/evil‟, looking instead to Nietzsche‟s unification of Dionysian (female) 
fluidity with Apollonian (fixed, male) form in order to reconceive sexuality as a continuum 
of constructed sexes, sexualities, and behaviours that all deviate to some degree from the 
standardized norm. Viewed in this way, subjectivity is never fixed, singular or pre-given, 
but always fluidly and multiply inscribed, and therefore always able to be accepted, 
rejected or modified. It is this notion of fluidly contiguous subjectivities and identities that 
allows Bordo (1993, p. 170) to interpret anorexia as an extreme manifestation or 
„crystallization‟ of the wider and contradictory socio-cultural ideals of femininity imposed 
on all twentieth century Western girls/women; ideals that the anorectic protests through 
their parodic manifestation. I would argue, however, that Bordo misconstrues anorexia due 
to a limited view of the essentialist logic of Plato, Augustine and Descartes (and 
consequently, of Foucault‟s anti-essentialist conception of subjectivity) that mistakenly 
posits the „mind/body‟ dualism, and thus overlooks the more fundamental „man/woman‟ 
dualism, as the metaphysical origin of anorexia.  
 
The Metaphysical/Essence Model of Anorexia  
Theoretical support for the claim that it is the „man/woman‟ dualism that is at the root of 
anorexia can be found in what I argue to be Bordo‟s misconstrual of Platonic and 
Cartesian dualism. For, when she grounds anorexia in the „mind/body‟ dualism espoused 
by Plato, Augustine and Descartes, thus viewing the anorectic as protesting and rejecting 
traditional feminine ideals and fearful archetypes by becoming a purely transcendent 
masculine mind, Bordo misconstrues the metaphysics of these philosophers who (as 
indicated in Section I) construct the mind/body dualism only by denying a soul/essence to 
woman. And this construction does not correlate mind with male, and body with female, 
but conceives the lower, sensual, material aspect of man‟s mind and body as 
purely/impurely female. That is, denied her own essential form or existence, „woman‟ 
constitutes both the pure, passively receptive mind/soul that forms and motivates man‟s 
wholly immanent being (the good Psyche/Diotima), and the (im)proper sensual/sexual 
body that constantly threatens its downfall and death (the evil Eve). And even when 
Descartes definitively separates mind from body, he still conceives the immature mind of 
man as femininely pure, obedient and submissively receptive to impregnation with the 
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masculinizing Word/Logos of God, thereby being transformed into the virile masculine 
generator of scientific truths (Scheman, 1993). For, like Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, 
Augustine, Kant, Husserl, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault, Descartes 
conceives the development of mature, enlightened, rational subjectivity as requiring 
ascendance from a pure, primordial state of passive, femininely submissive immanence, to 
a (rationally and/or aesthetically) cultivated state of active, dominant, unified (manly) male 
transcendence - whether that subjectivity be disembodied or embodied. Similarly, for these 
philosophers, as for Western philosophy in general, the real, unappropriated sexual 
woman/female - as man‟s formless, chaotically undifferentiated, abyssal „not-man‟ - 
signifies dark, evil, unbounded, unconstructible fluidity, and thus, symbolic and subjective 
non-existence. To ignore this more fundamental Platonic/Aristotelian „man/woman‟ 
dualism is to therefore ignore the possibility of a fundamental connection between 
anorexia and the real sexual female self/body.
48
 Further support for this assertion that it is 
the „man/woman‟ dualism that underpins anorexia can be found in Foucault‟s strategies to 
overcome Platonic/Cartesian dualisms, strategies that Bordo sees as a means for the 
anorectic to resist and escape her „Othering‟. 
 
Drawing upon Kantian Enlightenment ideals of rational autonomy and the aesthetic ideals 
of 19
th
 century French poet Charles Baudelaire, the later Foucault (1991) suggests that 
successful resistance to and freedom from oppressive social/discursive conditions requires 
the existence of a self-conscious, self-critical, embodied subject who may free himself (sic) 
from subordinate immaturity by undertaking the aesthetic and ethical cultivation and 
reconstitution of the self, thereby attaining an enlightened state of mature, self-determined 
subjectivity. This aesthetics of the self requires the cultivation of body and mind into what 
is essentially a beautiful, original, self-created “work of art” that, in creating a “critical 
ontology of ourselves”, sets its own transgressive but also ascetically based standards and 
limits of morality and behaviour (ibid. p. 47). Following Baudelaire, Foucault finds the 
ideal expression of this embodied, aesthetically cultivated and enlightened subject in the 
modern figure of the (male) “dandy” or “flâneur”. Besides Baudelaire, other famous 
examples of the modern dandy are 18
th
 century Frenchman Beau Brummell and 19
th
 
century Englishman Oscar Wilde, both personifying the dandyish characteristics of a 
cultivated indifference to social rules, norms, values and practices, especially those of 
                                                 
48
To say that the mind/body dualism is not the cause of anorexia is not to deny that the anorectic may 
experience the body as a separate or alien entity. However, this separation may be seen as a symptom of the 
deeper cause.   
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bourgeois capitalism and compulsory (masculine) heterosexuality. Instead, the dandy 
values and practices a decadent dedication to useless, artistically absorbed passions, and a 
constant reinvention of both physical and psychic aspects of the self that requires the 
cultivation of a fluidly rational and moral mind, and a sartorially refined, stylishly 
androgynous appearance. But, despite its cultivated indifference to social norms and 
constraints, an essential feature of dandyism is the ascetic moderation and control of the 
body, as evidenced by the slender, refined feminine shape often acquired through corseting 
and dieting. For Baudelaire‟s modern man views the body as a sort of raw, natural 
materiality that, through artistic creation, must be “torn apart from all images of nature” in 
order that he cultivate and attain mature, self-controlled (femininely embodied) 
subjectivity (Seppä, 2004, §5).  
 
One might think, then, that Foucault‟s aesthetics of the self, in recognizing an always 
embodied, culturally- and self-constituted and ensouled subjectivity, offers a perfect 
alternative to the dualistic separation of (male) mind from (female) body that Bordo and 
others (Wolf, 1991; Lester, 1997) identify as the metaphysical origin of anorexia, and thus, 
the possibility of successful (rather than collusive) resistance to and escape from one‟s 
„Othering‟. For this Foucauldian subject seemingly does away with fixed, hierarchically 
divided dualisms such as „masculine/feminine‟, „mind/body‟, and „heterosexual/ 
homosexual‟ (that underpin traditional feminine ideals of passive subservience), instead 
allowing the self-directed subject a fully autonomous, plurally embodied, and multiply-
identified existence that transcends normalizing/pathologizing forms and mechanisms of 
social and discursive control.  
 
In seemingly offering a means of escape from familial/social construction as the deviant, 
pathological „Other‟, Foucault‟s model of plurally embodied, self-cultivated subjectivity 
has informed therapeutic approaches to eating disorders such as the „narrative therapy‟ 
developed by Michael White and David Epston (1990). Narrative therapy sees a person‟s 
identity and her problem (disorder) not as essentially fixed and unified, but as separate 
entities that are constructed and shaped by the stories or narratives that interpret our life 
experiences, with negative or damaging experiences/stories producing the problem. In 
conceiving him/her self as separate from the externally imposed problem, the person can 
then remove it by replacing or giving new meaning to the problem-causing narratives (ibid, 
p. 14). As the problem, anorexia is depicted as an alien invader that infects not just the 
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adolescent but the entire family; an invader that may be repelled through unified resistance 
by the family, and a collaborative weaving of new narratives that focus on experiences of 
intrafamilial unity and harmony, rather than of conflict. As a language-based therapy, 
narrative therapy claims to have a high success rate in the treatment of eating disorders; 
claims that have been challenged, however, by those who assert a lack of clinical and 
empirical support, a success rate no higher than other forms of therapy, and the possibility 
that „recovery‟ from anorexia may simply involve its transformation into other mental 
disorders such as depression or obsessive-compulsive disorder (Abels, 2001, p.30; Schmidt 
et al, 2007; Wentz et al, 2009). There is, however, a mostly overlooked problem within 
Foucault‟s model of fluidly self-cultivated subjectivity that, I suggest, may refigure it, not 
as a basis for the successful treatment of anorexia, but rather, along with other (seemingly) 
anti-essentialist poststructuralist discourses, as an integral part of its metaphysical origin.   
 
When Foucault idealizes the Baudelairean dandy as the epitome of mature, autonomous 
subjectivity, and therefore presents this modern aesthetics of the self as a model for 
overcoming oppressively dualizing social, medical and scientific discourses and strategies 
of normalization, he initially seems to offer a way out to women currently shaped, 
constrained and pathologized by oppressive and conflicting ideals of femininity. For if the 
Foucauldian male body can be fluidly (re)constructed into different subjectivities and 
identities, then why not the (anorexic) female body? The very reason why not lies within 
Foucault‟s Kantian/Baudelairean model of rationally controlled, aesthetically shaped 
subjectivity. For, as Anita Seppä (2004) argues, the apparent usefulness to feminist theory 
of Foucault‟s attempts (along with those of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Derrida) to bring 
the „Other‟ back into traditional philosophy and theories of subjectivity evaporates when it 
is revealed that,  
 
[Foucault] misses – or actively ignores – the fact that for Baudelaire and many other 
modern male thinkers a dandy is by definition the opposite of a woman. In other words, 
just as in ancient theories of the self, in which femininity and self-government are largely 
taken as opposite conceptions, in Baudelaire there is a deep structural opposition between 
women and dandies…[that] is well evidenced in Baudelaire‟s early definition of a dandy, 
which places a strict opposition between the terms „dandy‟ (artificial, pure beauty) and 
„woman‟ (something natural and sexually uncontrolled). (Seppä, 2004, §9) 
 
 
Baudelaire makes this structural opposition that positions „woman‟ as the necessary 
opposite (or obverse side) of aesthetically self-constituted subjectivity all too clear when he 
states,  
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A woman is the opposite of a dandy. Therefore, she is horrible. A woman is hungry and 
she wants to eat, she is thirsty and wants to drink. She is in heat and wants to be 
fucked…A woman is natural, that is, she is disgusting [abominable]. Therefore, she is 
always vulgar. (1977, cited in and translated by Seppä, 2004, §9) 
 
Though perhaps more vividly stated, Baudelaire‟s conception of woman as uncontrollably 
„natural‟ and therefore uncultivable simply echoes that of Greek mythology, of Platonic/ 
Aristotelian metaphysics, and reiterated by male philosophers and theologians since, in 
perpetuating the (binary, moralized) conception of „woman‟ and her natural sexual female 
body as - like Eve and the Maenads - essentially formless, and thus, dangerously 
uncontrollable, impure, and evil. 
 
Because Foucault‟s analytics of power, subjectivity and aesthetic selfhood fail to challenge 
or even acknowledge the Nietzschean/Baudelairean conception of „woman‟ and her sexual 
female body as the base, formless - and thus uncontrollable and uncultivable - fluidity on 
which the very possibility of the rational/aesthetic cultivation of the embodied, bi-gendered 
male self depends, Foucault (like Derrida) simply assumes and perpetuates the dualistic 
presupposition that only „man‟ is capable of cultivation into subjectivity. For only those 
with male bodies have the enduring (phallic) form that permits the social construction and 
aesthetic self-cultivation of mind and body (and its „deviant‟ desires) into ascetically 
restrained subjectivity. Those with real (sexual) female bodies, now dispossessed of even 
inferior, objectified definition as man‟s proper „Other‟, are reduced to formless material 
fluidity and thus subjective non-existence, as the „holes‟ and „slime‟ that are the origin and 
the condition of (post)modern male subjectivity. Thus, in reuniting the Cartesian masculine 
mind with femininely subjugated body, Foucault (like Derrida) overcomes the „mind/body‟ 
dualism only by leaving the „man/woman‟ dualism firmly in its pre-Socratic place. As a 
result, and as his own life experience reveals, Foucault also leaves the „hetero/homosexual‟ 
dualism firmly in place, his own choice to remain discursively silent and closeted about his 
homosexuality revealing the enduring power of the sexual dualism, underpinned by man‟s 
homophobic fear of (fatal) feminization, to retain its fixed, hierarchically divided form.
49
 
In this case, Foucault‟s resistance to his „othering‟ seems to have simply reinforced the 
repressive dualistic structures that he sought to dismantle, thereby casting real woman as 
                                                 
49
 Here I draw on the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1992, pp. 284-7), who reveals that the fluidity, 
multiplicity and diversity that Foucault theoretically attributes to socio-discursively produced sex/gender 
identities and subjectivities was contradicted by his own dualistically closeted life and writings. 
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(improper) „Other‟ into the abyss of de-formed, unconstructible non-existence. On this 
basis, Foucault's analytics of power, resistance and embodied subjectivity reveals itself, not 
as the anorexic girl‟s means of escape from objectified, abject Othering into constructed 
subjectivity, but rather, as the obstruction of that escape through its denial of a persistingly 
whole, constructible form to her natural sexual female self/body. If this is the case, then 
Foucauldian/Derridean postmodern theory (and its performance) may be creating the 
metaphysical conditions for anorexia to occur, not as a form of protest, but as a 
girl/woman‟s battle for subjective survival in the face of the looming non-existence of 
womanhood. For, only boys or sufficiently boyish bodies may be subjects. Further grounds 
for this hypothesis can be found within other socio-cultural approaches to eating disorders.  
 
Whilst Bordo attributes anorexia to the social/cultural construction of the female body with 
confusing and contradictory feminine ideals and archetypes, other theorists have attributed 
it to the rapid and contradictory social changes brought about by women‟s (feminist-
inspired) entry into the public workforce, and to the less regulated, more varied practices of 
sexuality and food consumption that characterized the second half of the 20
th
 century 
(Brumberg, 1988; Gordon, 2000). However, Helen Malson (1998) has argued against these 
interpretations, noting that “contradictions in prescribed femininity are hardly new” (p. 95), 
traditional feminine ideals having contradictorily and confusingly required women to be, 
for example, sexually restrained, but not too restrained (a „prude‟), and sexually attractive, 
but not too sexual (a „slut‟); contradictions that have trapped women within a no-win 
situation that Marilyn Frye calls the “double-bind” (1983, p. 2). Further, since postmodern 
(male) theorists have viewed social and self-construction of the natural male body with 
multiple, shifting and possibly contradictory identities as subjectively liberating rather than 
confusing, it is unclear how similar constructions of the female body could, on their own, 
be seen or experienced as confusing in ways that might lead to anorexia. My approach 
endeavours to address these anomalies by grounding anorexia in the Platonic/Aristotelian 
misconception of essence (or form) as an immaterial, male preserve, followed by 
Descartes‟ mind/body split and conception of the natural (female) body as machine, as it 
impelled the 19
th
/20
th
 century feminist (equality) movement and consequent sociocultural 
reinforcement of heteronormative ideals (via the homosexual taboo), as they shaped the 
rise and spread of postmodernist/poststructuralist discourses. For this hypothesis 
recognizes the existence of an originary, spirogenetically essential female self that, through 
her metaphysically based, sociolinguistically imposed (pubertal) deconstruction and 
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reconception as Platonic/Cartesian man‟s good/evil (potentially hysterical) „Other‟, has 
striven in modern, feminist-inspired times to reconstruct and regain her autonomous 
subjective existence and representation. But, in doing so, she realizes that, in what has 
become a pervasively postmodern Western culture (in which man has reclaimed his 
Cartesian [feminine] body), her own natural sexual female body is now fluidly invisible 
and unconstructible. Hence, if she is to continue to exist, the postmodern girl/woman has 
no alternative but to strive for the newly ideal boyish form that will permit access to the 
realm of phallic (male) subjectivities and identities; an ideal form that is no longer a form 
of (feminist) resistance, but that is now pursued as a requirement for paternally/socially 
approved access to subjectivity. Once constructed, this boyishly ideal, pretend form/self 
must repressively deny the existence and needs of the (fragmented) essential sexual self, 
cannot achieve full (phallic) subject status, is always unstable, and, if denied, brings that 
girl face-to-face with her own symbolic and subjective non-existence. It is this prospect of 
subjective annihilation that anorexia recognizes and evades through its (internally waged) 
battle for the perfect (desexualized) form. And it is this essential model of anorexia that 
may explain why the ostensibly liberating social construction of girls‟ bodies with multiple 
and sometimes contradictory identities may be experienced as confusing and alienating in 
ways that might result in eating and associated disorders.  
 
For, while the postmodern (metrosexual) man may confidently conceive, experience, and 
symbolically represent himself as a fully inducted, wholly embodied, thinking, desiring, 
self-knowing subject who may therefore choose the identities and characteristics with 
which he is inscribed, thereby avoiding any that may be confusingly disharmonious or 
contradictory, the postmodern woman may gain limited, imitative access only by erasing 
her real sexual female self/body, and reconstructing it as the boyishly perfect form/self. 
This reconstruction perhaps explains why at least 80% of contemporary Western 
girls/women have taken to dieting, strenuous exercise, laxative use, „cosmetic‟ surgery 
and/or smoking to lose weight, whilst also striving for ever higher qualifications, 
intellectual/sporting/artistic achievements, and access to previously male only clubs and 
professions.
50
 For a woman who attains the ideal (boyishly slim, muscular, active, 
intelligent, self-restrained, androgynously attractive) form/function is rewarded with 
                                                 
50
 See Soliah (2009). Also, a study of 500 schoolgirls by Mellin, Scully & Irwin (1986) showed that 81% of 
ten-year-olds had dieted at least once, while a large scale survey by Garner (1997) found that 89% of the 
women surveyed wanted to lose weight, and 40-50% of the women who smoked did so in order to control 
their weight. 
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paternal/social recognition, approval and thus restricted access to the symbolic realm of 
phallic subjectivities and identities, this access now recognized and confirmed by her 
interpellation in various local vernaculars as „guy‟, „bro‟, „buddy‟, or „mate‟. But what is 
repressively shed in this reconstructive process is not just her sexual female body, but the 
very existence and sense of her self as a fully-fledged, wholly embodied, thinking desiring, 
self-knowing female subject. It is for this reason, I suggest, that the social construction and 
inscription of her pretend self with various phallic subjectivities and identities is 
(experienced as) contradictory and confusing. For, without (knowledge/concept of) an 
underlying, persistingly whole, same, integrated female self, there can be little or no self-
directed, self-related, experiential choice - and therefore harmonious integration - of 
subjective identities. Moreover, because this pretend self requires the shedding of one‟s 
essentially female thoughts, desires, and feelings in order to boyishly imitate those of the 
phallic male subject, the identities that a woman does inhabit - in being male-defined, and 
in conceiving her real sexual female body as the fearful, disgustingly uncontrollable 
„abyss‟ of non-existence - may be not just confusingly contradictory but also numbingly 
alienating from self/others, and thus always uneasy, possibly to the point of „dis-ease‟. 
 
Evidence for postmodern woman‟s experience of her (re)constructed, multiply identified 
existence as being confusing and uneasy due to its denial of her essential female self may 
be found in the writings of Latin American feminist philosopher Maria Lugones (2003). As 
a woman of colour, Lugones recognizes the performative possibility and liberatory value 
of always being in and travelling to different social “worlds” where one may accept or 
reject various ambiguous and contradictory (dominant and nondominant) identities, and 
thereby become a different person in each „world‟, whilst still remembering one‟s 
personage in other „worlds‟. In this way, one exists as “a plurality of selves” (p. 93) with 
no sense of an enduring, underlying self or “I” (p. 89). Whilst this form of playful, loving 
“world-travelling” permits one to see the world through the eyes of (different) others as 
subjects of their own world, Lugones admits that it can be a sometimes confusing, uneasy 
and unhealthy existence. Confusing, because one‟s various identities may conflict (for 
example, when one is constructed as the [arrogantly perceiving] oppressor in one world, 
and the oppressed „Other‟ in another); uneasy, if one is unable to fit or agree with the 
norms and meanings of, or find love within, a (hostile) „world‟; and unhealthy, if one is 
constructed within a „world‟ as seriously and inflexibly unplayful, rather than fluidly and 
lovingly “playful” (ibid. pp. 90-96). However, the deeper reason for this sense of confusion 
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and unease, I suggest, is because there is for Lugones no (sense/concept of an) essentially 
whole, integrated female self that underlies, and can therefore create, choose, remember 
and thus render cohesive, the various identities offered to her. Therefore, unless Lugones 
accepts and identifies with at least one socially prescribed identity, albeit a possibly 
derogatory and injurious one, she can, as Butler (1997) also says, have no existence 
whatsoever. It seems plausible, then, that the “lack of ease” (ibid. p. 93) and the 
unhealthiness that Lugones experiences in some hostile, agonistic “worlds” may be due, 
firstly, to this lack of an underlying, essentially unified self, and secondly, to the ever 
present possibility and fear of collapse of her social identity, and thus, of subjective 
annihilation; a collapse and resulting state of existential distress that may produce the „dis-
ease‟ of anorexia. If this is the case, then it is not (Bruch‟s) autonomous womanhood, or 
(Bordo‟s) contradictory and confusing feminine ideals, or even (Malson‟s) femaleness that 
gives rise to anorexia. Rather, it is the metaphysically based fragmentation and loss of 
(recognition/love of) the essentially whole, integrated - but now demonically „de-formed‟ - 
sexual female self that, in these post-feminist, postmodern times, must be reshaped to 
imitate the perfect boyish form, in order to gain (paternally approved) access to 
socially/discursively constructed subjectivity.
51
  If unable to attain this ideal form, and 
therefore condemned to subjective non-existence (by her „Eve-il‟ sexual self), a 
girl/woman may have no option but to withdraw within and anorexically punish, purify, 
deny, desexualize, „re-form‟, redeem, and thereby ensure the subjective existence of, her 
essential, but fragmented, demonically sexual, female self.  
 
A girl whose pubertal development signals the approach of womanhood may have already 
(through familial/social/linguistic inscription) begun to re-perceive and re-conceive her 
sexual female self and desiring body as inferior, imperfect, dirty, and bad, and thus needing 
to be restrained, hidden, and reshaped into the ideal feminine form if she is to be 
recognized, loved and accepted. What is required of this girl, then, is to diet, purge, cut, 
cleanse or otherwise remove from her body and mind all traces of (impure, natural) 
womanliness in the unrelenting pursuit of an ideally active, slender (and so, visibly self-
restrained) androgynously attractive form that will show her to look, think, desire, feel and 
act like a (postmodern) boy, thus ensuring access to the realm of phallic male 
                                                 
51
The idea that a girl experiences a wholeness of being that becomes fragmented through symbolic 
construction draws upon De Beauvoir‟s (1953) theory that, prior to adolescence, a girl experiences and 
images herself as an autonomous individual, before being socially constructed as the sexually objectified 
„Other‟. 
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subjectivities. Having accessed this realm, the girl/woman soon realizes, however, that her 
place there is conditional upon her maintaining the perfect form/function (and associated 
identities) in a way that is neither too masculine (or manly), nor too feminine. As former 
Prime Minister Helen Clark and CEO Christine Rankin
52
 discovered, to stray too far either 
side of the feminine ideal is to imitate phallic male subjectivity either too well, or not well 
enough, and to therefore invite ostracism (as a „lesbian‟ or „bloke‟, a „tart‟ or „slut‟) and 
even exclusion. But what this boyishly subjectified woman also realizes is that her access 
to subjectivity must everyday be won anew, not only by maintaining the ideal appearance 
(form), but by achieving the ideal performance (function), thereby iteratively preserving 
the perfect, pretend self. But, with seemingly ever more stringent ideals of slimness, 
youthfulness, and achievement, the pressure and fear of failure to (daily) achieve them may 
well (self-fulfillingly) result in actual failure to gain or maintain access to socially 
constructed subjectivity, and the prospect, not only of exposure of the demonically sexual 
female self beneath, but also of the nihilistic abyss that she portends.  
 
It is these realizations, I suggest, that may shift a postmodern girl/woman‟s (apparent) 
failure to gain or maintain access to the realm of phallic subjectivities and identities into 
anorexia and other associated disorders (e.g. depression, self-mutilation), all of which 
serve as an inner, self-adjudicated desexualizing, defeminizing means of perfect re-
formation, redemption, and thus ongoing subjective survival of the essential female self. 
For, as long as that self is metaphysically conceived as without essence or essential 
properties, and thus, as the formless fluidity that is the source (and downfall) of 
postmodern man, and as long as the term „woman‟ remains metaphor for the feminine 
„phallus‟, the „will‟, the „wisdom‟, the „bitch sensuality‟, or other aspects of his ultimately 
transcendent becoming, real woman cannot exist as subject.
53
 And so, unable to attain or 
maintain the paternally imposed, boyishly imitative ideals (of appearance and 
achievement) required for access to socially/discursively (re)constructed subjectivity, the 
anorexic woman withdraws from the familial/social arena, and turns within to conduct her 
own battle for the perfect form (and performance) - and thus, for the self recognition and 
                                                 
52
 As New Zealand‟s Prime Minister (1999-2008), Helen Clark was often criticized as being too masculine, 
this perception often accompanied by rumours of lesbianism. As CEO of Work and Income NZ (1998-
2001), Christine Rankin was criticized for her allegedly overly feminine, sexually provocative dress and 
appearance. See http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/2607353/The-real-Helen-Clark and 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/rankin-file/news/article.cfm?c_id=758&objectid=197665 for these criticisms. 
53
 See pp. 73-78 of this thesis for more (Nietzschean/Derridean) examples of traditional philosophical use of   
    'woman' as metaphor for the proper/improper (or present/lacking) aspects of the phallic male subject. 
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love - that will ensure her subjective survival. And this battle may be daily waged and won 
through the ritualized punishment, denial, purification, and erasure of her „dirty‟, „bad‟ 
sexual female self/parts, the weight lost, and the gradual emergence of a bony, childish, 
desexualized form being her measures of success. Sufficiently re-formed, this anorexic 
woman may one day (and perhaps by maintaining self-purifying rituals) reconstruct a 
socially or transcendently approved pretend self, or even seek indirect access to 
subjectivity as the perfect „wife‟ or „mother‟ of the traditional Cartesian man. In each case 
the anorexia can be shelved, though often to be simply replaced by other (self-denying, 
purifying) disorders such as depression, obsessive-compulsive disorders, (work/drug/ 
alcohol) addictions, or hysteria. She who remains anorexic, however, may eventually lose 
(or be denied) hope or means of escaping her bad sexual self, and die. Or she may, in 
maintaining an emaciated, desexualized, purified, childish form (of mind and body), 
sustain that essential self in the hope that one day, in a space beyond the „Eve-il‟ desires 
and il-logical Forms of Western metaphysics, language and religion, she may be 
reconceived and reconstituted as essential sexual female subject, thereby taking „woman‟ 
as her name. On this understanding, then, anorexia is an urgent battle for survival of the 
essential female self, in the face of failure to attain or maintain a socially/transcendently 
approved pretend self. And, far from colluding with the familial, social and discursive 
forces that create and demand this boyish (sexually attractive, fit, muscular, successful, 
pleasing) ideal self, the anorectic turns her back on them, becoming unattractive, unfit, 
unwell, emaciated, withdrawn, and unresponsive as she takes control of, re-forms, and thus 
sustains the existence of what only she knows as the real, original „me‟.   
 
Empirical support for this metaphysical/essential model of anorexia as based upon and 
surviving the (de-formed, demonized) fragmentation and loss of the essential sexual 
female self, and the failure to construct or maintain a perfect, socially approved pretend 
self, can be found in the narratives of currently or previously anorexic women. For 
example, reflecting on her experience of anorexia, Karen Margolis (1988) writes,  
 
I felt as far away from others as the sun is from the earth…Nothing I was, or had 
achieved seemed sufficient to make them recognise me, at least in the way I wanted…I 
felt I was trying to cleanse myself of extraneous matter, trying to reach the internal 
essence that had become obscured by my image of myself and as others saw me. (p. 20, 
my emphasis) 
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For Margolis, the „internal essence‟ is the original self, the “real me” (p. 73), as she had 
experienced, known, and now remembered it, but which had become obscured and 
alienated as she learnt to re-perceive and re-imagine that self through phallic male eyes as 
the sexually impure, voraciously “devouring female”; an image that, despite personal and 
professional achievement, she could not escape. Margolis‟ interpretation of her anorexia 
therefore fits with the metaphysical model presented here, in that her (daily) reconstruction 
of the perfect, paternally/socially approved pretend self only kept fragmented and alienated 
her essential (impurely sexual) female self, her anorexia then desexualizing, cleansing, and 
reforming that essential self.    
   
Malson (1998) lends further support to this metaphysical/essence model of anorexia when 
she highlights the anorectic‟s association of the onset of menstruation with “emotionality, 
sexuality, vulnerability, danger and lack of control” (p. 117), the amenorrhea associated 
with anorexia therefore signifying a refusal of these attributes that mark her and her 
developing body as sexual, uncontrollable, and thus, bad. Says her interviewee, Teresa, “It 
[anorexia] was about not having feelings, not having periods, not being…emotional, not 
being vulnerable…I was very asexual” (ibid.). Here, the anorexic self is the desexualized, 
desensitized and therefore purified, protected, childishly female self. Similarly, to the 
anorexic Elaine, the ideally slim, petite woman is seen as having a boyishly childlike, 
powerless and dependent form in comparison to the powerful form of „big‟, „muscular‟ and 
„protective‟ men. As she puts it,  
 
women are always…portrayed so petite…not even like little girls. They‟re portrayed like 
little boys…Men are always like this muscular…big…almost to make one protective over 
the other. (ibid. p. 114)      
 
 
Thus, for the anorectic, the attainment of the socially prescribed ideal form/function that 
initially promised inclusive liberation and empowerment ultimately reveals itself to be 
exclusionary and disempowering, since it is an (ever more stringent) male-defined ideal 
imposed onto a woman‟s body that requires her to remain (like Peter Pan) in a boyish state 
of immaturity and dependency, as opposed to postmodern man‟s ascendancy to 
(supposedly) mature, enlightened, autonomous subjectivity. With both social and anorexic 
ideals requiring the erasure of the sexual, womanly self, this perfect postmodern woman 
might well be seen as the 20
th
 century manifestation of Aristotle‟s (1953) pronouncement 
that “a boy is like a woman in form, and the woman is as it were, an impotent male”. 
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Stripped of her own essential form, this woman‟s very existence depends upon her social - 
or anorexic - manifestation of the perfectly boyish, childish form. 
 
Final evidence for this understanding of anorexia as the existentially necessary erasure and 
desexualized reformation of the (demonically de-formed) essential sexual female self can 
be found in the anorectic‟s inability to see, feel or otherwise perceive her sexual female 
body and associated emotions, feelings and desires. In a multicultural study that linked 
oppression-based trauma to body/eating problems, Becky Thompson (1994) found that 
many African-American, Latina and lesbian women who develop eating problems 
following racial or sexual trauma do not imagine or “see themselves as having bodies at 
all” (p. 16). For these women, anorexia, bulimia or obesity promises erasure of and escape 
from the dark, bad, sexual (menstruating) female body, and from the feelings of guilt, 
shame and pain associated with it. As Teresa said, “It [anorexia] was about not having 
feelings” (Malson, 1998, p. 117). And, as Nicki says of the time that her periods began, “I 
sort of saw my body as a separate thing, like it wasn‟t me…I wanted to sort of distance 
myself from it” (ibid. p. 118). The essential sexual female body, in signifying only bad-
ness, impurity, guilt and shame, must, as a matter of survival, become numbed, invisible, 
and even non-existent to familialy/socially and anorexically reconstructed selves alike. 
 
Other ‘Forms’ of Survival 
This metaphysical/essence model of anorexia as a (perfect) „form‟ of subjective survival 
accounts not only for the various symptoms, experiences and theories of anorexia, but also 
for its relation to, and differentiation from, other mental disorders such as bulimia, 
(morbid) obesity and hysteria. For these disorders may also be interpreted as a survival 
response to the de-formation, fragmentation and (repressive) loss of the essential sexual 
female self, a pathological de-formation that, rooted in the Platonic/Aristotelian 
„man/woman‟ dualism, may therefore be historically related - and hence relate these 
contemporary disorders - to the ancient Greek concept and manifestation of hysteria. Just 
as the ancient Greek physician Hippocrates saw a dry „wandering‟ (demonically 
possessed) womb as the cause of the loss of appetite and/or breath, and the loss of - or 
excessive - movement that characterize hysteria, so did some 19
th
 century physicians 
perceive the dry, „unused‟ womb (especially of unmarried women) as the cause of the 
hysteria that gripped epidemic numbers of Victorian women, its treatment therefore 
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requiring manual penetration and stimulation of the sexual organs. Freud (1953), however, 
viewed the symptoms of hysteria as the somatic effects of psychic conflicts in which 
forbidden, feared sexual sensations, meanings and libido are repressively transferred from 
the sexual regions of the body (and body image) onto other non-sexual organs or zones, 
and expressed via hysterical symptoms (e.g. constrictions of the throat, breathing, and 
movement). Although noting that most of the hysterics that he studied were highly 
intelligent, energetic and creative women, Freud failed to make any connection between 
that observation and the fact that these women were (after schooling) expected to assume 
the submissive feminine role of isolated, dependent, monotonous domesticity (Bordo, 
1993, p. 158). However, first wave feminist, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, in experiencing the 
depression, weakness, hallucinations and nervous collapse symptomatic of hysteria, 
directly related these symptoms to the culturally defined feminine role of isolated and 
immobilized domesticity imposed upon those approaching womanhood (ibid). This 
modern form of hysteria can therefore be related to its ancient form via the Platonic/ 
Cartesian „man/woman‟ dualism that has continued to conceive woman in inferior, 
posterior and „pure/impure‟ relation to man as essential subject, hysterical symptoms 
expressing (fear of exposure of) the repressed, demonically desiring female self, or its 
suffocation by objectifying, silencing, feminine ideals and roles. And the 19
th
 century 
epidemic of hysteria may then be explained by noting that the „first wave‟ of Anglo-
American feminist activism (including the women‟s suffrage movement) and the desire of 
many women to enter the public sphere saw the socio-cultural reinforcement of 
heterosexual norms and ideals of (submissive) femininity and (dominant) masculinity, a 
reinforcement facilitated by the discursive construction, pathologization, and 
criminalization of the homosexual individual and identity. Further, the same reinforcement 
of repressive, immobilizing feminine ideals that led to the 19
th
 century epidemic can also 
be equated with the 20
th
 century hysteria or the “problem that had no name” that Betty 
Friedan (1965, p. 17) identified in post-war American housewives socially and morally 
coerced into returning to dependent, isolated, ideal-driven domesticity having tasted the 
independence and camaraderie of participation in the wartime workforce.
54
  
 
Whilst both ancient and modern forms of hysteria (and the characteristic paralysis, 
muteness and fits) can therefore be seen as a response to the Platonic/Augustinian binary 
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 Psychiatrist Frazer McDonald identified the same problem in post-war N.Z. housewives as „suburban  
    neurosis‟. 
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conception - and the more recently intensified cultural inscription - of woman and her 
sexual body as either the pure, restrained, properly domesticated aspect, or the impure, 
improper, sexually uncontrolled aspect of man (i.e. as the exalted Mary, or the fallen Eve), 
the 20
th
 - 21
st
 century phenomenon of anorexia cannot be explained by this model for one 
very good reason. As Pierre Beumont (2007) notes, the current epidemics of anorexia and 
bulimia are occurring, 
 
in societies in which women have come closest to achieving equal rights, and there is an 
almost perfect opposition between countries with [a] high female illiteracy rate and those 
with a high prevalence of the disease.  
 
 
Thus, while feminist theory and activism has freed many women from their oppressed, 
appropriated state of cloistered domesticity, thereby theoretically lessening the risk and 
occurrence of hysterical disorders (such as conversion disorder and agoraphobia), the 
increasing incidence of anorexia has corresponded with postmodern woman‟s entry into 
the public realm of (phallic) male subjectivities, (uni-formed) identities, and their norms 
and ideals. It cannot therefore be the traditional binary conception and definition of (real) 
woman as the sexually objectified, passively submissive, feminine „Other‟ that motivates 
anorexia, but rather, and even worse, her complete loss of any subjective, symbolic or 
material definition or existence whatsoever, as the result of the postmodern male subject‟s 
reclamation of feminine embodiment, thereby reducing real, sexual woman to his dark 
„shadow‟. Her (fragmented) non-existence being the condition of his existence, the 
essential, sexual womanly self is no more than the formless fluidity of the “infinite, 
undifferentiated plenum” (Frye, 1996, p. 1000) that is the fearfully unknowable, 
uncontrollable realm of Aristotle‟s „non-man‟, of Augustine‟s sinful, potentially 
feminizing desire, of Descartes‟ disdainfully uncontrolled passions, of Nietzsche‟s mad, 
phallus-wielding, man-eating, Dionysian „maenads‟, of Derrida‟s essence-less, potentially 
engulfing „abyss‟, and of Baudelaire‟s „abominable‟ appetites. Is it any wonder then, that a 
postmodern pubescent girl might flee from approaching womanhood by doing all in her 
power to diet, run, slice or otherwise slough off her sexual female body and strive for the 
ideal boyish form (and functions), in order to attain even false, limited, and uncertain 
access to the symbolic order of phallic subjectivities and identities? And if this access is 
denied or revealed as no more than an endlessly self-denying, ever more demanding 
masquerade, is it any wonder that she might seek this perfect form (and thus, subjective 
existence) through the self-adjudicated anorexic punishment, purification and erasure of 
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her dirty, disgusting, sexual womanly self? It seems, therefore, that anorexia may be the 
subjective female self‟s prophylaxis against the fatal „dis-ease‟ of (post-feminist, 
postmodern) womanhood; this understanding of anorexia as a „form‟ of subjective survival 
also permitting its etiological and conceptual correlation with the more recent (and 
increasing) occurrences of bulimia and obesity in girls/women, and anorexia in boys/men.  
 
For, while the anorectic may ritually deny nourishment to, enforce exercise upon, and 
cleanse (e.g. with laxatives) her dirty, bad sexual self, thereby punishing, purifying and 
earning a daily measure of (desexualizing, reforming) goodness for that self, the bulimic 
girl/woman may binge to comfort or engorge the starving self, but then, through immediate 
purging, punish, purify, and ultimately deny nourishment to that self, thereby similarly 
pursuing the perfect, desexualized form. Both therefore gain the modicum of goodness, 
(self-)recognition and approval required for the ongoing existence of the (bad) essential 
self. Having similarly failed to achieve the socially prescribed ideal, boyishly slim 
feminine form, the obese girl/woman does not starve, purge, or cut away the dirtiness, 
badness, and shame of her (fragmented, alienated) sexual female self, but rather, may 
conceal, protect, and comfort it with layers of desexualizing, and thus purifying, re-
forming consumption. In addition, the only recent appearance of bulimia nervosa as a 
clinically recognized (Western) disorder, along with the increasing incidence of anorexia 
and obesity, may be explained by Gordon‟s observation that the ideal female form has 
become progressively thinner and more “tubular” during the last fifty years, making it even 
more difficult, if not impossible, to attain (2000, p. 120).
55
 Unable to reconstruct their 
fragmented, alienated essential self to fit this ideal, tubularly androgynous form, it may be 
expected that an increasing number of girls/women will use food as their means to achieve 
the desexualized, defeminized, childish anorexic form that ensures their own recognition, 
love, and thus, sustenance of the essential self. Hence, the question to be urgently 
answered, then, is: Just why is the ideal female form becoming ever thinner and more 
tubularly androgynous?          
 
Richard Gordon (2000, p. 121) suggests that this ideal form or standard of female 
attractiveness is largely created and imposed by men, as evidenced by the increasingly thin 
and tubular appearance of Playboy centrefolds, beauty pageant winners, and perhaps most 
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 Gordon‟s (2000) observation is confirmed by New Zealand studies indicating a similar reduction in size 
and weight of the ideal female form during the last fifty years (De Ras, 1997, p. 112). 
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obviously, of the catwalk models idolized by so many young girls/women. The female 
body most attractive to the postmodern metrosexual man, then, is the body that is ever less 
sexually female, and ever more boyishly androgynous - to the point where the currently 
most perfect model of women‟s couture is actually a boy.56 So why should this be the 
case? The answer may lie in what I have posited as the conditions of existence of the 
(Foucauldian/Derridean) postmodern male subject. The dandy/metrosexual‟s attainment of 
aesthetically self-cultivated, enlightened subjectivity requires visible subjugation of the 
immoderate female desire (to submit) that has traditionally characterized - and thus 
excluded from subjectivity - the „Eve-il‟, de-formed, fluidly uncultivable sexual woman. 
As the fluid source, the metaphorical properties, and the existential limit of the 
postmodern/metrosexual male subject‟s appropriately restrained (i.e. non-fatal) feminine 
form, real sexual woman does not and cannot exist. Thus, the ever thinner, younger, and 
more boyish ideal form required of postmodern woman ensures her real/symbolic non-
existence, whilst re-presenting her taught, tubular, always boyish body as the fetishized 
vehicle for the aesthetic sublimation of the dandy/metrosexual man‟s irrepressible desire to 
submit, thereby ensuring his retention of the phallus, and thus, his enduring, fluidly 
embodied existence. A fluidity that does not, however, mean the unrestrained expression of 
equally valued, bi-sexual identities, but that, following Heraclitus, requires the visible 
masculine (rational) dominance and disciplined definition of feminine (bodily) 
qualities/desires. Hence, when Derrida seeks to „become feminine‟, it is only a 
(heterosexual) male-defined and chastely restrained, boyishly feminine embodiment that he 
desires and ideally requires for the construction of phallic subjectivity. And it is the ever-
increasing difficulty, if not impossibility, to attain and maintain this ideal, ever more 
boyishly androgynous form that may explain the increasing incidence of eating disorders 
not only in girls/women, but also in boys/men. Moreover, recent studies of anorexia in the 
latter have shown gay, bisexual and transgender men to be at far higher risk of eating 
disorders than heterosexual men,
57
 a factor plausibly explained by their (self-) conception 
and perception as passively and de-formingly feminized, and thus, like real, demonically 
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 Bosnian-born Australian boy Andrej Pejic (19) is currently the most acclaimed women's fashion model due 
to his "impossibly skinny…flat-chested, snake-hipped figure" (Williamson, 2011).  
57
 Meyer & Feldman (2007) found that >15% of gay/bisexual and <5% heterosexual men had experienced an 
eating disorder. For Carolan & Redmond (2003), it was 19% of gay/bisexual boys/men and 57% of 
transgendered youth. 
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sexual woman, excluded from subjectivity.
58
 But what this metaphysical/essence model of 
anorexia cannot, on its own, explain, is the intrafamilial aspect of the disorder. 
 
For anorexia has also been identified as an inheritable disorder that is often passed from 
mother to daughter(s). This feature has led to its biomedical interpretation as a genetic 
disorder, a view that fails to account for the sex, race, culture, and class specific nature of 
anorexia. For, even where anorexia has been found to exist in non-white or non-Western 
cultures, and also in lesbian women, this occurrence has been linked with the global spread 
of, and desire to attain, the Western, white, heterosexual ideal of slenderness as it 
represents beauty, success and upward mobility (Bordo, 1993; Thompson, 1994, 1996). To 
explain the inheritable nature of anorexia, cultural theorist Charles Shepherdson (2000) 
looks to Freudian/Lacanian theories of psychosexual development, as viewed through the 
feminist psychoanalytic lenses of Luce Irigaray and Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni, in order to 
interpret anorexia, not as a genetic disorder, but as the result of a symbolic distortion of the 
developing psyche that is unconsciously passed from mother to daughter via the medium of 
the female body.  
 
Like Aristotle, Freud (1953, vol. 19) understood mind and body to be inextricably 
entwined, the mind developing from the imprinting of bodily drives - and particularly the 
core sexual drive or libido - onto the unconscious, immaterial surface of the brain and 
body. But, because the mind is also inevitably shaped by the constant perception of 
external, sociolinguistic stimuli, the development of subjectivity and sexual identity is not 
just a biological, but also a psychical and symbolic process in which the development of a 
masculine or feminine identity is determined by the presence or absence of the 
penis/phallus respectively. Employing the Greek tragedy Oedipus Rex
59
 as a model for 
understanding the process of psychosexual development of the conscious (male) self or 
ego, Freud sees this process as initially involving three stages: the „oral‟, the „anal‟ and the 
„Oedipal‟ (or phallic). In the oral and anal stages, the infant initially experiences itself and 
its mother as an indistinguishable unity, but then, in experiencing her absence, begins to 
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 This correlation of eating disorders in men with their perception as fluidly feminized and thus excluded  
from subjectivity correlates with the traditional Maori belief that mental illness in men as due to their 
(feminizing) penetration/possession by evil spirits or kahukahu (Best, 1904, p. 26). 
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 In Sophocles‟ tragedy, an oracle tells Oedipus, son of King Laius and Queen Jacosta, that he will "Mate 
with his own mother, and shed with his own hands the blood of his own sire." Despite all attempts to avoid 
it, Oedipus unwittingly fulfills the prophecy, Jacosta then hanging herself and Oedipus blinding himself in 
shame. 
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psychically separate from the mother and develop its own sense (and image) of an active, 
unified self (Malson, 1998). In the Oedipal stage of development, the child, in becoming 
aware that the mother lacks a penis, perceives her as a castrated male who therefore lacks 
the power and privilege that the father has, her castration seen as a form of punishment for 
sexual wrongdoing (e.g. masturbation). The child therefore repressively repudiates the 
(bad) pre-Oedipal mother/female, projectively reconceiving her as the passive object (or 
„Other‟) of the active, dominant, paternal subject‟s desire, possession and control. In 
withdrawing his/her (desire for) subjective love and attention from the objectified 
(m)other,
60
 the child redirects it towards the phallically privileged father, wishing to submit 
his/herself (and libidinal desires) to the father‟s disciplinary will and control, in order to 
gain his (identificatory) love and approval. Forbidden by Paternal Law (the incest taboo) 
from taking his (m)other as the object of his (now dominatory) sexual desire, the boy 
represses and projects that desire onto girls, thereby averting the threat of castration, 
inheriting the Phallus, and thus gaining entry into the socio-symbolic order that constructs 
and represents him as autonomous (heterosexual) subject. For this subject, the (moral) Law 
of the Father is thereafter internalized as the super-ego (or conscience) that, through its 
constant regulatory control of the aggressive libidinal drives and instincts of the id, ensures 
the autonomous, socio-linguistically ordered and approved existence of the phallically 
privileged, conscious male self or ego (1953, vol. 19). 
 
Freud describes the girl child as initially driven by the same aggressively masculine libido 
as the boy. In the Oedipal stage, however, the girl realizes that, like her (m)other, she too 
has been castrated (for wrong-doing), and must therefore be inferior, lacking, and 
imperfect compared to her perfect phallic father/brother. She therefore rejects her (m)other 
as love-object and masochistically submits her own will/desires to those of the dominant, 
disciplinary father, thereby gaining his (object) love and thus indirect access to (otherwise 
denied) phallic subjectivity and power (Rubin, 2000). Like her (m)other, then, the daughter 
relinquishes active, desiring subject status and becomes a passive, phallic object of male 
desire, ownership, control and (intersubjective) exchange, never thereafter to be “the 
subject of her own desire” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 88), or, for that matter, her own thoughts, 
feelings or actions. Rather, in being psychically and symbolically constructed, projected, 
and represented as an external sexual object, „woman‟ and her feminine/maternal body are 
                                                 
60
 Here I use the term „(m)other‟ to distinguish the real, biological, pre-Oedipal „mother‟ from the phallically 
related Oedipal image and definition of the „(m)other‟ as a „castrated‟ subjugated sexual object. 
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equated with all things physical, in opposition to the equation of masculinity with the 
metaphysical. In this way, Freud describes the psychosexual process by which boys are 
biologically and socially destined to become what De Beauvoir (1953) calls the 
Aristotelian essential, autonomously defined “Absolute”, while girls become the 
inessential, relationally defined “Other” (p. 16), through the paternally enforced repression 
and displacement of libidinal drives and instincts. And because these drives may be 
repressively displaced onto other objects/functions in order to gain the object-love of the 
father, these primal desires – whether for food, liquid, or (pre-Oedipal) maternal love – 
acquire a symbolic meaning and an alternative form of (conscious) expression that 
distances them from their original biological (sexual) meaning and function. For Freud 
(1953), then, the regulatory repression of forbidden libidinal desires is a necessary aspect 
of the normal psychosexual development of the self/ego, conscious fears and anxieties 
caused by these repressed desires/fantasies being allayed through their socially acceptable 
(often neurotic, ritualistic) sublimation. It is only when the desires cannot be sublimated in 
this way that psychosomatic disorders (e.g. hysteria) or psychoses (e.g. schizophrenia) 
may develop, the former allowing survival of the ego/identity through somatic expression 
of forbidden desires, the latter representing a chaotic overwhelming of the ego by those 
desires and anxieties, and thus, its detachment from reality (vol. 5, p. 202).  
 
Anti-essentialist psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1977a) takes this Freudian model of 
psychosexual development and endeavours to remove it from notions of fixed, biologically 
determined, singular and unified subjectivity. He does this, firstly, by reconceiving 
conscious subjectivity as a purely illusory linguistic construction, and secondly, by 
reconceiving the language that constructs the conscious mind as having no fixed, 
referential meanings. For Lacan sees language as composed of chains of „signifiers‟ that, in 
having no conceptual or material referent, gain their unstable and always shifting meaning 
from the central signifier, the Phallus, and from their relation to other signifiers. Because 
Lacan sees the Phallus and the subjectivity it constructs as having no referent, both can 
supposedly be taken up by boy or girl, and both present the possibility of multiple and 
always fluidly signified subjectivities. Paralleling Freud‟s oral, anal and Oedipal stages, 
Lacan posits Real, Imaginary and Symbolic stages of development, the child‟s illusory 
image of a whole, complete self or “ideal ego” (ibid. p. 158) forming in the Imaginary 
stage, and sexually differentiated subjectivity being attained, by boys at least, through 
(promise of) receipt of the Phallus, and thus, entry into and construction by the Symbolic 
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order of social law, language and exchange. But, as feminist theorists such as Grosz (1990, 
p. 105) and Irigaray (1985a, p. 67) have argued, in denying any semantic connection 
between the Phallus and the penis, Lacan is then unable to explain firstly, why the Phallus 
should hold its privileged position as transcendental signifier and bestower of subjectivity; 
secondly, why only those with a penis are seen as having the Phallus (and thus granted 
subjectivity and masculine sexual identity); thirdly, why the female body should be seen as 
„castrated‟; and lastly, why it is only the female body that becomes the symbolic Phallus 
that the male subject desires. It seems, therefore, that Lacan‟s supposedly de-essentializing 
theory implicitly depends upon the same phallocentrically essentialist assumption that 
underpins the writings of Derrida and Foucault: Only „man‟ can have the Phallus that 
ensures construction, definition, and enduring, privileged existence as Symbolic subject, 
whilst metaphorical „woman‟ is the phallic signifier with which the Lacanian male subject 
is constituted and constitutes his (language based) world. Consequently, real sexual woman 
remains outside the symbolic realm, banished to the unconscious, semiotic realm of 
forbidden, repressed and thus ever threatening drives and desires, as the condition of man‟s 
entry into subjectivity.  
 
However, Irigaray extends her critique of the Freudian/Lacanian model of psychosexual 
development in asserting that, because the boy‟s developmental process requires the 
paternally enforced separation from the real mother, followed by the sexual objectification 
and repression of (desire for) the Oedipal (m)other, it therefore involves a repudiation of 
the maternal/female that precludes rather than assists the attainment of mature, sexually 
differentiated subjectivity. The intervention of paternal law can therefore be seen as 
interrupting the development of sexed selfhood, firstly, through the breaking of the primary 
bond of love between (Real) mother and child; secondly, through the child‟s (Imaginary) 
separation from and repressive forgetting of the real mother/woman (Symbolically 
identified as the voraciously engulfing female); and thirdly, through his sexual 
objectification, forbidden desire for, and thus, repressive renunciation of the Symbolic 
(m)other. Because the mother/child bond is transformed (through paternal intervention) 
into a sadomasochistic bond of (masculine) dominance and (feminine) submission, the son 
must femininely submit to the will of the dominant Father in order to receive his love, 
approval, and therefore, the phallus. Because inter-subjective love and recognition can 
thereafter only be received from and given to the Father or other male subjects, the only 
intersubjective sexual love/desire that the phallic male subject may experience is that of 
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and from other men, paternal law demanding the redirection of submissive and incestuous 
desires. It is for this reason that Irigaray recasts supposedly „heterosexual‟ Western 
economies of exchange (of love, recognition, property, etc.) as purely “hom(m)osexual” 
economies in which girls/women are the phallic objects of sexual exchange that mediate 
the bonds of identificatory love between male subjects (1985b, p. 43). For, in adapting the 
Oedipal story, Freud fails to mention Laius‟ rapacious love for the boy/man Chrysippus 
(Balmary, 1982), a love that, in resulting in the latter‟s suicide, conveys to all phallically 
initiated boys the need to repressively project their lustful desires away from the paternal 
phallus and - under modern taboos against homosexuality and paedophilia - onto the 
(veiled) female as phallic object. In this case, mature, autonomous, sexually differentiated 
subjectivity is unachievable, the sexually immature subject forever enslaved by, fearing, 
and violently projecting his forbidden desires onto an external feminine (potentially 
feminizing) object world. Irigaray‟s interpretation of the paternally ordered Oedipal/ 
Symbolic process as an interruption of the development of sexually differentiated 
subjectivity therefore permits a feminist psychoanalytic account of what Scheman (1993) 
sees as the Cartesian perception, knowledge and control of natural bodies according to the 
(heterosexual) male subject‟s „logic of male homophobia‟, as well as Derrida‟s attempt to 
subdue that phobia by invoking „woman‟ as the phallus that cannot be lost. As the 
universal Oedipal man, the Cartesian subject achieves rational subjectivity only by 
detaching from and controlling his needy sexual mind/body, his perceptions and actions 
thereafter shaped by sadomasochistic desire and its constant repression and sublimation in 
obedience to the inner voice/Law of the real and Symbolic Father. For the girl child, 
however, masochistic subjugation to the will and Law of the Father brings not even a split, 
fearful, dependent form of subjectivity. 
 
Irigaray argues that because the once powerful mother comes to be seen as a lacking, 
inferior, castrated male, the perfectly whole image (or ideal ego) formed in Lacan‟s 
Imaginary stage of development in both boy and girl can only be a male image. With 
„woman‟ reduced to metaphor for the phallic signifier that constructs and inscribes man as 
“all”, real women are rendered “unrepresentable” (1985b, p. 253) within both the 
Imaginary order and the Symbolic realm of language, meaning and subjectivity. For Lacan, 
it is the essence of real sexual woman to be the “not all” that is the condition of man‟s 
inscription as “all”, and, as such, she does not and cannot exist. As he puts it, “There is no 
such thing as The woman since of her essence having already risked the term, why think 
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twice about it? – of her essence, she is not all” (1982, p. 144). Thus, while male subjects 
can occupy the subject-position „woman‟, and, says Lacan, be “just as good as women” 
(ibid. p. 147), women cannot occupy the subject-position „man‟, for real women have no 
subjective existence within the phallic function, and cannot therefore be symbolically 
inscribed as either male or female subject. Because woman is therefore denied both 
Imaginary and Symbolic existence, the supposed psychosexual development of female 
selfhood is, for Irigaray, a process of psychic and symbolic mal-development in which the 
separation of daughter from mother is prevented due to their inability to create (Imaginary) 
limits/form for their own female body/desire (1991, p. 108). Dependent upon the mother 
(and then father) for her (objectified) definition, identity, and protection, the daughter is 
thus denied any form of (inter)subjective expression, recognition or love. Hence, where 
Freud views psychosomatic disorders as isolated physical expressions of unresolved 
psychic conflicts or repressed memories/fantasies, Irigaray‟s interpretation of the 
Freudian/Lacanian model of self-development as actually resulting in failure to develop 
autonomous, sexually specific subjectivity permits a psychoanalytic understanding of 
anorexia that meshes, with and adds generalized psychic and intrafamilial dimensions to, 
the metaphysical/essence model posited here.  
 
In applying Irigaray‟s critique of the Freudian/Lacanian models of psychosexual 
development to Lemoine-Luccioni‟s clinical studies of anorexia, Shepherdson (2000) 
interprets anorexia as the extreme psychosomatic expression of woman‟s inability to either 
imagine or symbolically construct and represent her self as a wholly embodied, desiring, 
speaking, female subject. But for Shepherdson, this inherited inability does not have 
genetic origins. Rather, it is Symbolically created and imposed upon the developing female 
psyche, when the phallic (lack of) significance of the term „woman‟ and thus, the symbolic 
non-existence of the sexual female body is passed from (m)other to daughter as a 
“symbolic inheritance” (p. 12) that, unable to be spoken, is unconsciously transmitted “at 
the level of the flesh” (p. 18). Because the term „woman‟ has no (real or imaginary) 
subjective referent/meaning, it cannot be used to subjectively signify, construct or give 
limits to the sexual female body. And so, what silently passes from mother to daughter is 
the inability to perceive, conceptualize, or cultivate (into subjectivity) her therefore 
unlimited, uncontrollable sexual female body, and thus, the existential need to seek fixed, 
male-related definition and identity (e.g. as „wife‟, „mother‟ or „psychologist‟). But what 
unconsciously persists, and what may - if these identities become unstable - then find 
 147 
psycho-somatic expression as anorexia, is the unimaginable, unspeakable, symbolically 
inherited question: “Am I a man or a woman?” (ibid. p. 19). For, says Shepherdson, it is 
the linguistic signifier (or identity) of a body that gives it limits, and therefore, a (self-) 
perceivable presence. Therefore, denied (subjective) signification by the term „woman‟, 
and also denied access to the symbolic realm of phallic male-related identities, the 
developing female psyche cannot give limits to, and therefore seemingly lacks a body from 
which to cultivate autonomous subjectivity. It is this lack that the anorectic/hysteric 
experiences - but also passionately rejects - firstly by sloughing off her sexual, womanly 
parts and being the “little girl”; secondly, by imagining (and adoring) a whole, pure, 
perfect, maternal form (e.g. the Madonna) that seemingly presents an answer to the 
question, “What is Woman?” (ibid. p. 24); and thirdly, by striving to be a woman by 
assuming an identity - such as „mother‟ - that implies womanhood, “as though mother and 
woman were one and the same” (ibid. p. 17). In this way, Shepherdson presents a feminist 
psychoanalytic account of anorexia that concurs with Thompson‟s (1994) assertion that 
many anorectics experience themselves as lacking a body and the feelings that go with it. 
However, this account fails to explain other empirically identified features of the disorder.   
 
Although this feminist psychoanalytic approach to anorexia presents a non-genetic, 
generalized account of its inheritability in interpreting the disorder as the extreme 
manifestation of a symbolically imposed, maternally transmitted disruption of self-
development, its Freudian/Lacanian origins prevent this approach from associating 
anorexia with the existence of an essentially formed (or limited) subjective self that pre-
exists symbolic construction, and that is de-formed (or de-limited) by the term „woman‟. 
And yet, it is (alienation from) this essential self to which Margolis relates her anorexia, 
and that is denied not only by Freud and Lacan, but all philosophers from Heraclitus and 
Plato to the present day, so that only the male form may be constructible into subjectivity. 
And it is the loss of unconditional inter-subjective existence, (maternal) recognition and 
love of this self/form that may explain the daughter‟s need to submit (now unruly drives) 
to the Law, will and ideals of the (real/social) Father, and, in failing to achieve his ideal 
form, her anorexic need to imagine (and be) the perfect child/maternal form. In addition, if 
this essential self is a wholly spirogenetic self, as I hypothesize, then anorexia may well 
have a genetic aspect, but only insofar as it is the symbolically imposed, pathological 
fragmentation of this self that creates the disintegrated, dysfunctional psychosomatic 
foundations (the limitless self/body) for the possible occurrence of anorexia. Whilst the 
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increasing prevalence of eating disorders can be partly explained by the paternal/social 
imposition of ever slimmer, more boyishly androgynous, and thus ever less attainable 
feminine ideals,
61
 this feminist psychoanalytic approach to anorexia/bulimia permits 
further (and intrafamilial) explanation of the increase inasmuch as these disorders respond 
to a perceived inability to escape one‟s „Eve-il‟ sexual female self.     
 
Although Freud later modified his theory that many of his hysterical patients had 
experienced actual childhood sexual abuse (reinterpreting this abuse as childhood fantasy), 
subsequent research indicates that his initial theory was most likely correct (Bordo, 1993). 
In addition, recent clinical studies have suggested that around 50-60% of anorexic 
girls/women have experienced childhood physical, sexual or other abuse, with up to 80% 
of that sexual abuse thought to be incestuous (Sheinberg & Fraenkel, 2001; Delys, 2007, 
Bulik, 2001). This close correlation of abuse with anorexia/bulimia leads Thompson 
(1994) to describe eating disorders as a survival response to sexual, racial, homophobic, or 
other traumatic events. For a girl who is experiencing or has experienced sexual or other 
abuse, escape from her bad, shameful sexual female self/body may be (or seem) almost or 
totally impossible, especially if she is blamed and/or blames herself for the abuse. This is 
particularly the case with incestuous abuse, for example, with Greek and Māori 
mythologies and Biblical scriptures implying that the daughter (of Zeus, Tāne and Lot) 
must bear the blame, guilt and shame (and for Persephone and Hinetitama, the price of 
death) for supposedly tempting her father into sexual relations.
62
 Thus, with rates of 
childhood sexual/incestuous abuse reportedly (and dramatically) increasing over the past 
30 years,
63
 it would seem that the postmodern paternal/social ideals of pure, self-restrained 
femininity can only become ever less attainable for an increasing number of girls/women, a 
factor that - along with the ever more stringent ideals - may explain the recent increase in 
incidence and prevalence of eating disorders. The psychoanalytic correlation of eating 
disorders with various forms of childhood trauma does not, however, account for the 
remaining 40-50% of cases of anorexia that seemingly do not involve abuse, nor does it 
explain why all girls/women exposed to trauma do not then develop eating disorders. But, 
if this correlation of abuse and eating disorders is situated within the broader context of the 
metaphysical/essence model of anorexia, then childhood abuse appears to be simply the 
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 See Genesis:19; Tikanga Māori (Mead, 2003, p. 245); and  
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physical/emotional enforcement of the (Aristotelian/Freudian) Symbolic Law of the Father 
that, in denying, sexually objectifying and denigrating the essential female self, causes its 
psychosomatic fragmentation and guilty, shameful repression, thereby breaking the bond 
of mother/child love, and requiring the daughter‟s masochistic submission to the father‟s 
will/control. On this basis, anorexia is the result of a metaphysical/symbolic inheritance 
not just from the (m)other, but also from the real, Symbolic, religious, philosophic, and 
psychoanalytic father(s), psychoanalytic theory revealing itself not as a cure, but rather, as 
a perpetuator of the pathological basis for eating disorders: the loss of the essential female 
self. Situated within this context of paternal subjugation and control, Bruch‟s (2001, p. 55) 
description of the anorectic as experiencing her body as controlled by external forces, or as 
having inside her a ghostly “dictator who dominates me”, a “little man who objects when I 
eat” seems perfectly understandable. And, in interpreting anorexia as an inner battle for the 
perfect, lovable form and thus survival of the essential (demonically) sexual female self, 
this metaphysical model also echoes Thompson‟s reading of anorexia as a mode of 
survival, along with Margolis‟ interpretation of her own anorexia as encapsulated in the 
words “So you could say I starved for love” (1988, p. 73). But this metaphysically based, 
parentally transmitted model also permits inclusive and coherent explanation of the 
historical manifestations of anorexia.     
 
For it relates contemporary manifestations and features of the disorder to what Rudolph 
Bell (1985) identifies as the “holy anorexia” manifest in some medieval Christian saintly 
women, and to what Brumberg (1988) identifies as the “anorexia mirabilis” perceived in 
the “fasting girls” of 18th century Europe. Just as the Lacanian Symbolic Father commits 
the essential womanly self to non-existence, and demands the daughter‟s attainment of the 
perfect boyish form to earn his approval and imitative access to symbolic subjectivity, so 
the Christian transcendent Father demands self-mortifying punishment, denial, and erasure 
of her (soulless) „Eve-il‟ sexual female self/body, so that the medieval holy woman may, 
like Jesus, achieve union with, and receive the charismatic „Word‟ of, God the Father. 
Thus, in starving herself, the 16-year-old visionary, Catherine of Siena, cast off her own 
sexual female flesh, and, in consuming the eucharistic flesh and blood of God, purified and 
masculinized mind and body, thereby persuading the Holy Fathers that, like Jesus, she had 
resisted and overcome sinful desires (for Satan‟s fruit), and was therefore a worthy 
recipient and voice for God‟s charisms. But Catherine‟s entry into the holy order also 
depended upon the support of higher male clergy who, in verifying her visions to be a sign 
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of Godly transcendence (rather than demonic madness), enabled her conditional, imitative 
access to the sanctified realm of God-fearing, ascetically self-purifying holy men (Bell, 
1985). Ongoing access therefore depended upon the ongoing and visible transcendence and 
erasure of Catherine‟s (soulless) womanly self and (uncontrollable) female desires, a 
transcendence achieved and demonstrated via a refusal of food that ultimately resulted in 
anorexia. Like the contemporary anorectic then, Catherine‟s anorexia and resulting death 
can be seen to result from the biblically imposed denial, (demonic) de-formation, and 
erasure of the essential sexual female self, and the (traditional role-rejecting) pursuit of the 
perfectly self-controlled, pure, childish form that is her ticket to transcendent (male-
imitative) subjectivity. Fearing the inevitable failure to perform (i.e. to survive on God‟s 
word alone), Catherine retreated to the “cell in the interior of her soul, whence she resolved 
never to come forth”, where she could remain the perfect (anorexic) subject, recognized 
and loved by the perfect father (Jesus) and mother (Mary) till death.
64
 Similarly, the 
„fasting girl‟ of 18th century Europe escaped the subjective non-existence portended by 
(de-forming) womanhood, using starvation to reshape herself into the perfectly pure, 
desexualized, childish form that, seemingly miraculously able to survive without food or 
fluids, was therefore (like male mystics) seen as able to transcend (potentially sinful) 
bodily appetites and desires. Apparently capable of miraculous deeds, the fasting girl 
became the focus of public attention, her parents and family profiting from exhibition of 
her supposedly magical (masculine) powers (Brumberg, 1988). In this way, she won 
paternal/social approval, and thus imitative access to a transcendent (male) subjectivity and 
identity that, in depending upon her ongoing starvation, was bound to collapse. Facing a 
loss of subjective existence, recognition and love, the fasting girl may prefer to 
anorexically starve - and even allow her parents to starve her - to death, rather than 
relinquish the (albeit false) subjective form, identity, and love she held as the „fasting girl‟. 
For this girl, then, as for the holy and contemporary anorectic, real death, as the price of 
subjective existence, may be preferable to the existential death portended by demonically 
de-formed, despised womanhood. This metaphysical/essence model of anorexia, in 
positing a general, metaphysically based, parentally/socially transmitted (de)construction 
of the essentially subjective sexual female self as its pathological origin, now permits 
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reinterpretation of the biomedical view that attributes the disorder to neurological and/or 
endocrinal dysfunction.
65
 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, anorexia and bulimia (along with associated disorders 
such as anxiety, depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorders) have been associated 
with low levels in the brain of neurotransmitter hormones (such as serotonin, dopamine 
and oxytocin), an association that has prompted a neurobiological interpretation of eating 
disorders as resulting from systemic malfunction in the limbic or hypothalamic regions of 
the brain. Neuroscientists have also discovered, however, that feelings of love, pleasure, 
happiness and laughter induce the production of these hormones in the limbic region of the 
midbrain, with oxytocin specifically produced during the development of the mother/child 
bond.
66
 Because a neurobiological etiology of anorexia cannot account for the 
intrafamilial, social, cultural and historical specificities of anorexia/bulimia, it seems 
plausible to reinterpret the lack of neurotransmitters associated with eating disorders as a 
biological consequence of the paternally imposed disintegration and repressive loss of the 
essentially spirogenetically unified, integrated, subjective female self, and the associated 
loss of unconditional, inter-subjective recognition and love. Denied subjective existence, 
this fragmented, repressed self simply cannot experience the recognition, love and 
nurturing it needs to survive, and so it is to be expected that the neurotransmitters 
associated with this experience may also be absent. Further, with the need to repressively 
restrain and reconstruct that self and its needs, desires and feelings to produce the ideal, 
paternally approved, social or anorexic form, any dopamine/serotonin-induced feelings of 
pleasure will now come not from satisfaction of these needs/desires, but from their almost 
constant denial. And, because the conditional love received through this denial is only a 
substitute for the deeper, unsatisfiable need for unconditional love, like an addictive drug, 
it will over time produce fewer neurotransmitters and less pleasure. Thus, the fragmentary 
loss of essential selfhood accounts not only for neurological dysfunction, but all other 
forms of hormonal/organic dysfunction that would result from this loss. If this is the case, 
then any attempts to treat anorexia/bulimia with electro-convulsive therapy, (serotonin-
raising) antidepressants, or anti-psychotic drugs, for example, may affect the neurological 
symptoms, but will not be addressing the underlying cause, an argument that may well 
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explain the ineffectiveness of these treatments.
67
 This argument may also explain the lack 
of success of family therapies in treating anorexia that is long-term and/or occurring in 
women, as well as the (reported) success of these therapies in treating short-term anorexia 
in girls.
68
 For the therapeutically prescribed re-enforcement of parental control (of eating) 
can be seen as offering the anorexic daughter an escape from womanhood, and thus, from 
the loss of (love of) the intersubjective self, through a return to her identity as the good 
child.  
 
It seems, then, that successful treatment (and prevention) of anorexia requires the 
metaphysical, linguistic, and real reinstatement of woman - and thus, of the (m)other - as 
essentially whole, logically defined, symbolically recognized, sexual subject. For only in 
this way can we enable the endurance and development of the original bond of 
intersubjective mother/child recognition and love, a bond that American psychoanalyst 
Jessica Benjamin (1990) posits as necessary for the successful development of sexually 
differentiated subjectivity. Benjamin argues that the development of subjectivity depends, 
not on separation from the mother (a separation that leads to disconnection from other 
minds and a solipsistic, narcissistic intrapsychism), but on an alternating process of self-
assertion and mutual recognition between mother and child that is only possible within an 
enduring bond of love and “attunement” (p. 31). This bond produces an intersubjectivity 
that is both autonomous and relational, both intra- and inter-psychic, and also based upon 
and recognizant of subjective sameness, but also sexual difference. Within this context, the 
sexual drive can be reconceived as an extension of the original bond of intersubjective 
love, and as a drive/will to love, rather than the (submissive, sublimated) Nietzschean/ 
Freudian will to objectify, dominate, consume and destroy. As such, it presents to men the 
opportunity for a sexual love based upon the intersubjective recognition of sexual 
sameness and difference, rather than upon „hom(m)osexual‟ sameness, (paternally) 
submissive desire, and its fetishistic sublimation and control through the ultimately 
dissatisfying objectification, possession and annihilation of the (boyish) female. For 
women, however, the development of an essential, sexual female (inter)subjectivity within 
the enduring bonds of maternal recognition and love may mean an end to the 
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psychosomatic (dis)orders or re-formations that currently manifest - and survive - the 
pathogenic fragmentation and loss of this subjective self. 
 
It is the metaphysically-based, Paternally imposed de-formation and loss of the essential 
female self, and the breaking of these bonds of intersubjective attunement, recognition and 
love that can therefore account for the development of not only eating (and associated) 
disorders, but also other forms of disordered consumption that may be seen as produced 
by, as an attempt to ameliorate, this loss. For even the attainment of the ideal (boyish) form 
and imitative access to loved, admired (phallic) subjectivity is an always false, limited, 
uncertain and possibly unsatisfying, addictive substitute for the real thing: essential, 
unconditionally loved selfhood. And, in denying and reshaping the desires of that 
disintegrated self, this substitute may well result in forms of excessive, always unsatisfying 
consumption. It is not surprising then, that, as increasing numbers of girls/women are 
becoming anorexic/bulimic, the average body size and weight of Western women has 
steadily increased to the point where around 62% are currently considered to be 
overweight or obese (NIDDK, 2007).
69
 Nor can it be surprising that this increase in the 
(compulsive) consumption of food has been matched by an increase in the (compulsive) 
consumption of alcohol, clothing, accessories and all kinds of home-ware.
70
  For it is this 
consumption that fires the pleasure-based dopamine and serotonin so lacking in the 
fragmented, repressed, isolated self (and reduces the glutamate), temporarily comforting, 
relieving, and giving fixed external form/identity to the inner emptiness, confusion, and 
existential stress caused by the loss of (form/recognition/love of) this demonic sexual self. 
This increase in compulsive consumption may therefore be related to contemporary 
woman‟s increasingly obsessive need to clean, renovate, control, and thus perfect her 
surroundings, both expressing the anxious need to present and maintain the perfect, pretend 
(lovable) self. In this way, the metaphysical/essence model of anorexia has not only 
offered an account of the various historical and contemporary manifestations, features, and 
biomedical, psychological, (feminist) cultural and psychoanalytic theories of this (and 
associated) disorder(s), but also, in refiguring anorexia as an inner (pretend) form of 
subjective survival of the essential self, related this (dis)order to its outer, familialy/socially 
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constructed (pretend) form and associated forms of compulsive consumption. For, both 
inner and outer forms are a means of surviving the fragmentary loss of the originary, 
spirogenetically essential - but metaphysically, familialy, socially and discursively denied 
and de-formed - sexual female self.   
 
Having explicated and critiqued the various historical and contemporary biomedical, 
psychological, cultural and psychoanalytic theories and treatments of anorexia/bulimia, I 
have then presented an alternative model that interprets it as postmodern girl/woman‟s 
inner, self-adjudicated battle for subjective survival of her essential female self in the face 
of failure to attain or maintain a boyishly perfect, pretend, paternally approved self/form, 
and thus imitative access to (phallic) social/transcendent subjectivities and identities. 
Where anorexia has variously and contradictorily been seen as: a disorder of the nervous 
system (Gull); a gastric disorder caused by intrafamilial conflict (Lasègue); a 
science/equality based „neurasthenia‟ (Playfair); a disruption of psychosexual development 
due to repressed libidinal desires (Freud); a repudiation of normal heterosexual 
womanhood, fear of fatness, and a deficient and externally controlled sense of self (Bruch); 
an over-conforming embracement of feminine ideals and stereotypes (Boskind-Lodahl); a 
protesting of confusing and contradictory ideals of femininity (Orbach, Bordo); a cultural 
and discursive construction (Malson); or a genetic/neurobiological disorder (Insel); all of 
these interpretations can now be collectively seen as symptoms of the underlying 
metaphysically, socially and discursively fragmented loss of self/form and state of 
existential distress that anorexia relieves. As such, this (dis)order may be seen as the 
somatic expression, not of the question - „Am I a man or a woman?‟ - but rather, of the 
more vital - „Do I still exist?‟; the nemesis of this anorexic girl/woman now seen to be, not 
the fat body, but her diabolically de-formed sexual female self. If this is the case, then the 
resolution of anorexia, as for all related forms of purifyingly desexualizing, perfectly re-
forming (under- or over-) consumption, lies in the return of her (spirogenetic) essence to 
woman, thus enabling her uninterrupted construction as essentially unified, integrated, 
desiring, speaking subject, and her imaginary and symbolic existence and representation as 
essential, subjective referent of the term „woman‟. It is in seeking empirical support for this 
metaphysical/essence model of eating (dis)orders, and thus, for the more fundamental 
existence of a spirogenetic essence and essential female self that I undertook practical 
research into the processes of self-development in both eating disordered and non-
disordered women, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5.   
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                                                          Chapter 5   
                                                                
                          Silentstones: Real, Lost and Pretend Selves 
In the first four chapters of this thesis, I have attempted to present theoretical support for 
the hypothesis that human existence is based upon and partly constructed by an originary, 
self-subsisting spirogenetic essence that operates at individual, sexual and species levels, 
and in conjunction with familial/social, discursive and psychosomatic forces, to shape and 
motivate the (whole, integrated) form, function and development of every substantial 
being. Further, it is the historic and ongoing lack of metaphysical and symbolic recognition 
and representation of a female essence and essential female self that is resulting in the 
(paternally/socially imposed) de-formation, fragmentation and loss of this essential 
(sexual) self, and thus, a state of existential (di)stress in girls/women that is relieved via 
their pursuit and attainment of the (boyishly) perfect self/form. Failing to achieve this 
paternally/socially imposed ideal feminine self/form, a girl/woman may retreat from this 
social pursuit to conduct her own desexualizing purification, punishment and perfect 
(childish) re-formation of the fragmented, demonically sexual self in a battle for survival 
that is currently manifesting as the eating (and associated) disorders anorexia, bulimia and 
orthorexia nervosa, and obesity.
71
 It was in order to gather empirical support for this 
hypothesis that I carried out research using a methodology that - in reflecting the 
theoretical basis and nature of the hypothesis - recognized and incorporated a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative principles and practices in what is known as an extended case 
methodology (Burawoy, 1998).  
 
Methodology 
Traditionally quantitative social science research has been based upon the 
empiricist/positivist principle that, like the physical world (and the language that represents 
it), the human social order (and its relationships and behaviours) is underpinned and 
ordered by logical laws, structure and properties that may be revealed and known through 
the generation of generalizing theories, and their reductive, deductive testing via the 
objective observation, measurement, analysis and interpretation of data (Sarantakos, 1998). 
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 In viewing obesity as an eating disorder, I am following Bruch's (1974) understanding of anorexia and 
obesity as similarly arising from a pathological misuse of the eating function, as well as contemporary 
theoretical classification of obesity as a mental disorder (e.g. Gillet [2009]). 
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For the empiricist researcher, there is one (observable) reality, and thus, only one true 
explanation (or theoretical model) of natural/social phenomena, and it is the goal of 
scientific research to discover that truth, a discovery reliant upon the transcendently 
disinterested objectivity and value-neutrality of the traditionally male observer, and his 
ability to extract, and then logically analyze and interpret, data from the passive subjects of 
the research (ibid.; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). This quantitative approach has been criticized, 
however, by followers of the Kantian/Husserlian phenomenological (or subjective idealist) 
view of reality, who argue that the observed or phenomenal world is not identical to or 
even an exact imprint of the external world of real things-in-themselves, but is subjectively 
and intentionally constructed and given meaning by and within the conscious mind of the 
transcendent (male) subject through the interplay of its innate logical concepts/categories 
and its sensible experience of that reality (Sarantakos, 1998, p. 48). The researcher must 
therefore always recognize and account for the subjective, intentional and concept-laden 
nature of his/her observations and interpretations, as well as those of the research subjects. 
In which case, the goal cannot be to produce one objectively conceived, tested and verified 
(universal) explanation (and prediction) of social phenomena. Rather, the aim is to create 
the clearest and most comprehensive account and understanding of these phenomena 
through the qualitative exploration and contextualized interpretation of the subjective 
perspectives, memories, beliefs, values and meanings of both the researcher and those 
being researched (ibid. p. 53). In addition, feminist critics of traditional research 
methodologies have argued that the supposedly objective, sex- and value-neutral scientific 
observer has in fact been viewing the object world through the lens of his own singularly 
privileged (and therefore biased) male subjectivity, perceiving and theorizing women and 
minority groups as inferior, passive, objectified „Others‟ in a way that has denied them a 
subjective position, perception, and voice within the research setting (Denzin, 1994, p. 
503). In this way, the researcher/interviewer has utilized his position of power, authority 
and control to subjectively perceive, influence, and assign his own culturally based 
meanings and values to the ideas and words of the interviewee. But interpretive, feminist 
(and) poststructuralist theorists argue that, since we (as bodies) are subjectively constructed 
and inscribed with the various identities, ideologies, meanings and values of the societies, 
cultures, and discourses that we inhabit, researchers must be aware of, and strive to 
understand the various socio-cultural and discursive structures, beliefs, meanings and 
values that continue to (re)shape and (re)signify their own - and the researchees - lives and 
perspectives. That is, research participants must be seen as subjects and interpreters of 
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their own lives; lives to be qualitatively viewed, explored and interpreted within the 
context of the various familial, social, cultural and discursive relationships, perspectives 
and values that shape and give meaning to them (Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1991). Thus, 
the most useful and informative research methods will acknowledge, include and address 
both similarities and differences in social, cultural and linguistic practices and meanings 
through constant awareness, inquiry, exchange and clarification (Rubin & Rubin, 1995).  
 
The quantitative and qualitative research methodologies outlined above can be seen to 
reflect the particular conception of essence held by the philosophies underpinning those 
methodologies. For example, the quantitative deduction of hypotheses to be objectively 
tested and (dis)proved via the observation, quantifying measurement, analysis and 
interpretation of (sense) data assumes a Lockean view of an essentially self-subsisting, 
transcendently objective subject/mind that, through its synthesis of complex ideas from 
„bundles‟ of passively observed sense data, can universally know, define and classify the 
nominally essential properties of real, essentially determined objects/bodies. In contrast, 
the qualitative, interpretive methodology assumes the Kantian/Husserlian view of spatio-
temporally unified phenomenal objects/bodies actively and logically constructed and 
known by and within the conscious mind of the transcendent (male) subject, according to 
his subjective intentions, perceptions, meanings and values. And the poststructuralist, 
culture-based, interpretive methodology assumes a persistingly formed natural (male) body 
that is socio-culturally and discursively constructed and inscribed into plural, fluidly 
mutable, and always contextual subjectivities and identities. But, because (in Section I) I 
have argued these conceptions of essence to be the purely immaterial or material 
misconceptions of what may be an originary and wholly spirogenetic essence, 
misconceptions based upon the Platonic/Aristotelian denial of essence to woman, it 
followed that research into the existence of a female spirogenetic essence and essential self 
would require a different methodology that, in positing material and immaterial, and 
persistingly whole, identical, but also different, mutable, and thus constructible aspects to 
essence, utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods. This methodology would aim 
to gather data for/against the hypothesis, not through the researcher‟s detached 
observation, intuition, and logical definition of immaterial properties, as Aristotle 
proposed, but through her direct engagement with, and intersubjective exploration of, the 
participants‟ memories, reflections, and contextual interpretations of the stages, processes, 
and key moments in the development of the female self (-concept). Because it utilizes 
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intersubjective dialogue as the means to generalized, contextualized, thematized, scientific 
knowledge, this dialogue not just acknowledging, but valuing the mutual interactivity 
between researcher and researchee, I used the „extended case method‟, and its entwining of 
discursive theory and lived experience, to gather data that would not only serve as 
evidence for/against the theory, but also enable theoretical adjustments “that continue until 
one‟s theory is in sync with the world one studies” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 17). This method 
therefore enabled a reflexive scientific approach that sought an ever more accurate and 
generalizable - but also falsifiable - explanation of female self-development as it relates to 
eating disorders.      
 
In positing an originary spirogenetically formed, logically defined female subjectivity that 
is the condition of its familial/social construction, this extended case method therefore 
required formulation of an hypothesis that would stabilize and loosely guide a mutual 
exploration of the development of female selfhood, by assisting the (inter)subjective 
recollection, expression, exploration and interpretation of the essentially and socio-
culturally constructed experiences, thoughts, feelings, meanings and values of both the 
researchee and researcher. But, as Irigaray (1985a, 2008) has long argued (and as I have 
argued in Section I), women have historically been denied real, imaginary, and Symbolic 
existence and recognition as fully embodied, sexual female subjects. It was therefore a 
requirement of the interview process, and also key to exploration of the question - Is there 
a (spirogenetic) female essence and an essentially subjective female self? - that I structure 
and explore the interview questions in ways that attempted to recognize and enable the 
expression of both interviewer and participant as not only socially/discursively constructed 
and identified, but also autonomously whole, self-aware, and thus epistemically privileged 
female subjects and creators of their own (self-)percepts, concepts, memories, meanings 
and values. For only by attempting to think, remember, imagine, speak and relate as (self-) 
consciously whole, integrated subjects might the layers of sexually objectifying, self-
silencing, self-annihilating sociocultural (de)construction be identified and peeled back to 
possibly reveal an essential self beneath. In addition, such an intersubjective exploration 
required that, at some (later) stage in the interview process, I share with the interviewee 
some aspect or other of my hypothesis so that she might consider its relevance (or not) to 
her experiences, concepts, and reflexive understandings of the stages, processes and key 
events in the development of her own (sense/concept of) self. In this way, the extended 
case method sought a collective, ultimately objective knowledge of the participants‟ 
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subjectively perceived, experienced and remembered self/world that, far from representing 
the “view from nowhere” of the transcendent (male) subject and creator of reality, strove 
for an inclusive “view from everywhere” (Bordo, 1993, p. 40) created through the 
(inter)subjective expression and collective analysis, understanding and interpretation of the 
experiences, perspectives, and self-concepts of all participants. Or, in other words, an 
objective view and knowledge of (inner) reality gained through clearly perceiving, 
understanding, and relating the self-experienced, self-expressed nature and development of 
whole, integrated, autonomously and relationally defined „persons-in-themselves‟.  
 
While the research quantitatively sought to gather, analyse, collate and present interview 
data as evidence for or against the hypothesis, its qualitative recognition of the subjective, 
theory- and concept-laden nature of our perceptions and memories of events meant that it 
was not specific, episodic memories (or their veracity) that were the focus of the research, 
but rather, the ways in which remembered events (real or imagined) had shaped, and been 
shaped by, the participant‟s sense/concept of self. That is, the research focused on 
autobiographical memories. Because these memories have been recognized as accurate 
and enduring, and because, as conscious subjects, the participants had epistemic privilege 
to their own perceptions, experiences, and memories of events, and the ways in which 
those events (re)shaped their sense/concept of self, they therefore presented as reliable 
witnesses to the nature of and changes in that self. It is this witness reliability that 
underwrites the validity of the research data to stand as evidence for/against the hypothesis. 
This premise of memory reliability draws upon recent studies (e.g. Conway, 2005; 
Pillemer, 2001) that recognize two separate types of memory systems: episodic (about real 
events) and autobiographical (memories of events that have shaped the sense/concept of 
self). Because they shape who we were/are/become, and because they are personal and 
therefore context-, emotion-, and concept-laden, autobiographical memories have been 
shown to be very accurate and also to be better remembered, especially those events that 
have deeply affected our sense/concept of self. As Pillemer says, “memories associated 
with life transitions are especially vivid and long lasting” (ibid. p. 125), this semanticizing 
of episodic memories making them more resilient to forgetting. Hence, because our 
memories not only shape, but are shaped by, our sense/concept of self, autobiographical 
memories (or the lack of) - in their endurance and plasticity - can provide valuable insight 
into the developmental stages, and processes, and the state of, and changes in, that self. 
The research therefore gave priority to the enduring effects/affects, the layers of meaning, 
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as well as the specific content of autobiographical memories, which present as evidence for 
the various ways in which the persisting self has perceived, (re)constructed, and been 
(re)constructed by, her own life experiences. On this basis, and in line with Gillett‟s (2009, 
p. 265) view that a child‟s sense of self affects the content of her memories, it may be the 
very incongruities and inconsistencies in memory that offer the keenest insights into, and 
new understandings of, the nature of and changes in the subjective self, especially when 
those memories and percepts/concepts of self are collectively correlated with - and 
thematically analysed in relation to - those of all the research participants.  
 
The subsequent thematic coding, analysis, collation, and contextualized interpretation of 
the interview data, and the final discussion of this interpretation with participants therefore 
enacted a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods designed to reveal support (or not) 
for the existence of a spirogenetically and socially constructed subjective female self, and, 
conditional upon this support, for the possibility of a real essence-based, logically (and 
thus universally) defined, but also socially/culturally situated knowledge of human 
existence. For, if the evidence were to support the existence of a spirogenetic essence and 
essentially subjective female self, then that which Kant and (the Tractarian) Wittgenstein 
saw as an impossible task - to know the real, unified thing in itself - would become 
possible if and when we recognize and accurately represent the essential form and function, 
not of an immaterial soul/mind or its phenomenal objects, but of the spirogenetically 
unified, subjective „person-in-him/herself‟. 
 
Interviews 
The research process entailed a series of in-depth interviews with five women who had 
previously experienced eating disorders, and five who had not, in which both interviewer 
and interviewee equally and openly engaged in mutually respectful in-depth discussion and 
critical exploration of the (personal and social) recollections, meanings, assumptions, and 
current perceptions of the significant events and stages in the development of their own 
subjectivity and sexual identity. With a keen awareness of the sometimes highly sensitive 
and emotionally charged nature of the topic, I (as the interviewer) endeavoured to loosely 
guide the discussions in a sensitive, empathetic, non-prejudiced, and reflexively and 
culturally interpretive manner that reflected my own past experience of, and thus 
sensitivity to, the issues of female self-development and anorexia. To reiterate, the aim of 
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this interview process was to explore the hypothesis of a self-subsisting „spirogenetic‟ 
essence operating at individual, sexual, and species levels to (co-)construct every human 
being as a sexed subjective self. It is the metaphysical and symbolic denial of the female 
essence and essential sexual female self that, through familial/social (de)construction and 
pejorative inscription, is causing a generalized pathological fragmentation and loss of that 
self (-concept), thereby creating a state of existential (di)stress that, under certain further 
conditions, may result in eating (and associated) disorders, as forms of survival. Data taken 
as evidence in support of this hypothesis included: 
 
i) the interviewee‟s experience, description or interpretation of her childhood, adolescent 
and adult self-development as a process of diminution or loss of a pre-existing or 
originary self, along with attributes and capacities associated with that self (e.g. 
wholeness, autonomy, intuition, wonder, self-knowledge, connectedness, empathy, an 
integration of needs, interests, perceptions, feelings and actions); 
 
ii) any marked changes in the interviewee‟s experience, view or concept of self and others 
during pubertal/sexual development (e.g. a reperception, reconception, and pejorative 
devaluing of her self, i.e. seen not through her own, but through the eyes of others);  
 
iii) any marked features or changes in verbal or non-verbal expression that might indicate a 
recalled or immediate change in the interviewee‟s perspective, concept or experience of 
her self (e.g. the substituting of „you‟ for „I‟, or changes in intonation);  
 
iv) any sense or experience of this loss of original/real selfhood involving a splitting or 
fragmentation of the self (e.g. a mind/head-body split; a self/other disconnection; a 
fragmenting of self- or body-image into separate parts), followed by the felt need to 
reconstruct that self as a perfect self, form or identity; 
 
v) any occasions when the interviewee felt a reconnection of mind/head and body; times 
when the self felt whole again and/or reconnected to others;  
 
vi) any experience of the reconstructed/gendered self being shattered or threatening to 
shatter due to a real or perceived inability or failure to attain or maintain familial/social 
ideals and expectations; 
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 vii) any subsequent feelings of rejection, alienation, hopelessness, and thus, the need to 
escape or withdraw from the external, social world, accompanied by a need to punish, 
purify, desexualize and control the sexual female self (and body), or what may be seen 
as the „real me‟; 
 
viii) any understanding of this withdrawal and need for (visible) self-control, punishment 
etc. as a battle for (desexualized, childish) purity and perfection (of form), and thus,  the 
subjective recognition, love and approval of the inner self that may be experienced (or  
later interpreted) as a hopeful means of its survival; 
 
ix) any post-interview experience of a sense of reconnection of (or with) the original self 
and others (e.g. a feeling of finding one‟s solid ground; of being back in one‟s body 
again; of coming to know one‟s own thoughts, feelings, and desires; of being able to 
speak one‟s truth without fear, censoring, or self-consciousness; of being able to look 
out and see the world again, rather than looking within).    
 
The interviewees were all New Zealand residents, ranging in age from seventeen to 
seventy-nine. The group was composed of, initially twelve, but ultimately ten women who 
were either previously unknown to me (6), recent friends (3), or academic/social 
acquaintances (3) that were invited to participate or heard of the research and expressed 
interest in participating. Even though they were informed (either in conversation or 
introductory letter) that the research would involve an exploration of the development of 
female selfhood and eating disorders, none of the twelve participants was given any detail 
of the specific nature or focus of the research until some time into their own interview 
process (if ever). Hence, none had any prior inkling of the research premise. Following 
delivery of the letter of introduction, and the gaining of informed consent, two or three 
conversational interviews were conducted with each participant at intervals ranging from a 
week to two months, depending on her availability. Two of the twelve participants 
withdrew from the interview process (one before it began; one for personal reasons), and in 
two other cases (where the interviewees [Miss P, Fleur] were concerned over recent 
nightmares or possible violence) it was necessary to obtain guidance from the research 
advisor and counsellor, Wol Hansen. In each case the difficulties were overcome, and both 
participants completed the interview process. The interviews were digitally recorded, 
transcribed (using a verbatim method and a „Key‟ to emphasise the form as well as the 
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content of speech), and then returned for checking and any deletions that the interviewees 
may have wished to make in light of post-interview thoughts or concerns. The transcribed 
information was then analysed and re-presented as a culturally described - but also 
topically and theoretically interpreted - report. My method of data analysis was based on a 
“grounded theory approach” which employed a “constant comparative method” (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1998, p. 137) which required that the collected data be coded, analysed and 
collated according to specific themes, and in order to discover and develop concepts which 
did or did not support the hypothesis. The data collected from the ten participants were 
therefore firstly analysed to identify and group remembered experiences, events and related 
changes in self (-perception) according to their occurrence in either childhood, adolescent 
and/or adult stages of self-development. The data was then thematically coded, analysed 
and collated according to the five main themes informing the interview questions (i.e. the 
personal, familial/social, sexual, maternal, and anorexic/bulimic self). I then compared and 
contrasted the two analyses, in order to identify and examine major similarities and 
differences between the two groups in terms of their percepts/concepts of and relationship 
to their (sexual) female selves and significant others. The final method of analysis involved 
a closer examination and interpretation of data relating to the „pre-sexual‟ and the „sexual‟ 
development of the female self (and self-concept) to see if there is empirical support for 
the existence of an originary spirogenetic essence and essential female self, the loss of 
which may be resulting in the development of eating (and associated) disorders.  
 
Results 
In presenting the results of this research, I wish firstly to pay tribute to the participants who 
saw the process through to completion, and were prepared to answer and discuss what 
were sometimes very sensitive, difficult and probing questions regarding their personal 
lives and experiences. Because many had not previously spoken about, or may have been 
unwilling or unable to explore certain issues (especially those concerning the sexual, 
abused, or disordered self), and because the theory presented here is a new and unexplored 
theory (of essences, sexual self-development, and eating disorders), it was necessary to 
pose these questions and suggest new ways of approaching these issues in order to give 
participants the opportunity to consider, and either confirm or deny, the relevance of the 
theory to their own life experiences. Therefore, at some later stage in the interview process, 
I wove relevant aspects of the hypothesis into the discussion, asking the participant to 
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consider them in relation to her own lived experiences, perspectives and reflections. 
Hence, in the following results, questions or suggestions that may appear to „lead‟ the 
participant are simply presenting this new (spirogenetic) approach to female self-
development and eating disorders so as to gain a considered, intersubjective response from 
the interviewee. And because they were being asked to consider a new approach to 
difficult issues, the interviewees‟ sometimes seemingly tentative agreement with this 
approach has, if supported by the larger picture presented in the transcript, been taken as 
evidence in support of the theory. One final factor taken into account in considering and re-
presenting data as evidence for or against the hypothesis was the information that is lost in 
translation of the spoken word (and the gestures, moods, and intuitive/empathetic 
understandings accompanying it) to the written and read transcript.
72
 In analysing, 
collating and interpreting the data, I have made every effort to account for and remain true 
to the verbally and non-verbally expressed thoughts, feelings, moods, and signals of the 
interviewees, and the spirit in which they were conveyed. To gauge the accuracy of this 
analysis and interpretation, four of the interviewees were invited to read this chapter, and 
all were in agreement with the way their recollection, ideas and interpretations had been 
presented.        
 
Although I understood the final group of interviewees to include five eating disordered and 
five non-eating disordered women, it came to light during the interview process that one of 
those classified as non-eating disordered (Gina) had experienced a 2-3 year bout of 
bulimia, while her daughter Lewie had experienced bouts of disordered eating described by 
her mother, but not herself, as anorexia. I therefore placed Gina but not Lewie in the eating 
disordered group. Of the six interviewees with experience of eating disorders, one had 
experienced orthorexia
73
 (Gorgie, from 17 through her 20‟s), three, anorexia (Kerry, Miss 
P and Sunshine - from late teens through 20‟s) and two, bulimia (Gina [mid 20‟s], and 
Cilla [mid 40‟s]). There were two mother-daughter pairs in the research (Gorgie-Sunshine 
and Gina-Lewie), and all four had experienced either an eating disorder or disordered 
eating. 
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 This understanding of the orality that may be lost in translation of the spoken to the written word is gleaned   
from an unpublished essay by Vanessa Lewis (2010), as drawn from Kate Moore in Anna Green's 
Unpacking the Stories (2004, p. 170). 
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 Orthorexia was first defined and diagnosed in 1997 by Steven Bratman M.D. as the fanatical and 
unhealthy  obsession with the preparation and eating of healthy foods, an obsession that socially isolates the 
individual, and in which food is eaten not for pleasure, but for virtue. 
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The Personal Self 
When asked about their experiences and self-perceptions during early childhood, eight of 
the ten participants remembered themselves as happy, confident, active, creative, self-
motivated, and self-expressive; as feeling that they could play and explore freely; as 
seeing, experiencing and conceptualizing their self through their own eyes, and as whole 
and integrated; as feeling that they knew and were free to be the „real me‟; as being seen 
and unconditionally loved by others for who they were (i.e. no expectations); as 
developing close and enduring friendships with other children; as connected to and loving 
nature/animals; and as being either non-gendered or aware of themselves as being female 
without that marking or implying any difference from their brothers or other boys in terms 
of ability, worth, recognition or self-expression. For example, Gorgie (55), who grew up 
playing sport and exploring with her five brothers, said of her childhood self: 
 
     Once I was so confident in myself….that I would just run in and just say „this is me‟….and  
     you could see people once upon a time responded to that …[my brothers] knew I was a girl,  
     but it was like it didn‟t ^matter…when I was at a co-ed like Intermediate, boys admired me  
     for my athletic prowess, and so did the girls, so I was seen for what I was, that‟s what gave  
     me the feeling that I was a strong girl….there was nothing that indicated to me that I didn‟t  
     have as bright a future as them.
74
 
 
And of her father‟s view of her child self, Gorgie says, “when I was young I was always 
his princess, and he‟d call me „Gorgie‟…he loved me for who I was”. Similarly, Gorgie‟s 
daughter Sunshine (33), who had two younger brothers and also a very sports-focused 
childhood, said of her child self, “when I was younger, I was always a real confident 
kid…at first I didn‟t care how anyone perceived me, I was me…I was real…yeah…I knew 
what I wanted”. And Lewie (17) echoed Sunshine when she said of her child self,  
 
    as a child, you are just yourself….you just do whatever the hell you want to do, you don‟t  
    have expectations put upon you, and you‟re just the child, you‟re a person 
    Would you say you‟re loved for who you are? 
    Yeah, for who you are, yeah…you‟re your whole self.…there‟s a sense of love, between  
    your mother and you that is so close and so strong 
    Your whole self, would you call that the real me? 
    Yeah….the child…that‟s why children are so beautiful, „cause they‟re just, they‟re the  
    original person. 
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 Key to transcript excerpts: underlining indicates emphasis;  ^  indicates rise in pitch;  *….* indicates 
speech quiet and/or dispirited;  ~…~ indicates strong, spirited tone;  **…** indicates rapid, fearful 
speech;  ',' indicates pause less than ½ sec;  '…' indicates pause more than ½ sec;  --…-- means 
interruption;  '….' means discontinuous text   
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                Figure 3:                       Original Whole Unfettered Self                        (by Lewie, 15) 
 
In the same vein, Fleur (41), raised as one of eight children on a Waikato dairy farm, 
perceived the child that she was at 4-5 years of age as the „real me‟, a girl who loved, and 
was encouraged and excelled at primary school, and who therefore had no reason to see 
herself as different from or inferior to boys. This perception of childhood as a time of 
expression of a real, unrestrained self was also echoed by Jean (59) and Gwenda (79) who, 
as „tomboys‟, were given the freedom by their parents to pursue what were traditionally 
masculine interests (e.g. making guns, fishing, playing on farm machinery), but which both 
saw as just part of who they were and what they did as girls. In Jean‟s early childhood, 
there was no particular awareness of sex or gender, and just the freedom “to make things 
and to create things, I was allowed to be the real me I think…I was allowed to be my 
natural self, now that natural self happened to be quite tomboyish”, whilst Gwenda 
similarly reflected,  
 
    as long as I can remember, I always had a hammer „n nail in my hand… I‟d get an apple-box 
    and put the wheels on it, and a handle, and they had a ^pram, for their dolls „n things, and I       
    wasn‟t interested in dolls….I didn‟t play [my sisters‟] games 
    So you were what you‟d call a bit of a tomboy? 
    That‟s right, yeah…I was really the boy 
    the fact that you were a girl, and the boys were boys, and that you had different bodies was  
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    ….never made an issue of? 
    Didn‟t make a difference, never made a difference, no.75 
 
 
Whilst Cilla (67) too “liked all the boys‟ things”, and played the sports the boys played, 
she also loved her dolls, and loved to learn, and so was allowed to pursue a broad, non-
gendered range of interests in what was initially a happy childhood in which she felt seen, 
known, loved and accepted for who she was by her parents and siblings. Similarly, as one 
of six children raised in an English mining village, Gina (54) recalled an initial freedom to 
play in and explore her surroundings without the constraints placed on children today, 
though the conscious self that Gina recalled was not a whole, embodied self:   
 
    as a child, I mean there are, huge gaps of memory in my, I remember tiny little, snippets of it,  
    I don‟t remember significant portions of my childhood…. of the tiny amounts of memory that  
    I do have, I just have of seeing myself looking out…without judgement…I just remember  
    being, and observing…the best way I can describe that is just, is being an observer looking  
    down, that‟s the *only memory I have.* 
 
As becomes clear in her later comments (see p. 170), Gina interprets her perception and 
experience of her child self as „an observer looking down‟ as being related to parentally 
imposed constraints, punishments, and thus, a sense of guilt and shame associated with the 
sexual female parts of her body. 
  
The other two participants, Kerry (38) and Miss Perfect (55), had little or no memory of 
even having a childhood, let alone one characterized by such features as self-knowledge, 
self-expression, wonderment, creativity and unconditional love, features that the other 
interviewees had associated with their real, original or core self. Instead, these women 
recalled only the fear, shame, secrecy and alienation of growing up around paternal 
alcoholism, parental conflict and violence-based control, and thus, for Kerry, a feeling of 
“always walking on eggshells” - always self-monitoring in order to avoid paternal 
disapproval and abuse: 
 
     I think probably as a young child.…when that‟s the only reality you know, you accept  
     that as being reality, right, so that was my reality, I didn‟t know any other way of being  
     other than being extremely controlled and extremely…extremely kinda under the thumb. 
 
For Miss P, the knowledge and unconditional love of the original female self that she was  
                                                 
75
 Transcript beginning in lower case indicates omission of preceding words.   
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to one day feel for her newborn daughter was absent from her own childhood. Traumatized 
by parental conflict, her father‟s alcohol-driven violence, and her mother‟s lack of 
affection, Miss P recalled only ever striving for their recognition, love and approval:  
 
    I can‟t ever remember knowing myself…I can‟t ever remember knowing myself or loving  
    myself, ever….I never saw Mum „n Dad kiss or cuddle in my life…Dad was sick most of  
    his life apparently after his mother committed suicide.…most nights when he came home  
    he‟d been drinking anyway, there was more violence that went on in the house than anything  
    …he‟d bash Mum up, he‟d tip preserves down the toilet, smash up the china…we used to go  
    „n hide behind the couch down in the basement at night, to get away from it. 
 
Far from a carefree and unrestrained childhood, both Kerry and Miss P felt from a young 
age the weight of parental - and particularly maternal - expectation to create and present to 
the social world a perfect, successful and happy façade that would mask the underlying 
family dysfunction. Thus, from the age of six/seven, Miss P was expected to take on the 
wifely duties of cooking and cleaning, whilst also excelling in the public arena by 
rigorously pursuing and achieving excellence in schoolwork, ballet and dramatic 
productions. As she recalled, “I was dux of the school when I left, and I did all the school 
shows, I did all the production stuff… I put my life into excelling”. For, to be perfect in the 
eyes of the world was to please - and thus gain a modicum of recognition, love and 
approval from - her parents.        
 
The Familialy/Socially (De)constructed Sexual Female Self 
Whether it began at an early age, as for Miss P, Kerry, and Gina, or with the onset of 
adolescence and pubertal development, all participants spoke of, and were more or less 
affected by, the experience of coming to see themselves no longer through their own (non-
judgemental) eyes, but through the critical, sexually objectifying and fragmenting eyes of 
others - particularly their parents, and more specifically, the father. Rather than seeing, 
knowing and loving themselves (and being seen, known and loved) for who they were - 
that is, as the „real me‟ - almost every participant learnt to re-perceive and re-conceive her 
real self as imperfect, inferior, sinful, shameful, and „bad‟ because of her female body, or 
more specifically, its „dirty‟, „disgusting‟ sexual, female parts. Parental recognition, love 
and approval was no longer unconditional, but depended upon the sloughing off and 
erasure of the real sexual female self in pursuit of the perfect form that, in meeting paternal 
and social ideals of femininity, would enduringly redefine and identify her as a „good‟ girl. 
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What followed, then, was a splitting, fragmentation and loss of the „real‟ or „core‟ self (and 
self-concept), as that originally unified, integrated and related female self became dis-
integrated, disconnected from others, and literally and conceptually divested of the 
offending sexual female parts. Through this fragmentation, the conscious self or „I‟ came 
to see and experience itself as either separate from and above the sexual body/parts, or as a 
head/mind detached from its sexual female body, the „dirty‟ and/or inadequate parts being 
pared or “pruned” off both the real and conceptual self/mind and body, as they were 
anxiously reshaped to fit the ideal feminine form and functions.  
 
Jean, for example, remembered her originally whole, connected natural or “core self” as  
beginning to „close down‟ at around eight years-of-age, due to the alienating effects of 
parental alcoholism. But it was pubertal development and the onset of periods that brought 
a sense of shame, fear and anxiety about her female body, and thus a secreting, „pruning 
off‟, and silencing of the sexual female parts of that core self:  
 
    Well I got my period when I was 13, and that was a pretty scary number….it was a bit like   
    surgery….Yeah, it‟s a secret…and I don‟t remember Mum‟s stuff ever being around, so you  
    copied, because it was somehow secret in the household, it had to be a secret from Dad….I  
    did develop round shoulders so it was probably from wanting to…feeling just a bit  
    embarrassed about who I was and not wanting to stand up tall 
     
    could you say, then, that what you felt self-conscious about was actually the sexual parts  
    of you? 
    Yeah…yeah….anything to do with sex was intrinsically dirty 
    this closing down or this withdrawal that occurred, would you say then, that felt like  
     a closing down of your core self? 
    I‟d say it was more like a pruning…instead of it, [being] able to just keep on growing  
    and therefore flowering in that sense, and doing a natural cycle, I‟d say it was all kind of  
    trimmed, I took the pruning shears to myself…. oh, definitely a control. 
 
Whilst the dirty, shameful sexual aspects of Jean‟s core self were sloughed off, others were 
added, when, concerned by a lack of breast development, Jean‟s mother bought her a 
padded bra; her relief at acquiring a pleasing (if false) feminine shape outweighed only by 
the constant fear of exposure and embarrassment: “to have admitted that you had a padded 
bra would‟ve been the most, the worst thing that I could ever imagine, I would‟ve almost 
died before I did that”. Similarly, Fleur recalled a marked change in perception and 
experience of her self occurring at around eleven/twelve years-of-age as, set against a 
background of paternal violence, she left the security of long-term friendships and 
individual achievement at Primary school to face isolation, degradation, and a consequent 
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failure to achieve at Intermediate. This failure created a sense of self-worthlessness that 
was only exacerbated (in High School) by the secrecy, shame, humiliation, and further loss 
of trust that accompanied sexual development. As Fleur put it,  
 
   I sort of felt worthless I think, at school, because.…I didn‟t feel I was given the opportunities 
   I should‟ve been, so I sort of felt, yeah I did, I felt worthless 
   A gradual process of losing your sense of self-worth, and your confidence in your self? 
   Yes, yes, I did, that‟s exactly how I felt….I just fell off the track, I….derailed myself really 
   So at some time you feel you lost yourself? 
   Yeah, for a lot of years….I‟d say from, Intermediate…on…. I think I just became lost  
    in myself, I didn‟t know who I was, I didn‟t want to know who I was, really….you sort of get  
    a co…I got a complex….I think with the way my father was, I just sort of, I lost…trust    
    maybe, back then 
    Was [puberty] a difficult time? 
    Well, yeah it was, Mum never explained anything to me, and I was sitting in class and I got  
    this terrible stomach-ache and I thought *„Oh my God‟*, and I‟d got my first period, ‟n mum  
    never…she never told me….it was horrible… so that was quite humiliating 
    you became aware of yourself as a girl, and having this secret, developed a different image of  
    yourself? 
    Yeah, you do, and it‟s a negative one. 
 
Rebelling against the paternal and pedagogical authority that had degraded, betrayed, and 
abused her real female self, Fleur was expelled from school at fifteen, and, alienated from 
that self and family, set off for Sydney to build a new, good, successful, socially acceptable 
identity. 
 
Though beginning at a much earlier age, Gina also developed a negative awareness and 
concept of her sexual female self as a “bad person”, as the imposition of parental 
constraints and punishments taught her that anything to do with the sexual (or sexualized) 
body was naughty, dirty, and shameful. Thus, at around three years of age, during a family 
camping trip, Gina was severely chided by her mother for „peeing‟ on the grass, and on 
another occasion, for touching her “genital area”. This awareness greatly intensified, 
however, with the onset of pubertal development, and the realization that Gina and her 
sisters were “sexual prisoners” in their father‟s home, either forbidden boyfriends, or made 
to feel smutty and dirty for having one: 
 
    I was not allowed a boyfriend, before I had my periods „cause I wasn‟t old enough, and after 
    my period, I was never allowed a boyfriend because I could get pregnant, and so, in reality I  
    was never allowed a boyfriend….so we were kept virtual, sexual, prisoners….Then I met a  
    boyfriend, who I brought back to my Mum….when he went, my mother was furious I‟d sat  
    on the edge of the settee, near him because I could show him my legs….and so we were made  
    to feel smutty, because we had an interest in boys…. my mother made me feel dirty, or I  
    allowed my mother to feel me, make me feel dirty, because of her behaviour. 
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Gina‟s sexual female self therefore became a source of intense shame, guilt and embarrass-
ment that she escaped by transcendently separating her conscious self/intellect from sexual 
body; that is, by becoming the detached, desensitized “observer looking down”:  
 
      I don‟t remember being happy and I don‟t remember being sad, I don‟t remember anything,  
      It‟s just sort of a…just an observation….I don‟t attach any feeling to it.   
 
Subsequent interview questions around Gina‟s feelings and self-perceptions following 
sexual activity with her boyfriend indicated this detached transcendence to be motivated by 
still powerful feelings of shame and guilt associated with inhabiting what Gina had learnt 
to see as her bad, disapproved, sexual female self/body:  
 
    how did you then feel after you knew you had had sex, and then had to….face your family,  
    it would‟ve caused a great amount of perhaps shame or…? 
    I don‟t know I think, I mean I‟ve, I‟ve gone back to looking down again (laughter)…so I  
    don‟t know, I actually, it‟s like it‟s not me that lived, you know 
    Yep, so it‟s got to be a sexual thing eh, the looking down? 
    Yeah, it does, yeah. 
 
Despite Gina‟s best efforts to break the cycle, her daughter Lewie experienced the same 
pubertal fragmentation and loss of a previously whole self, accompanied by a feeling of 
loss of the unconditional love of her parents and alienation from her siblings, as she learnt 
to perceive and fragmentarily reconceive her female self through the sexually objectifying 
and judgemental eyes of others. Whether those others were the schoolgirls who sniggered 
about her premature breast buds (and later, her large breasts), or the Mormon leaders who 
demanded that girls cover their shamefully seductive sexual bodies, or even boyfriends and 
male friends who continue to pejoratively sexualize teenage girls as either „sluts‟ or „cock-
teasers‟, Lewie learnt from them to dislike, feel uncomfortable with, and thus divide and 
hide, her sexual female self/body: 
 
    the Mormon church was quite….you‟ve got to cover this up kind of thing. Your body, as a  
    female, was something to be covered up so that males didn‟t, you know, check you out….  
    And it even happens not even within a religion, just within society really….I mean, just being  
    a teenage girl, girls are always the sluts, the whores... 
 
    …I‟m not very comfortable with my own body at all….I guess I‟ve always felt like that…. 
    like I can‟t remember, when it started, I mean it‟s more or less the whole body image sort of  
    thing, where I‟m just not comfortable with my body „cause I‟ve got a blemish there, or a hair  
    or wherever….I‟ve never liked my boobs which is funny „cause I developed them at a very  
    early age.…I don‟t like looking in the mirror to be honest.…I guess I mainly see my face, I  
    look at my face, more so than I do my body. My face is more important to me than my body  
    …*in the sense of…yeah, what I look like….I hate my legs, I‟ve always hated my legs.* 
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During the discussion, I asked Lewie if the fragmentary shift that she had experienced at 
puberty could be described as a shift from a state of being, and being seen and 
unconditionally loved for who you are, to a state in which whether you are seen, loved, 
and even exist depends on how you look and what you do. In agreeing with this 
description, Lewie revealed that this disintegrative process, as she had experienced it, had 
been the topic of her school artwork in the year(s) prior to the interview. Apart from 
offering unexpected support for my hypothesis, Lewie‟s artwork managed to show in just a 
few pictures what I had so far taken two hundred pages to write, and for this reason, she 
has allowed me to include several pieces in this thesis; pieces such as the one below that so 
clearly depicts the dismayed sense of fragmentation and loss of self accompanying pubertal 
development and the sexualizing objectification of what was once, for Lewie, her 
essentially whole, subjective female self.  
 
 
            
             Figure 4:                                   „Dolls Don‟t Cry‟                                     (by Lewie) 76 
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 In depicting the (mal)development of her own essential female self, Lewie's art  (created at 15-17 years-of-
age) also mirrors various stages and processes of development as described by the other participants and 
myself as interviewer. With Lewie's consent, I have added captions to her artwork.    
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Lewie‟s artwork also reflects Gorgie‟s experience of her real self and the dramatic shift in 
the way her father and five brothers (and therefore she herself) came to perceive and treat 
her as a girl with a sexually developing body. This shift began at nine years-of-age when, 
following her mother‟s death, Gorgie‟s oldest brother began to sexually abuse her, this 
abuse continuing for six years. Along with the secrecy, guilt and shame associated with 
this violation came the realization that to be a girl now meant being seen as different from, 
weaker than, and inferior to the boys, and thus excluded from their games, while her father 
made Gorgie self-consciously aware of (deficiencies in) her appearance, and the need to 
present herself and act in a femininely restrained, but sexually attractive, way. Adolescence 
therefore brought the frightening realization that there were now conditions to being - and 
being recognized and loved as - a (good) girl, conditions that Gorgie was ultimately unable 
to meet: 
 
    I no longer could run into a room and say “this is me”… it was like I would walk into a room 
    and think, well, this is me, but do you really want to know me because I think you‟ve already  
    decided who I ^am.…so you just don‟t say anything, in fact, you want to not be seen…. I  
    didn‟t feel as proud of my body outside of the sports field, as I did on it…you know,  
    somehow I had lost that…whereas, at one stage, before that, at Intermediate, I carried it from  
    the sports-field into the classroom…you know “this is me”…I never separated the two 
    Yeah, and what was it, do you think, that made you not feel proud or confident of your body? 
    Because the body all of a sudden became sexual 
  
    what were the things that were happening in your life, say in your family, and with your  
    brothers say, that made you start to see your self as sexual? 
    Well, they began pointing out parts of my body, and then my father would be saying  
    „hey….brush your hair more‟, „n „clean your teeth‟ and „look how you‟re dressing….I  
    became aware that my father was looking at me differently, it was like my physical  
    appearance was suddenly important….So you couldn‟t do the things that you really wanted  
    to do…you were….having to play this role where your body has become sexual, and that it‟s  
    there for the boys to admire…and I didn‟t feel good about that at ^all, and yet in a way….you  
    wanted to be admired, but you couldn‟t…you didn‟t feel good about that part of yourself and  
    who you are, and your body…but once you did…and you‟d…. you‟d wish you were in  
    another body
77
 
     
    Well I just separated myself from the girls, and the boys…I became an island…and the only  
    time I showed myself was when I was playing sport…I withdrew….I‟d participate, I‟d be  
    there, but I was not there. Nobody could see who I really was 
    But you were aware of who you really were ^inside? 
    No, no, I‟d lost…over time you completely lose yourself…you know that you‟re holding  
    back…and you start putting up fronts. 
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 I have used red text here to highlight the clear shift from Gorgie's use of the first-person 'I' to the second-
person you' in describing the pubertal shift in which her unconditional existence and sense of self suddenly 
became conditional upon satisfying paternal/fraternal ideals of (objectifying) feminine appearance and 
achievement.  
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This sexually objectifying fragmentation, withdrawal and ultimate loss of the real female 
self was of course compounded for Gorgie by the secrecy, shame, fear and confusion 
imposed by ongoing incestuous abuse. Gorgie describes the abusive „taking‟ of self as 
follows: 
 
    Does someone take „n take, take off you „n it becomes a secret? That someone takes your  
    sexual self, and, and creates it, makes it into a secret, that can devastate the person you love  
    the most, your father….„don‟t tell your father that I‟m actually taking, your female body, I‟m  
    touching the parts that make you different from me, and I‟m getting turned on by it‟…. I see,  
    like a hunger…a hunger that can‟t be fulfilled…and I don‟t understand ‟cause I don‟t feel a  
    hunger, I only feel a fear, a secret, a hurt…a numbness that‟s developing, a fear, I‟m  
    frightened…I‟m frightened because this doesn‟t feel right, this feels so wrong. 
 
 
It is this fearful secreting, withdrawal, and fragmenting of (sexual female) self that Gorgie 
later passed on to her daughter Sunshine, at the time of her pubertal development and 
sexual activity with boyfriends. As Gorgie recalled it:  
 
    I remember Sunshine even being in the lounge….with a boy, and I walked in once, and you  
    could see they must‟ve been touching each other under the blanket, and I closed the door „n  
    thought **„I don‟t want to know this!‟… it was awful, I didn‟t want to know…isn‟t that  
    irresponsible?…but I didn‟t want to know **….I‟d say to her „are you „n D being sexual?‟, „n  
    she‟d say „no‟, and I‟d say „well that‟s alright then‟, and there they are sleeping in the same  
    bed!…you know, „that‟s alright then‟….because that‟s as far as I wanted to go. 
 
For Sunshine, this shift in perception and the pejorative, fragmentary reconception of her 
real female self began with the realization (at ten) that her father‟s recognition, love and 
approval were no longer unconditional, but from now on to be earned through sporting 
excellence (in the volleyball team that he coached), a (fear-driven) failure to perform 
incurring her father‟s wrath and her humiliation and embarrassment in front of teammates. 
Sunshine‟s real female self now inadequate in her father‟s eyes, the subsequent pubertal 
development of that self brought a further measure of imperfection, shame and secrecy that 
initiated a paternally/socially imposed, fashion-fuelled reduction of her previously whole 
self and (sexual) body to a collection of more or less imperfect parts: 
 
    we were all pushed down, especially when we wanted to talk about sex, you couldn‟t talk to  
    Mum about sex, Dad, you could never talk to him about that sort of stuff anyway…it came  
    to feel dirty, because it was a secret. It was obviously something you didn‟t talk about, it was 
    made to feel wrong 
 
    you don‟t look at yourself as a whole then? 
    No!…I don‟t think I‟ve done that for years…years and years and years. But I think you‟re  
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    actually taught to look at yourself like that…it‟s like you look in the magazines: how to get  
    those hips, how to get those arms in shape….and they have one page for this, „n…it‟s always  
    in bits….[O]ther people look at you and….they dissect you…so they go „oh, I love your  
    legs‟, and you go „ok, so you don‟t like the rest of me‟. 
 
A failure in her father‟s eyes, and her real sexual self reduced to shamed silence, Sunshine 
became alienated from her self, her parents and friends, and, in turning to boys for love, 
affection and a sense of security, ultimately experienced the terror of extreme sexual 
violation. The result of this process was a separation of mind/head from a violated, 
degraded, fragmented sexual body that left Sunshine unable to see her face, or 
acknowledge the person within:  
 
    Have you ever read the book The Handmaid‟s Tale?….when they have sex, they pull up  
    a sheet, between the bottom and the top, so you don‟t see the face, so it doesn‟t become  
    personal…so the body‟s seen as completely sp….it‟s all detached, like the body‟s split 
    …and it‟s purely just to reproduce.78 
 
 
A similarly fragmentary shift in perception, and disconnection from her real female self 
and also her family began, for Cilla, at three years-of-age, when she was sexually abused 
by “Joe Pig” (who worked for her father as a railway ganger), and then, under threat of 
death, reduced to a state of enduring fear, secrecy and shame. The sense of alienation from 
family grew even stronger when a trike/car accident put Cilla in hospital for thirteen 
months, far from infrequently seen family, and later when, approaching puberty, Cilla was 
sent off for holidays to her favourite aunt‟s, where she was once again sexually abused, 
this time by her uncle. Possibly more traumatic, however, was the fact that, having told her 
mother of the abuse, Cilla was still dispatched each holiday to her aunt‟s place: 
 
    He was the main abuser in my life, and he was eleven years older that my aunty who was ten 
    years older than Mum, so that, he‟d abused my mother.…he was a filthy old man…. So I told  
    my mother, „cause the older I got, I told my mother and she said „oh look, he used to do that  
    to me too, but‟, she said, „it would kill aunty if I told her‟….and back I was sent for ^more  
    abuse. 
 
                                                 
78
The Handmaid's Tale is a futuristic novel by Margaret Attwood (1987). In the totalitarian, theocratic 
republic of Gilead, women have been stripped of their rights, and reduced to subjugated sexual objects of 
male ownership and control. As handmaids, young women are seen as headless bodies, non-persons 
enslaved to and used by infertile couples to reproduce. In the 'Ceremony', the wife restrains the handmaid 
while the husband penetrates her. 
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The effect of this abuse and her mother‟s betrayal, followed by further sexual abuse by her 
eldest brother up to the age of thirteen, was to alienate Cilla not only from her family, but 
also from her real (sexual) female self; a self and body that she now conceived as dirty, 
worthless, shameful and abandoned, and thus, to be punished, cleansed and hidden:  
 
    yeah, you felt filthy all the time, I mean I scrubbed my legs until they were nearly bleeding 
    …. when I was a child, I was scrubbing myself, with our old bloody hard-bristled scrubbing 
    brush that they used to scrub the floors with…and my mother must‟ve seen me doing that 
    when you were an adolescent, how did you see your body, did you see -- 
    -- Oh no, I hid it….I would never look at it really, I can‟t ever remember looking at it, my  
    body  
    So therefore a certain shame about your body? 
    Yeah, yeah, definitely a shame about it…and a worse shame when you got your period and it 
    ran down your legs at school…because my periods were horrendous….I hated that part of  
    myself 
    
    And how did it make you feel about yourself, like, can you think how you coped with it? 
    Oh no, terrible struggles, terrible struggles…crying in my bed at night, and not knowing 
    …and then reverting back to the things that had happened to me…. And just feeling that  
    nobody had stood by me…. I felt abandoned…‟cause how many people had I told. 
     
 
 
                   
                      Figure 5:                                    Stolen Music                                         (Lewie) 
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Kerry also recalled a similarly pejorative, fragmentary and alienating shift in perception 
and conception of her female self that began in childhood with the awareness of her 
father‟s “immense dislike” of and violence towards women (a dislike and 
physical/emotional abuse that was deflected by her mother onto Kerry), but that greatly 
intensified with puberty and the frightening realization that she herself would soon have a 
womanly body. Having learnt that womanhood was not something to be paternally 
celebrated and loved, but rather, reviled and despised, and also aware of her father‟s great 
disappointment that she had not been a boy, Kerry‟s sexual development was shrouded 
with fear, anxiety, and extreme secrecy: 
 
    I don‟t think I was that aware of it, in that pre-teen part of my childhood… but he certainly,  
    it became much more blatant, like I can remember my mother telling me, later on, that he‟d  
    been really disappointed that I wasn‟t a boy….I can really clearly remember my father  
    making some really snide comments about the sorts of physical changes that I was under-  
    going. I can remember being…I was extremely secretive when I got my period, *I didn‟t tell  
    my mother for six months*….I think I was actually really scared of being punished, for any  
    form of disruption to the status quo….anything….to do with physical change, to do with  
    sexuality.…anything to do with basically the experience of becoming a woman, was going  
    to be framed in a negative way.       
 
Thus, like Gina, Kerry experienced from an early age a sense of “depersonalisation” in 
which her conscious self was experienced as separate from, and “looking in” or taking “the 
eye-in-the-sky view” of her body. As the observing mind, this self had a material existence 
for Kerry only insofar as it was contained within a head either without a body, or with a 
measure of embodiment (e.g. neck) that depended on how comfortable she was with her 
body at the time: 
 
    I had always had [this sensation], right from a very young child, of, not being present….the  
    bird‟s-eye view of myself….rather than a view from within my body, it was very constantly,  
    the bird‟s-eye ….a very strong sense of outside, looking in…..In terms of my self-concept…. 
    on my better days, I‟m there in my body….I‟m quite happy to look at my head, but I don‟t  
    have any full-length mirrors in my house, at all. 
  
It was the desire to completely escape her body that Kerry identified (later in the interview) 
as a motivating factor behind her anorexia. 
 
Similarly for Miss P, puberty brought a dramatic shift in (perception of) the perfect 
self/form that she had created in early childhood, as she learnt to perceive and reconceive 
her sexually developing female self/body as a source of imperfection, inferiority, shame, 
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and embarrassment from which she must escape in order to maintain that “perfect form”. 
This sense of imperfection was instilled, for example, when a disappointing lack of 
pubertal development compelled Miss P‟s mother to take the high achiever and promising 
ballerina off to an Auckland growth clinic to be humiliatingly and embarrassingly paraded 
and photographed in only her underpants, before a panel of male doctors. Whether it was 
her mother‟s disapproving eye, or sexual abuse by her older brother at fourteen, or simply 
learning to see her sexual female self/body as dirty, inferior and uncontrollable, Miss P was 
driven to escape this imperfect self by excelling at everything she did, thereby hiding not 
just her own female imperfections but also her family‟s dysfunction from social view, and 
thus gaining parental recognition and approval:  
 
    Can you remember your feelings about your body and your awareness of your sexual body,  
     and did you like that side of you, or did you dislike it?      
     ……no I‟d say I disliked it. I don‟t remember much about growing up….Oh I was always  
    a late developer and I hated that, I used to be very embarrassed by that…I hated my body  
    when I was 16 and I still had no breasts, „n Mum took me to this growth clinic „n, see I  
    disappointed her then…something wrong with me… 
     
    my mother said had my father ever sexually assaulted me, and I said „no, but your son has‟ 
    …„How could you Miss P, how could you?‟  
    „How could you Miss P‟ like saying you were to blame?….and seeing you as the, the dirty  
     one 
    Yeah, yeah 
 
    would you say one of [your] identities is as a woman?…or would that mean failure,  
     or imperfection? 
    *More as imperfection, than failure*….female is, female is inferior, inferior sex….I was  
    always a fixer-upper, while I‟m perfect I can do that. 
 
With pubertal (mal)development threatening her ability to maintain the perfect form and 
performance, Miss P escaped the fear of failure by imagining herself to be the character 
she‟d played in a school production - Dorothy from The Wizard of Oz - flying over the 
rainbow, free of her dirty sexual female self/body and the ultimately unachievable 
demands to be and remain „Miss Perfect‟. As Dorothy, Miss P could be (loved and 
accepted for) her real self:  
 
    I was away from my body…I just flew…I was in a different world and that‟s where I  
    wanted to be 
     
    [when I met „K‟]I was Dorothy and the Wizard of Oz  
    Yeah, and what was the difference? 
    „Cause he didn‟t have any expectations of me.…I was me, he was he….he showed he 
    loved me, and I loved him back 
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    you‟d be able to be your self in that world? 
    Yeah…. It‟s not painful in that world 
    Why? 
    *Because you can be yourself*. 
 
It was this disdain for her own painfully imperfect, uncontrollable sexual female body, and 
thus, the need to control and escape it, that later played a part in the breakdown of Miss P‟s 
previously close relationship to her daughter at the time of her pubertal development:  
 
    My daughter and I had a close relationship up till when, her hormones started to change 
    … everything was out the window 
    With puberty and sexual… 
    (Miss P nods agreement) 
    when your daughter‟s hormones went crazy, how did you see that? Did you want her 
    to remain the child? 
    Yeah…mmm 
    Ok, and so, in a way, could that have been threatening, her pubertal development? 
    Probably…yeah probably  
    So then you could say that it‟s something that is, in that way passed from mother to 
    daughter, the idea that the development of the body and womanhood, is passed on as the  
    idea of imperfection and dirtiness 
    Oh everything you learn gets passed on doesn‟t it, let‟s face it, it‟s in your genes and in  
    your learning process 
    And what your daughter saw in the way that you were, and what you felt about your body 
     and keeping things in order, and under control, has she taken that on herself in any way? 
    No, she‟s totally broken away from me, she‟s the opposite. 
 
All these participants therefore experienced at puberty a major shift in perception, concept 
and experience of self, as they came to see and judge that (sexual) female self through the 
pejoratively objectifying, fragmenting, and often violating eyes of others, as intrinsically 
imperfect, inferior, dirty, shameful and bad, and therefore as needing to prune off, hide or 
erase from consciousness the offending sexual parts in order to gain parental/social 
recognition, love and approval.  
 
Gwen was the exception to this story, in that, for her, pubertal development did not bring 
the same objectifying, degrading and shameful awareness of, and thus, fearful need to 
reject, slough off, or erase her sexual female body: 
 
    were you aware of your body and…. did you like yourself as a child, and your shape, or 
    did you not -- 
    -- Never thought about it, no…it didn‟t come into the question at all 
    Ok, and within your family…when your periods started, and when you developed breasts, 
    were you made to feel that that was something to be secret or kept quiet about? 
    No, it was just part of growing up…no there was nothing, no, no 
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    Did you like who you were, or did you ever feel self-conscious or embarrassed about who  
    you were? 
    No, no, I never felt that, no. 
     
Although Gwen‟s sexually developing female self/body was not a source of secrecy or 
shame, it was the focus of a paternally/socially imposed shift in self-perception, with her 
father insisting that this farm-loving tomboy be a feminine „girl‟ and wear dresses rather 
than the boyish shorts that had freed Gwen to ride horses and build wooden prams for her 
twin-sister „K‟s‟ dolls. This was a constraint that Gwen readily accepted, but also to some 
degree evaded. For, having been held back a grade at school, and thus separated from and 
seen as not as „bright‟ as „K‟, Gwen left school at fourteen, and, uninterested in boys or the 
local dances, went to live and work on nearby farms until becoming a herd-tester at 
eighteen. And when her father was against her taking on this „man‟s job‟, Gwen risked his 
disapproval in order to pursue her love of rural life: 
 
    Mum had been into the shops „n she‟d sent up a top „n shorts….and when we got home  
    again, Dad wouldn‟t let me wear those shorts 
    Wouldn‟t he? 
    Nooo, oh no no no, that‟s boys‟ wear, no, no, no, he wouldn‟t have that, girls were girls, he  
    was very proud of his girls 
 
    So you never sort of had time for boyfriends, or weren‟t really interested? 
    Oh no, no, no, no, I was too busy doing my own thing 
    So when you talk about your father having standards [of dress] or roles that his daughters  
    were meant to play, did they expect all the girls to go off „n get married 
    Oh I expect so….He didn‟t like it because I was sort of doing a man‟s job, as he said, he  
    didn‟t like that…but what else was I going to do, I didn‟t want to be in town.  
 
The risk was easier to take, however, knowing that Gwen had as her backstop a deep and 
unbreakable bond of unconditional love with her twin „K‟, as well as a deep and abiding 
Christian faith that God loves and protects from evil those who follow his will: 
 
    how did that bond with your sister develop?…I mean you‟ve obviously kept a sense of  
    closeness… 
    Oh yes, it‟s there, it‟s there and you can‟t get rid if it…I wouldn‟t even try to get rid of it… 
    that bond is there, it‟s always there 
    Yeah, and would you say that‟s sustained you in many ways, having that closeness with „K‟? 
    Oh I would think so, yes, I think so, yes 
    So would you say it‟s an unconditional love then? 
    Oh absolutely, absolutely, yes 
   
    what would your principles be, then, as part of who you are, and how you‟ve lived your life 
    in an authentic way? 
    We‟re born into sin, we can‟t do anything about it, because of Adam and Eve, but we can do  
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    something about that, by accepting Jesus Christ as our personal saviour, and doing what‟s  
    right in God‟s sight, and that‟s what‟s important to me. 
 
As a devout Christian who later served in the St John‟s Ambulance for 31 years, Gwen was 
able to gain the approval of the social/transcendent (if not her own) Father, and thus 
conceive herself as a „good‟ person. It was this need to please, and thus gain the 
recognition, love and approval of the real, social and/or transcendent father that, for all 
participants, saw the reconstruction of a pretend self/form that might meet current social 
and/or spiritual ideals of femininity.  
 
The Reconstructed, ‘Re-formed’ Self 
This self-reconstruction followed what was variously described as a closing down, pruning 
off, hiding, fragmentation, withdrawal and/or sloughing off of the dirty, shameful and 
imperfect sexual female self/body that for many participants brought a conceptual and/or 
perceptual separation of mind/head from body, of physical body from its sexual parts, and 
of conscious mind from sinful, shameful or painful memories, thoughts and images. For all 
participants, this re-formation of the self was carried out with the aim of retaining or 
(re)gaining the recognition, love and/or acceptance primarily of parents (particularly the 
father), and secondarily of peers and social or transcendent authority figures such as 
teachers, coaches, employers, clergy, or God. And the achievement of this aim required the 
pursuit and attainment of parental/social expectations and ideals of feminine subjectivity; 
ideals based not on who one is, but on how one should look and what one should do in 
order to become the good/perfect female self. Without exception, the conception and 
construction of this ideal self entailed a refusal or rejection of what participants saw as the 
traditional, male-defined model and ideals of passive, sexually objectified, subjugated 
femininity that had, to varying degrees, shaped the lives of their mothers. The 
reconstructed self might therefore include aspects of the original or core self that satisfied 
paternal/social ideals of feminine subjectivity (e.g. the slim, beautiful, intelligent, sporty or 
artistic aspects), thus maintaining a connection to the real (but now fragmented) self. But 
the main aim of this reconstruction was to recreate and regain a sense and appearance of a 
perfectly formed, self-controlled, and therefore a „good‟ and loveable (subjective) self, 
through the pursuit and attainment of (paternal) ideals of beauty, playful sexual 
attractiveness, intelligence, slimness, fitness and achievement, but also (sexual) 
submissiveness. As the following excerpts show, it was the (fear of) perceived or actual 
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failure to meet these ideals and expectations that ultimately turned the interviewee towards 
other social/sexual/spiritual relationships, or even towards her real, secreted, sexual self, in 
search of more achievable ideals and identities that would give apparently perfectly 
unified, controlled form and function to - and thus ensure the recognition, love, and 
continued existence of - the subjective self.       
 
For Jean, this reconstructed self took the form of a „good‟ persona or pretend self, created 
by pruning off the „bad‟ (homo)sexual female parts of her „core‟ self, and refashioning a 
boyishly sporty, intellectual, heterosexual self, that then, from the age of thirteen, led a 
double life. However, the need and the constant effort required to create and maintain this 
pretend self brought with it an intense fear of failure, exposure (of personal/parental flaws) 
and humiliation, and thus a severe “performance anxiety” that self-fulfillingly resulted in a 
failure to achieve that was then concealed through various strategies of deception. As Jean 
disclosed: 
     
    from thirteen I‟d led that double life….I just had this huge secret with „L‟…. I kept [the  
    attraction] a secret, didn‟t tell a soul, not a soul…. I‟d have three or four boyfriends, but  
    they certainly were a ticket, to normality 
 
    So the sporty self….was the thing that you could hold on to, that you knew you were good at 
    Yeah….I probably had quite a bit of praise for my sporting achievements 
    even when in the other areas you felt inadequate? 
    Totally, mmm….[Mum]‟d get frustrated as a teenager when she‟d try and teach me stuff at  
    cooking, but there was definitely a level of anxiety there about cooking „cause I just didn‟t… 
    as soon as the anxiety came along, I couldn‟t think, so I couldn‟t…and Mum would get  
    frustrated, and impatient and nasty    
    
    So it was quite a strong thing of doing the right thing or the wrong thing, and -- 
    -- Hiding it…I would‟ve lied…I was good at lying -- 
    -- [You] had no compunction about covering up to keep the image of the good person 
    No. 
 
Maintaining the apparent form and identities of the good pretend self therefore became an 
anxiety-ridden matter of keeping the bad (sexual) self a secret, and cheating and lying to 
parents and then others to conceal her failure or inability to achieve the standards required 
for each subjective identity. With the realizations in her late teens that her sporty self could 
no longer attain the success required for paternal approval, and, more importantly, that her 
alcoholic parents could not provide the recognition, love and approval that she needed, 
Jean entered the workforce only to find the stability and credibility of her pretend self 
undermined by the same performance anxiety: 
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    from probably Intermediate school on, I was aware of their alcoholism…and they both drank  
    more and more, as the years went on. So, you don‟t have a relationship with an alcoholic  
    really, they‟ve already got one…the bottle     
                         
    I didn‟t like Mum, as much, you know, she disappointed me, she wasn‟t intellectual enough,  
    she was illogical, in fact she was very illogical 
 
    I went to work in a bookshop, but I can remember being totally anxious about the till…this  
    performance anxiety of how to do change, and as soon as I got anxious, any instruction they  
    gave me, I couldn‟t hear it, I couldn‟t remember it so I‟d ask them again, and then I‟d have  
    to do all of these secret things, to sort of try and make out as if I did know how to do it. 
 
It was marriage and motherhood and a new identity as the good wife and mother that 
brought a stability and security to Jean‟s „ideal‟ pretend self/form that allowed her to 
clearly separate it from the „bad‟ concealed (homo)sexual self, thereby allowing her 
attraction to women to be covertly explored within the safety of heterosexual gatherings: 
 
    I never talked to [my husband] about being interested in women. So it was a complete  
    double life….not talking about sex and relationships would‟ve been totally normal. No  
    role-modelling for talking about things of that emotional kind of depth…we wouldn‟t  
    even„ve had the wordage. 
 
Even after the marriage ended in her thirties, Jean‟s identity as the good heterosexual 
(divorced) mother sustained her perfect pretend self/form through a long-term affair with a 
bisexual woman, and then, at fifty, entry into a long-term lesbian relationship with „S‟, by 
now „natural‟ strategies of concealment protecting the good form and existence of this 
socially acceptable persona:    
 
    why did you go for 15 years, like, out of your marriage? 
    I don‟t know, just…just not stepping, again that secret of pretending in the community,  
    going to the tennis club, and they might say „oh, have you found a guy yet?‟ and I‟d go „no‟ 
    so you were wanting to keep up the image? 
    Mmm, and I had a girl, at least one child at home, and I was still wanting to keep up all the  
    normalities 
     
    „S‟ was quite happy to, she was obviously wanting to be closeted about it….as well…  
    We just do it naturally….so we would be the same, have the same languaging when we‟re  
    out. If somebody said…. „have you been married?‟, [we‟d say] „yeah, not married at the  
    moment‟….or we‟d ignore each other. 
 
For Jean, the need to lead a double - and therefore false and deceitful - life was driven by 
fear of losing other people‟s recognition and admiration of her as a person, a shattering of 
her pretend self promising social humiliation, exclusion, and subjective non-existence. 
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What gave an added unity, stability and goodness of form to Jean‟s perfect self, thereby 
allowing her to live comfortably within her double life, was the fact that she did not 
conceive the core aspects of that self as female, but rather, as strongly masculine, a 
conception supported by an astrological identity and belief system that also cosmically 
justified the pretend self and double (sexual) life: 
 
    [the soul may choose to be gay in this lifetime because] we wouldn‟t know what this feels  
    like, unless we‟ve known that….so that it‟s not like it‟s such a sin 
     
    Does it feel like….you‟ve got….different identities, different ways of behaving in different  
    worlds? 
    Yep…and I‟m comfortable with that….the core self is still there though….my core self goes    
    everywhere….when I describe my core self to somebody, it‟s not as a female, it‟s like my  
    deep interest in communication or my deep inter…nothing to do with female…. my chart is  
    quite male orientated, I was born with more male thinking, more male energy 
    
    So the identities that you might use, that would describe your life, such as sportsperson,  
    mother, wife…counsellor….would you include the identity of „woman‟? 
    I wouldn‟t, no, I wouldn‟t.    
 
     
  
 Figure 6:                                                           Bound                                                                       (Lewie) 
 
Similarly, for Fleur, the fear and sense of worthlessness instilled by paternal violence, the 
secrecy and shame of sexual development, and the failure and rebellion that brought 
humiliating expulsion from school were all hastily buried beneath a false self or „face‟ that, 
in covering the real self, would be pleasing and likeable to others. Alienated from her 
„hated‟, abusive Pakeha father, and denied affection from her loved, but abused, silenced 
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Māori mother, Fleur left their farm at sixteen and set off to Sydney to create an attractive, 
successful, socially acceptable identity for herself. Raising her age by two years, Fleur 
secured a job in a chartered accountant‟s office, rented a small flat in Neutral Bay, and 
made a few friends. But despite gaining a measure of independence and control over her 
life, Fleur knew the self she was presenting to the world to be false; a robotic self 
disconnected from the hurt, angry, alienated self buried deep within. As she describes it: 
 
    And so that time in Australia, did you develop in a lot of ways…did you regain some sense  
    of confidence? 
    I don‟t think I did, no…. when I was in Aussie, I wasn‟t really happy…you know, I wasn‟t  
    happy happy.…you sort of get a co…I got a complex, you know 
    A complex, like an inferiority complex? 
    Yeah, and it was like, I was angry and… I didn‟t want to know who I was, really….I was  
     trying to please other people…. 
    Would you say that that was like putting on a -- 
    -- A face, yes  
    A face…that you thought others would like? 
    Would like more than, the person that was…than the real me…you know what I mean? 
     
    So, would you say back then, you could‟ve looked in the mirror and actually not seen  
    yourself? 
    Yeah, not seen who I am….Yeah, just a shell…just an image -- 
    -- Someone‟s face and it wasn‟t really you? 
    Yeah, yeah, it wasn‟t me…‟cause I think with all the trauma, and…pain „n that, that…it‟s  
    with you for life, eh 
    Yeah, and perhaps a numbness to your feelings? 
    Yeah, yeah, yeah….I never expressed, yeah…just kept them all to myself „n, bottled a lot of  
     things up….Like I said, I just felt like I was, just on automatic pilot, „n just going through the  
     motions….it was like somebody else, I was a robot….I worked, went home, went out. 
 
As a socially defined and accepted, likeable robot, Fleur could no longer feel the presence, 
pain or even the instincts and intuitions of her real self, and thus, at twenty-six and wanting 
the recognition, love and affection she‟d been denied, married a man who ultimately 
revealed himself to be, like her father, jealous, abusive and controlling. Needing to be the 
perfect, pleasing wife, Fleur went on a strict diet, losing 16kgs, only to find that her 
husband became even more jealous and controlling. Finally, after being pressured into an 
abortion, Fleur left the three-year marriage and returned home to Hinuera, all her efforts to 
construct a slim, attractive, intelligent, successful and therefore a good, loveable self 
reduced to nothing as she was reduced to the bad, worthless, failed wife/woman:  
 
    So you lost weight to keep him happy, and when you lost it -- 
    -- To keep him happy, and when I lost the weight, he was worse…. I had an abortion to  
    him, „cause I fell pregnant and he didn‟t want the baby….I had no respect for him, I didn‟t  
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    respect myself for doing what I let him do 
    So you went against your own instincts to please him? 
    I did, yeah….when I got with him, it was like, „shit I‟m back to square one‟. 
 
Returning to the family farm, Fleur lived with her mother for five years, before the latter‟s 
death. Her father having died several years earlier, Fleur was able to reconnect on some 
level, and share some affection with her mother, though neither was able to speak of the 
secrets or the deep anger, resentment and loss of self that both had experienced as women; 
an anger that her mother contained for fifty years to avoid social disapproval, until it could 
be contained no longer:  
 
    Mum told me, she said back then, women with kids didn‟t leave their husbands, because that  
    was a no-no, you just didn‟t do it, you were a scarlet woman, in society. 
 
    Mum just picked up „G‟s‟ walking stick, and said „this is what you‟ve put me through all 
    these fuckin‟ years‟, and she had him on the ground…I had to take the stick off her, „n she  
    just… must‟ve belted him about eight times, just, ohh just all that anger….I said „Mum you‟d  
    better stop, you‟ll kill ‟im‟…„this is what he‟s put me through‟.   
 
In the years following her mother‟s death, Fleur entered another relationship, gave birth to 
a daughter, „T‟, and then, when the same pattern of alcohol-fuelled disharmony and 
violence began to emerge, left her partner to set up home with her daughter. It was her 
relationship to „T‟, however, that provided the beginnings of Fleur‟s reconnection to, and 
reconstitution of her real self, through the bond of love developed between mother and 
child: 
 
    You were sort of lost the whole time? Or living a kind of an alter ego sort of life? 
    Yeah, yeah, yeah.…I, like I haven‟t really found myself till I had „T‟ really…„cause I‟ve  
    gone through so much…barriers, that I‟ve, it‟s only now I‟ve found the real me, and I‟m  
    forty-two this year 
     So in a way, you‟ve brought the bits together, would you say Fleur? 
    Yes, yep the jigsaw‟s come back…yep, I‟ve got my girl „n… 
 
With Fleur‟s sexual, womanly self no longer having to be reshaped to fit the ideal form, 
meet the expectations, and thus gain the approval of others, she has begun to put together 
again the pieces of the jigsaw of what was her real whole childhood self; a slow process 
sometimes interrupted by (alcohol-driven) outbursts towards „T‟ of the same hurt, anger 
and frustration felt by her mother: 
 
    Like I get, when I get really angry with „T‟, I smack her, but, I worry myself because  
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    sometimes, I get to a point where I can‟t stop smacking her because I‟m just so, wild. 
 
    last time when we talked, you were saying about with T „n that, sometimes you‟d lose 
    your temper „n, get a bit angry about stuff 
    Yeah…I don‟t get so angry now. 
 
Fleur‟s realization during the interview process that this deep-seated anger was at her 
father‟s abuse of her mother and the children‟s animals, coupled with a shift into her own 
farm cottage that became a place of self-discovery, -possession and -expression for both 
Fleur and „T‟, saw a positive shift in Fleur‟s perception of her self, and in her relationship 
to „T‟, and also T‟s father: 
 
    I‟m stronger now, I don‟t depend on him….it‟s my way now.…I don‟t have to take it  
    from [men]….I don‟t have to do it their way, I can do, it‟s my way….now I‟ve got [my 
    own space], I‟m coming out „n being who I want to be. 
 
Through her desire to be an independent woman and a good mother, by providing „T‟ with 
the recognition, love and encouragement of her real, subjective self that she did not have, 
Fleur is putting back together the pieces of her own real self again; a self that, for the first 
time in her life, she is prepared and happy to perceive as wholly and positively female: 
 
    Yes I would, I‟d be happy out here….I mean I‟d love to have pigs, a couple of pigs, a  
    couple of sheep.…get a house cow, you know.…this is, yes, this is bringing me to where 
    I want to be, where I‟m happy to be….I‟ve found my self, here   
    you want people to see who you are again 
    Yes…to see the real you, and not someone that you‟ve tried to be, for all that time…  
    in that picture of yourself, that image of yourself ….do you see yourself as a woman as well? 
    I do now 
    Now that you‟re the real self? 
    Yep, yep 
    So „T‟ will have a different view of herself as a woman 
    And just be who she is, be who she wants to be, that‟s what I want to give her.     
 
 
As mentioned earlier, although Gwen did not experience this same sense of shame and 
embarrassment about her pubertal female self, and thus the fragmenting and sloughing off 
of sexual parts of that self, she was nevertheless shaped and constrained by her father‟s 
wish for his tomboyish daughter to be an attractively feminine girl who might (like her 
sisters) marry or work in an office or dress shop, rather than taking on a „man‟s job‟ as a 
herd-tester. Gwen therefore knew that she would have to disregard her parents‟ wishes to 
be true to her self and follow her love of rural life by pursuing what was a traditionally 
masculine role, but which was, for Gwen, simply an expression of her natural self: 
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    in terms of gender roles….you could say that women are in many ways channelled into that, 
    to doing the motherhood thing 
    In those days they were, yes, but that wasn‟t me, and I don‟t think my mother could change  
    me 
    when you went herd-testing, he wasn‟t really happy about that…  
    Ooh no, „cause that was a man‟s job….and he felt that it was too heavy or, you know, women  
    shouldn‟t be doing it, but there were a lot of women doing it 
    you risked disapproval in a way, didn‟t you? 
    Yes, yeah…yes….you have to be natural, and naturally be yourself. 
 
Whilst Gwen may have failed to meet her father‟s traditional ideals, the socially identified 
self that she constructed and presented to the world - as a herd-tester, sportswoman, Girl 
Guide leader, devout Christian, St John‟s Ambulance officer, and later, a rural delivery 
owner/operator - was able to successfully maintain the ideals and expectations associated 
with these identities/uniforms. It was these stable, admired social and spiritual identities, 
allied with her sister K‟s unconditional love, a disinterest in sexual relationships, and a 
perception of herself as masculine in her thinking, interests and attitudes, that enabled 
Gwen to be, know, and subjectively define herself as a (boyishly) self-directed, successful, 
asexually pure, spiritually disciplined, and thus „good‟ self: 
  
    you‟ve done things that gave you quite a bit of autonomy and independence 
    Oh yes, well virtually I was my own b…yes that‟s right, yes  
 
    So then you could say you‟ve actually probably got a more masculine view of the world? 
    More than likely 
    A masculine way of thinking about things? 
    Yeah 
    would you say, you‟ve wanted to always be a good person, and be seen as a good person? 
    Of course. 
 
This is not to say, however, that Gwen saw her womanly self as intrinsically good or equal. 
On the contrary, her Christian beliefs decreed that, because of Eve‟s original sin, woman is 
born sinful and weaker than man, and must therefore serve as the „neck‟ that supports man 
as the „head‟. Hence, although both may make decisions and work together, as man‟s 
„helpmeet‟, woman must ultimately submit to his will: 
 
    See, man is the head, God made man the head, Adam was the head 
    Right, ok, he sets the rules sort of thing, or governs the house, he‟s the head of the family? 
    Well, he should do, but woman is the neck…and the head can‟t do anything without the  
    neck turns it….[but he] makes the decisions…he has the final say.              
     
    So….[because of original sin] you can never actually end up being a good person 
    ….you‟re always striving everyday to be good 
    That‟s right, to do what‟s right, yes. 
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Thus, for Gwen, to be a virtuous person in God‟s eyes was to constantly think, act and 
present herself in a way that made the sinful female self good; that is, by asking for God‟s 
forgiveness for past sins, by “accepting Jesus Christ as our personal saviour and doing 
what‟s right in God‟s sight”, and by covering and thus protecting one‟s self with the 
“armour of God”: 
   
    It‟s like in Ephesians, where you have to put on the whole armour of God…you know, from 
    the helmet „n the breast plate, and go right down your body; if you‟ve got a sticky problem…. 
    so you put the whole armour of God on, and that protects you, it‟s amazing.       
 
    as long as you feel that you are doing right in God‟s sight, then you feel you‟re a good  
    person, and you can….like yourself for who you are? 
    Yes, yes absolutely. 
 
By spiritually cleansing her self of, and protecting her self from evil, Gwen was able to 
construct and maintain a whole, identity-based sense or concept of her asexual, masculine 
(female) self as a good and likeable person. This wholeness of self was threatened, 
however, on two particular occasions: firstly, when „K‟ married (at 21) and moved to 
Christchurch, thereby separating Gwen from her source of stability and unconditional love:  
 
    I wasn‟t very well for a little while after K got married, but certainly was no depression….I‟d  
    have a meal and I‟d lose it, „n that type of thing.…I was just sort of generally upset I suppose 
    And, so that would be the time when your sense of wholeness and stability, or control of  
    your life,had been shaken or, or taken away 
    Well, part of you had gone, yes…. Oh, it was a big loss to me, big loss 
    Yes, and how did you fill the gap, or the void, or how did it affect you? 
    Oh I think I was just lonely…but then I had to soon get used to that…I had a job to do, and I  
    just got on with it. 
 
And secondly, when, after forty years of living on her own or with female companions, 
Gwen decided (at 64) to marry a man considerably older than herself, whom she had 
known and respected as an elder of her Open Brethren church. Finding herself sleeping 
with a man for the first time in her life, Gwen became embarrassed that others would 
(mistakenly) see her as sexual: 
 
    How did that feel getting married….did you like it? 
    It was very strange…very strange, I mean, I hadn‟t ever been with a man, and, you know,  
it was extremely strange, and I suppose I felt embarrassed too 
    In what way? 
    Well, the fact that I was actually sleeping with a man, in a man‟s bed, was, you know,   
    strange….but „N‟ being sick and having heart congestion, [sex] was out of the question. 
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When Gwen‟s seemingly whole, self-disciplined, good, loved self threatened to fragment, 
it was her work identity and achievement, her husband‟s identity and standing as a Godly 
man, and an ability to distance herself from her problems that allowed this reconstructed 
self to endure and survive. As she put it,   
 
    You have to be careful, that….if you‟ve got a problem, you don‟t dwell on it…problems  
    should be out there, right out there, and that‟s where they stay…. I don‟t take them aboard,  
    as such…or I might say „look God, that‟s your problem, not mine, you deal with it‟, and he  
    does  
    So you separate that problem from your identity, and from your self as a whole, and that  
    helps you stay strong within yourself?   
    Yes, that‟s right…it‟s a great help. 
 
 
For young Lewie, however, reconstructing and maintaining such a whole, stable, identity-
based sense/concept of her originary female self as a good and thus recognized, loved and 
accepted (subjective) self was not so easy. Having for her first seven years been the focus 
of her mother and older siblings‟ attention, the arrival of a baby sister brought feelings of 
maternal/familial rejection that, along with growing embarrassment at her premature 
sexual development, initiated a fragmentation and loss of (unconditional love of) her whole 
„original‟ self as Lewie learnt to reconceive that sexually developing female self/body as 
imperfect, inferior, shameful and isolated. Feeling alienated from family and school-
friends, Lewie followed her best friend into the Mormon Church, and, in initially adopting 
its strict and exclusive moral codes, came to see herself as the “black sheep” of the family. 
 
 
                
        Figure 7:                                           The Black Sheep                                                (Lewie) 
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Within the Mormon community and its ascetically ordered, regulated way of life, Lewie 
found a sense of belonging, and a seemingly secure identity as a good, disciplined, and 
admired girl: 
 
     What held you there for so long? 
    Well, it was basically feeling like I belonged, you know „cause they were all like „oh Lewie  
    you‟re so great, you‟re a convert, you're being so strong standing up for what you believe 
    in', and basically I mean, looking back on it, it was probably just flattery really. 
  
But as the adolescent Lewie became more aware of biblical teachings that depicted her 
own sexual, menstruating female self/body as the „seductress‟ needing to be restrained 
from the “Great Sin” of forbidden sex or else face exclusion from the church community, 
rising scepticism forced her to abandon not only the church, but also the Mormon school 
that Lewie had attended for two years. As she recalled it, 
 
    they‟re very strict on your personal life, I mean, before you go, you have to be interviewed  
    on your worthiness to attend….and if you‟re a virgin….if you're sexually pure basically….I  
    really hate how sex is treated both within religion and in the outside world, „cause I‟ve  
    experienced both, you know like, I mean it‟s just disgusting really, asking a twelve year-old  
    if they‟re a virgin and basing their worth upon their sexuality, whereas outside it, everyone‟s  
    so sexually outrageous, and sex is just the centre of the universe….[teenage] girls are always  
    the sluts, the whores.  
 
However, despite her disdain for dualistic religious and social conceptions of the female as 
either virgin or whore, the teenage Lewie found herself seemingly unable to free her 
concept and experience of her own sexual female self/body from connotations of dirtiness, 
evil, shame and guilt, and thus, the need to slough off the dirty sexual female parts and 
reshape herself into the ideal feminine form/identity that could be loved by others, and by 
herself. For Lewie, the form and existence of this ideal self, initially based on looks and 
achievement, came to depend solely upon her identity and performance as an artist. 
Lewie‟s artwork encapsulates her experience of this de- and re-construction of her 
originally whole, unconditionally loved, child self in the story of The Hare, The Bear, and 
The Doll;  
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     Figure 8:       The Hare 
 
                                            
                     The Bear 
 
                                        
                        The Doll                                                                                  (Lewie)                                                                                                              
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                                                                            Figure 9:        Path to Perfection           (Lewie) 
 
  
In the hopscotch that signifies the years and stages of Lewie‟s life, the Bear (the originally 
whole, unconditionally loved, but then sexually imperfect self) is succeeded by the Hare 
(the boyishly playful, sexual, performative self, constantly and madly striving to meet 
parental/social expectations and, therefore, to exist and be recognized and loved by others), 
and the Doll (the perfectly and eternally beautiful, youthful, feminine appearance that is, 
for the adolescent Hare girl, constantly pursued, but ultimately unattainable). As the Hare, 
Lewie constantly and even obsessively strove to achieve the standards of perfection, firstly, 
within Mormonism, and later, in her school art, academic grades, and friendships, that 
would clothe her imperfect sexual female (Bear) self/body with a stable, unified, 
recognized subjective identity or form of existence: 
 
    you‟re shaped by your actions, and who you are, like, not who you are but what you do, and  
    it‟s always what you do, not who you are really….I guess it's been like that my whole life  
    because I think Mormonism was one of those things - if I could be a good Mormon, then I  
    could be, you know, and then for a while I had nothing, if I could be a good friend…that  
    kind of failed….then it was only last year that I started to think „well maybe, if I can be a  
    high academic achiever‟ (laughter) you know, it‟s always something, I always have a project.  
                                                                        
„It's about girls specifically, and how they 
become a person, what makes a person a 
person in themselves….and what happens 
when that is obstructed in childhood 'n 
stuff. So I created three characters which 
were the Hare, the Bear and the Doll, and 
they were all played by little girls, I 
dressed them up…there's the teddy bear, 
and she was just in a bear suit, and they all 
had a toy which represented what they 
were. So….at the beginning, the Doll was 
sort of like the show-pony, she's what a 
little girl is supposed to be and what she is 
supposed to be throughout the rest of her 
life. And the Hare, is almost like, and I 
put her as the youngest one to just be a 
bit, you know, sort of sexual kind of, the 
one that wants to be good enough…. but 
she's supposed to be playful….and then 
there was the Bear, and I switched the 
Hare and the Bear around because the 
Hare should've technically been the older 
one, and the Bear should've been the 
younger one, 'cause the Bear was 
unconditional kind of love, but I switched 
them round to show what happens if these 
roles are reversed, and if a girl is too 
young and has these expectations on her 
when she's too young‟. 
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                              Figure 10:               Pursuing the Ideal Ego                 (Lewie) 
 
Knowing that she must daily re-attain and maintain the standards of performance required 
for the perfect form - and thus the enduringly recognized, loved existence - of her 
performatively recreated self, Lewie‟s life became consumed by a sense of loss, 
depression, and emptiness, her real self reduced to an empty cup, drained of goodness and 
love, that must, each day, be refilled: 
 
    all the time my whole life, it‟s like, a constant war with myself….waking up, feeling like  
    crap, but you have to get up….it‟s like a cycle, because after a while it gets incredibly   
    emotionally exhausting and you start behaving in a terrible way, and start treating people  
    differently, and you‟ve got to still control it and maintain this sort of thing that you‟ve  
    created for your self in front of these people, because otherwise you lose friends, and then  
    you sort of lose a lot of other stuff….I have to get up and over the course of the day, it‟s like  
    filling the cup….I have to kind of fill the cup during the day, ‟n then I go to sleep and it gets  
    emptied….So I have to, physically….I have to make myself feel alright a lot of the time 
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    Did you always feel like that as a child? 
    No…. it only really properly started from about thirteen onwards when you‟re, a teenager „n  
    you have to, be certain things.  
 
To Lewie, refilling the cup meant constantly producing great art, achieving top grades for 
it, and therefore being and excelling as an artist. But the pressure and fear of failure to do 
so, which self-fulfillingly resulted in an actual failure to perform, and thus, the prospect of 
her own non-existence, found Lewie turning her attention, and her existential need to 
achieve, onto her own sexual self and body. For, if the Hare Girl could not be the perfect 
artist in the eyes of others, then at least she could refashion her Doll self to be more 
beautiful and sexually attractive, or even more boyishly childlike in her own eyes, thereby 
attaining the measure of purposeful achievement and goodness of self/form that would 
ensure her ongoing existence:  
 
    the thing to me that relates [all these identities] is you‟re saying you could be good; it will  
    make you good, and by being good, you‟ll be loved and accepted 
    Yeah…‟n it will give your existence some sort of purpose 
     
    what exists alongside of that is the fear [of] „what happens if I can‟t be good at that?…then -- 
    -- I am nothing, yeah…. like my whole world started depending….on what mark I got for my  
    art, you know, and if I didn‟t get that, I was absolutely nothing….I feel bad because I haven‟t  
    been able to do it, „cause I‟m too scared to do it now, and I just can‟t, like I‟m afraid of  
    failing to myself….when you fail at it….you feel like you‟re nothing. 
 
    some days I‟d want it to be a very sexual body, and other days I would want it to be a  
    completely unsexual sort of boyish kind of body…at the beginning of it, I started wearing,  
    this hat that was like a little Victorian boy chimney-sweeper kind of hat, because I wanted to  
    be small and, like a child….I‟m fine with my gender, but I guess it‟s almost like, I‟ve always  
    liked making „n dressing in costumes, so it‟s like becoming someone else or something else  
    for a little while.…it‟s like playing a game of pretend for the day, like a child game of   
    pretend where you‟re a child again, you know?  
 
Turning her body into a work of art or a „pretend‟ self that was either a playfully sexually 
attractive, or a boyishly desexualized image or persona was Lewie‟s way of creating and 
showing to her self a form of her self as the „good‟, successful person. As she put it, “It‟s 
like you‟re achieving something because you can‟t achieve what you used to be able to 
achieve”.  
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   Figure 11:                         Performative Selves                                            (Lewie) 
 
 
For, whether the cultivated feminine beauty, or the desexualized, defeminized child that 
she once was and wished to become again, these pretend images obscured and disguised 
the mirrored image of her real, displeasing, sexual female body: 
 
    I don‟t like looking in the mirror to be honest.…I guess I mainly see my face, I look at my  
    face, more so than I do my body….I pay more close attention to my face, because to me my  
    face is, the thing to show off, if that makes sense, rather than my body, I don't see my body  
    as something to particularly….show off as such…[Mum] can‟t understand why I‟m so prudey  
    and covery-uppy…because she sees bodies as beautiful, and undirty.
 
 
 
But Lewie‟s self-transformation was to be carried out not just on canvas, or with costume, 
but also on her own sexual female self/body, as the lingering Mormon (and also 
maternally) instilled conception of that self as dirty, shameful and bad became suddenly 
and horribly intensified with the onset of sexual activity.
79
 For Lewie, this intensification 
involved a shattering experience in which, following (hetero)sexual intimacy, 
 
    I‟d feel incredibly bad….and that was awful, like, I just felt like rock bottom….kind of  
    disgusting and stuff….I started feeling detached from myself and I had this horrible  
    experience, where afterwards I just shut my eyes, and I was like „oh god‟, and it felt like  
                                                 
79
This seeming contradiction between Lewie's and my account of her mother Gina's attitude to (sexual) 
bodies is explained in the exploration of Gina's maternally/intellectually reconstructed self (see page 205).  
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    every single one of my limbs was completely detached from me, and I was just this…  
    chopped up sort of person….I felt like I was just sort of floating in the middle of nowhere. 
 
This sexually induced destruction of her good, boyishly feminine form, combined with an 
intense fear of artistic failure, resulted in a loss of ability, identity, and ultimately, of self, 
that created in Lewie the need to punish, purify, and even erase her bad sexual female 
body, by denying it food and growth:  
 
    My entire existence depended on that one, that mark….and so then, what had become really  
    positive for me, my place of peace, which was art, turned around and became a demon, and  
    was something that I had to feel crap about my self….I felt like I was turning into this waste 
    of human space - that I‟d completely, lost my self 
    
    you went through that phase of feeling like you weren‟t being successful in your art, and you  
    weren‟t achieving, then your attention turned to your body…thinking „ok if I get a bit slimmer 
    -- Yeah, but….I wanted to become thinner, because….it was almost like being a child again,  
    if that makes sense, and I‟ve always hated my breasts, so I found that I could wear some of  
    my clothes, now, that would look slightly baggy and so they‟d make my breasts look smaller,  
    so I looked…more like a child than a…voluptuous sort of woman, because I never, got to  
    look like a ^child if that makes sense, I don't remember being allowed to look like a child and  
    I always wanted that….I always did really thin sort of people in my artwork, so…it was  
    almost like well, if I couldn‟t do the art *then maybe my body could be the art*.  
 
Food therefore became the artistic tool that Lewie used to reconstruct her dirty, all too 
sexual female self/body into that of the child that Lewie wished she could have been: 
 
    For most of it I‟m not really rigorously trying to lose weight or anything in the sense that, I  
    stop myself from eating, because like.…I eat when I‟m hungry, but a lot of the time I wasn‟t  
    hungry, not at all hungry, I didn‟t want to eat because eating reminded me that I was a person,  
    if that makes sense, it made me feel sick, just shoving the food down my throat was like  
    shoving more crap down into me…it was like a phobia of food, it was like 'no-ho-ho‟, like…I  
    guess at the very start, like a few months ago, I started feeling bad about myself….so, I would  
    say „right, as punishment you‟re not going to eat till say 4 o‟clock today‟. 
 
 
Thus, for Lewie, who was always very slim, the avoidance of eating was not about weight-
loss per se. Rather, it expressed a deep fear of making her already dirty, bad, real (sexual) 
self/person even dirtier, while the smallness, desexualization, redemption, and sense of 
artistic achievement that came from nutritionally denying, disciplining, and re-forming her 
self/body promised a return of that self to its originally whole, child state of purity, 
goodness, and unconditional love:     
 
So….it wasn‟t about not eating and starving yourself to get slim….there was some other  
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reason and some other sense of gratification that you were getting from it? 
It makes me feel like a kid again, it‟s like I was back then….it‟s like I‟ve grabbed on to what 
I was, if that makes sense?  
Sure, and would you say then, that by going back to that childlike state, that‟s sort of an 
escape from that whole thing [of expectations and failure]? 
*Yeah…mmm*… [but] it‟s hard to get [back to] the total complete self and soul, that had no  
expectations when you‟ve got the expectations ~ because the expectations are sort of what 
rip you apart a bit, if you know what I mean? …. *and sort of fragment, defragment you*…. 
we‟re just making this huge bomb really in each female….that is ready to go off at any time. 
 
 
 
                           
                          Figure 12:                Death by Expectation                    (Lewie) 
 
 
The Eating Disordered Self 
Although Lewie did not consider her restricted eating to be an eating disorder as such, but 
rather, a desexualizing, artistic means to reshape her bad sexual self into the good, self-
approved, childish form, she interpreted her friend‟s bulimia in the following way:  
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    maybe it‟s about an achievement of something and trying to be good enough, and so, if   
    you‟ve lost what you once were or once had, or once could do, you‟d turn it on yourself  
    and kind of be like „ok, if I can lose weight, I‟m actually achieving something and doing   
    something here, and I can do something‟….and again it would empower you….it‟s just to  
    get rid of the awful feelings all the time, and she feels so bad about herself, she said   
    sometimes she can almost see herself growing in front of the mirror. 
 
 
Lewie‟s interpretation of her friend‟s bulimic state roughly describes the experience of the 
six research participants who experienced an eating disorder at some time in their lives. If 
“trying to be good enough” is about reconstructing and re-presenting the dirty, bad, 
deformed, sexual female self in a form that strives but fails to meet the expectations and 
ideals imposed by parents, peers, and society at large, then anorexia/bulimia/orthorexia 
may be a self-purifying, self-reshaping means to achieve the perfect (child) form and 
function, and thus the ongoing, loved existence of the real (bad, sexual) self, in the face of 
a (feared) disintegration of the socially reconstructed self.   
 
 
                               
                                    Figure 13:                                             (by Kayla Wright, 17) 
80
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 Although Kayla was not a participant, I came into contact with her while writing this thesis, while she was 
bulimic, and several months prior to her suicide in November 2008. I have included some of her artwork as 
a tribute, and as it may reflect the thoughts, feelings, and self-perceptions of the eating disordered 
participants. Retrieved June 1, 2011, from http://www.flickr.com/photos/26142764@N07/ 
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This account encapsulates the experience of Lewie‟s mother Gina, for example, who, 
having learnt from her own mother to perceive her sexually developing body as dirty, 
smutty, and to be hidden, and having then engaged in sexual activity with her boyfriend, 
saw no alternative but to marry in order to escape the repressive sexual constraints and 
certain parental disapproval that would not only confirm but magnify her conception of 
herself as a “bad person”: 
 
    after…a short time, a year or whatever having this boyfriend, I had sex with him, and so I  
    really believed that because I had sex with him, I had to marry him. And my twin sister got   
    married to her boyfriend when she was nineteen, and I was desperate to get away from my  
    family….and my Mum in particular, and so I married my boyfriend and went to live with  
    my twin sister 
    Why were you desperate to get away from your family? 
    The control…that kind of control, and that kind of….the putting down of sexuality I guess. 
 
Gina also recognized, however, that her mother‟s perception of the sexual female body as 
dirty and sinful, and the consequent shame and secrecy between mother and daughter 
around pubertal development, had its origin in traditional patriarchal beliefs and rituals 
such as the high Anglican practice of “churching” to which her mother was subjected after 
the birth of each of her children. As Gina described it, because of her supposed sexual 
impurity, “a woman was not allowed to go outside of the home….until she‟d been 
churched, to cleanse herself after having a baby”. Deeply offended by this practice, and by 
the growing awareness that her husband expected her to conform to the traditional 
feminine role as his passive, submissive wife, Gina became “an angry feminist”, protesting 
and rejecting the feminine ideals that had shaped and constrained her mother, and 
embracing contemporary ideals of feminine independence and achievement by throwing 
herself into a nursing career. Attaining within two years the rank of highly responsible 
charge nurse, Gina carved an identity for and concept of her subjective self as a slim, 
beautiful, successful, highly competent, and therefore a good person, a concept 
strengthened by her own dislike of or indifference to sexual activity, and the ability to 
disconnect her intellectual self from anything to do with her (bad) sexual body: 
 
    Woh, I guess I ignored it, I mean I was a sexual body, I was married, and….on the times  
    where, you know times I wasn‟t remotely interested in sexuality, I didn‟t actually, I had  
    no interest, and it would become very…my husband would demand or would want sexual   
    relationship which is what married people actually do, and it actually, I remember dis- 
    connecting because, it was easier just to give in. 
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Gina thereby began to reconceive and identify her socially/professionally reconstructed 
self as a (feminist) intellect, a mind and brain, not a physical, sexually desiring body, in 
this way continuing her childhood practice of separating from and transcending her 
(naughty, bad) sexual body:  
 
    My focus was on being a good charge nurse, and actually just getting on with the job, and  
    my work, and actually just being, you know, who I was, I wasn‟t remotely interested, in even  
    looking at other people‟s sexuality -- 
    -- Because you didn‟t want to look at your own?…you didn‟t need to look at your own? 
    I don‟t know, I haven‟t a clue, I don‟t know, I mean it just wasn‟t part of my framework….  
    when you actually go for, the empowerment, and the opportunity and freedom of self, in  
    some way for me there‟s been a trade-off, from that, with the physical…a disconnect….my  
    intellect was my solace, my brain, my mind was my place. 
 
 
The integrity of Gina‟s socially reconstructed, admired, subjective self was threatened, 
however, firstly by her husband‟s perception of her as “just a stupid bloody woman” who 
should bow to his demands, and secondly, by an incident at the hospital where, as a charge 
nurse concerned by and questioning doctors‟ treatment of a terminally ill patient, Gina‟s 
actions were severely criticized, and she received a „toasting‟ from her superiors. Both of 
these threats to her subjective selfhood were ultimately resolved, with Gina leaving her 
marriage and England for a new life in New Zealand. But, in doing so, Gina left behind the 
identities that had shaped and constituted her reconstructed self, this destabilized self then 
threatening to shatter when accosted by her best friend‟s husband who - in seeing Gina as a 
slim, beautiful, now single woman - pressured her for sex. This distressing event was the 
beginning of a two-year experience of bulimia in which Gina‟s weight and size „yo-yoed‟ 
as she struggled with her appearance and sexuality: 
 
    I went on the contraceptive pill and gained some weight…. and I struggled with that weight  
    ‟n hated it, because, it was alien to me. And….then when my marriage split up, I actually, lost  
    some weight because of the emotional trauma, and stopped eating, and then, one of my best  
    friends‟ husbands came round to try „n have sex with me….and I found that very deeply  
    distressing, and so, I started off on a bulimic kind of eating to get fat again; I was never fat,  
    but I mean, perceptually fat….so that I didn‟t actually attract people, I didn't want that 
    So it was a defence mechanism? 
    Yep, mmm, and then I would hate it, and so then I would actually, lose it, not quickly, and so  
    my weight yo-yoed, for probably two years, where I was under significant emotional turmoil  
    really, based on my physical appearance and sexuality….I didn‟t want the male attention really 
    Would you say that was a way then, of attempting to desexualize yourself, to remove the male  
    gaze from you? 
    Yeah, but I still wanted to be beautiful, I didn‟t want to be ugly. 
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Here was Gina‟s quandary: she wanted to be beautiful, desirable, and thus meet social 
ideals of feminine subjectivity, but in doing so, risked losing that (asexual) subjectivity and 
identity through men‟s reduction of her self/body to a dirty, used sexual object. So to binge 
and make her body „fat‟ comforted and protected Gina from that threat to her constructed 
identity, but also threatened the ideals that gave her that identity - her beauty and slim 
sexual attractiveness: 
 
    I was binge-eating, but I‟d want to lose the weight, and so I…I was in that state for about  
    two years, easily two years, where I hated myself when I got to 62 kg, I despised myself  
    when I got there, because I knew I shouldn‟t be there….I wanted to be beautiful and I  
    wanted to be, a sexual being, but when I was a beautiful sexual being, I didn‟t like the  
    attention….yeah, it was a strong yo-yo, it went up, you know, substantial, and 5kg is not  
    much, but when you think, 5kg is a lot, up „n down „n, up „n down 5kg in a week, it‟s huge. 
 
However, Gina‟s bulimic bingeing and purging to gain and then lose weight was not 
designed to gain attention and approval from others. Rather, she experienced it as an inner 
battle to make the „bad‟ person „good‟ in Gina‟s own eyes: 
 
    But I wanted to be beautiful for me, I didn‟t want to be beautiful for other people, I wanted  
    to be beautiful for me 
    why? 
    Because, it made me feel beautiful, because, because beauty is within really isn‟t it 
    But this is surface beauty too though, isn‟t it? 
    I know, I know, but I wasn‟t distinguishing between the two 
    So by [hav]ing surface beauty meant you're beautiful within….a beautiful person, inside and  
    out? 
    Yep…and by being, physically not beautiful somehow made me not beautiful inside,  
    somehow it made me a bad person because I had a beautiful body and I was exploiting it. 
 
For the bulimic Gina, then, to purge her body, starve off her “alien” weight, and once again 
have a slim, beautiful body, inside and out, presented visible evidence and confirmation to 
herself that she was indeed a „good‟ person, and not the „bad‟ person who had allowed that 
body to be used in sexually objectifying ways that rendered it (and her) dirty and shameful. 
Gina‟s bulimia was therefore not about a fear or fatness or a desire for slimness per se, but 
about comforting, protecting, purifying, beautifying, and thus redeeming and reforming her 
real, bad, sexual female self and body, in the face of a shattering of her socially 
reconstructed self/identity: 
 
    So it wasn‟t fatness that was the issue? 
    So it wasn‟t fatness, no, no it wasn‟t…but, it was a comfort too, food was a comfort, and so I  
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    think comfort eating, and then, um, that, that awful sexuality thing where I didn‟t want to  
    be too attractive either, but yet when I gained weight I hated it, and so I had this rebound,  
    backwards and forwards, backwards and forwards.   
 
 
 
                                                  
                                     
                                          Figure 14:                    Rebound                 (Lewie)       
    
Gina‟s bulimia ceased when, having settled in New Zealand and gained employment 
with a pharmaceutical company, she met and married „M‟, and thus found herself in a 
stable and loving relationship with a man who, in being “tolerant and gentle and kind, 
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and actually quite feminine I guess”, allowed Gina to reconstruct and maintain (a 
identity/concept of) herself as an active, intellectual self or person. This self was again 
threatened, however, with the births of her (4) children, and Gina‟s withdrawal from the 
public sphere into full-time mothering; a withdrawal that plunged her into what, on 
reflection, she recognized as post-natal depression involving a feeling of numbed 
detachment and, initially, a deep resentment towards and separation from her children: 
 
    It was a very tough time…and then I ended up pregnant with my third child….and so life 
    was a blur really. I look back and I think I suffered some post-natal depression but was  
    undiagnosed, and these dark clouds of gloom, you know, and then I got, deeply resentful,  
    that my husband was going out to work and I was staying home looking after these monsters,  
    and, you know, I was in a sort of robotic state…. that depression, that dark cloud of just  
    darkness really, I blamed the children for that….I mean it was just this sense of hopelessness,  
    this sense of no, um, future. 
 
Gina relates this sense of hopelessness and lack of a future to a feeling of complete loss of 
her (real) self as a person, as her socially reconstructed self again disintegrated, and she 
became defined only in relation to her husband and children - as a struggling, resentful, 
robotic wife and mother: 
 
    I was lost…completely, I mean, as a person….I didn‟t know what I wanted, I didn‟t know  
    why I wanted anything, I don‟t think I wanted anything, I think I was just, in a sense of  
    numbness really 
    Could you….call it a loss of connection to the self that you had been before? 
    I don‟t know, I think who I‟d been before was socially constructed, and so to lose that wasn‟t  
    actually a problem, because, I guess…I was probably hoping to find myself through children 
    ….I don‟t know if I‟d found myself to lose it, I don‟t know if I‟d ever had it, and maybe the  
    sense of the dark cloud was having never had it…. I‟d never been seen as self….I had always,  
    had to do what other people wanted me to do.    
 
Although anti-religious, it was through reading A Course in Miracles
81
 that Gina ultimately 
did develop a sense of her self as a spiritual being that, disentangled from social 
expectations, constraints, and her own resentments, “just learnt to be, and just to accept”, 
and thus to live and experience life without judgement. With her family returning to 
Britain for a year, Gina re-entered the public workforce, only to realize that, while perhaps 
necessary, the feminist drive for equality was also denying her what she most desired: the 
enjoyment of mothering her own children. Back in New Zealand, Gina therefore returned 
to fulltime mothering, seeking to re-establish the bonds with her children by home-
                                                 
81
A Course in Miracles was written by Helen Schucman (1975), who claimed that it had been dictated to her 
by Jesus. The miracles are based on forgiveness, as the change of mind that makes love possible. 
 205 
schooling them for six years, until, fearing that she may become an “empty shell”, Gina 
sought to nourish the self within by redirecting her life away from motherhood and toward 
academic study. In this way, Gina reconceived, reconstructed and experienced her self as a 
spiritual and intellectual mind existing predominantly within her head, her asexual body 
now simply a „vehicle‟ on which to transport that head/mind:      
 
    Well [my body] is a vehicle with which to get my mind around…I mean it carries my mind 
    Could it be a trolley that you put your head on? 
    Yeah (laughter)…yeah, could be 
    But….do your sexual parts as female parts….shape you as a mind? 
    No… I don‟t, maybe I…(sigh) they have shaped me as a mind because they have given me  
    the experiences that I‟ve had, in raising four children, and being a friend of „M‟, right, but I  
    wouldn‟t say, um, I mean I guess I still disconnect it, *even now, I disconnect sexuality from  
    who I am*. 
 
 
For Gina, then, her good, acceptable self was an asexual, spiritual mind/intellect and body 
disconnected from sexual female parts that she had so thoroughly learnt to perceive as 
smutty, naughty, shameful and bad that when, as a 32-year-old happily married woman, 
Gina first became pregnant, she couldn‟t tell her mother: 
 
    I daren't tell my mother, because, to tell my mother would‟ve been to have admitted that I'd  
    had sex, and I couldn't, I was frightened to tell her, and I was married, and thirty-two years  
    old, and I daren't tell her. Now that's dysfunctional, but that's because I didn't want her  
    disapproval for having sex   
 
Thus, both Gina and Lewie sought to hide or otherwise escape from their (bad) sexual 
female self/body in order to construct and maintain a socially, spiritually or self-approved 
identity as a good (subjective) self, an escape that both agreed could therefore be seen as a 
means of survival. But for Gina, now in her fifties, the maintenance of this good, stable, 
recognized, loved spiritual/intellectual self has also brought feelings of loss and nostalgia 
for the sensual, submissively feminine (potentially bad) aspects of her self, sacrificed in 
order to attain, maintain, and protect its existence. Similar strategies of reformation, 
protection and survival of the real (bad, fragmented) sexual female self were also 
employed by Gorgie and her daughter Sunshine.    
 
For Gorgie, the realization that her father and brothers were now seeing her pubertal 
female self as different from, inferior to, and weaker than themselves, resulting in her 
exclusion from their sport- and game-playing, and the sudden need to focus on her 
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appearance, meant the even more shocking realization that Gorgie could no longer be, and 
be seen and loved unconditionally for, who she was. Instead, she would now have to 
remodel herself to meet paternal ideals and expectations of appearance and achievement if 
she was to be, and be recognized and loved by him as, a good girl; expectations requiring 
that she groom herself, be femininely attractive to boys, be a mother to her brothers, and 
play (and succeed at) girlish sports such as tennis, rather than the more important cricket 
and rugby she had always (and equally) played with her brothers: 
 
    Yeah, you couldn‟t play with them….so I had to go off „n play tennis, ok, so it was sort of  
    like I was separated from them…so I took up tennis….I felt incredibly separated, you know  
    like, the seriousness was the rugby „n cricket, and „now you go off „n do what you need to do‟. 
 
However, the incestuous abuse that Gorgie had endured since the age of nine (and of which 
she knew her stepmother was aware), meant that she could feel only a shame, guilt and fear 
of exposure that led to a splitting and withdrawal of her real (sexual) self and a 
fragmenting, hiding and numbing of the sexual female body that she had come to see as 
dirty and bad.  
 
 
                                
                                Figure 15:                                                                    (Kayla) 
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This, along with the growing awareness of her boyishly androgynous appearance, meant 
that, for Gorgie, shapely feminine attractiveness was an ideal that she simply could not 
attain: 
  
    I distinctly remember, not feeling comfortable in my developing body, I just didn‟t, I didn‟t  
    know how to…I didn‟t like it…I felt incredibly uncomfortable growing up as a woman,  
    growing up as a maturing….turning into a woman…I certainly didn‟t like showing my  
    breasts around my brothers 
 
    you‟re getting a sort of a picture of what everyone considers is beautiful, and you‟d think  
    „well I‟m not like that‟, and then you‟re starting to think „well if they‟re beautiful, what am  
    I?‟, and then you‟re starting to develop a picture of yourself through other people‟s eyes, of  
    your inadequacies.    
 
The ideally reconstructed self that Gorgie hoped to present to her father would therefore be 
based not on appearance, but on the achievements of the fit and talented sporty self that 
Gorgie had always loved, and that had always made her feel good about her self. If she 
couldn‟t be beautiful in the eyes of her father and others, then at least she could show her 
prowess on the tennis court and sports-field. And if Gorgie could assume the identity of the 
good „athlete‟, then she did not need to see or acknowledge her sexual female self/body. 
As she put it, “I just saw myself as, an athlete…ok, so I didn‟t have to be a woman, I didn‟t 
have to be a man, I could be an athlete”. 
 
But when Gorgie actually entered the sporting arena, she found that the growing sense of 
guilt, shame, secrecy, and thus isolation felt around her secreted sexual female self and 
body, together with the fear of failure and consequent loss of approval and love, eroded 
confidence in her sporting abilities: “I lost my confidence in my own ability, I didn‟t want 
to be noticed anymore ….I didn‟t like getting out there and being in front of people 
anymore”. Thus, this fear-fuelled loss of confidence self-fulfillingly resulted in Gorgie‟s 
actual failure to perform, bringing the devastating realization that she could not meet her 
father‟s expectations, whether of form or performance: 
 
    Our relationship had changed…it went from being one where I just knew he loved me for  
    who I was, to one where I had to earn it, and I always felt I was disappointing him….I    
    remember when I lost a tennis match, and I could see his disappointment, ‟n I thought „Dad  
    can‟t you see my dungery ol‟ racquet?‟, and „look at my crappy ol‟ shoes‟…but it was like  
    he couldn‟t see it, all he saw was that I was failing him…at sport, at school, my looks…‟n I  
    couldn‟t tell him what was happening to me [K‟s abuse], or how it was affecting me…all I  
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    knew was „Dad, I can‟t be who you want me to be anymore‟…it was like all my dreams had  
    gone. 
 
Unable to re-imagine or re-present her self in the pleasing, sexually attractive but also 
„lady-like‟ form and manner expected of her, Gorgie became awkward and self-conscious 
about her appearance and movements in a way that completely undermined her sporting 
abilities and identity, thereby producing a total loss of connection to her real (sexual) self, 
and a failure and disintegration of the reconstructed (sporty) self: 
 
    I didn‟t feel comfortable with who I, I‟d lost who I was, I‟d lost feeling good about myself,  
    and no one came in my life to make me feel good about myself.…my body all of a sudden  
    became, it didn‟t matter how successful you were….you were being judged on how you  
    appeared, and I didn‟t know how to appear anymore…. even on the sports field, I didn‟t  
    want to be noticed….I became awkward and self-conscious….incredible really, it was like 
    I sabotaged myself all the time. 
 
 
Aware that it was her imperfect, shamefully and guiltily sexual female body that had 
brought the loss of and inability to regain (the recognition/love of) not only her real, whole 
self, but also her reconstructed self, the teenage Gorgie turned within, resorting to two self-
reconstructive strategies that, on reflection, she saw as means of protection and survival. 
Firstly, Gorgie created for herself a story or a fantasy world of perfection, into which she 
could retreat at bedtime, and particularly if weighed down with problems. In this perfect 
world, Gorgie assumed what she saw as the perfect form: that of a boy, who was always 
going on adventures, and, though he might make mistakes, remained perfect to, and loved 
and forgiven by, his perfect mother: 
 
    If I had troubles, like if I had an upsetting day, for example, and then I thought, I can‟t sleep,  
    so I knew.…that I could put myself into a story. So things that were pleasant…like I‟d see  
    something, even the Sound of Music or, the Partridge Family (laughter)…all these sort of  
    things.…I'd think that was perfect 
    The perfect family?…the perfect mother -- 
    -- No, the perfect mother…ok, the perfect mother. So that could be, I would be the person  
    being nurtured by the perfect mother….and so that, was the perfect story, for me. But I was  
    always, like I said, a boy…ok, so….if I could put myself in that story, and have wonderful  
    adventures….I could go to sleep, and that would stop me from thinking negative thoughts 
    
    do you think you did want to be a boy?…or -- 
    -- No, I just….I knew who I really was, I was a woman, or a, a girl, I was a teenage…I knew 
    really what I was, it‟s just that, I felt…that wasn‟t perfect, I wasn‟t the sort of…the ideal….as  
    a boy, I was perfect…so if I did something wrong, I was still me…I still existed…but as a girl,  
    or a woman, I felt that if I did something wrong, *I wouldn‟t be me anymore…wouldn‟t exist*. 
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Gorgie held on to this fantasy of the perfect form and existence throughout her adult years. 
And so, despite marriage at twenty, the birth of three children, divorce after twenty-two 
years, and then setting out to find her self and explore an up until then unrecognized 
attraction to women, she continued to inwardly imagine her subjective self as the active, 
adventurous ten-year-old boy who, no matter what he did, knew that - being male, and 
therefore „perfect‟ - he would always exist within the recognition and love of his mother:  
 
    You‟re starting to doubt yourself, you know, you‟re doubting your future, you‟re doubting  
    everything, where do you fit?.…as Sal Mineo, you didn‟t enter this different part of your  
    life, you stayed…it was Peter Pan, you don‟t want to grow up…that‟s what it was.     
 
 
Gorgie‟s other self-reconstructive strategy of survival, initiated when - at seventeen and at 
her stepmother‟s behest - Gorgie was forced to move away from her family and into a 
small, solitary flat, was to enter a phase of orthorexia. Having lost her father‟s recognition 
and love, and feeling alienated from her brothers, Gorgie developed a fanatical desire to eat 
only the most tasteless and disgusting „health‟ foods, perceived as a means of keeping her 
self and body safe and well. In retrospect, however, Gorgie further related her orthorexic 
behaviour to having come to see her failed, rejected self as unattractive and unlikeable, and 
therefore having to be sexual to be liked and accepted, even though to do so left her feeling 
dirty, bad, and unable to face the boy again. 
         
 
            
             Figure 16:                                                                                                                   (Kayla) 
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Living alone and now able to control what she ate, food became the means with which to 
cleanse, purify, protect, and thus make „good‟ again Gorgie‟s bad sexual self; the self that, 
deep down, she liked and wanted to survive: 
 
    [Being] sexual with men….was being something I didn‟t really want to be, but I didn‟t know  
    you could be anything else. I didn‟t want to go through life on my own, I didn‟t see any  
    alternatives, and so I had to be what I felt terribly uncomfortable being. But one thing I could  
    be, was very protective of what I ate…it was like, this is what I can do….I can only eat what I 
    feel is good for you….it was like I could feel good about my body because I‟m eating well 
 
    I was so fanatical about it, and I mean I was fanatical, that I ate food, that was bloody  
    ^horrible…like wheatgerm and, and soaked soy beans overnight, and put them in my  
    ^porridge, and they tasted ^hideous…. but the pleasure was the fact that I was, a bit like a  
    martyr or something…I‟m eating something, it doesn‟t taste very nice…. tell me what health  
    food‟s nice…it‟s like „gulp…ahhh‟, you know, but I‟ve had it…and that‟s how I lived…  
    „ughhh, I‟ve had it‟. 
 
Health food, then, was the “yucky” medicine that would cleanse, purify, redeem, and thus 
sustain Gorgie‟s real (but bad, sexual) self. Even tasty “junk” foods became a path to 
redemption, by serving as a means to punish, reward, and thus control, the sexually 
uncontrolled self. For, in her own secret, martyrish rituals, Gorgie would punitively deny 
her self one treat, only to later reward it with another, thereby making the bad self good, 
and thus ensuring its survival:  
 
    I‟d completely bar myself from potato chips or something like that, no way, no potato chips.  
    But I‟d say, oh you know, „it‟s alright to have a bit of chocolate though‟….so you‟re giving  
    yourself pleasure in other ways…like you control, and then you give yourself pleasure 
 
    Well, it was a way of saying „hey, I do deep down love my body…I want to love my body,  
    but no one else knows…it‟s my ^secret…and I‟m going to look after my body, and I‟m not  
    goin‟ to get sick, „cause I do love my body, „cause I love what it does on the sports field, I  
    love it. 
 
Even after Gorgie sought and found a measure of safety and security within marriage and 
motherhood, with the identities of good, successful and independent „wife‟, „mother‟ and 
„sportswoman‟ creating a socially acceptable (and for Gorgie, an asexual) form and 
concept of her (subjective) self, these secret strategies for survival of the real, secreted self 
continued. For the price paid for the „safe‟ identity and existence of her socially 
reconstructed self was marital sex and the consequent feelings of dislike, badness, secrecy 
and shame; a price that Gorgie paid only with the assistance of her perfect story, and 
ongoing orthorexic rituals of cleansing, control, punishment and purification:  
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    Being sexual was, like you always felt that you weren‟t supposed to be doing it, you know, 
    there was nothing open or joyful about it 
    So, it was a necessity? 
    It was a necessity, yeah, it was thinking, I really like this person, he‟s a guy, and to keep him,  
    I‟m going to have to be sexual, it‟s as simple as that. So….that‟s how our relationship was … 
    that I have to be sexual to keep him. 
 
Being sexual also resulted in the birth of Gorgie‟s first child, her daughter Sunshine, and in 
finally feeling her numbed self bond with Sunshine, Gorgie felt the pure mother/child love 
that she remembered from earliest childhood, and had since experienced only within her 
perfect story. As Sunshine grew, however, Gorgie found herself imposing the same 
feminine ideals (of appearance and sporting achievement) onto her daughter that she 
herself had wanted so desperately to fulfil: 
 
    I could lose myself in her, totally….like the attention came onto Sunshine….and so life  
    became very easy…I no longer had to worry about myself.…totally obsessed with her  
    development, and how she‟s gonna be, I‟d love her like I wanted to be loved….and for her  
    to be who I could never be….she was going to be a beautiful sportswoman off „n on the  
    field…she was going to be great at sport and she was going to be so confident off the field,  
    and she was going to be loved by everybody, „cause everybody‟s going to see who she is 
    ….I wanted her to show her body, I wanted her to feel good about her body.         
 
 
With the birth of her two boys, Gorgie threw herself into the role and identity of the perfect 
sporting mother, and as the need and willingness to give up her body for sex lessened, so 
did her orthorexic fanaticism, though the need to eat in a healthy and restrained way, and 
thus, a feeling of guilt in consuming what was „bad‟ for her, still persists. And although 
Sunshine was beautiful, and did excel at sport, as an adolescent she learned from her 
father/coach that she could never be good enough to win and keep his love and approval; 
whilst from her mother, she learned that, no matter how close they‟d once been, anything 
to do with the sexual female body and sexuality was to remain unseen and unspoken. Thus, 
when Sunshine turned to boys for love, affection, and approval, her active, exuberant 
feminine self was violated and shattered, as Gorgie‟s had been: 
 
    She would‟ve picked up the fact of the silence…but also picked up my look of saying  
    „Sunshine, you look good, you look beautiful…you look desirable‟….You‟ll be picked up,  
    but be in control of it, don‟t let anyone take it from you….but someone did take it off her  
    obviously…I don‟t know, she‟s never told me her story, but something terrible happened.…  
    someone took, and destroyed…what she thought that she could show, and no one would harm  
    her…I should‟ve given her the warning signs, I never told her, because I was reluctant to talk  
    about it. 
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It was only when Gorgie‟s husband ended their marriage, thereby shattering her seemingly 
safe, secure identity as wife and mother that Gorgie set out to find, or release from within, 
her real self. Having, since her teens, remained alienated from and blind to that sexual 
female self/body, it was through developing loving friendships with women, and later 
venturing into two lesbian relationships, that Gorgie was able to begin acknowledging, 
exploring, and expressing her own previously suppressed, numbed desires, feelings, 
thoughts and sensations from within a mind and body that she is learning to once again 
experience as wholly integrated, sensually female, and able to freely give and receive 
unconditional love: 
 
    Yeah, you keep hold of something of yourself, that one day you hope that you‟ll be able to  
    restore….because you can't completely lose yourself, otherwise you‟re completely….you‟d  
    never be able to come back Jane, and that‟s madness, when you can never come back. So you  
    kinda hold on to something, and that‟s why I‟ve come back, because I‟ve actually held on to  
    that sporty person. 
 
    I wanted to be a, a woman, be feminine, and play sport and be a sensual being…which I  
    didn‟t even know what that was, but that was me, I wanted to be loved and admired for  
    who I was. 
 
It was in beginning to rediscover, be, express, and therefore be seen and loved (by her 
current partner) for who she was - an active, thoughtful, sensual, sexual woman who was 
always already perfect - that Gorgie was finally able to relinquish her fantasy of being the 
perfect (boy) child. As she put it, “I got to a point where I could drop that, you know, and 
then I could just, be me”. 
 
In a final interview with Gorgie, around three years after the first,
82
 she described the 
changes in her self (-concept) over that time as follows: 
 
    Well, I‟m not in front of myself, protecting myself anymore….I‟m not putting….this thing  
    in front of me, which was me, ok…you‟re only going to know so much, I‟m going to stand  
    back, you know…I‟m actually behind myself now  
    Behind yourself? 
    Yeah my body‟s in front of me. I‟m….basically I‟m looking [out] from myself….that‟s the  
    huge difference - that I can feel that it‟s me…it‟s me out there….the thing that I didn‟t want  
    people to look at, is what I want them to look at now, is my face, ok…that‟s what I want  
    people to look at, I want people to look at my eyes, I want people to look into me now     
 
                                                 
82
The time lapse between interviews was because Gorgie was first interviewed for a social science research  
project (on the same topic) conducted in 2007 under Dr John Patterson (UoW), that interview then 
becoming the basis for the later interviews with Gorgie as a participant in the current research.  
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    What I am saying is that, if we all lined up in a cardboard box naked, I would say that I‟m a  
    good person… „look at me, I‟m a good person, you know, I really…I‟m worth a chance‟.    
  
What has also changed during that time is Gorgie‟s relationship to her daughter Sunshine.  
 
For Sunshine, the pubertal fragmentation and social alienation of her previously whole, 
active, intelligent, sporty child self - firstly, through a withdrawal of affection and approval 
from her father, and a loss of school friendships through several relocations, and secondly, 
through the later awareness that anything to do with her sexual female self/body was taboo 
- brought the realization that she must now strive to be and re-present her self as a good 
person to gain the recognition and love of parents and peers. Like her mother before her, it 
was the sporty aspect of her real self that Sunshine retained, and around which she 
constructed an adolescent persona or identity as an active, talented, successful subjective 
self that would hopefully meet her parents‟ sporting ideals and expectations, particularly 
those of her father coach. For as Sunshine quickly learnt, the consequences of not meeting 
his expectations were criticism and public humiliation:  
 
    I was really hard on myself, and I wanted to always win, but Dad was horrible….he was the  
    most, I think 'cause he tried to overcompensate 'cause I was his daughter that he was the  
    toughest on me, and he….made me cry…yeah…he made me cry, and I ^think he did the  
    same to Mum…he was real harsh on like Mum when she played sport.…maybe he strived for  
    perfection and could see the ability in us to be better, but when you‟re around your peers… 
 
 
Now needing to excel in the game she loved in order to avoid punishment and humiliation, 
Sunshine developed a fear of making mistakes and failing that inevitably led to failure, loss 
of enjoyment, and the feeling that she would never be good enough to attain her father‟s 
love, a feeling that continued into adulthood; 
 
    I‟d become so competitive, I hated making errors in my self, and that‟s from Dad. I‟d get real  
    hacked off if I‟d made a mistake and I sort of forgot the enjoyment of it for a long time….   
    [my brother] used to come and watch sport, and, he would hide, because he was scared of me  
    making a mistake, and he was scared that Dad would yell at me….And he wouldn‟t just yell  
    …he would scream…. I‟m never going to win probably in Dad‟s eyes, I‟m always going to be 
    …I dunno whether this is an excuse, I lost the enjoyment of it, and it just becomes hard work. 
 
With loss of hope of regaining her father‟s (intersubjective) recognition, love and approval, 
and feeling alienated from her team-mates, Sunshine‟s sporting persona collapsed. No 
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longer knowing who she was, whom she wanted to please, or how to please them, she 
turned from parents to peers and set about (re)building a recognized, approved social 
identity based not on sporting ability or achievements, but on her sexual attractiveness and 
ability to socialize: 
 
    You‟re trying so hard to be good, and never quite sort of there, and in the end, I was like   
    …maybe that‟s what hurt Dad the most, was that I had stopped playing volleyball…he  
    had all these big dreams for me, and I said no 
 
    [Mum and I] were good sportswomen…and yet you look at it and think, we never both  
    carried it through, Mum had children, I stopped playing…and I started drinking and  
    socializing and it was like, you know what? I have done this my whole life…pretending to  
    be… winning…and all it does is not bring very much happiness at the moment anyway.  
 
For Sunshine, this social and sexual persona meant a further reason for secrecy and (both 
psychic and physical) separation from her mother Gorgie, due to the latter‟s inability to 
acknowledge even her own sexual body, let alone Sunshine‟s.83 Sunshine‟s naivety about 
the possible consequences of being (seen as) an attractive, sexually desirable young 
woman, along with her desire to be liked, loved and given the affection she craved, 
resulted in an act of sexual violation, that, as stated earlier, brought a shattering of the 
social persona, a withdrawal and loss of self, and a conceptual and perceptual “splitting” of 
the head/mind from sexually defiled, fragmented body. As Gorgie described the psychic 
and visible effects of this experience: 
 
    Sun became terribly withdrawn…became incredibly withdrawn…I didn‟t recognize her.  
    When I picked her up at the airport, I never recognized my child. I thought „who is this  
    person‟ you know, she was shaking, her hands were like that (shakes)…she was like a punk  
    rocker…and smoking, and she stayed in bed, ‟n wouldn‟t get out of bed…‟n she was just a  
    complete, shell…of this vibrant, beautiful girl that went off, with a crew-cut, she went this  
    healthy, strong, beautiful girl. 
 
Her real and social selves shattered, and her self-controlled, sexual body taken and reduced 
to a headless, mindless object/hole of defilement, Sunshine returned home and 
subsequently entered a phase of fanatical exercise and restrained eating that developed, in 
her early twenties, into what she recognized then, and in the interview, as anorexia. 
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 See pages 174 and 211 for accounts of the rift that occurred between Gorgie and Sunshine due to the 
unspoken communication from mother to daughter that the sexual female body and sexuality was dirty, 
shameful, bad, and thus, to be kept hidden, and always under one's control.  
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                           Figure 17:                                                                    (Kayla) 
 
 
Having always been slim, fit and athletic, dieting had never been an issue for Sunshine, 
and so, as she experienced it, anorexia was not about slimness or weight-loss per se, but 
about the “control” and purification of her “bad” sexual self/body. And, as Sunshine 
described it, the motivation for this need to control and purify was the feeling of a loss of 
control of her own self (and life) that arose from a failure to gain her parents‟ (now 
conditional) recognition, love and approval, followed by the exacerbation of this loss of 
control through sexual violation and its fragmentation, separation (from head/self), and 
utter degradation of her sexual female self/body: 
 
    It was after what happened in Australia, and all that back in my whole teenage years, and,  
    at 19, I came back, and I just got addicted to the gym…it was like, I was purifying....But it  
    was like I was putting all those last seven years - from 12 to 18 - and going, I‟m taking  
    control of my life again   
    
    Like, erasing the effects of that, and, by erasing them, trying to get back some sense of self? 
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    Yeah…yeah….that‟s when it became an isolation, trying to separate and control, because  
    beforehand it was a mental thing. It was trying to like…I was worried about someone else  
    and not being good enough…trying to please your parents 
 
    Well [Mum] used [food] as a way to purify, I used it as a form of, something you can  
    control…with food… you could control your intake…like I‟d say „oh my gosh I only had  
    this today‟, and I could remember what I ate…it was like, control. 
 
 
For Sunshine, the anorexic control of mind and body had several characteristics that 
separated and distinguished it from the parentally/socially directed control over her self 
and its performance and appearance, and thus, the recognition, love and approval from 
others that she‟d pursued in adolescence. Firstly, Sunshine‟s anorexic pursuit of control 
occurred as a consequence of her not only failing to attain paternal/parental recognition 
and approval, but also then walking away from that pursuit:  
  
    I think I gave up on my parents‟ approval though…Dad was by this stage pretty much  
    overseas…I remember going over to South Africa for my 20th birthday, and, it was  
    almost like he‟d forgotten and didn‟t want to talk about the past.    
 
Secondly, the control of the self/body imposed through the restraint and denial of eating 
was perceived and experienced as a „battle‟ within and with her self/body, in which the 
conscious self or „I‟ must constantly strive to make the „bad‟ self/body good:   
 
    There‟s no outside factors, you‟re doing the whole thing, there‟s no extran…outside forces,  
    you‟re in your own little bubble 
    Would you say that, all the outside forces.…you talked about seeing yourself through other  
    people‟s eyes…do you think that‟s a way of pushing that [away] -- 
    -- Yeah…well in a way, it was just me, and the control of not eating….The battle is that I‟m  
    in control of whether I eat or not…I‟m in the battle with myself, between myself and…  
    myself!….that‟s what it feels like, so it‟s like, „you‟re not going to eat‟. 
  
Thirdly, in this internal battle for purified goodness, the controlling (subjective) self set her 
own standards by which to measure the attainment (or not) of goodness by the bad sexual 
self, and was therefore no longer aspiring to paternal/social ideals of goodness or 
perfection of form (e.g. slender sexual attractiveness, beauty, compliance, ability, etc.): 
 
    Yeah, it‟s funny how….instead of [thinking] „I‟m a bad girl for losing…for being way  
    underweight‟…you‟d think that‟d be terrible for me, but no…you feel good, you feel clean,  
    you feel….Yes, it‟s like you feel sort of exalt…exalted?….and I‟m horrified if I‟ve put on  
    like a kilogram…I feel down, I feel fat, I feel bloated, I feel dirty and ^depressed 
    Yes…dirty and depressed is the bad girl. So, would you say then, when you say „I‟m in  
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    control, I‟ve won the battle‟, it‟s the battle between your bad and your good self? 
    Yes  
    And you‟ve taken control, no one else can say whether you‟re bad or good anymore? 
    Yeah, that‟s it, because it‟s like the battle is between myself…not between anyone else….I  
    don‟t need any outside forces…to control, or to please…I‟m pleasing myself by losing the  
    weight. 
 
Sunshine‟s own standard of goodness was the ability to attain and exhibit a daily measure 
of control, purification, and self-denial through the ritualized monitoring and regulation of 
food intake, the constant loss of weight, an often-punishing exercise regime, and internal 
cleansing through laxative-use. And her success in meeting these standards of goodness or 
perfection was evidenced and measured by the amount of weight and size lost each day, 
and thus, the degree of protrusion of ribs or other bones: 
 
 
                                
                               Figure 18:                                                                (Kayla) 
   
 
    It‟s sort of like, you become quite detached…like I wouldn‟t look at my face…I‟d look at  
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    the bones, sticking out…I‟d look at the collar bone, but I never looked at, like anything  
    ^personal -- 
    -- You didn‟t look yourself in the eye? 
    No, but I‟d look at my ribs, and then I‟d look at -- 
    -- For a sign of success? 
    Yeah, but I‟d never look at my face. 
 
The fourth difference, then, between Sunshine‟s anorexic battle and the preceding pursuit 
of parentally or socially imposed ideals of feminine form/function was that the anorexic 
standards and perceptual evidence of goodness did not focus on the face or its appearance. 
Rather, in reflecting and reacting to the violation-based separation of head/person from 
fragmented, defiled sexual body that Sunshine had experienced (and to which she found 
analogy in The Handmaid‟s Tale), the anorexic standards and search for evidence of 
control, purification, punishment, and goodness focused only on the body and (erasure of) 
its bad sexual and other parts: 
 
    [In The Handmaid‟s Tale], when they have sex….you don‟t see the face, so it doesn‟t become   
    personal….so it‟s all detached, like the body‟s split…and it‟s purely just to reproduce  
    [So] it‟s totally about the sexual objectification of a woman, and the idea that you are no  
    longer a person… 
    Yeah 
    And is that how you would‟ve felt? 
    Yeah…you don‟t…it was…strange 
 
    And, if I do this to my body…this is what you‟ve made my body, if I do this to it, if I erase or  
    remove the sexual bits, I won‟t be that any more? 
    Yeah…yeah….anorexia‟s a form of self-mutilation….it was the ribs….the body was  
    important ….my face just wasn‟t important to me…it became, I guess, too personal, I didn‟t  
    want to look at myself in the eye, because I think deep down I probably knew I was doing  
    something wrong with controlling myself…. it was like you just looked at everything else,  
    just to get that detached  …*yes!*…the bone…it was almost like a detached feeling. 
 
By looking only at the body and its mutilated, erased sexual parts and protruding bony 
parts, and not at the face or the person behind it, the controlling self obtained visual 
evidence of a fragmented detachment of „bad‟ sexual female body from „good‟ head/self, 
and of „bad‟ impurely sexual, fleshy, bloody parts from „good‟ desexualized, cleansed, 
purified, bony parts. 
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                                   Figure 19:                                                       (Kayla) 
 
Fifthly, this internal battle for goodness and self-approval - through achievement of the 
ideal form - was constant and ongoing; goodness could never be finally attained and kept, 
but was, with each new day, to be pursued and won anew: 
 
    I think when you look in the mirror, you don‟t see what other people see…you still see like  
    that ideal thing that you wanna see, it‟s that battle that you‟re winning, and so you still see  
    your self, like you can understand, but you‟re still seeing your self 
    So could you say, you can never be good enough? 
    No….that‟s why you control your food, you‟ve got to constantly do that to be winning, you  
    can‟t just say stop, or what are you fighting for, you know, what do you do, it‟s like you‟re  
    blocked…it‟s your fault 
     
    If you can never escape that image of the bad girl, then you can never stop, because then  
    you will  be the bad girl, is that what you‟re saying? 
    Yeah, and that‟s the whole point with this battle…is that you constantly want to be better, so  
    it‟s like you‟re purifying, it‟s like you‟re keeping in control, and you want to forget about  
    everything else, and you‟ve got this control of what‟s happening and then you stop…and it‟s  
    like, then that bad girl‟s come back. 
 
Sixthly, in contrast to the recognition and praise received for the extreme pursuit of 
parental/social ideals, if the anorexic control and purification of the bad sexual body went 
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too far, and too much weight, size and strength lost, then Sunshine began to perceive her 
reformed self and body as visibly out of control, ill, and therefore as „dirty‟ to others: 
 
    It was like there was an equilibrium, a point when I was in control, in control of my weight,  
    and I could control what I ate, but if I got too thin, it was like I was out of control…cos I‟d  
    start getting flushes and dizzy spells, and it was like I was losing control….suddenly you  
    come back really dangerously thin, and it‟s like „oh my god no…I don‟t want to know‟  
    …you‟ve suddenly become dirty to them. 
 
Seventhly, Sunshine retrospectively understood her anorexia as expressing a sense of loss 
of, and a deep desire to become again, the whole, self-knowing, self-directed, 
unconditionally loved child that she once was, and to thus experience again the simplicity 
of that life, as opposed to the fragmentation, confusion, alienation, and trauma of her 
teenage years:  
 
    there were so many things going on with sport 'n volleyball 'n friends 'n parents…I became  
    so lost, it was trying to…like I was out of control in so many different ways 
     
    Does that make any sense to you, the idea that (anorexia) is a way of going back to who you  
    were as a child, when you could just be who you were and be loved for it? 
    Yeah…I‟d agree with that. I‟d say it was definitely a way of me…definitely, simplifying  
    things…to me, the control of food meant you didn‟t have to think about other things, you  
    know, you thought about just the things you wanted to think about, like food…you had  
    more control of yourself 
 
    I think I spent my whole life in my twenties trying to get that feeling back of when I was 5  
    or 6, that same sense of…and it‟s not there, 'cause it‟s never going to be there. 
 
And lastly, for Sunshine, the anorexic battle to be the controlled, desexualized, purified, re-
formed child again was, in effect, a battle for the survival of the real self. For, to give up 
the battle would have meant a loss of hope of ever being good enough to subjectively exist 
and thus be recognized, known, and loved again. And in this case, the real may be 
preferable to the living death of the self: 
 
    Well, it keeps your sanity…like, I have no idea what I‟m doing in life, but in this small  
    aspect, I can, and it ended up being a huge thing though, because suddenly it affects other  
    things because I wanted to be thin, and so I was managing the effects of it, and so it became  
    the whole part of who I was 
 
    The girls that die from anorexia, would you agree that you could see it as a total loss of  
    hope? 
    Yeah…they can never get there, yeah….Your body just gives out…your body can‟t cope…  
    it‟s not just the physical, I think it‟s the mental. Your body just can‟t cope with the failure  
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    of never going to be.…it‟s like the mind gives up, the body gives up, cos it‟s all connected,  
    that‟s what I believe. Like, everything‟s a living entity, and if your mind, and your heart… 
    it‟s not just a beating thing, it also controls, what you don‟t…if you have this realization that  
    you‟re never going to get there, no matter how much you try and be in control of it; you try  
    and be good, but you‟re never going to be good enough, then your whole body will just… 
    
    So in a way, it was a survival mechanism, to say, „I can‟t achieve what you want me to do; I  
    can‟t be who you want me to be, I‟m tired of trying…but I want to be good, I want to like  
    myself, I want somewhere that I can exist and be happy with who I am 
    Yeah…yeah…and that‟s it. 
 
         
   
   Figure 20:                                                                                                                  (Kayla) 
 
Her originally whole subjective female self reduced to little more than a bundle of dirty, 
bad, used and abused sexual parts, Sunshine found in anorexia the hope and means of 
redeeming and re-forming that self by purifying, punishing, and ultimately erasing those 
sexual female parts, and reconstructing herself as a once again whole, asexual, childlike 
person who, in being „good enough‟ to earn a measure of self-recognition, -love and  
-approval, sustained her own existence.    
 
Although Gorgie encouraged Sunshine into a return to volleyball playing and sports 
coaching, her physical weakness, loss of spirit, and lingering fear of failure meant that she 
could not, or lacked the will to, pursue or achieve success. This realization, along with the 
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sense of alienation from her father, and the ongoing inability of Gorgie and Sunshine to be, 
express and connect as real, sexual, womanly selves meant that Sunshine sought safety and 
security in relationships with men who might give her a stable social identity and a sense 
of her self as loved and protected. Travelling the world with her boyfriend „S‟, and needing 
an income, Sunshine put to use her (hetero)sexual attractiveness and desirability by 
working as a stripper in a high-class Japanese night-club. Protected by bouncers and paid 
well to perform, Sunshine found here what she had always yearned for - friendship and 
camaraderie with the other women. And, while admitting she would not have done this 
work in New Zealand, Sunshine enjoyed a sense of control over her own feminine body 
and life, and a power over the male customers that gave her a (albeit temporary and 
imitative) measure of boyishly subjectified identity and existence: 
 
    It was like…power…these men desire you, you get naked, no one knows you…I would never 
    dream of doing this in New Zealand. „S‟ thought it was the sexiest thing in the whole world,  
    so I was in control of the relationship…I was in control of the money…I was in control of  
    everything…the men in the club….And I took on a…a fake name…pseudonym…of „Taylor‟  
    …well it‟s quite funny, it‟s a boy‟s name, that I‟d taken on….You could say we were taken  
    advantage of, but….It was like, for once we‟re doing what they do to us…we‟re taking   
    money off them, we‟re taking the piss, they think we like them, we don‟t; it was like a whole  
    big sexual switch.     
 
But the price of this socially reconstructed identity and sense of power was the ongoing 
sexual objectification of her own real self/body, and the use of that body to try to find what 
Sunshine really wanted  - the safety, security and stability of a loving, affectionate 
relationship with someone who would see, know, and love her for who she really was.  
 
It was not until she married „C‟, and gave birth to her two children, that Sunshine found a 
secure and loving place within which to begin reconstructing her self - as wife, mother and 
daughter - in a way that might assist the emergence of the real whole, free-spirited, 
connected self of her childhood. But what persisted through this reconstruction was the 
sense of her sexual female self and body as bad and imperfect, and thus the inability to 
reconceive herself as a perfectly whole, integrated, sexual female being, rather than a 
number of more or less imperfect parts: 
 
    I don‟t really often look at my face in the mirror….but when I look in the mirror and I‟m  
    looking at my face, I‟ll see the grey hair, or I‟ll see my wrinkles there, and I‟ll see all my  
    faults….Yeah, I‟ll isolate…but I already know that there‟s something wrong with them,  
    like I already know that there‟s a frown, so I‟ll look there….but I won‟t actually look at  
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    any of the good things…like I won‟t look at my eyes  
  
    „C‟ wants me to get [boobs]…. it‟s like the boobs will take away all the other things, like  
    I‟m getting older, all the other bad, what I deem the bad things. It‟s like, ok, this is some-  
    thing that I could be alright, to gain that confidence back. 
 
Along with this persisting fragmentation and isolation of self and body came the 
continuing need to constantly and guiltily monitor and restrain her eating to a degree that 
was not a return to anorexia, but that permitted Sunshine a feeling of control over, and 
goodness of, her real self when she felt unable to control the actions, expectations and 
responses of others, and thus, a sense of sustaining the inner self just in case of a loss of 
her socially reconstructed self/identities: 
 
    It‟s like what am I going to become?…I just become a Mum…but again I lose who I am 
    But if you weren‟t the mother, what would you be? 
    Oh god, no, no one 
    It‟s almost like you wouldn‟t exist anymore? 
    No… so that's why constantly still… like, I mean, I'll eat, but I feel guilty after I eat. Like,  
    ….'T' and I sat in bed and we shared an avocado sandwich. I felt so guilty for having it…. 
    Like, you have no control of other aspects, but this is the little thing that…it‟s just me; it‟s  
    just who I am. It‟s like trying to find me battling with myself, with eating. 
 
In the nine months since the interviews with Sunshine, her mother Gorgie has spoken of 
experiencing a feeling of “coming to recognize her daughter again”, observing a gradual 
re-emergence of the vibrant and strongly moral self that she knew Sunshine to be as a 
child; an observation that Sunshine later reinforced in saying to me that, since the 
interviews, she had felt “much lighter…like a weight‟s been lifted”. During an interview, 
Sunshine also said of Gorgie that, in the last couple of years, she has seen a “light” and 
“life” in her mother‟s eyes that wasn‟t there before. Gorgie and Sunshine‟s pubertal 
deconstruction and reconception of their real (sexual) female self as imperfect, dirty, bad, 
and therefore needing to be constantly controlled, punished, purified and thus 
reconstructed into the perfect, lovable form was also reflected, though to a different degree, 
in Miss P‟s anorexic and post-anorexic experiences and recollections. 
 
Although Miss P could not recall a time when she did not feel the weight of parental 
expectation that she would be, and represent her family as, perfect, as a child she was able 
to fulfil these expectations in a way that brought praise, love and gifts from her father, and 
sometimes jealousy from her mother. As Miss P put it, “I was the perfect child….I didn‟t 
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have a childhood because, in between my dancing….I reclused into my books….I had to 
excel at everything”. Thus, the young Miss P was able to conceal and alleviate parental 
conflict, and her (pharmacist) father‟s chronic depression and drunken violence, by 
excelling at whatever she did, thereby creating and maintaining the façade of the perfect 
family:  
 
    That‟s what I did all through my life with my family, I was always putting together the bits 
    when there was an argument the night before, I had to try and, heal it. I remember going to  
    school on a school bus and my best friend was „D‟…..we were the put-togetherers, we were  
    the make-righters.  
 
With adolescence, however, and the failure of Miss s sexual body to grow and develop 
„normally‟, came the realization that she was no longer perfect in her mother‟s eyes. It was 
with this failure, and the sexual abuse by her eldest brother, that Miss P‟s façade began to 
crack, as she learned to see her (sexual) female self/body as not only imperfect and 
uncontrollable but also „grubby‟, and thus to be disguised, erased and overcome to regain 
her perfect, pleasing form:  
 
    When I was perfect, I was a child, I couldn‟t do anything wrong. As I grew up, I couldn‟t  
    keep things perfect…I was out of control basically, and I couldn‟t control things around me 
    So the body that you‟d had as a ten year-old, which was petite and a perfect form, which  
    was a pleasing body then became a displeasing body 
    Yeah, something wrong with me.  
 
 
Her teenage years were therefore a frenetic time of striving to excel in every activity Miss 
P undertook, so as to recreate, identify, and regain parental/social recognition for her self 
as the perfectly controlled, self-disciplined daughter, actress, schoolgirl and ballerina: 
 
    I came out at the end of college and took the lead roles in the production [of the Wizard of  
    Oz], I did the choreography, I got the scholarship to ballet school…yeah, I got joint dux of  
    the school….'cause that was the only way I got recognition 
    So you were doing all that to get recognition, from who, your father, or society at large? 
    People in society at large…..Yeah, and my parents….I got very close to my father…very  
    close to my father. I was a very talented dancer at that time, and I got a scholarship to  
    Wellington, and I didn‟t really want to take it up because….I took it up because it was  
    expected of me, it was one way of making the family look good. 
 
Having developed a very close relationship to her father (“I was more like his wife, I 
would‟ve been what his wife should‟ve been”), Miss P went away at sixteen to Ballet 
School, to take up the scholarship and hopefully become a prima ballerina. However, 
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within less than a year, and feeling that she was not gaining enough recognition, and not 
tall or slim enough to be an outstanding dancer, Miss P began to limit her food intake and 
lose weight. Around the same time, she received from her father a letter explaining that he 
and her mother were separating. It was these two events, perceived as resulting from her 
own failure and inability to remain the perfect child maintaining the perfect front, that Miss 
P recognized, in retrospect, as initiating what became a nine-year experience of anorexia. 
Eventually too weak to perform, and despite knowing that she would disappoint her 
parents, Miss P relinquished her scholarship and returned home. As she said of that time: 
 
    I‟ve thought about this really carefully actually…I felt like I wasn‟t excelling at that time in  
    my life, and I thought by getting thin, I could shine out  
    In relation to your ballet, or as a separate thing? 
    In relation to everything….I wasn‟t the perfect child….when I was at ballet school, [Dad]  
    wrote to me and said that Mum and Dad were separating…and that‟s exactly when I started  
    to stop eating 
    Is that because you thought you‟d let them down? 
    Possibly, yeah….The fear of failing….What am I going to do, how can I fix it up? 
   
Her parents having tried various treatments for Miss P‟s anorexia, including hypnotherapy, 
a stint in Ashburn Hall, and time in Ward 17 (Tauranga Hospital), Miss P‟s world changed 
traumatically when, just prior to her 18th birthday, her father followed his mother in 
committing suicide. Devastated at losing the person she loved most, and told that it was her 
anorexia that drove his death, Miss P remained in an anorexic state for the next eight years, 
living with and keeping house for her mother in the ultimately unfulfilled hope of 
achieving her recognition and acceptance. On reflection, then, Miss P understood her 
anorexia to have expressed a need to regain a sense of control over her self and the world 
around her, at a time when her reconstructed „perfect‟ self was collapsing and thus 
threatening to expose her own and her family‟s imperfect and dysfunctional form, thereby 
incurring parental displeasure and rejection. Through the daily restraint of eating and use 
of laxatives, Miss P regained a sense of control over her self and life but also found a 
means by which to secretly cleanse her self/body in a way that brought feelings of inner 
purity and goodness, whilst also incurring her mother‟s disapproval:  
 
    Anorexia was a way of me getting out of her grip…she was no longer in control…‟how   
    could you do this to me Miss P, how could you do this? You‟re my only daughter‟…‟quite  
    easily Mum‟….Mmm…it‟s control 
    Control, but also purifying 
    Yep 
    I‟m no longer grubby, I‟m clean? 
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    That‟s right….Well that‟s like, why did I take laxatives after I‟d eaten?…to clean my body  
    out „n make myself pure. I was lucky I had a Dad who was a pharmacist, Coloxyl with  
    Danthron, ok it‟s done my bowel in for my life, but, I‟d go through a bottle a day, no  
    problem, and I felt so good when I was cleansed right through. 
 
But more than just a means of controlling and purifying the grubby, imperfect self, Miss 
P‟s anorexia was about wanting to regain the perfect form she‟d had as a child. And to do 
this required the starving or sloughing off of her imperfect, uncontrollable sexual female 
self and body, to thus become the perfect little girl again:    
 
     I‟m seeing the whole thing of anorexia as, as a way of fending off -- 
     -- You‟re safe in the little girl‟s shell 
    Yeah ok, holding the perfect form of the little girl 
    Mmm 
    And in a way you could say anorexia would be cutting off the bits, sloughing off the bits 
    Mmm, so you stay young „n little…yeah. 
                                          
 
            
            Figure 21:                                                                                                 (Kayla) 
 
In the final interview, Miss P perceived a connection between her anorexia and the vivid 
nightmares she‟d experienced since adolescence, in which her earliest memory was 
replayed; a memory in which six-year-old Miss P was “climbing up the jigsaw wall, and 
forcing the jigsaw wall to come down on top of me, and then put to bed, and having to put 
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all the jigsaws together”. In her nightmare, Miss P was surrounded by other people‟s mess, 
and impossibly expected to restore order by a certain time to avert the total collapse of her 
self and world: 
 
    every dream I have is about everything going wrong, there‟s a mess around me, I‟ve got to  
    clean it up….and always my mother in it, my Dad‟s never in it, it‟s always my brothers and  
    my mother and her relations, and me having to clean up, and then having so long to do it in   
    …And I can‟t cope, I can‟t cope…this desperation, desperate feeling and I wake up and I  
    feel „oh, I just want to go to sleep‟.  
 
Perceiving the jigsaw to be the façade of perfection that Miss P had been expected to put - 
and hold - together all her life, the nightmare expressing terror at the pubertal collapse of 
the jigsaw and her inability to remake it in time to save from exposure the real, imperfect 
self beneath, Miss P saw her anorexia as a turning within to create her own standards of - 
and means to - perfection. A retreat that was ultimately an escape, not only from the sexual 
female self that was the source of her imperfection, but also from the real world: 
     
    For a girl who‟s 15,16,17 and developing sexually, becoming very aware that she has….a  
     female sexual gender, anorexia could be seen as a way of getting rid of that -- 
    -- Escaping it 
    Did that then give you a sense of yourself as more boyish? More childish? 
    Childish 
    By going back to the child, you retain that perfect form? 
    Untouchable form…. mmm…but you‟ve still got to remain perfection…maintain your  
    perfection 
    And how are you doing that? 
    Because you‟re in control 
    So it‟s keeping up the rituals (nods)…and as long as you did that, you‟re maintaining the  
    perfect -- 
    -- Control….I‟m in control….so if I get hurt by someone, I‟ll take control of my control  
    ….when I was anorexic, I separated from the world…I distanced myself from reality  
    basically ….people couldn‟t hurt me. 
 
What Miss P finally realized, however, was that years of anorexia were ultimately not 
going to achieve the familialy/socially recognized goodness, and thus, the love and 
acceptance of others for which she longed. Along with the experience of meeting up with 
two men (in Ward 17) who accepted and befriended Miss P simply for who she was, and 
not for how she looked or what she had achieved, this realization was the impetus for a 
shift away from anorexia, followed by marriage (at 28), and the birth of her two children.  
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For Miss P, marriage and pregnancy promised the opportunity, as the perfect wife and 
expectant mother, to finally redeem her self in her mother‟s and wider family‟s eyes: 
     
    I think the happiest moments in my life [were] when I was pregnant….I just felt really good in 
    myself, I felt like I had a glow coming out of me, it wasn‟t a glow that was down there, it was  
    a glow that was coming out of me…. when I was pregnant I was doing a good thing, I was  
    producing a child, for the family, I was doing a good thing 
    Ah, ok…that would get your parents‟ admiration and -- 
    -- Yeah 
    So, in a way, the child was sort of saving you, or allowing you to be something you couldn‟t 
    be otherwise 
    Exactly, exactly.    
 
Despite the promise of a good, loved self and identity that she could at last keep hold of, 
Miss P‟s husband showed himself to be a wife-batterer whom she left after three years of 
marriage. Perceiving her self to have failed as the perfect wife and mother, thereby again 
failing and disappointing her mother and family, Miss P‟s socially reconstructed self/front 
began to crumble, causing a recurrent feeling of loss of control over her self and life: 
 
    There was a time when I thought I had control in my life, when I was first married and then I  
    got pregnant…. I was the perfect form, I had two beautiful children….And then when that all  
    fell apart, everything was out of control again, and the only way I could control my life was  
    to, do the other part…I mean, I was on my own with two children, I used to wake up, it was  
    nothing for me in a day to, get up get the kids organized, wash the windows, wash the car,  
    mow the lawns, clean out the garage, do a full house-clean, get the groceries…I don‟t know  
    how I did it.     
 
Thus, instead of reverting to anorexia to rebuild her („grubby‟, uncontrolled) self as the 
perfect form, Miss P turned to her home and surroundings, and the repeated, ritualized 
cleaning and ordering of those surroundings - in order to purify, re-form and protect that 
self. It was these rituals that became, and that Miss P later recognized as, a form of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder that has dominated her life since, and that she perceives to 
be simply a transformation of her anorexia, the need for standards and visible evidence of 
control and perfection of her inner (bad) self shifting from a ritual (desexualizing) 
purification and reformation of her body, to a ritual cleansing and reordering of her 
physical surroundings: 
 
    I often look back at my past and I think that what I‟ve ended up into now is a side-shoot of   
    anorexia….I‟ve shifted my compulsion to something else….it‟s like the way I dust my house  
    every night ‟n vacuum, people laugh at that, but that‟s my way of feeling good within myself,  
    that‟s my safety net….If things are nice ‟n tidy ‟n orderly and neat ‟n tidy outside, I feel good  
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    inside, if they‟re messy out there, then I feel grubby ‟n out of control inside….And the same  
    thing happens when your eating‟s out of control           
    You feel grubby inside? 
    Mmm….this is my way of keeping control of my life…it‟s the last thing I‟ve got, that I‟ve  
    got control of 
    Ok, and so if it‟s not order in that place, it‟s order in…  
    Yes, as I said, I think what I‟ve done is I‟ve transferred my order from one part of my life to  
    another.…neither is any better, I mean personally I‟d rather be skinny….can‟t stand my  
    weight, hate being like I am….I exercise like crazy down in the garage every night. 
 
 
Thus, despite reconstructing a seemingly solid, stable and socially acceptable identity or 
persona for herself, firstly, through a second marriage to „K‟, and secondly, through her 
work as a carer in charge of a dementia ward, the enduring conception of her sexual female 
self/body as dirty and imperfect has demanded private rituals of control that, in making 
that (inner) self good again, serve as means for its protection and survival in the face of a 
shattering of the social self/façade.  
 
For Miss P, the problem with these compulsive rituals is that, firstly, it is unavoidable that 
forces beyond her control (e.g. the weather) will occasionally prevent satisfaction of the 
obsessive need for control, cleanliness and order, thereby creating fear and anxiety at the 
prospect of exposure of the bad self to the outside world. As Miss P described it, “The 
minute something gets out of kilter, like I‟ll wake up and there‟s a storm outside, you ask 
my husband, I go…I go ape-shit, I can‟t handle it”. And secondly, no matter how often 
these rituals are performed, and therefore how pure and perfect everything may appear on 
the outside, as Miss P said, “I still feel as miserable as shit in here”. Unable to escape the 
maternally reinforced sense and concept of her real sexual female self as grubby, imperfect 
and a failure, Miss P‟s rituals are those of the little girl still seeking her mother‟s 
acceptance and approval:   
 
    I think my image of myself with my mother is that I‟m still a little girl….I‟ve never grown  
    up, and never allowed myself to grow up in front of her….that would be one of my biggest  
    wishes in life is to not feel driven by sources around me, to actually live with myself as I am,  
    to accept myself as I am, and not what other people want me to be.    
 
 
To be, know, and accept her self for who she is, would mean no longer having to wish or 
fearfully and compulsively strive to be the perfect form - whether in Miss P‟s fantasy of 
Dorothy flying over the rainbow, in her jigsaw nightmare, or in her anorexic and 
obsessive-compulsive need for control and order. But, while its femaleness marks that self 
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as imperfect, Miss P must continue the obsessive pursuit of perfection, thereby feeding her 
addiction to the love and approval necessary for her survival, but to be constantly won 
anew:  
 
    Well-balanced people don‟t need love and approval 
    Don‟t you think we all need love and approval? 
    Oh to a certain extent, but not to the degree of someone who is actually not given love and  
    approval 
    So you‟re saying that someone who is not given love and approval, it becomes-- 
    -- It becomes an addiction  
    An addiction, yes, right, in that, your activities become a means to -- 
    -- Survival. 
 
Perhaps Miss P‟s predicament - her existential need to perfectly re-form and re-present her 
real (but imperfect) sexual female self in order to gain recognition, love and approval - was 
best expressed with her comment: “I‟ve always said if I‟d been born with balls, I would‟ve 
been alright in my life”. This sentiment may also resonate with Kerry, whose pejorative 
perception (and thus, reconstruction) of her sexual female body was very much shaped by 
her father‟s expressed wish that she‟d been a boy. 
 
Experiencing a similarly dysfunctional family environment that was shrouded with secrecy 
and a façade of perfection covering her father‟s alcohol-fuelled, misogynistic violence, 
Kerry‟s childhood dissociation of mind from body, and the tendency of her mind/self to 
assume a „bird‟s-eye view‟ of the life of that body, was exacerbated with the onset of 
puberty and the realization that her developing female body would be even more of a target 
of abuse. Kerry‟s efforts to maintain the status quo and a veneer of normality for herself 
and family were destabilized, however, firstly with a shift from Primary school to 
Intermediate, and a consequent loss of friendships, cultural familiarity, and sense of 
identity, and secondly, with the distressing realization that, as a now dry alcoholic, her 
father‟s violent behaviour had not lessened as she had hoped. These events combined to 
produce a feeling of instability, disconnectedness, and lack of control that resulted in 
Kerry‟s first major act of self-assertion in deciding to become a vegetarian in a household 
ruled by meat-loving restaurateurs; a decision that, in retrospect, Kerry perceived as driven 
by the need to regain some control over her unravelling life: 
 
    By the time I got to Intermediate things were really starting to come undone for me….when  
    I was fourteen, and I would say this was probably when my struggle with food, in retrospect,  
    started …. I decided I was going to become a vegetarian which of course just about turned  
 231 
    our household upside-down…it was like World War III….I think it was the first step towards  
    me saying „Hey I‟m going to have one part of my life that I‟m going to take control over‟…  
    food was really important in our house, and that‟s what it‟s going to be. 
 
The next major threat to her sense of stability and control over her self and life came at 
seventeen, when Kerry decided to leave home, once again finding herself in a very 
different social reality and beginning to exhibit some of her father‟s aggressive behaviours 
that, in being so unacceptable to others, made her aware of just how dysfunctional her 
home life had been. With a feeling of “the ground just being pulled out from under me…. I 
don‟t know what‟s going on, I don‟t know how to read the world, and I don‟t know how to 
operate in it”, Kerry‟s eating became even more controlled with her decision to become a 
vegan and join a vegan community in which she became recognized and valued for her 
intensive study and knowledge of nutrition, and the cultivation and preparation of vegan 
foods. Thus, as a „vegetarian‟, and then a „vegan‟, Kerry gained a social identity and a 
stable sense/concept of her self as wholesome, good, disciplined, knowledgeable, and 
respected by others. It was also an identity that allowed her to justifiably limit the amount 
and kinds of food she was eating, any weight lost from Kerry‟s already naturally slim body 
seen as simply a consequence of eating only good, healthy, vegan foods. But this 
seemingly stable, controlled, socially constructed self was to be shaken once again, with 
the birth (at twenty-one) of her first child.  
 
Having decided at a young age that she would not be following her mother into the 
traditional feminine role of subservient domesticity and dependency, Kerry approached 
pregnancy and motherhood with the same need to be in control of her self/body and do 
things her way, rather than follow the advice and orders of midwives or child-care 
agencies. Having „sailed‟ through a vegan pregnancy and birth, however, Kerry then found 
herself too thin and mentally/physically unable to consume sufficient food to provide milk 
for her daughter „S‟, and thus - having anticipated being the perfect mother - trapped in a 
breast-feeding nightmare: 
 
    I just sailed into motherhood pretty easily actually, I was on my own, and had, a horrific time  
    with breast-feeding….she was a 10 pound baby, and….any weight that I had put on when I  
    was pregnant with her…basically I…I lost, when I had her….you had to eat a huge amount  
    to breast-feed, and she was a hungry baby, and basically I just couldn‟t keep up enough  
    calories to keep her full….I took a real…my self-confidence, my self-esteem, my self-identity  
    took a real battering, through that phase….I‟d bought this child into the world and everything  
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    was going to be beautiful, and everything hadn‟t been, and so there was probably a lot of  
    guilt, around that. 
 
With Kerry‟s identity and role as a good, admired vegan preventing her from being the 
perfectly self-sufficient mother, and also facing the stress of sitting first-year university 
exams six weeks after giving birth, the first trace of anorexia appeared, as “over kind of, a 
really short period of time, about 6 or 8 weeks, I lost 9 kilos, and my hair fell out”. But a 
shift to bottle-feeding allowed Kerry‟s sense of control over her own body and her and S‟s 
feeding habits to be briefly restored, until a series of events during the following year led 
to her first „full blown‟ bout of anorexia. With Kerry‟s relationship with S‟s father ending 
soon after her birth, and wanting to separate „S‟ from the negative influence of Kerry‟s 
father, Kerry „divorced‟ her own father, before entering into another (short term, violent) 
relationship that left her pregnant once again:  
 
    So, I‟ve been through…two relationships in a year, I‟ve had a baby, I‟ve divorced my father,  
    and I‟m now pregnant again with a baby that I don‟t know who it belongs to…yeah, in the  
    course of a year, so things are spiralling out of control pretty rapidly 
    So you have no idea who you are or what you‟re doing or -- 
     -- No…no…all I know is that there‟s this thing living in me that I‟m going to have to feed  
    that I don‟t want, so I didn‟t have the baby, I had a termination, and um, and I certainly don‟t  
    have any regrets about that decision….But I, following that, the eating, I just stopped eating. 
 
 
Her life seemingly spinning out of control, and her identities and existence as the good 
vegan, mother and daughter having been shaken or lost, Kerry simply could not tolerate the 
thought of feeding (and fattening) herself up to feed a baby that therefore seemed like “a 
complete parasite”. For to do so would rob her of her last remaining means of survival: 
control of her own bodily form and function: 
 
    [It was] like „I am having to feed this thing, and I‟m not doing it‟ 
    Was it like a survival thing? 
    Yeah, I think there was just too much going on and it was just too out of control. 
 
Thus, the existential need for control over her own self/body won out, and Kerry became 
severely anorexic for the next three or so years, her weight initially plunging from 52kgs 
down to 40.5kgs in seven months as she completely denied her body food in a way that she 
described as “taking something back”. 
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For Kerry, then, anorexia was not about “body image” or slimness, but primarily about the 
control, safety, and survival of the self when its social/maternal identities, roles and 
existence were failing and beyond her control. To anorexically deny and transcend bodily 
needs meant escape, not only from the turmoil around her, but from her guilty, 
uncontrolled, failing self/body: 
                        
    I absolutely, really frame it up as a control thing…rather than a body image thing….it‟s  
    safety because, you know you‟re away with the fairies, you‟re either buzzing round or you‟re  
    so wiped out that you can‟t think straight    
    so it numbs you in a way? 
    So it does numb you, after you get over that initial kind of buzzy bit, I mean, you‟re away  
    with the fairies really, when you‟re really unwell, because cognitively….you‟re not really  
    there, you‟re just going through the motions…. It‟s a dissociative sort of experience….like  
    you become quite mechanical eventually. 
 
Clearly aware that this form of self transcendence, control, and denial was anorexia, Kerry 
also knew that her anorexia was not about being visually attractive or pleasing to herself or 
others: 
 
    I didn‟t find the anorexic image of myself attractive at all….at all….like I‟m not one of   
    those people that looks in the mirror and sees, you know, „I‟m 40kgs, but I still looking  
    like I‟ve got the thighs of an ox‟…I looked like shit….I mean I‟d lost half my hair ‟n… 
    the whole nine yards, I couldn‟t keep warm…I just have an innate fear of the cold ever  
    since that experience because I could not get warm 
    Because you were basically disabling yourself eh? 
    Yeah…yeah. 
 
Anorexia was therefore not just about control, but also the painful destruction and disabling 
of the desiring self/body, a disablement that was also a source of pleasure. For, the upside 
to constant hunger and discomfort was that, after a certain period of starvation, Kerry knew 
that a feeling of euphoria - somewhat like a runner‟s high - would flood her consciousness: 
 
    I had a huge sense of comfort in feeling hungry, yeah, „cause if I was feeling hungry it  
    meant that sooner or later those endorphins were going to kick in, and….you‟d ride that  
    out….‟cause I was really conscious about this - if I don‟t eat for 3 days, this is what happens -  
    I was really clear, and that, yeah, it was worth not eating for 3 days to have that happen. And  
    then I‟d zoom around like a mad thing, you know, I could just take on the world when I was  
    in that state. 
 
 
However, Kerry also recalled a point in the anorexic experience where she felt a loss of 
control, as the anorexia took control of her; a shift that she likened to the development of a 
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“rip-roaring” drug addiction from what was initially an occasional and controlled social 
use. It was this feeling of losing control to anorexia that allowed Kerry to later 
(therapeutically) conceive the anorexia as an entity separate from her self; a demanding, 
devious entity that only constant awareness and vigilance could keep at bay:  
 
    So there was a real turning point between „I don‟t control you any more, you now control  
    me‟, yeah, so really similar to the sorts of parallels that people draw around addiction….it  
    was anorexia and it now had control, I had, like at that point I just had no control over it… 
    *it now had control*.…so it was kind of like this thing that you just had to live with.   
 
 
But more than just demanding and devious, this anorexic entity had an almost superhuman 
power to subversively persuade that, as a means of distancing herself from full-blown 
anorexia, Kerry likened to the demonic temptation of Eve: 
 
    it‟s a sneaky thing.…it‟s a bit like Eve ‟n the apple….it‟s constantly trying to find ways to,  
    tempt you back over that wall that you‟ve put between you and it, and sometimes it can be  
    quite subversive in the way that it operates….you need to develop a consciousness about that  
    thing and your relationship with it, and until you actually develop that consciousness, because  
    that‟s your barrier, that consciousness of that thing, whatever you want to call it, the beast….  
    that‟s your protection. 
 
 
       
 Figure 22:                                                                                                                                                (Kayla) 
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As part of that protection, and thus, a means of exiting from severe anorexia, Kerry 
recalled several strategies that helped her to “carve out” a stable, unified and respected 
social identity (and concept) for her self as a mother, an academic, and a spiritually aware 
person, but an identity that she also perceived as never totally free of the hooks of 
anorexia. Firstly, no matter how averse she was to the thought of eating, Kerry always kept 
to a strict routine of preparing and being present for her daughter‟s meals, also making sure 
that the pantry was always well stocked, in these ways presenting to the outside world the 
image of a good, normal mother and family. This identity of the good mother was 
reinforced when, having recovered from (severe) anorexia, Kerry gave birth to a second 
child that she was able to successfully breastfeed (for 6-7 months), only to be threatened 
again as he became fractious and demanding, resulting in another, milder bout of anorexia 
the following year. As her children grew (and her son diagnosed with Aspergers), Kerry 
created a safe home environment based around the routines and rituals that gave her (and 
her son) the required high degree of order and control. Secondly, she maintained a network 
of close, supportive friends who assisted when the pull of anorexia became too great. 
Thirdly, in later becoming a teacher and then (in her thirties) an academic, Kerry created a 
recognized social and intellectual identity for (and concept of) her self that also served as a 
foil against anorexia. For, as a researcher and writer, Kerry saw her self guided and 
inspired by an external power, a kind of “daemon” or spiritual genius for whose ideas she 
was a “conduit”, her ongoing, recognizant relationship with this positive force also 
providing protection against a return of the anorexic „beast‟. For, to be seduced and 
controlled by the destructive anorexic demon meant a mental and physical inability to 
serve and satisfy the creative daemonic power: 
 
    It‟s kinda predictable, but it‟s, I have to acknowledge that thing, and so I come in every  
    morning and say „Good Morning‟ to it, you know, „I‟ve turned up for work, let‟s get into  
    it‟….[My] productivity is only maintained, if I‟m in touch with whatever that thing is, that  
    ….the work comes through, and I‟m not in touch with that when I‟m not well….there‟s too  
    much interference, ‟n I‟m not clear….there‟s something else that comes in, so it‟s kinda like  
    that whole….that having to protect yourself from that so that you can focus on this, so it‟s  
    kinda like this battle, between the two things…. So I guess, I‟ve kind of exchanged the  
    relationships, to a certain extent. 
 
 
In thus re-conceiving her self and existence as the product of a battle between (good, 
transcendent) intellectually creative, and (evil, beastly) anorexically destructive forces, 
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Kerry also drew upon Rudolph Steiner‟s anthroposophical „science of the soul‟,84 finding 
here a unifying framework upon which to reconstruct her self (-concept) as an essentially 
spiritual and intellectual mind, more or less existing within her head; her body little more 
than a mechanical means to support and transport that mind/self:  
 
    it‟s certainly given me a framework that I didn‟t have before, to work with, in terms of…. 
    trying to draw those fragments together in a way that‟s conceptually, you know it‟s quite  
    a structured, way. 
 
 
Reconstructing her self (-concept) in this way, two things became anathema to Kerry: 
mirrors and photographs. For both reflected a real body that conflicted with this 
reconstructed spiritual/intellectual (concept of) self and body: 
 
    There‟s two things that I avoid, one is mirrors, and the other is photographs….full-length  
    mirrors are *one way to big nightmares, I don‟t like them*….but I‟m quite happy to use a  
    mirror that‟s just my head….I‟m actually pretty comfortable in my body, it‟s not about  
    body-image 
    So what is it about then, when you say I don‟t want to see my body? 
    I don‟t know, it‟s just a…I think it doesn‟t match.…with my self-concept *of my body*….  
    I‟m always quite shocked when I see myself, in a full-length mirror because how I see myself  
    in my head when I‟m outside looking in, and how I actually look in the mirror are two quite  
    different… 
 
 
Towards the end of the interview process, Kerry perceived the mismatch between her self-
concept (as a mind/head on a mechanical body) and the mirror-image of her real body as a 
conflict between a more masculine or androgynous concept and experience of her self and 
world, and the obvious femininity of her sexual female body; a femininity that had 
traditionally - and for her own mother - connoted weakness, inferiority, shame, 
irrationality, subjugation and objectification, and a worth based solely on appearance. In 
then relating this self-concept to anorexia, she concurred with, and further explored in 
relation to her own anorexic experience, the idea of anorexia as expressing a need to 
slough off or otherwise dissociate from - and thus escape - her “womany” sexual female 
body, as a means of survival of the subjective self:  
 
    [When I was anorexic] there was nothing from here [neck]…from here down, and I knew  
                                                 
84
 Steiner conceived human being as consisting of four different elements: the physical body, the life body, 
the astral body (all shared with animals), and the intellectual ego or self-consciousness (unique to humans).   
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    how well or unwell I was by, by how far in my body I was….In terms of my self-concept 
    …. so you know it may only have been from the mouth up…. or it may have been from the  
    shoulders up…so I had….no consciousness of the rest of my body…. It‟s not mine….it was  
    like I was a head sitting on top of this machine 
    [You were] wanting to actually get rid of…if your body had disappeared… 
    Yeah well it‟s kinda, it‟s you disappearing isn‟t it?...it‟s unimportant, because you‟re not  
    actually using it….the body was just a vehicle on which to get my head around….I mean  
    you could‟ve sat my head on a trolley and that would‟ve been fine…[the head/mind] is the  
    essence of me and that‟s where I carry myself, when I‟m not well. 
 
 
                               
                                 Figure 23:                                                                             (Kayla) 
 
 
Anorexia, then, was about Kerry reshaping her real physical form to match her self-concept 
as a head/mind without a body, and therefore, without the sexual parts that would mark her 
as typically (and pejoratively) female, a concept of her self that she had rejected since 
childhood:  
 
    Perhaps that‟s my shock about full-length mirrors, as well…that what I see doesn‟t  
    actually match up with my self-concept…yeah, because what I see is quite feminine,  
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    but my experience of life and how I choose to pursue things I pursue in my life, is not,  
    typically female.        
 
Denied any social or linguistic self-concept that situated intelligent, self-directed, 
recognized subjectivity within a real womanly body, and determined not to follow her 
mother into paternally objectified, denigrated femininity, Kerry had no existential choice 
but to literally and conceptually hide or erase her sexual female body, by becoming the 
good (socially/daemonically approved) vegan, mother and academic, or, failing that, by 
withdrawing into (demonically approved) disembodying anorexia. With this erasure 
necessary for subjective survival, it is not surprising that the list of identities that Kerry 
chose to describe her self did not include „woman‟. For Kerry, as for her parents, the term 
„woman‟ meant dirtiness, guilt, disdain, and lack of control, and thus the need to re-present 
to the world a purified, desexualized, perfectly controlled self or front that led her mother 
to an obsession with self/home beauty, cleanliness and order, and Kerry to a dissociation 
from and erasure of her sexual female self/body. Thus, while Kerry has avoided becoming 
the objectified “womany woman” by achieving subjective identity, existence, and 
recognition as an academic and an independent mother, she does so only in the knowledge 
that anorexia is always lurking, waiting to pounce on the vulnerable, inattentive subject:      
 
    It‟s been a big process, yeah, and I kind of feel like things are pretty good at the moment,  
    pretty stable…but you can never, you never let your guard down with anorexia, ‟cause the  
    minute you do.…the minute you get cocky about it, it‟ll knock you for six….the minute you  
    stop discounting its presence, it‟ll get ya. 
 
 
Whilst Kerry became anorexic when faced with the failure and unravelling of her socially/ 
maternally reconstructed self, Cilla - knowing that she simply could not abstain from 
eating - became bulimic as a means of controlling, purifying, and escaping her (failed, bad) 
sexual female self that she too experienced and interpreted as a means of subjective 
survival.  
 
By the time Cilla reached her teenage years, she had experienced a loving but also tough 
and ultimately destructive home-life, numerous family relocations due to her father‟s 
railway job, an accident that landed her in a faraway hospital for thirteen months, and 
repeated sexual abuse at the hands of „Joe Pig‟, Cilla‟s uncle, and then her oldest brother. 
The combined effect of these events was to alienate Cilla not only from her family and 
childhood friends, but also from her self; a sexual female self and body that she came to 
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perceive as dirty, worthless, shameful and unloved, and therefore to be repeatedly 
punished, cleansed and hidden. For, despite Cilla‟s description of her father as a kind and 
gentle man, he (like so many other fathers mentioned in the interviews) was a heavy 
drinker, stopping at the pub each night after work, and arriving home drunk and sometimes 
violent; a violence that Cilla therefore perceived as her punishment:   
 
    He drank a lot….So that made my mother angst…I just adored my mother…never ever knew  
    my father and yet he was there all the time….I really regret that Jane, „cause he was a placid,  
    lovely man, and he provided for us well….[Mum]‟d say „your father‟s coming and he‟s  
    paralytic‟, so of course, „get up in your room „n hide‟, so you did that, just about every night 
 
    He would get agitated at the table with a bit of the drink, and the tiredness, and we‟d be  
    behind the table, three of us on a form…and you‟d get a „woof‟ „n a „whack‟ in the face, “I  
    told you not to talk at the table”….when he was carving the meat ‟n you said the wrong thing,  
    „whack‟ „n you had a cut this long. 
 
And with three haemophiliac sons, and constantly shifting, life was hard for her mother 
and also for Cilla, in willingly helping with the cooking, endless (hand) washing and 
cleaning. The activities that she most loved, however, and at which Cilla excelled, were 
schoolwork, sports, and dance. But with successive experiences of abuse (and an inability 
to tell her mother, or a lack of response when she finally revealed her uncle‟s abuse), the 
shame and secrecy of pubertal development, and the family‟s favouring of her younger, 
prettier, more feminine sister, Cilla‟s early sense/concept of herself as a good, obedient, 
helpful and successful child began to crumble: 
 
    When you were an adolescent, how did you see your body, did you see -- 
    -- Oh no, I hid it….I didn‟t wear…I only wore long sleeves „n…I was happy with your  
    softball uniform, ‟n your cricket uniform, everything down to the feet…. I didn't want  
    any breasts or period 
     
    Yeah, so would you say then, you didn‟t want to be seen as having a sexual body, or as 
    having a female body, or what? 
    Probably female body I would‟ve thought, yeah 
    You would rather have seen it as a covered body then, it doesn‟t have any -- 
    -- No breasts 
    So you didn‟t want you to be female or sexually female? 
    No, no. 
 
    I didn‟t particularly like my sister, I love her now, because she, got everything, she was the 
    pretty little blonde.…always the flower girl…you know, nine, ten times…I said to her „why  
    don‟t they pick me this time?‟, and it wasn‟t „cause I was plain, it was just that she was  
    pretty, and she was a really…agreeable sort of a child…happy go lucky….verry feminine. 
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To hide the sense of shame, guilt, inferiority and worthlessness now correlated with having 
a sexual female body, and thereby create an image of her self as a good girl in the eyes of 
others, Cilla developed a “bolshie” front or façade, based around her ability to achieve at 
school and on the sports field. Having worked hard to be the best in her class and sports 
teams, however, Cilla would then find herself afraid of being in the spotlight, and, failing 
to maintain her high standards, would therefore drop down to the safety and relative 
obscurity of lower grades: 
 
    I studied to be top of the class, and then they‟d put me up to C4-A, and I‟d get probably in  
    the last ten, and I‟d think „oh good, I can go down to my mates now‟….so I was proud of    
    where I was at, but I didn‟t like being up there, at the top, there was too much pressure for me 
    Why wouldn‟t you have been able to maintain it? 
    I don‟t think, I just thought I couldn‟t…not worthy….I was actually probably failing up there  
    on purpose. 
 
Thus, by High school, Cilla‟s constructed façade and image of her self - as a good achiever 
and, therefore, as recognized, loved and admired for her academic and sporting skills - had 
begun to crack. But with two relocations causing her to fall badly behind in her learning, as 
well as losing friendships and the stable sense of identity they had given her, Cilla came to 
see herself as a “dummy” whose only way to get attention was through rebellion and 
trouble-making. And so, as she put it, “I headed for the naughtiest girl in the class, and 
stuck with her”. In this way, Cilla‟s dreams for her future, and thus, the forging of an 
active, self-directed, successful, admired identity and sense of self, were lost:  
 
    [I] gave up, my plans went out the window, by the time I went to….the third College, my  
    dreams had gone…of what I wanted to be, and where I wanted to go. So, from there, it was  
    all down hill, getting married early. 
 
With her good reconstructed self/image in tatters, Cilla left school and home and went to 
live and work in Wellington, marrying at eighteen, and, at twenty, giving birth to her 
daughter „K‟. For Cilla, marriage was an opportunity to escape from her family, and 
recreate an identity and life for her self as a good wife and mother; an opportunity taken up 
despite a lack of sexual attraction to men, and a growing attraction to women. In reflecting 
on the changes in self (-concept) as she moved from childhood into adolescence, Cilla 
agreed with the suggestion that she went from being and feeling loved for who she was, to 
feeling recognized and loved only on the basis of what she achieved, and how she looked, 
and, having failed to earn the (subjective) recognition and approval of her parents, 
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marriage and motherhood provided a place of safety and a stable, socially approved 
identity. However, because of Cilla‟s lack of heterosexual attraction, and her inability to 
reveal the abuse that left her repulsed by the (sexual) male body, the marriage faltered and 
ended after four years. It was then that Cilla began to explore relationships with women, 
falling in love and entering into an eleven-year (closeted) relationship with „D‟, and raising 
„K‟ within the Mormon community to which „D‟ belonged. Initially loving, the 
relationship ultimately soured as Cilla‟s distrust of others, and D‟s allegiance to the church 
(and her ex-husband) pulled them apart. For Cilla, now in her mid-thirties, this break-up 
inspired the desire to find her self again. So she and „K‟ set off for Australia and the Blue 
Mountains where they lived within and were embraced and nurtured by a community of 
„hippy lesbians‟ who gave Cilla the space and energy to begin to rediscover and express 
her self. As she described this time, “I was creative, I used to run for miles, I had runner‟s 
high…the whole seven years I was there”. Having, like her mother, sometimes struggled 
with her weight, Cilla was now slim and taking pleasure in her appearance: “I looked the 
best I‟d ever looked…I was eight stone, and felt stunning”. With „K‟ becoming pregnant 
and giving birth to an “Italian baby”, Cilla also became a grandmother, and then - when 
„K‟ returned to work - a mother to her grandson.  
 
But with her grandchild developing haemophilia, and the family compelled to return to 
New Zealand, the seemingly stable self and identities that Cilla had created - as 
independent, successful mother, grandmother, chef, and sportswoman - began to fall down 
around her, leading to a nine-month experience of bulimia. Devastated to have left her 
Sydney friends and returned to a damp, dark, dilapidated house in the middle of a cold 
Waikato winter, Cilla‟s self and world completely collapsed when „K‟ and her son left 
home to live with K‟s new boyfriend: 
 
    We came back in the winter, ohh, in Hamilton, and, I got a job, I hated it….she met this  
    ^guy….and that threw me right into bulimia 
    Yeah, things had fallen apart a bit? 
    Yeah 
    And your sense of self….how did you feel then? 
    Ohh, I felt in the gutter… there was nobody…there was nobody…. I was comfort eating,  
    I was totally…planning what I was going to buy, and eat ‟n come home ‟n spew it up 
    So it was almost like your identity…you‟d sort of lost your identity  
    Oh I‟d lost it within….I‟d had…a purpose, I had no purpose, no purpose whatsoever, and  
    my daughter was venturing off with…my baby 
    so you were losing your role as a mother as well? 
    Yeah…the role of a mother ‟n a grandmother…that baby boy was in my home from birth,  
    and in my arms from birth…every day 
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    Yeah…so you could almost say then, that it felt like you didn‟t exist anymore? 
    Yeah I did…did feel like I didn‟t exist…and I could easily have committed suicide. 
 
 
Bulimia, then, was a means to comfort, control, cleanse, and punish her self, at a time when 
Cilla felt totally „in the gutter‟. Stripped of the positive, admired familial/social identities 
with which she had reconceived and recovered her abused, inadequate sexual female 
self/body as a good, attractive, purposeful individual, Cilla found her own private way to 
rid that self of now exposed and overwhelming feelings of badness, dirtiness, shame, and 
worthlessness: 
 
    [I was] just throwing up the bad stuff I thought…that I‟d bought…specifically to abuse  
    myself….once I vomited up, I felt in control 
    Some bulimics have talked about it, or anorexics….as a sense of like cleansing and 
     purifying the body  
    Yeah, oh definitely…definitely all stemming back to the childhood thing 
    The abuse? 
    Yeah, yeah…God yeah 
    In what way….when you say it goes back to the childhood -- 
    -- Well I was hurting myself…I felt I was hurting myself 
    Was that a sort of a -- 
    -- Punishment…yeah 
    Punishment…and a purifying of the sexual stuff? 
    Yeah 
    And a feeling of punishing yourself then as a girl, or what…as a female, or as sexual, 
     or what did you want to rid yourself of? 
    Ohh, the past I think…yeah…total childhood…and yet I had some great childhood  
    memories too, you see 
    Yeah, so it‟s the sexual… 
    Yeah it‟s just the sexual…element of the childhood, yeah 
    And the sexual element of yourself as a woman? 
    Mmm (agreement). 
 
In controlling, purifying, and punishing her bad sexual self/body, and thereby delivering to 
it a (albeit temporary) measure of goodness and redemption, bulimia was, for Cilla, a 
hopeful means for survival of the otherwise seemingly irredeemable, unlovable self: 
 
     If you felt like that, you could then say that your bulimia, and the food „n that, was….a  
    means of survival for you, when you had nothing? 
    It was…it was a means of survival, and it did get me through…what else could‟ve got me  
    through, and I think about that, even now…and yet, it was only a matter of probably, I‟m  
    thinking 8 months….but 8 months is a long time to abuse your body like that….my teeth  
    started to go already, with the acid….I had pains in my kidneys ‟n…‟cause I had no  
    nourishment, I was as weak as hell. 
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                             Figure 24:                                                                (Kayla) 
 
 
It was when Cilla realized that the cycle of bingeing and purging and the damage it was 
doing to her body may spin out of control that she sought help through a counsellor and 
self-help books, and, through hard work, re-established for her self a stable, admired 
identity as a perfectionist in whatever job she undertook. But, for Cilla, the existential need 
to be seen as perfect in whatever she does not only made her an excellent employee, but 
also turned her work into an obsession driven by the persistent need for recognition and 
approval of her achievements: 
 
     my work‟s kind of an obsession…. I need to pull back a bit Jane…I‟m tired, you know….  
    [but] it‟s hard to pull back „cause I feel important …see? 
     because it‟s always a conditional [approval]….based on what you do, and how you present 
     yourself, you can never actually have it, you can never stop, can you? 
    No, no, you can‟t 
    And so there‟s this striving, to always get this love [and approval] 
    Oh god yeah…to give the very best service…the bosses have got to see me to be doing the  
    very best  that a person could do.…it‟s quite a hard thing to keep up some days, you  
    know….it‟s become a habit, because, as I say, there‟s that façade, and that barrier  
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    Because what would happen if you stopped? 
    *Well I‟d be a failure, wouldn‟t I?…I would be a failure to myself…yeah, too…and they  
    wouldn‟t see me as being successful…you see?*….I've got to be perfect 
 
 
But this obsessive drive for the perfect performance that would maintain her own and her 
bosses‟ recognition and approval also applied to Cilla‟s appearance, the need to be seen as 
attractively slim and self-controlled resulting in a constant monitoring of and desire to 
reduce her weight and size; a desire also shared by her mother and daughter. For, to Cilla‟s 
eyes, her ample body was huge and unattractive, though not to the point of wanting its 
surgical reduction:  
  
    I see myself as huge, absolutely huge…but I also had a very…a mother that was always  
    dieting ….and then I kind of did the same to my daughter  
    do you like [your body], or do you dislike it because you -- 
    -- No I dislike it…dislike it‟s shape 
    Why, because you see it as a big body, or as a female body? 
    Yeah, bigger, a big body…yeah, not so much the female thing 
    So you‟re sort of, quite comfortable with your femaleness? 
    Yeah, yeah…I wouldn‟t want to be a boy, no, not ever 
    No…do you see it as a sexual body? 
    Not now 
    Or an asexual body? 
    Asexual 
     and you‟re critical of it? 
    Yeah I am critical of it….I‟d never have it operated on though, isn‟t that funny. 
 
Unable (in later years) to maintain the ideally slim, youthful form required for social 
recognition and approval, Cilla‟s obsession with maintaining the perfectly disciplined 
performance was accompanied by a need for the comfort of food, for the (desexualizing) 
cleansing and hiding of her (bad) sexual self afforded by a larger body shape, and for the 
control and denial of that self achieved through dieting. But the fear of failure and thus a 
shattering of the perfect self/identity that drove Cilla to constantly perfect her work and 
appearance has also led to private compulsions or rituals that she perceives to be 
transmutations of her earlier bulimia, and that, in producing feelings of (self) control, 
order, cleanliness, retribution and goodness, serve to relieve that fear and related anxieties:      
 
    You know what I‟ve got now….I‟ve got this thing, if I go to stay in a motel, I‟ve got to  
    cleanse all the handles before I even touch one, yeah, I‟ll have wipes with me, all the  
    switches, and I have to put my sheets over the sheets in the motel, and my own pillow, and  
    take that top duvet off in case somebody‟s bonked on it 
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    So there‟s….an inner person saying „if I do this, I‟m still good‟….even if I‟m losing control  
    out there in my workplace, in here I‟m still in control…I‟m clean, the house is clean,  
    everything‟s in order, in your own mind‟…does that make sense? 
    Yeah, very much so Jane…and that‟s why I‟ve ripped the nails to bits the last couple of days  
    …I‟ll bite them all off, like a torture, I‟ve done it now….it‟s a release, it‟s like a tranquillizer 
    So it‟s also self-punishment, or self, self-mutilation in a way, isn‟t it? 
    Yeah, yeah…it is self-mutilation, yeah…it is…. it was so far down, one of them, it was  
    bleeding. 
 
And, for Cilla, these punishing, purifying rituals, like the bulimia they replaced, are a 
response to the seemingly indelible, inescapable image and perception of her real sexual 
female self as dirty and worthless; the image that had been inscribed in, and endured since, 
childhood: 
 
    When you say that the bulimia was replaced with other things, I‟m thinking that, it‟s this  
    constant need, like if we have this image of ourselves inside as…still this perhaps a lingering  
    feeling of -- 
    -- Worthlessness  
    Worthlessness…or dirtiness?  
    Oh definitely, yeah…all of that, dirty…yeah dirty 
 
 
                   
                   Figure 25:                                                                                      (Kayla) 
 
However, now in a stable and enduring lesbian relationship, an adoring mother to her 
family and two dogs, and more concerned with the inner, spiritual aspects of her existence, 
Cilla‟s self-concept and existence as a good, worthy, and loved person is gaining a unity, 
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stability, and coherence that may be shaken - but never shattered - by external forces or 
criticisms. As she sums it up: “I may not ever be completely right, in myself, but I… 
enough for me, enough for me to cope, in this world”.  
 
 
By the same token, if all hope is lost of ever reconceiving and reconstituting one‟s 
monstrous, demonic, fragmented sexual female self and body as an essentially - or even 
socially or bulimically reconstructed - whole, good, recognizable, lovable, subjective self, 
then death may seem like the only escape. 
 
 
                             
                                     Silentstones                     (Kayla Wright,  1991-2008)  
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In this chapter, I have presented the methodology and results of practical research into the 
various stages and processes in the development of female selfhood, as they may relate to 
the hypothesis of an originary spirogenetic essence (and essential female self) that, through 
its familialy, socially and discursively imposed (de)construction, fragmentation, and 
demonization, is presenting the (necessary but not sufficient) conditions for the 
development of eating (and associated) disorders in girls/women. In Chapter 6, these 
results are analysed and interpreted in relation to the hypothesis, in order to conclude 
whether or not they provide support for its tenets. I then further interpret and discuss the 
hypothesis and findings in relation to the biomedical, psychological, and (feminist) cultural 
and psychoanalytic theories around eating (and associated) disorders, as presented in 
Chapter 4.  
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                                                               Chapter 6 
 
                                 Life Cycle of the Essential Female 
The analysis of results from the interviewing of ten women, six with previous experience 
of an eating disorder and four without, permits the painting of a six-part picture of the 
(child, adolescent and adult) stages and processes of (mal)development of the Western, 
patriarchally inscribed female - and also eating disordered - self that may be described as 
follows: 
 
  
 
 Figure 27:                                                   Me and My Selves                                                 (Lewie)
 85
 
 
i) There is an original, subjective self that was variously experienced, known and described 
by participants as: „the original person‟, „just you‟, the „essence‟, the „total complete self 
and soul‟ (Lewie); „the real me‟ (Jean, Fleur, Gorgie, Sunshine, Lewie); the „core‟, 
„natural‟, and „connected‟ self (Jean); „who I was‟, „my authentic self‟, „the person who 
runs‟ (Gorgie); „just me‟ (Gwen); „the whole person‟ (Cilla, Gorgie); the „perfect form‟ 
                                                 
85
This work is from Lewie's photographic depiction of the development of her female self in 'The Hare, The  
  Bear, and The Doll', as recounted on pp. 192-93. 
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(Miss P); „just being‟ (Gina); the self that is seen, known, and unconditionally loved for 
„who I am‟ (all). Even though most participants recalled being aware that this self was 
female, this was not a reason to see themselves as different from, or to be seen, valued or 
treated any differently to boys. In addition, for Gorgie, Sunshine, Lewie, Gina, Gwen, 
Fleur, Jean and Cilla, this original self was experienced and remembered as a whole, 
complete, unified, self-motivated mindbody self that perceived and knew herself as a 
real/essential person, with her own thoughts, feelings, desires, and abilities. This self was 
experienced as being loved for who she was; as doing things purely for the enjoyment and 
for their own sake; and, as living/being in the moment. In the above artwork, Lewie 
represents this real me - the originally and freely active, creative, loved, exuberant self - as 
the Bear Girl that, now isolated, dispirited, immobilized, and precariously suspended, feels 
the loss of her unconditional existence, recognition, and love.  
 
ii) Whether it occurred in childhood or with the onset of puberty, all participants, to one 
degree or another, experienced a shift in perception of that originary self, described as a 
shift from seeing and knowing one‟s self through one‟s own non-judgemental eyes, to a 
state of seeing that self through the critical, objectifying, dissecting eyes of others 
(particularly the father/parents), for whom its femaleness now meant difference, 
inadequacy, inferiority, restraint, and/or the need to hide or modify one‟s (sexual) female 
parts. With the onset of puberty, however, this shift in self-perception intensified as almost 
all participants (either subtly or violently) learnt to reperceive and reconceive their sexually 
(non-)developing female body as a source of imperfection (of form), shame, guilt, and 
badness, and thus, the further awareness that there were parental expectations and ideals to 
be met if one was to be recognized and exist as, a good/perfect and therefore lovable 
girl/daughter. In all cases, the need and striving to achieve these ideals and expectations 
required the actual and conceptual fragmenting, secreting or „pruning off‟ of one‟s 
shameful sexual parts, and/or a separation of mind/head from body that resulted in a 
sudden or gradual loss of the previously whole (child) self, and a real or felt separation and 
alienation from parents, siblings and friends. The sense of alienation from the mother was 
further exacerbated by an awareness that the pursuit and attainment of contemporary 
(equality based) patriarchal ideals and expectations of (attractive, active, successfully self-
directed) feminine subjectivity required the participants‟ rejection of the traditional ideals 
of (attractive, passive, subservient, objectified) femininity that had shaped and constrained 
their mother‟s life and sense/concept of self.      
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iii) This fragmentation, alienation and loss of (knowledge of) the original (but now bad, 
shameful) self and the anxious, obsessive pursuit of paternal expectations and ideals was 
very much associated with the reconstruction of a perfect pretend self or form that was 
presented to the social world in order to gain paternal/parental recognition, approval, and 
love. In Figure 27, this pretend self dually appears as the Doll and Hare Girls, these co-
existing aspects representing the participants‟ pubertal experience of shifting from a state 
of being recognized and unconditionally loved for who one real-ly is, to a state of being 
conditionally recognized and loved for how one looks, and what one does; that is, for one‟s 
perfected sexually attractive appearance, and playful yet disciplined performances. 
Subjective female existence was no longer a given, but depended upon the daily pursuit 
and visible attainment of the ideal boyishly feminine form and attributes (e.g. slimmed, 
visibly self-disciplined sexual attractiveness, intelligence, fitness, sporting/professional 
competitiveness and achievement) that were, through verbal or gestured shows of parental 
(dis-)approval, conveyed to the pubescent girl. And, as Lewie‟s picture shows, essential to 
the attainment of (recognition of) this perfect sexually desirable (Doll) form and actively, 
playfully, but also frantically and obsessively pursued (Hare) function was the repressive 
fragmentation, denial, and overcoming of the real but imperfect, dirty, bad (and thus 
unlovable) sexual female (Bear) self/body, now dispiritedly and precariously sub-sisting 
out of social and conscious sight and mind.   
 
iv) Because the pretended self would often include positive (beautiful, intelligent, sporty, 
artistic) aspects of the original self, attributes and abilities that were once part of the wholly 
integrated subjective existence and expression of that self became the basis for the 
acquired appearance, identities, and achievements designed to earn parental recognition, 
love, and thus, the persisting, re-formed existence of the self. But the recruitment of these 
attributes to serve the pretend self brought with it a fear of failure to achieve and maintain 
the (boyishly) perfect form/performance that not only forced some participants to deceive 
in order to appear successful, but also ultimately and self-fulfillingly resulted in an actual 
failure to perform, and parental disappointment and disapproval. The prospect or reality of 
this failure saw all participants turning to and pursuing the (more achievable) standards 
required for access to other (boyishly subjectifying) social or transcendent identities (e.g. 
girlfriend, vegan, wife, mother, nurse, athlete, academic, herd-tester, stripper, counsellor, 
Christian, spiritual or astrological follower) so as to construct and maintain the perfect 
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self/form and performance - and thus earn the recognition and love - required for ongoing 
subjective existence.   
 
v) For the eating disordered (hereafter „ED‟) participants, the actual or perceived failure or 
inability to achieve or maintain this perfect (parentally/socially/transcendentally 
prescribed) pretend self brought a fear of exposure of the real „dirty‟, „bad‟ sexual female 
self beneath, and thus, the possibility of subjective non-existence that resulted in a need to 
withdraw from the social realm, relinquish the paternally adjudicated pursuit of the perfect 
form, and conduct one‟s own inner battle for the goodness and survival of that real self. 
Thus, for all ED participants, their experience of anorexia/bulimia/orthorexia was not 
about fatness or the pursuit of slimness per se. Rather, it was about the self-directed, 
ritualized control of eating, drinking and other physical activities (e.g. exercise, laxatives, 
purging), as a means of desexualizing, degendering, erasing, purifying, punishing, 
comforting and thus achieving the good/perfect, lovable form and ongoing existence of 
their imperfect, fragmented, uncontrolled, sexual female self/body. And whether it was 
seen as attractive or hideous, the (ever-greater) slimness and loss of weight produced by 
these activities was a visible sign to herself of daily success in the ongoing battle for the 
goodness/perfection of that real self. In retrospect, then, the participants interpreted their 
eating disorder as a means of taking (back) control of one‟s life; of re-forming, recognizing 
and protecting one‟s real self (the „bad girl‟) as a good, lovable self when all social forms 
of identity, recognition and existence had been denied, in this way, ensuring the subjective 
survival of that self.   
 
This anorexic/bulimic pursuit of the good/perfect self was therefore seen by most ED 
participants (i.e. Lewie, Cilla, Miss P, Gorgie, Sunshine) as expressing the desire to be a 
child again; to regain the originally whole, non-sexual, non-gendered, mindbody form that 
would mean the enduring, unconditional existence, recognition and love that they 
experienced in, or associated with, childhood. For, just like Dorothy in Miss P‟s perfect 
world, and Peter Pan in Gorgie‟s perfect story, the always childlike anorexic girl would 
always have the perfect (boyish) form, and thus, no matter what she did, always exist, and 
be recognized, loved, and forgiven, so that, as Gorgie said, “if I did something wrong, I 
was still me…I still existed”. Anorexia/bulimia/orthorexia thus created a good/perfect, 
enduringly whole, same self/form, and thus, a stable, secure, inner (subjective) existence 
that, safely hidden from, and unable to be hurt or crushed by outside forces, gave the 
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participants a sense of being “in control of the control”; that is, in self-adjudicated control 
of the measured restraint and erasure of one‟s bad, sexual female parts, and thus, of the 
virtuous survival of the „real me‟. As Cilla said of her bulimia: “it was a means of survival, 
and it did get me through…what else could‟ve got me through?”. 
 
What brought an end to the eating disorder was, firstly, the realization that, at some point, 
this self-directed control (and goodness) of mind and body would be lost, as bodily 
functions collapsed and/or outside (medical, family) forces threatened to override the 
means of survival. Secondly, the (sufficiently redeemed) ability and opportunity to assume 
(more or less) socially/transcendently approved identities/roles enabled reconstruction of a 
(still) good, desexualized, boyishly subjectified pretend self, and thus, a measure of 
subjective recognition and existence within the social order. But for all ED participants, 
this exit from anorexia/bulimia was also followed by - and/or seen as a transformation of 
the disorder into - other obsessive-compulsive or ritualized behaviours (e.g. compulsive 
cleaning, working, smoking, self-harming; ritual eating, alcohol/drug dependency) or else 
depression. Whilst these compulsive behaviours were seen as a means to repeatedly 
control, purify, punish, and comfort the (sexual) female self/body just in case of collapse of 
the social self, they were also, along with the depression, interpreted as a conscious 
absence of the real self, characterized by an inner emptiness and feeling that if the social 
self collapsed (say, through performance failure), the person would no longer exist.    
 
vi) Some of the participants therefore spoke of the desire and intention to recover their real, 
whole (child) self again, through the creation of a mental/physical space within which to 
revive, reunify, reintegrate and express the real sexual female self/body, free from the 
pejoratively objectifying and annihilating conceptions of womanhood, and the 
paternally/socially imposed (boyish) gender ideals and expectations that caused its 
fragmentary loss. During the year following completion of the interviews, what became 
apparent to me and to some of the participants was a gradual change in their self-
perception, appearance and behaviour, and a feeling of becoming their real self again, and 
of wanting to know - and be seen, known and loved for - who they really are. For Gorgie, 
this reconnection with, and reconstitution and expression of her real, sensual, desiring self 
meant a desire and ability to reconnect with her daughter (and sons) and to reconstitute 
their bond as a „real‟ bond of love, respect, and honesty between two subjective female 
beings, rather than the false tie (based on unspeakable truths) that had sustained their real-
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ly fragmented, masquerading selves. And, for Lewie, to begin to reconnect with, 
reconstitute and express her real self meant recovery from several years of depression, and 
a reconnection with her mother, as acknowledged in her Christmas ‟10 art/card to Gina:   
 
  
         
        Figure 28:                                  Finding My Self, My Mother                                            (Lewie) 
 
 
As Gina interprets Lewie‟s artwork and message: 
 
The red coat is a coat that I wore in [the] UK between 1997 and 1998….it represents 
[Lewie‟s] last recalled connection with me the mother…. it is fascinating that she has 
chosen the comfort of the red coat to represent me encapsulating her. I see this 
photograph as profound, from the disconnect from mother to the transition to the healing 
of self; everything that your thesis represents. 
 
 
Interpretation of Results in Relation to the Hypothesis 
I can now relate the above summary of results to the list of factors
86
 taken as evidence in 
support of the first part (or theme) of my hypothesis: namely, that there is an originary 
female „spirogenetic‟ essence, and an essentially whole, integrated female self that is 
becoming fragmented and lost (to consciousness) through its familialy/socially imposed 
(de)construction by a metaphysically misinformed symbolic order that denies its existence. 
                                                 
86
 See pages 161-62 for this list. 
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And, if I can justifiably interpret what participants subjectively experienced and identified 
as the „real me‟, or the „original‟, „core‟, „whole‟ female self as evidence of this essence-
based female self, then the results will indeed present support for this first part of the 
hypothesis. So, what is it about this „real‟ self and its processes of development and 
construction that supports its interpretation as an originary, spirogenetically essentially 
whole, (inter)subjective female self?  
 
Firstly, most participants recalled enduringly perceiving and knowing their childhood self - 
the „real me‟ - through their own subjective eyes, consciously experiencing it as a real, 
original, natural, enduringly whole, integrated mindbody self featuring the already active 
(and passive) powers of intuition, exuberance, self-motivation, self-knowledge, 
connectedness, empathy, and the open (i.e. fearless, non-anxious), wholly integrated 
expression (and satisfaction) of needs, interests, feelings and desires. In this way, 
participants experienced and described what Aristotle (1994) conceived as the essential 
categories and qualities of real, essential, substantial, relational being. But, whereas 
Aristotle conceived this natural essential/logical form as the immaterial (and Derrida, the 
material) preserve of men, Gorgie, Sunshine and Jean experienced their originally whole 
form as indistinguishably material and immaterial, and Lewie perceived it as something 
that all girls/women have, when she said, “we‟re a person …we‟re an existence, we‟re an 
essence, we are an ego”. And, while Gorgie, Miss P, Gwenda and Cilla recognized their 
essential self/form to be originally and enduringly female, it was experienced, in 
childhood, as being just as active, capable, purposeful, assertive, valuable, perfect, and 
loved as the essential male self, in a way that allowed them to (wholly) perceive and 
experience it, and Miss P to describe it, as a “non-gendered” self. That this essential self 
was consciously experienced, recognized, and remembered as such is, in itself, evidence 
for the originally sexed, spirogenetic nature of girls/women and their essence.  
 
Secondly, the (childhood/pubertal) shift in self-perception in which participants learnt to 
reconceive their essential female self in imperfect and pejorative relation to, and through 
the sexually objectifying, dissecting eyes of the essentially perfect male self/form can be 
interpreted as marking the beginning of the metaphysically based, parentally/socially 
imposed denial, deconstruction and dissociation of her spirogenetic essence and essential 
self/form. For, as participants realized the need to prune, hide or otherwise reshape the 
„dirty‟, inadequate, uncontrolled, and thus socially unacceptable (sexual) parts of that self, 
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there was, for nine of the ten participants, a real and conceptual fragmentation and loss of 
their originally whole self that Gorgie identified with the words, “over time you 
completely lose your self”; Sunshine acknowledging the same loss of self (-knowledge) in 
recalling, “everything got muddled…I didn‟t know who I was anymore”. Because this 
parentally inaugurated, muddling fragmentation and loss of the essential self was 
experienced as a splitting off of mind- and body-parts, and a detachment of mind/head 
from sexual female body (with mind/self and head remaining one), it supports my 
interpretation of the essential self as having an originally and enduringly spirogenetically 
whole, determinate form that, in being essentio-socially constructed, and able to be 
fragmented and variously reconstructed, is also fluidly mutable.  
 
In addition, the incongruities and contradictions in the participants‟ narratives, particularly 
in the mother/daughter couple‟s understandings of each other‟s perspectives, motives, 
actions, and experiences may be interpreted as resulting from (and indicating) the pubertal 
fragmentation, demonization, silencing, and dissociation of an essentially whole, 
intersubjectively perceiving, congruously knowing self, and her consequently isolated, 
discordant strivings to meet paternal/social ideals. For example, Lewie‟s belief that, in 
contrast to her own prudery, her mother Gina was far too willing to show her own body, 
reveals the misconceptions that arose due to their pubertal dissociation - from self, and 
from each other. For, as Lewie discovered in reading Gina‟s interview transcript, her 
mother‟s apparent unselfconsciousness was in fact a deliberate effort not to pass on to 
Lewie the deep sense of shame and guilt over her „dirty‟ sexual female body that Gina 
herself had experienced since childhood. It was this breaking of the silence, and the desire 
to reclaim their essential selves, that, for both mother/daughter couples, saw the 
incongruities and the sense of alienation begin to dissolve in what both Gorgie and Gina 
experienced and described as a “healing”. Similarly, Cilla‟s incongruous recollection of 
her father as a „placid‟, „lovely‟, though violent man may be coherently understood as the 
view of an essentially whole, but pubertally de-formed, fragmented, demonized, and 
alienated girl/woman who therefore perceives her bad sexual self/body as deserving of and 
redemptively requiring the violence as punishment from a therefore good, loving, and 
otherwise placid father. Thus, contradiction and incongruity characterize and reveal the 
secreting, silencing, confusing fragmentation and loss of the originally and essentially 
whole, integrated, congruous self.      
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Thirdly, that the pubertal pruning and reconstruction of the real, „bad‟, sexual female self/ 
body into a (boyishly) androgynous form that might meet parental expectations and ideals 
was perceived by participants as the daily construction of a false or pretend self or form - 
known for her appearances, identities and achievements, not for who she was - supports 
interpretation of that real self as a non-constructed, and therefore, an original or essential 
self. And because several participants were able to maintain some (good) aspects of the 
fragmented essential self, incorporating them into the pretend self, and then later wishing 
to find and reconstitute this essential self into its originally whole, integrated, relational 
form, the essential self can justifiably be conceived as not only fluidly mutable and 
(re)constructible, but also enduringly and recognizably same, this enduring (though 
fragmented) sameness being a condition of its reconstitution. Further, because the whole, 
integrated form of the (fragmented) essential self must have, at some deeper level, been 
preserved in order for (a need for) restitution to occur, Gorgie and Fleur‟s self-perceived 
need to reconstitute their fragmented, lost, female self offers support for my hypothesis of 
an underlying, persistingly same, specifically human/female spirogenetic essence or 
(potential) form that would serve as the memory and „blueprint‟ for this reconstitution.  
 
Fourthly, because the participants uniformly rejected the traditional feminine ideals and 
roles of (passive, subservient, objectified) womanhood that had oppositionally reshaped 
and redefined their mothers, their pursuit of contemporary ideals can be understood as 
motivated by the realization that to become (and be seen as) a real sexual woman meant 
imperfection, deformation, fragmentation, badness, and ultimately, a subjective non-
existence from which not even male appropriation could save them. Recall Gorgie, for 
example, describing her sexually developing, womanly self: 
 
    [As] a woman, or a, a girl, I was a teenage…. I felt…that wasn‟t perfect, I wasn‟t the sort  
    of…the ideal….as a boy, I was perfect…so if I did something wrong, I was still me…I still  
    existed…but as a girl, or a woman, I felt that if I did something wrong, *I wouldn‟t be me  
    anymore…wouldn‟t exist*. 
 
And Lewie, describing the existential consequences of the fragmentation and loss of her 
essential self that came with sexual development and approaching womanhood: 
 
    My whole world started depending on it, on what mark I got for my art….and if I didn‟t  
    get that, I was absolutely nothing….my entire existence depended on that one, that mark. 
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And also Kerry, Gina, Jean, and Miss P‟s conception of their reconstructed self as having, 
not a sexual, womanly form, but rather, a disembodied, mechanized, masculine or childlike 
form. That the term „woman‟ meant non-existence in others‟, and thus, in the participants‟ 
eyes, lends support to my contention that the familialy/socially imposed (de)construction 
of the (sexually developing) essential female self by a (Platonic/Cartesian based, 
poststructurally modified) metaphysics and language that denies the existence of real, 
sexual women is causing a fragmentation and loss of that self. But it also suggests that it 
was the prospect of looming womanhood - and subjective non-existence - that motivated 
the participants to pursue and attain paternally prescribed ideals and identities (i.e. the 
perfect form), in the hope of maintaining some (albeit false) sense/concept of wholly 
defined, recognized, subjective existence for that „de-formed‟ self. If this was indeed the 
case, then the participants‟ correlation of the term „woman‟ - and real womanhood - with 
subjective annihilation permits an interpretation of the reconstructed, pretend self (the 
Hare/Doll Girl, or Miss Perfect) as a form of survival of the essential, but fragmented, 
female subject. This interpretation then offers explanation as to why participants such as 
Miss P and Lewie experienced (in either dreams or waking) an intense and enduring fear of 
failure to maintain parentally/socially imposed ideals, and thus, a shattering of the façade 
of a perfectly whole, controlled (childlike) form. For this shattering would not just mean 
the shameful exposure of the real, „grubby‟, imperfect, voracious, sexual self hidden 
beneath, but worse, the social, symbolic and psycho-somatic annihilation of that self.  
 
Fifthly, even though most participants did manage to maintain a good/perfect pretend self 
through their daily (often obsessive) pursuit of boyishly androgynous ideals and identities 
(of slim, self-disciplined, sexually attractive appearance and sporting/artistic/intellectual/ 
maternal achievement), thereby gaining parental/social/transcendental approval and 
subjective existence, they still felt „robotic‟, „shell‟-like, „grubby‟, „false‟, „muddled‟, 
„anxious‟, „insecure‟ and „empty‟ inside; feelings that all related to the fragmentation 
and/or loss or of their real, original self. These feelings may therefore be interpreted as 
expressing a visceral awareness that, no matter how hard they tried, the pursuit and 
attainment of the ideal form was not going to bring (back) the essentially whole, self-
subsisting, female selfhood, or the (inter)subjective expression and satisfaction of the 
wholly integrated needs and desires (and particularly the need for unconditional love) that 
they experienced as children. At best, it brought a conditional, and thus, repeatedly fought 
for, false subjectivity, the daily winning dependent upon erasing one‟s „imperfect‟ sexual 
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female self, and successfully (boyishly) imitating what was socially and linguistically 
recognized and defined as the epitome of perfection: the (phallic) male form. But at worst, 
the pursuit of this ideal form and performance ultimately resulted in a failure and loss of 
essential abilities that had initially won praise and approval for the reconstructed self, but 
that over time became disabled by the fear of failure, and thus, exposure of the real (bad) 
sexual female self.  
 
That the participants experienced these (sporting, artistic, and maternal) abilities as 
sublime moments of reconnection of mind to body; of self to others, and of exhilaration in 
feeling the natural movements and functions of the mindbody, but then, of loss through 
recruitment into the pursuit of an artificial form of existence, lends support to my 
conception of the essential female self as having essentially fixed, wholly integrated (but 
also developing) form, functions and abilities. For, only the (paternally enforced) 
degradation and dis-integration of what was an essentially whole, functionally integrated, 
female form would cause a sense of inner loss, turmoil, confusion, fear, emptiness, 
desensitization and dysfunction that would persist even through erasure of the now „de-
formed‟, uncontrollably „bad‟ sexual female parts, and the construction of what was a 
seemingly „re-formed‟, reunified, perfectly functioning self. And it is arguably because this 
reconstructed self was in fact little more than a mechanically conceived and constructed, 
iteratively and robotically performative imitation of the perfect phallic male form, 
identities, and abilities that once spirogenetically motivated and integrated female abilities 
(e.g. breastfeeding, athleticism) became dysfunctional.  
 
It seems, therefore, that the sense of inner loss, turmoil and emptiness - a loss that Lewie 
experienced and described as feeling like an empty cup that each day must be refilled - was 
a loss of, and mourning for, the self/socially (de)constructed, demonized, essentially 
spirogenetic (sexual) female self, masked and banished to the unconscious, hellish depths 
where, deprived of her original form, function, recognition  and love, she barely sub-sists.    
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  Figure 29:                                    The Demise of Demonic Woman                                        (Lewie) 
 
This interpretation of the development of sexual selfhood as the parentally/socially 
imposed fragmentation and loss of the essential female self/form, and the ideal-based, 
iterative reconstruction of a boyishly imitative self as an ultimately unfulfilling, always 
uncertain means to goodness and subjective survival, then allows me to interpret 
participants‟ experience of eating disorders as a conditional consequence of this loss. That 
is, as a desperate, internally fought battle to perfectly re-form and thus sustain the (bad) 
essential female self, in the face of a (feared) shattering of the ideal self/form, and thus, 
subjective annihilation. And if I can justify this interpretation, it will then provide support 
for the second part of my hypothesis: namely, that the parentally/socially imposed 
pathological (de)construction and loss of the essential (sexual) female self, and a failure to 
reconstruct or maintain a perfect pretend (social) self/identity, is producing a state of 
existential distress in girls/women that is resulting in the development of eating (and 
associated) disorders as an inner, self-directed means of subjective survival. 
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From the time of pubertal development if not before, all ED participants experienced a 
splitting or fragmentation of their original, essentially whole mindbody selves, as they 
learnt (through parental/familial disapproval or abuse) to see that sexual female self as now 
imperfect, inferior, bad, and shamefully uncontrolled, and thus, to be pruned off and 
hidden away beneath a perfectly reconstructed self/body. This pretend self was required to 
visibly demonstrate the pursuit and attainment of, not traditionally objectifying, but 
boyishly subjectifying ideals of slimmed, self-disciplined beauty, sexual attractiveness, and 
ever-higher achievement in order to attain and maintain the perfect form (Doll), and 
performance (Hare), and therefore achieve the parental/social recognition required for 
ongoing subjective existence. And when inability or fear of failure resulted in actual failure 
to perform (whether in sport, ballet, art, schoolwork, veganism or motherhood), a slim, 
reconstructed, sexually attractive appearance became the means to social recognition, 
approval, and existence. As Sunshine put it: 
 
    Girls learn to dissect themselves in a way… then it becomes „oh, what‟s wrong with this part  
    ….how do I improve that part?‟ And the reason why has to be because you feel otherwise,  
    you won‟t be admired, you won‟t be attractive, you won‟t be loved.  
 
 
But pursuit of this perfected appearance ultimately brought a horrifying realization: to be 
likeably attractive (or even unattractive) to boys/men required (hetero)sexual activity, and 
thus, the forceful reduction of the subjective female self to a (decapitated, dismembered) 
object/hole of male desire, use, and abuse; that is, to what Sartre (1976) saw as undefinable 
“holes” and “slime”, and to what Gina remembered as “that awful sexuality thing”. In 
other words, a shattering of the perfect feminine (Doll) form, and an unavoidable and 
uncontrollable reduction to what I have argued above to be the „demonic‟, „de-formed‟, 
essential sexual female self/parts, and thus, to the very state of subjective and symbolic 
fragmentation and non-existence that they had striven so hard to escape. It is within the 
context of this externally imposed loss of control and fragmentation of what had been 
reconstructed and maintained as the good bi-gendered self that I situate and interpret 
participants‟ eating disorders as a self-imposed withdrawal from the social order and the 
ultimately self-destructive pursuit of gender ideals, in an attempt to regain the control that 
had permitted a (boyish) reformation of the deformed, fragmented essential (sexual) self, 
only to then be taken from them.  
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This interpretation of eating disorders then accounts for and explains participants‟ 
description of their disorder as not primarily about fatness or the pursuit of slimness, but 
about the „taking back‟ of control of their goodness and existence when all external forms 
had been denied, leaving their real self and existence spinning out of control. This control 
was regained and exercised through the waging of a daily „battle‟ to be „good enough‟, in 
which the ritualistic denial (or purging) of food and enforcement of activity were the 
weapons used to hurt, punish, purify, restrain, reform, and thus make good, whole, and 
lovable again, the bad sexual female self and body. And, because participants perceived 
and used the denial of food and consequent weight loss as a way to erase their bad, 
shameful, sexual female self/parts, and even become a child again, the main goal of this 
war of attrition can justifiably be seen as the desexualizing, defeminizing reformation and 
redemption to a state of (childlike) perfection, of an essential female self that, in becoming 
sexual, had fallen so far from paternal grace. For, to have a purified, desexualized body 
was to regain the “perfect form” that meant self-control, -recognition and -love, and thus, 
perpetuation of the subjective existence of the „real me‟. But to be a woman, and especially 
one denied access to socially approved (boyish) imitations of phallic subjectivity, was to be 
without form, without control of one‟s existence, and therefore - as the essential, 
demonically sexual female self cast down into the formless, fiery „plenum‟ - without 
subjective existence, recognition, or love. On this interpretation, then, it was not the fat 
body, nor even the sexual body that was the anorexic girl/woman‟s nemesis, but rather, her 
essential sexual female self; the real but symbolically de-formed, depressed, deadened, 
silenced „me‟. And the inner battle waged against that nemesis was in fact a battle for its 
survival, in which the participant now had the power to set, judge, and meet her own 
standards and means of purity and perfection, thereby gaining a control over her existence 
that, in no longer depending upon outer (paternal/social) standards and judgements, could 
not be so easily taken away. As Miss P described it, 
 
    You‟re still in control, ‟cause that person‟s not getting at you.…it‟s like an animal attacking  
    you, you withdraw…like a bird at a snail….I was safe, because I was in control under my  
    shell, and I was in control when I was anorexic, people couldn‟t hurt me. 
  
Anorexia, then, is seemingly an escape not only from the outer world of expectations 
and fears of failure, but also from the prospect of de-formed, diabolic rejection and 
annihilation faced by those entrapped within real sexual womanly bodies. This 
interpretation then permits explanation as to why - when asked what identities they 
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would choose to describe themselves - Kerry, Gina, Gorgie, Miss P (and Jean) did not 
choose the term „woman‟. It also explains why, even after their eating disorder had 
subsided, and they had acquired a reasonably stable set of socially approved identities 
(as the good wife, mother, academic, spiritualist etc.), the participants still felt the need 
to control, purify, punish and (repressively) erase the still „bad‟, sexual female self 
through the private practise of ritualistic, obsessive-compulsive and self-abusive 
behaviours such as cleaning, dieting, nail-biting, smoking/drinking, or (violent/ 
detached) sex. And why Kerry, Gina and Sunshine would erase their sexual womanly 
self/body by conceiving the (good) self as a mind/head on a „trolley‟, a „machine‟, or a 
collection of bones. For all these strategies served to defeminize, desexualize, and thus 
give a fixed, unified, controlled (masculine) form and order to, and hence an escape 
from, their otherwise de-formed, disordered, essential, demonically sexual, female self. 
And finally, this interpretation of eating disorders permits explanation as to why some 
participants (Cilla, Gina, Gwen) were, in older or post-menopausal age, willing to 
accept the identity of „woman‟. In identifying themselves as asexual, the term „woman‟ 
no longer held the (same) power to divide, demonize and destroy their subjective female 
selves. Hence, as Lewie portrays it, the older, asexual woman may finally, sadly begin 
to reclaim, reunite, and express her essential female self - the „real me‟ - once again. 
 
 
   
   Figure 30:                                  Life Cycle of the Essential Female Self                                  (Lewie) 
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But the fragmentary reconception of the essential sexual female self as de-formed, 
disordered, disconnected, and thus subjectively and symbolically non-existent that compels 
girls/women to pursue contemporary (equality-based) gender ideals - or retreat within to 
pursue her own anorexic/bulimic ideals - in order to gain/retain a (perfect) „form‟ of 
(boyishly) subjective existence, is not the product of equality feminism. Rather, it can be 
seen as a direct result of the poststructuralist metaphysics of theorists such as Derrida, 
Foucault and Lacan, and of the postmodern cultural and social perspectives, images and 
practices that their theories inform. For the feminist egalitarianism that directly or 
indirectly inspired all participants to reject the traditional patriarchal role as the subjugated, 
objectified „Other‟ and pursue contemporary ideals that promised access to public, male-
dominated subjectivities and identities, assumed the wholly formed, material existence - 
and thus, the (social) constructibility - of real women. It was therefore not feminist ideals 
that drove the participants to slough off their essential sexual female selves and pursue a 
perfect, boyishly androgynous form and function(s) in order to be seen as constructible into 
subjectivity. Rather, it was the correlated postmodernist model of re-embodied (male) 
subjectivity that conceives real sexual woman as having no essence at all (Derrida, 1979), 
or that sees it as her essence to be the fluidly formless, unconstructible no-thing or “not 
all” (Lacan, 1982), the disgustingly natural, unbounded, uncontrollable body that is the 
very condition of postmodern man‟s sociolinguistic construction and existence as sole, 
phallically formed, inspirited, imitated subject, creator, and (increasingly violent) 
controller of the symbolic order. With this postmodern obliteration of real, natural women, 
and its reduction of „woman‟ and the feminine to phallic metaphor for „dissimulation‟ or 
pretence, it is unsurprising that postmodern girls/women are spending exorbitant amounts 
of time, money and effort being „made-up‟, or that (ever more youthful) surgically 
reconstructed, bionically mechanized, and cyber bodies are rendering unpalatable and 
really/symbolically non-existent, the natural sexual female body. Thus, when the adult 
Gorgie created and entered the imaginary world where she became Peter Pan, the eternal, 
always perfect boy, forever loved by the perfect mother, as a way of escaping the real, 
sexual womanly self that she equated with badness, disapproval, and non-existence, this 
can justifiably be interpreted as an escape from postmodern man‟s conception of the 
essential, sexual woman as without (logical) form, and thus, without order, control, 
goodness or existence. Similarly, when all participants strove to slough off, hide, purify, 
and/or punish their real sexual womanly selves in order to attain a persisting, recognizable, 
boyishly androgynous (or machine-like) form, and when some were forced to retreat 
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within to anorexically achieve that form, they were arguably reacting to the postmodern 
(textually inscribed) denial of an essential form and existence to that womanly self, and to 
its metaphoric reduction of „woman‟ to masquerade, multiplicity and fluid undecidability.  
 
For, in reclaiming the properties that Plato and Aristotle used to fixedly and materially 
define woman as the pure, immanent aspects of man‟s essential being - properties such as 
passivity, emotion, place, plurality, and fluidity - the re-embodied postmodern male subject 
has outdone the ancient Greeks in denying real women any material definition or existence 
whatsoever, by taking for himself the term „woman‟ as metaphor for the veiled phallus/pen 
with and around which he constructs his embodied, subjectified self and (textual) world. In 
this way, even woman‟s traditionally indirect access to subjective existence, as 
(heterosexual) man‟s pure, appropriated, materially defined „Other‟, has been denied, her 
real, material body now sacrificially dissected and dematerialized; its metaphorical parts 
(e.g. lips, vagina, hymen) used to textually construct Derridean/Foucauldian metrosexual 
man‟s femininely (re)embodied existence, its other parts hastily reassembled to imitate his 
(perfect) boyishly male form.
87
 This postmodern interpretation of participants‟ experiences 
of the (de- and re-) construction of their subjectivity explains very clearly, then, why those 
who found themselves unable to construct or maintain the perfect, boyishly attractive and 
successful form/function demanded by the outer real/Symbolic Father, would withdraw to 
conduct their own anorexic/bulimic/orthorexic battle for the perfect form/function and thus 
the ongoing subjective existence granted by the inner father. Within the contemporary 
feminist/postmodernist infused symbolic order, there simply is no alternative form of 
subjective definition or existence available to those girls/women.  
 
However, although it is the postmodern model of (male) subjectivity that I have argued 
here to be the contemporary context for and driving force behind the participants‟ 
development of eating and associated disorders, it is not postmodernist/poststructuralist 
theory that originally denied the essentially whole form and function(s) to real sexual 
woman, that she, in her subjective and symbolic non-existence, currently guarantees to 
men. Rather, the conception of the real sexual female (or womanly) self as de-formed, 
imperfect, undefinable and thus unknowable originated with the Platonic/Aristotelian 
                                                 
87
This poststructuralist dissection and dematerialization of real woman, and the postmodern subject's 
metaphoric appropriation of her sexual parts is expressed in the wider culture through men's use of the term 
'cunt', for example, as the most derogatory term one man could call another; also 'pussy', 'twat' etc., all 
implying his subjugated feminization. A woman's successful imitation of male subjectivity is recognized 
through her inclusion as a 'guy', 'mate', 'bro', „buddy‟, or, as having 'balls'.  
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denial of a spirogenetic essence and essential female form; a denial that, in being reified 
within language and the binary logic that underpins it, created the metaphysical 
foundations and conceptual/linguistic means for the de(con)struction of all essentially 
whole, sexual female subjects since. Whilst this denial and deconstruction may have 
historically created the foundation for disorders such as hysteria and depression, my 
interpretation of the research data suggests that it is currently - and within the context of a 
poststructuralist denial of any fixed material existence whatsoever to real women - creating 
a fragmentation and loss of essential female subjectivity that, when other means to 
reunified subjective existence are denied, is resulting in eating and associated „disorders‟. 
If my interpretation is plausible, then the research indicates Plato, Aristotle, and those that 
followed to be mistaken: there is indeed a spirogenetic female essence, and an essentially 
formed, integrated, subjective female self that, through parental/social inscription with a 
metaphysics and language that denies its existence, is becoming split, fragmented and lost.  
The existence and loss of this essential self/form then explains the historical/contemporary 
(moralized) conception of the real sexual female self as de-formed, uncontrolled, and 
therefore needing to be repressively restrained and ideally re-formed if it is to survive.  
 
For, with the loss of the whole form that ensured their (subjectively) unified, integrated, 
and thus controlled expression and satisfaction, essential needs, feelings and functions 
become disintegrated, uncontrolled and insatiable, and therefore perceived as bad, mad, 
and demonic. That is, as the wild, „voraciously engulfing‟ female (desires) that must be 
consciously repressed, restrained and redirected (through reward or punishment) in order to 
construct and serve the (boyishly imitative) social/anorexic form and function(s) that will 
bring subjective recognition, love, and survival. Thus, within this pretend form/self, the 
essential need for unconditional (inter-subjective) existence, recognition and love is 
repressively replaced and sublimated by the existential need to control one‟s self and 
surroundings, and to re-form that self in a way that pleases - and thus gains subjective 
identity and existence from - the outer/inner Father(s). But, because this conditional 
approval and existence is always a poor, uncertain, and thus, ever more arduously and 
graspingly attained substitute for the essential, but now unsatisfiable need, it can only ever 
be unstable and unfulfilling, thus creating the feelings of loss, emptiness, fear, anxiety and 
addiction (to work, exercise, success, etc.) experienced by participants. Hence the 
persisting need to privately punish (through OCDs), sometimes reward (through binges), 
and thus purifyingly control, re-form and sustain the subsisting, demonically desirous 
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woman, not only to ensure conditional existence, but also in the hope of one day 
reclaiming, reintegrating and thus, freely expressing (and being unconditionally loved for) 
her essentially whole female form, needs, feelings and functions. And, because this 
essential female self was originally - and even in its fragmentation and disguise - 
experienced as an inextricably immaterial (mind) and material (genes) mind-body/head 
self, the essential form that Plato/Aristotle perceived as immaterial, and Derrida/Foucault 
as material, can justifiably be seen as an individual, sex and species-specific, spirogenetic 
essence/form. On this basis, it seems that the research results have supported and further 
clarified the hypothesis of a spirogenetic essence and essentially whole, subjective, 
essentio-socially constructed, female self, the metaphysical denial and socio-linguistic 
(de)construction of which is creating in girls/women a state of existential (di)stress relieved 
through the reconstruction of a socially/transcendentally or anorexically perfected self, as 
forms of survival of that essential self. This interpretation of the research results as 
confirming the hypothesis now permits an analysis of the ways in which this 
metaphysical/essence model of eating disorders may concur with and/or differ from the 
biomedical, psychological, (feminist) cultural, and psychoanalytic approaches outlined in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Situating the Metaphysical/Essence Theory of Eating Disorders 
As postulated in Chapter 4, it appears that an essence-based, paternal/social de- and re- 
constructionist approach that conceives eating disorders as a means of survival then 
permits a reinterpretation of features previously seen as causally related to these disorders 
as symptoms of the prior fragmentation of, and thus, the existential need to consciously 
control, desexualize, punish, purify and re-form, the (bad) essential, sexual female self. In 
this way, the metaphysical/essence theory not only provides cohesive explanation for 
contemporary occurrences of eating disorders (including the only relatively recently 
diagnosed bulimia/orthorexia), but also permits correlation of these occurrences with 
historical accounts of the mystical anorexia of 18
th
 century „fasting girls‟, and the „holy 
anorexia‟ of saintly medieval women like Catherine of Siena.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, anorexia has variously (and chronologically) been described as: a 
disorder of the nervous system (Gull); a gastric disorder caused by intrafamilial conflict 
(Lasègue); a science/equality induced “neurasthenia” or nervous exhaustion (Playfair); a 
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disruption of psychosexual development due to repressed sexual fears/desires (Freud); a 
repudiation of normal heterosexual womanhood, a fear of fatness, and a deficient and 
externally controlled sense of self (Bruch); an over-conforming embracement of feminine 
ideals and stereotypes (Boskind-Lodahl); a protesting and rejection of confusing and 
contradictory ideals of femininity (Orbach, Bordo, Grosz); a cultural and discursive 
construction (Malson); and a genetic/neurobiological disorder (Insel). However, the 
evidence presented above for the existence of a spirogenetically essential female self, the 
metaphysical/symbolic deconstruction of which is causing a fragmentary loss of its wholly 
integrated form, functions, needs, feelings, and even existence, not only allows these 
seemingly disparate causal interpretations to be united and reinterpreted as symptoms of 
existential distress. It also refigures the biomedical, psychological, (feminist) 
psychoanalytic and socio-cultural discourses that have characterized anorexia in these 
ways as themselves constructing, inscribing, and thus perpetuating the metaphysical basis 
for its occurrence, and, as such, acting as pathogens in the de(con)structive process leading 
to anorexia‟s preservative manifestation. But in doing so, this metaphysical/essence model 
also resituates the pathological disorder, not with the occurrence of anorexia, but with the 
socially and discursively imposed de-formation and fragmentation of the essential sexual 
female self, and thus, the state of existential (di)stress created in Western(ized) 
girls/women who, in a postmodern world, daily face and strive to avert their own 
subjective, material, and symbolic non-existence. For it is this denigration and loss of 
essentially whole selfhood, and the resulting dis-integrated, disorganized, alienated state of 
mind and body that creates the fear, anxiety, depression, anger, and their uncontrolled, 
seemingly neurotic outbursts that then must - and can only - be contained, controlled and 
subdued through the construction of a paternally prescribed ideal self/form. A perfect 
pretend self that may now be seen as a prophylaxis - a form of mass medication - against 
the metaphysically based, paternally imposed, pathological fragmentation wrought by the 
symbolic inscription of the essential (sexual) female self as deformed, imperfect, 
uncontrolled, dirty, shameful, and bad. But, while these feelings may be successfully and 
repressively controlled and subdued, they may also subliminally act to undermine the 
reiterated form and performance of that pretend self through a constant fear of its failure, 
shattering, and thus, exposure of (and reduction to) the demonically desiring woman - the 
veiled „evil-Eve‟ - subsisting beneath. This paternally prescribed prophylactic „form‟ of 
subjective existence necessarily pursued and maintained by the postmodern girl/woman 
can therefore be seen as an uncertain, fear-driven, frenetic form of survival that, in its 
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actual or threatened disintegration, may bring her withdrawal into an inner, imaginary 
world to anorexically prescribe, measure, and administer her own purifying, punishing, 
desexualizing medicine - her own prophylactic „form‟ of goodness and survival - to her 
ailing, ever-evil sexual female self: the „real me‟.       
 
This resituation of the pathological state of disorder with the paternal/socially imposed 
fragmentation and loss of the essential female self, a disorder internally treated and 
controlled by the anorexic girl/woman in order to re-form, reorganize, and thus assist its 
survival, permits a reinterpretation and integration of the current biomedical, 
psychological, psychoanalytic, and social theories of eating disorders, as outlined above. 
For example, the Freudian view of (so-called) normal psychosexual development that 
views the aggressive sexual libido as primary and as the motivator of the bodily drives and 
desires that, through their repetitive imprinting, give rise to the conscious/unconscious 
mind and thus the subjective self (-image), now re-presents as a secondary and destructive 
stage in that process of development. For the primary stage is the self-motivated existence 
and development of the essentially whole, spirogenetically integrated (subjective) being, 
whose primary need is for unconditional maternal recognition and love; a need that, if 
satisfied, brings the satisfaction of all other physical and emotional needs, and the gradual 
development, within that primary, inter-subjective bond, of the wholly autonomous, but 
also always intuitively and empathetically connected, fe/male self.
88
 It is paternal 
intervention that teaches the child to reconceive the real mother as the dual „other‟; that is, 
as the castrated, submissive - but also potentially uncontrollable - object of masculine 
desire, thereby initiating the breaking of the mother/child bond of intersubjective 
recognition/love, and its gradual transformation into sadomasochistic bonds of (masculine) 
dominance and (feminine) subjugation. In this way, the boy‟s essential need for 
unconditional recognition/love is reshaped into a (femininely subordinate) desire for the 
conditional recognition, disciplinary love and approval of the father, this submissive desire 
then heteronormatively sublimated as the aggressive libidinal desire to dominate, 
appropriate and consume the feminine „other‟, thereby constructing and consolidating his 
phallically fixed, formed and privileged subjectivity. Having constructed this paternally 
and socially approved phallic (hetero-)subjectivity, the (perfect) male subject is assured of 
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This reinterpretation of the Freudian libidinal development/emergence of mind from body as secondary to 
and destructive of an already subjective spirogenetic self is also supported by psychological research 
findings that the foetus is consciously acting, and perceiving and interacting with its environment, from 
early gestation (Chamberlain, 1998).      
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the intersubjective recognition and love of the father, and thus, of his enduring place within 
the symbolic order.  
 
For the girl, the essential need for, and (maternal) bond of, unconditional, inter-subjective 
recognition/love is also reshaped into a desire to please or be punished, and thus be loved 
by, the paternal subject. This (conditional) love may be achieved while the girl has a 
childish/boyish form. But with the onset of sexual development, a stage Freud (1953) 
identified as involving a shift from active (clitoral) to passive (vaginal) sexuality, all trace 
of essentially whole, loved, subjective existence is lost as the girl comes to see her sexual 
female self as de-formed, fluidly uncontrollable and bad, and therefore to be visibly 
restrained, repressed or masochistically punished in order to meet the (objectifying) 
feminine ideals ensuring phallic definition and existence through her father/husband. It is 
this repressive loss of subjective female selfhood (and its essential form, function, and 
unconditional love), a loss that the metaphysical/essence model identifies as generally 
pathological, that Freud views as the repressive origin and condition of the normal, 
psychosexually mature, female ego or self, a self characterized by penis envy and sexual 
neuroses that, in relieving the fears and anxieties associated with forbidden, repressed, 
screened fantasies and desires, maintain the supposedly stable, sane existence of that self.  
 
That this development and existence of sane, sexually mature womanhood should depend 
upon the neurotic expression of fears, guilts and anxieties associated with supposedly 
natural, instinctive, but paternally forbidden and thus repressively controlled (sexual) 
desires and fantasies makes sense only if that womanhood is reinterpreted as a 
(prophylactic) pretend or „screened‟ self objectively (re)constructed, projected, and defined 
in self-repressively „proper‟ and thus pleasing opposition to the paternal male subject. For 
these (id) instincts and desires that Freud sees as innately sexually aggressive, 
uncontrolled, and thus needing to be repressively controlled, were not so prior to paternal 
intervention and the imposition of expectations and ideals of femininity that initiated - and 
that participants experienced as - a fragmentation and loss of wholly integrated and freely 
expressed selfhood. What arguably made these instincts and desires aggressive, 
uncontrolled, and sexual, then, was their dis-integrated separation from the originally, 
essentially whole female self, the repression of that (demonic) self and its now insatiable 
needs and impulses, and the reshaping of the essential need for unconditional 
recognition/love into a masochistically self-denying, existential need to be the ideally 
 271 
pleasing sexual object - or imitator - of the father‟s phallic gaze, desire and control. In this 
case, the Freudian notion of normal, stable, psychosexually developed womanhood is 
actually the reconstructed, constantly reiterated, prophylactic self - a false, projected, 
commodified self with a worth based on looks and utility that is always overshadowed and 
undermined by the fear of failure, a shattering of that self, and reduction to symbolic non-
existence. Thus, the fear-releasing neuroses that Freud described as a sexually motivated 
aspect of normal, well-adjusted selfhood are, in this understanding, expressing the 
pathogenically constructed fear of exposure of, and reduction to, the de-formed, real-ly 
diabolical, womanly self, and her unbounded, hellishly unsatisfiable desires. If this is the 
case, then it becomes possible to reinterpret the hysterical neurosis that Freud identified in 
Victorian women, not as an isolated pathological and somatic expression of the repressed 
fears/anxieties attached to forbidden sexual desires and fantasies (thus permitting a return 
to „normal‟ womanhood), but as a survival response to the feared or real failure to attain or 
maintain the traditionally ideal qualities of the perfectly „finished', restrained, passively 
subservient, feminine „(m)other‟. In other words, an overwhelming fear of a shattering of 
the façade of feminine perfection (the Doll) and exposure of the “devouring, insatiable 
female” (Bordo, 1993, p. 161) beneath, that forces a retreat from social constraints and 
expectations, and the hysterically redemptive immobilization of that demonic self and her 
desires (causing fainting and paralysis), sporadically interrupted by enraged outbursts of 
that self (expressed as „madness‟ and convulsions). In this way, Freudian hysteria presents 
and aligns itself alongside anorexia as a self-prescribed, self-screening prophylaxis that 
ensures the subjective survival of the fragmented, repressed, and barely-subsisting, sexual 
female self. The difference being that hysteria reacts to the Platonic/Cartesian conception 
and definition of woman as the immanent, objectified „Other‟, whereas anorexia reacts to 
the poststructuralist (male) reclamation of that otherness, leaving postmodern women with 
no other means to defined, subjective existence but to do as Plato advised, and strive to 
“become a man” (Timaeus, 90e). Both so-called disorders can therefore be reinterpreted as 
a survival response to the metaphysically based, paternally imposed, pathological 
fragmentation of the spirogenetically whole female self, and the consequent 
psycho/somatic state of numbed, disordered, uncontrollable fluidity that portends real, 
psychic, and symbolic non-existence.  
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            Figure 31:                                                                                                    (Kayla) 
 
Thus, when Freud relates anorexia to childhood sexual abuse - a relation supported by 
current statistics (and this research) indicating that (at least) 50-60% of anorectics have 
suffered significant physical, sexual and/or emotional abuse - that abuse can be 
reinterpreted as just part of the overall familialy/socially imposed denial, pejorative sexual 
fragmentation, and thus (repressive) loss of the essential female self. In exacerbating this 
loss by magnifying the dirtiness, badness, guilt, shame, and secrecy that is already 
inscribed onto the sexual female self/body, the abuse renders the socially constructed, 
prophylactic self even less tenable, thus increasing the possibility of anorexic/bulimic 
withdrawal. Hence, when Freud described anorexia as “a melancholia where sexuality is 
undeveloped”, he was correct; but the melancholia is for the lost child self, and the 
unconditional recognition and love of that self. This metaphysical incorporation and 
reinterpretation of the Freudian model of psychosexual development and associated 
hysterical and anorexic (dis)orders can now be applied to feminist psychoanalytic and 
cultural approaches.                
 
For, when Luce Irigaray (1991, p. 108) interprets the Freudian/Lacanian model of 
psychosexual development as a failure of the child to separate from her mother, and thus, 
to construct the self-limiting boundaries necessary for autonomous, sensibly transcendent, 
sexually differentiated subjectivity, and when Irigaray (ibid. p. 55) continues to associate 
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embodied female subjectivity with fluidity, multiplicity, and the absence of an essentially 
fixed, whole form, she too denies the prior existence of an essential (spirogenetic) female 
self. But, in doing so, she overlooks the possibility that the base, uncontrolled, animalistic 
bodily instincts and drives that she sees as needing to be (via breath control) conquered and 
cultivated into (divine) subjectivity, may actually be the de-formed, dissociated remains of 
that original self (-concept). And, therefore, that the self-constructed, symbolically 
mediated limits of transcendent female subjectivity, the lack of which she perceives (says 
Whitford) as “a source of pathology and dereliction” (ibid. p. 77), a source of hysteria, 
may actually be the falsely constructed and incomplete limits of a therefore always fluidly 
shifting, unstable and undefinable subjectivity, that, as such, may produce the (fear of) 
fragmentation that results in anorexia and associated disorders. If this is the case, then 
Shepherdson‟s Irigarayan interpretation of anorexia as somatically presenting the 
unspeakable question - „Am I a man or a woman?‟ - is mistaken. This is the question posed 
by hysteria, not anorexia, since the hysteric has a choice: she can identify with man, or be 
his oppositely and fixedly defined material property, woman. The anorectic, however, has 
no such choice, since, for her, the term „woman‟ means nothingness; a state of non-
existence that only the daily renewed attainment of paternally bestowed, male-imitative 
subjectivity can avert. Thus, the question daily, silently, and more urgently posed by the 
anorexic self is - “Do I still exist?” - her ever more clearly defined, purified bones 
answering in the affirmative. But the resolution for both hysteria and anorexia remains the 
same: the return to this girl/woman of her original, essentially whole female form and 
function. Because Irigaray denies the existence of this originary essence, she leaves real 
woman in the (pathological) metaphysical state of fluid unconstructibility and symbolic 
non-existence to which she was consigned by poststructuralist (male) theorists.   
 
This metaphysically based psychoanalytic understanding of eating disorders as an inner 
means of surviving a general pathological loss of essential female selfhood then permits 
the integration of this approach with the feminist cultural approaches of Orbach and Bordo. 
Both interpret anorexia as an unconscious form of feminist protest (through exaggeration) 
of feminine ideals that, in demanding slimness as a sign of beauty, purity, youth and the 
submissive desire to please, but also of autonomy and self-control, are contradictory, 
confusing, and unattainable. Bordo therefore groups anorexia with hysteria and 
agoraphobia, describing them as “pathologies of female protest” (1993, p. 159), in which 
the anorectic resists these ideals, and flees the corresponding archetypal image of the evil, 
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devouring female, by taking the pursuit of slimness to its extreme, starving away her 
female body to become the perfectly pure, transcendent (male) mind; that is, to become 
and remain a boy, thereby escaping womanhood. Whilst Orbach also sees anorexia as a 
form of protest, it is not just confusing feminine ideals that it is protesting (via “hunger 
strike”), but also the inability to attain these ideals in a public sphere that perpetuates 
women‟s inequality and demands (slimmed) compliance with masculinist values. 
However, although expressing a desire for autonomy, anorexia actually results in extreme 
separation of self from body, and prevents separation from the mother, thus precluding 
autonomous selfhood. While the metaphysical model relates anorexia to a rejection of 
traditional femininity, confusion at contemporary ideals, and escape from the demonic 
female body, in recognizing what Orbach and Bordo‟s poststructuralist models deny (an 
essential female self that, with sexualization, becomes the demonic female), this model 
requires the distinguishing of hysteria from anorexia, and the refiguring of pathology and 
protest as prior to and part of the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the 
occurrence of anorexia. For, contrary to these cultural theories, the research results 
indicate the original site of pathology to be with the pejorative sexual fragmentation and 
objectification of this essentially whole self (-concept), and the consequent post-feminist, 
postmodern need to pursue imitative entry into the still male-dominated realm of 
phallically bi-gendered subjectivities and identities. And this entry required the attainment 
of an ideal form that was experienced as contradictory and confusing only because it was 
false and required alienation, not from the female body, but from the essential 
(demonically sexual) female self. By making subjective existence, recognition, and love 
conditional upon the attainment of this ideal form, this imitative subjectivity ensures a state 
of parental/social dependency for all (postmodern) girls/women that, with a failure to 
maintain ideals, may shift to an inner anorexic dependency on the ability to desexualize, 
purify, and thus sufficiently re-form that demonic self. On this understanding, it is not body 
image (and fatness) that is the anorectic‟s focus, but her essential sexual female self (-
concept), and the existential need to remove all trace of her (imperfect, bad) sexual female 
parts and achieve a perfectly boyish, childlike, or even machine-like self/form. Thus, 
anorexia does not protest, but relinquishes the pursuit of social ideals. This understanding 
then permits correlation of anorexia with bulimia, orthorexia and obesity, all of these 
„disorders‟ being similarly reinterpreted as an inner battle to desexualize, defeminize, 
discipline, punish, and thus purify, re-form, and protect the essential sexual female self/ 
body, in the private pursuit of goodness and subjective survival. In this way, the 
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metaphysical model incorporates Bruch‟s association of anorexia with obesity, whilst 
reinterpreting her perceptions of anorexia as arising from body image distortion due to fear 
of fatness, a detachment from bodily sensations, a deficit in autonomy, and  “various 
symbolic misinterpretations of the eating function” (1974, p. 236) as unified in their 
motivation by a very rational fear of the development of the (bad) sexual female self that 
signifies imminent subjective and symbolic death.  
 
But this fear and the (causal) features that Bruch attributes to anorexia can only be 
cohesively related and explained in relation to other eating disorders if they are identified 
in the first place with the initial fragmentation and loss of the essential sexual self, and 
(re)construction of the ideal-based, prophylactic pretend self. For, in this case, fatness and 
food consumption represent a visible and dis-integrated expression of the bad, fragmented, 
uncontrolled sexual self that must be constantly and noticeably restrained, purified, and 
repressively erased if that seemingly unified, controlled, hopefully perfect, pretend self is 
to be sustained, and paternally approved (subjective) existence attained. The young girl 
therefore learns from her mother to resignify and utilize food as a tool of self-denial, 
control, punishment, purification, and desexualizing reconstruction of the impure, dis-
integrated, sexual female self/body. But with this loss and false reconstruction(s) of the 
essential self comes alienation from her feelings, desires, emotions and intuitions, as they 
are repressively hidden or reconfigured according to the desires and expectations of the 
real, social, and/or transcendent Father, thereby producing in the developing girl the sense 
of detachment, lack of autonomy, and externally imposed control that Bruch associates 
with anorexia. However, it is only with the failure to attain or maintain feminine ideals, 
and thus, the lack of socially approved, self-reconstructive means to attain and exhibit the 
self-disciplined, boyishly attractive, paternally approved form, that a girl/woman may have 
little choice but to use food and body shape as the socially disapproved, self-destructive, 
anorexic means and measure of desexualizing purification and re-formation of the „de-
formed‟ sexual female self. Hence, while the anorectic continues to perceive her essential 
sexual self through the pejorative, annihilating gaze of the real/social father, and may thus 
judge the goodness of her pretend self through the (punitive, self-destructive) standards of 
an inner demonic father, thereby compromising her autonomy (as Bruch suggests), she 
nevertheless gains a sense of control over her self, her goodness, and thus, her subjective 
existence, that, as the socially reconstructed self, she did not have. It is only when this 
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control is taken from her, and/or all other (non-destructive) means to a good, loved 
subjective existence denied, that real or psychic/psychotic death may ensue.  
 
Thus, having utilized the metaphysical/essence model of eating disorders to incorporate 
and reinterpret current psychoanalytic, cultural, and psychological models, it remains now 
to account for the biomedical genetic and hormonal approaches, the final synthesis then 
permitting explanation of both historical and increasing contemporary and cross-cultural 
occurrences of these „disorders‟ - now reinterpreted as „re-ordering‟ means of survival of 
the subjective self. For, if, under the metaphysical model, the original pathology is situated 
with the reconception of the essential sexual female self as demonically de-formed, 
uncontrollable, and potentially non-existent, and thus needing to be hastily buried beneath 
a socially or anorexically reconstructed, pretend self as its prophylactic „form‟ of survival, 
then this model recognizes a genetic/inheritable component to anorexia, but only for the 
following reasons. Firstly, it is the parents that (through a perceptual shift) initiate and 
transmit this fragmentary loss of essential selfhood, as the daughter learns to perceive and 
reconceive her mother and thus her sexual female self as de-formed, uncontrollable, and 
thus male-dependent, and therefore needing to please the real/social/transcendent father by 
reshaping and thus escaping that self. And secondly, the breaking of the bonds of 
unconditional, maternal recognition and love (of the essential self), and the abuse-fuelled 
failure to gain paternal/social approval and love that created in the ED participants a sense 
of fear, distress, anxiety, worthlessness, abandonment, and futility, have in recent studies 
been shown to cause genetic/neural dysfunction in, and reduction of, certain regions of the 
brain. For example, in studying the brains of suicide subjects who had been severely 
neglected and/or abused in childhood, McGowan, Sasaki, Huang, Unterberger, Suderman 
…Szyf (2008) found impaired gene expression and therefore neural dysfunction in the 
hippocampus (the region encoding memories) that, in an earlier study of similarly 
(maternally) deprived and thus fearful, neurotic, stressed rats, increased the production of 
stress hormones.
89
 It seems plausible to suggest, therefore, that the genetic, neural, and 
hormonal dysfunctions biomedically associated with anorexia may be symptomatic of a 
prior (Paternally/abuse driven) loss of (inter)subjective existence, construction, recognition 
and love of the (essential) self, symptoms that anorexia attempts to relieve through its 
recrafting of a perfectly reformed, recognizable, lovable subjective self. And, in adversely 
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See pages 59 and 100 for references to other epigenetic research linking parental influence to genetic    
dysfunction. 
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affecting the brain, this loss of essential selfhood may also be expected to produce 
hormonal, menstrual, and other physiological irregularities, both in the anorexic and the 
supposedly normal (but false, conditionally existent) self/body, thus explaining the 
increasing incidence of fear/stress/anxiety-related disorders (and associated higher levels 
of stress hormones) in contemporary Western girls/women - including hypertension, 
obesity, coronary disease, cancers, and food/air allergies.
90
   
 
In addition, the often traumatic loss of unconditional, inter-subjective existence, 
recognition and love of the essential self, along with the fear, stress and anxiety around 
constructing and maintaining a perfect pretend self, would explain the low levels of 
neurotransmitter hormones such as dopamine, serotonin, and oxytocin (and the elevated 
levels of stress-related glutamate) found in depressed, stressed, anorexic, and obsessive-
compulsive girls/women. For, as noted in Chapter 4, the production of these pleasure-
based neurotransmitters has been associated with the satisfaction of needs for (maternal) 
recognition, love, affection, food and laughter, and if these needs are repressed, or 
reshaped and deployed in the pursuit of conditional approval and existence, then they 
cannot be satisfied, causing hormonal/neurotransmitter levels to become depressed.
91
 But, 
for both the social and the anorexic (prophylactic) selves, what will increase the levels of 
the pleasure-based hormones and neurotransmitters is a daily measure of success in the 
disciplined (masochistic) achievement of the ideal, male-imitating form and function(s), 
and thus, the daemonic approval ensuring ongoing existence of the suitably desexualized, 
dewomanized, boyishly perfected female subject. Hence the addictive nature of the 
anorexic Kerry‟s periods of starvation that, after a certain time, would produce an 
endorphic „high‟ signalling a further erasure of, and escape from, the weakly feminine, or 
demonically uncontrolled (non-existent) womanly self/body, and thus, an albeit temporary 
lowering of fear, anxiety, and stress-related hormones and responses. And also, the 
obsessive nature of Cilla‟s post-bulimic, socially reconstructed self‟s drive for 
achievement and recognition within her workplace, along with her addictive need to 
visibly purify and punish the still sub-sisting (dirty, bad) sexual self through ritual 
cleansing and painful, bloodied nail-biting; both pursuits delivering a measure of goodness, 
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 Research indicating an increasing incidence of stress-related physiological and mental disorders within  
contemporary American women, and their higher levels in women as compared to men, can be found in 
Juliet Schor's The Overworked American (1993); Elder, Gullion, Funk, DeBar, Lindberg & Stevens (2011); 
Schulte (2011). 
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reassurance of ongoing subjective existence, and thus, a tranquillizing “release” from 
anxiety, to the prophylactic self.  
 
This metaphysical/essence model of eating disorders may therefore explain and resituate 
their neurological interpretation as being due to a dysfunction in the limbic (or 
hypothalamic) region of the brain, the centre associated with emotions, (food/tactile/ 
sexual) appetites, and the (satiated) production and regulation of dopamine, serotonin and 
oxytocin. For, with the repressive loss of the spirogenetically integrated form and function 
of the essential self, it can be expected that the functions (and even form) of the limbic 
system would also become dis-integrated, depressed and reshaped, with once 
unconsciously integrated emotional and physical needs, appetites, and modes/feelings of 
satisfaction and pleasure being psychosomatically reconstructed and (re)pressed into the 
service of the pretend prophylactic self and its pursuit of the ideal form/function. For this 
self, it is no longer the satisfaction of bodily appetites that will cause a release of pleasure 
hormones, but their denial, as she strives for success in attaining paternal ideals and 
approval. It is this success that now fires the limbic system into producing feelings of 
satisfaction and pleasure, and that, if denied, motivates a retreat from social into anorexic 
pursuit of the perfect form, success here bringing the required limbic response. By its very 
nature, however, the anorectic‟s pursuit of the perfect, lovable form (and associated 
feelings of pleasure) must also cause physiological changes in the brain/limbic system (and 
other organs), as she starves to erase and escape her dirty, bad, de-formed, sexual female 
self/body. It might be expected, therefore, that the degree of physiological disintegration 
will reflect the degree of dirtiness, badness, shame and/or disdain that the anorexic 
girl/woman has come to associate with her sexual female self, an inability to escape that 
badness ultimately resulting in loss of hope and somatic failure. Or, as Sunshine 
experienced and described it: 
 
    I‟d start getting flushes and dizzy spells, and it was like I was losing control of my….Your  
    body just can‟t cope with the failure of never going to be…the realization that you‟re never  
    going to get there…. you try and be good, but you‟re never going to be good enough…. you  
    can‟t function, therefore your body gives out, you just can‟t be yourself.     
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Thus, for the anorexic/bulimic girl, 
detached from and denying the needs, 
desires, feelings, and even the 
existence of her real, evil sexual 
female self/body in the pursuit of 
goodness, it is not just the limbic 
system but the heart and all other 
spirogenetic parts and functions that 
are reshaped and reduced - or even 
stopped, if the battle to escape their 
shameful, painful badness and become 
a whole, lovable self again, seems lost.  
 
 
                
     Figure 32:                                 (Kayla) 
 
But, because the conditional approval and love of the real/social/d(a)emonic father is only 
ever a poor and iterative substitute for the unconditional, intersubjective mother/child bond 
that is the most essential need, the mind, head and body of both the anorexically and 
socially reconstructed selves remain in a state of depressed, deprived, obsessive, addictive, 
and melancholic longing for that essential, but now lost maternal recognition and love of 
the originally perfect child self. It is this metaphysical/essential reinterpretation of the 
physiological and neurological aspects of eating disorders that then permits incorporation 
and reinterpretation of the final pieces of the puzzle: the historical cases of “anorexia 
mirabilis” identified in 19th century Europe‟s „fasting girls‟, the “holy anorexia” of saintly 
medieval Christian women, and contemporary Western and cross-cultural increases in 
cases of not only anorexia, but also bulimia, orthorexia and obesity.        
 
The holy anorectics and the fasting girls also faced the prospect of demonic de-formation 
and symbolic non-existence associated with possession of a sexually developing female 
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body, and, desperate to escape this pathological destruction of the subjective self, also 
sought imitative access to the Phallic Order of transcendent subjectivities and identities - 
perhaps the only form of subjectivity available to them in those pre-egalitarian times. But 
this access was dependent upon meeting the ideals and thus gaining the recognition and 
approval of the familial, mystical and/or religious Father; ideals that required, not the 
boyishly slim, restrained, sexually attractive form demanded by contemporary social 
ideals, but a boyishly pure, virginal form that, transcending the demonic desires of the 
sexual female self/body, was worthy to receive the phallic Word (and flesh) of the 
supernatural Father, and thus ultimately become divinely disembodied (male) spirit: the 
flesh made Word. And the only means available for attainment of this boyish form was the 
self-destructive weapon of purifying, mortifying, desexualizing, defeminizing self-
starvation, a tool of reformation that, if seen as divinely inspired, brought provisional, 
imitative access to transcendent subjectivity, but that, if seen as demonically inspired, 
meant madness and symbolic death. Therefore, with no other form of recognized, loved 
subjective existence available, for the holy/mystical girl, real death as a transcendently or 
anorexically perfect subject may have been preferable to the psychic death inflicted by 
traditional (male possessed) femininity, or its counterpart, the wildly unbounded 
(demonically possessed) essential female self. Thus incorporated and reinterpreted within 
the metaphysical model of essential/reconstructed subjectivities, this mystical and religious 
reformation of the (bad) essential sexual female self as the (boyishly) perfect, ultimately 
transcendent subject is similarly reflected in the prophylactic selves created by my research 
participants. That is, in Kerry‟s concept of her good anorexic/academic self as a head/mind 
on a trolley; Jean‟s concept of her core (astrological) self as a masculine „head‟ self; 
Gwen‟s concept of her good, boyish self as clothed in the armour of God; Gorgie‟s 
conception of her good, orthorexic self as the always perfect (supernatural) boy, Peter Pan; 
Miss P‟s conception of her perfect anorexic self as Dorothy, flying free of her imperfect, 
pubertal female body and over the rainbow; Fleur‟s concept of her good, socially 
acceptable self as a disembodied, desensitized robot; Sunshine‟s conception of her good 
anorexic self as a person with a number of bony parts; Cilla‟s concept of her good 
bulimic/obsessive self as cleansed of its dirty sexual parts in the quest for social/spiritual 
perfection; Gina‟s concept of her good spiritual self as a desexualized, disembodied 
intellect; and finally, Lewie‟s artistic concept of her ideal self as the young „chimney-
sweep‟, the always perfect, boyishly non-gendered child.  
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In this understanding, historic and contemporary modes of transcendentally and 
anorexically attained subjectivity are united in depending and drawing for their existence 
upon the ideals, approval and love of an immaterial father, whether that be God, daemon, 
or the inner voice (the „super-ego‟) demanding abstinence of the (imperfect) daughter. 
Ideals that, in redemptively demanding a desexualized, defeminized, boyish, and ultimately 
disembodied form, promise and protect a form of subjectivity that averts the (social) sexual 
objectification, penetration, and thus annihilation of the prophylactic self. In other words, 
for the transcendent (outer/inner) Father, sexual attractiveness is not a requirement for 
subjectivity. Rather, it is the reductive changes in appearance/size - signalling the 
mortifying, purifying erasure of the bad sexual female self/body and the defeminizing 
achievement of a (hetero)sexually unattractive, diminished, and therefore redeemed 
childish/boyish form - that please the Father, therefore achieving and sustaining (as well as 
protecting from violating dispossession) the subjectivity of the transcendent/anorexic self. 
 
 
 
                                         
                                                Figure 33:                                   (Kayla) 
 
 
 
Thus, in a reversal of the spirogenetic construction and functioning of the originally 
integrated self, visibly self-mortified frailty, diminution, and unattractiveness are what 
gratify the transcendent (prophylactic) self, thereby increasing neural secretions of 
pleasure-inducing dopamine, serotonin and endorphins from its depressed, dysfunctional 
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limbic system, and reducing stress-related glutamate secretions. This metaphysical 
reinterpretation - and thus correlation - of historical and contemporary forms of 
transcendent and anorexic subjectivity, along with the resituation of their 
psychological/physiological causes as symptoms of a prior pathology (the loss of essential 
selfhood), now allows reinterpretation and explanation of a seemingly contradictory 
feature noted in both historic and contemporary cases of anorexia: the absence/presence of 
hunger. While Freudian theory characterized anorexia as the absence of hunger (due to a 
fear of oral impregnation or other repressed sexual fantasies), and while biomedical theory 
later linked this absence to neurological dysfunction, other psychological/cultural theories 
have contradictorily characterized anorexia as the enduring suppression of a therefore 
voracious hunger. The metaphysical model, however, recognizes both the presence and 
absence of hunger as features of the anorexically reconceived and reconstructed 
prophylactic self, as she strives to avert subjective non-existence.   
 
For the holy anorectic, the mystical fasting girl, and the postmodern anorectic desperately 
striving to escape their own (bad, deformed) sexual female self/body and thus attain or 
retain an ideal, boyishly/childishly embodied subjectivity, the subjective experience and 
denial of bodily appetites is initially a source of self-control, (desexualizing) purification, 
punishment, goodness, and thus, of addictive, hormonally related pleasure (and stress 
relief) in pursuing these ideals. However, if her „badness‟ seems inescapable (due to 
sexual/incestuous abuse, guilt and shame, for example), then total body transcendence may 
be required for the construction of the good prophylactic self, in which case, bodily needs, 
appetites and functions may no longer register with its mind/brain. For the transcendent/ 
anorectic self who has reconceived her redeemed self as a head/mind on a trolley, for 
example, there may be no conscious awareness of bodily sensations, hunger, or even of the 
body itself, limbic pleasure now derived, not from the suppression and denial, but from the 
absence of that voracious hunger that signals transcendence of and escape from the 
demonically desiring, sexual womanly self. Finally she has achieved the perfect 
boyish/childish form that assures self/paternal approval, recognition, love, and thus, (albeit 
provisional, imitative) subjective existence to the anorexic self. Having thus accounted for 
and reinterpreted the various approaches to (historical and contemporary cases of) 
anorexia, it is now possible to employ the metaphysical/essence model to explain the 
recent increase in prevalence and incidence of all eating disorders, within both Western 
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and non-Western cultures (Talleyrand, 2006, Efron, 2008), and across divisions of class 
and sex.  
 
Characterizing anorexia as a result of a loss of essentially subjective selfhood, a (post-
feminist) rejection of traditional (objectifying) feminine ideals, followed by a failure to 
attain or maintain (imitative) access to the postmodern symbolic realm of phallic 
subjectivities and identities, explains the only recent spread of anorexia into classes and 
cultures where traditional feminine ideals have persisted, but where isolated individuals or 
groups have (like the holy anorectics) rejected them in favour of male-imitative 
subjectivities. Such was the case with (cousins) Fleur and Gorgie, who rejected the 
oppressive feminine ideals passed down by their Māori mother and father respectively - 
ideals that saw their great great grandmother, a Māori princess, gifted by her Maniapoto 
tribe to northern Māori as a peace-making gesture, and that had permitted the incestuous 
abuse of Fleur‟s mother and Gorgie - instead pursuing the seemingly liberatory 
opportunities offered to them by (middle-class) Pākeha culture. What both found, however, 
was that both cultures shared the same underlying concept of the sexual female self/body 
as dirty, bad, and shameful, an inherited conception that ultimately undermined their 
ability to reconstruct an enduring, paternally/socially approved, subjective (Pākeha) self; 
Fleur constantly shifting (identities), Gorgie turning to orthorexia, and both ultimately 
opting for marriage as an indirect but safer path to a phallically ensured subjective 
existence. For both, the postmodern promise of fully embodied subjectivity for all forms of 
difference had revealed itself to be reserved only for those with (phallic) male bodies, with 
even limited subjectivity denied to those unable to escape their demonic femaleness. On 
this understanding, it becomes possible to surmise that the recent occurrences of anorexia 
in postmodern boys/men may be expressing a similar inability to escape what they have 
(perhaps through abuse or homosexuality) come to see as their own demonically castrated, 
de-formed, feminized sexual self/body, and the consequent inability to gain access to 
phallic subjectivities and identities. For, in a postmodern world, like real sexual woman, 
the deformed, feminized man comes face-to-face with his own material and symbolic non-
existence, anorexia offering an inner retreat and form of survival to his essential male self.              
 
Having begun this chapter with a summary of the research results presented in Chapter 5, I 
then thematically interpreted the results, finding strong support for the hypothesized 
existence of an original spirogenetic essence and essential female self, the metaphysically 
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based, parentally/socially/discursively imposed denial, (sexual) demonization and 
deconstruction of which is causing its pathological fragmentation and loss, and thus, the 
existential need to reconstruct a paternally prescribed ideal self as a prophylactic form of 
survival. In these post-feminist, postmodern times, this ideal is a boyishly subjectified 
self/form based on ever more stringent, bi-gendered ideals of appearance and achievement, 
and the (fear of) failure to attain or maintain this pretend (and thus unstable, unsatisfied) 
self is producing a state of existential (di)stress that is resulting in eating and associated 
(depressive, obsessive, addictive) disorders, as an inner battle to control, purify, re-form, 
and thus, sustain, the essential (but fragmented, demonic) sexual female self. I then showed 
how this metaphysical/essence model permits incorporation and reinterpretation of the 
various biomedical, psychological, (feminist) psychoanalytic and cultural approaches to 
eating (dis)orders as not only describing the symptoms of, but also acting as pathogens in 
the prior and pathological denial and de-formation of the essential female self, and thus, in 
creating the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for these disorders to occur. In this 
way, the metaphysical/essence model permitted and explained a correlation of anorexia not 
only with other contemporary eating and associated disorders, but also with its historical 
manifestations. Because I have located the origin of these forms of (dis)order in the 
Platonic/Aristotelian denial of a spirogenetic essence and an essential female self, a denial 
that sparked a trail of illogical misconceptions of both essence and woman, it remains now 
to relate the outcome of the research - its support for the existence of a sexed „spirogenetic‟ 
essence, and thus, for a metaphysical model of the (mal)development of the essential 
female self and associated mental disorders - to the historical (mis)conceptions of essence 
(and essential subjectivity) outlined in Chapter 3.  
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Section III:    Reconceptions of Essence, Subjectivity and Metaphysics 
 
                                                   Chapter 7 
 
                                    A Sexed, Spirogenetic Model 
 
If there is an originary, knowable, „spirogenetic‟ essence that determines and motivates the 
whole form, function and development of an essentially subjective female self, this 
unconditionally loved self becoming fragmented and lost through its parentally/socially 
imposed (de)construction by a metaphysics and language that deny and demonize its 
existence, and reduce woman to the material/metaphorical properties of man‟s immanent 
essence, then it may be expected that the stages and changes in the development of this 
essential female self will reflect changes in the metaphysical/discursive conceptions of 
essence. And indeed, in relating this metaphysical/essence model of female subjectivity to 
the genealogy tracing the historical philosophical development of the notion of essence, it 
appears that the history of (mal)development of the contemporary essential female self, 
and especially the anorexic self, manifests the history of metaphysical and linguistic 
(mis)conceptions of the notion of essence from Platonic/Aristotelian times to the present 
day. If this is the case, then the anorexic self presents as evidence for the existence of a 
sexed spirogenetic essence and the very real effects on past and present girls/women of 
Aristotle‟s (il)logical misconception of that essence and the trail of ever more intricate 
misconceptions that have rendered postmodern woman‟s very existence dependent upon 
her pretended possession of a material essence and its perfect boyish form. As such, the 
anorexic self may also point the way to an accurate and coherent metaphysics. 
 
This research into the origins and processes of development of female selfhood and 
associated mental disorders suggests that, when the ancient Greek Heraclitus monistically 
viewed reality as a material world of space and time that is always fluidly changing and 
therefore never the same (or knowable) from one instant to the next, and when Plato 
countered with his dualistic, hierarchical division of reality and human (male) being into 
fixed, knowable, immortal form and transient, changeable, unknowable matter, both 
ignored a third option. As theorized in Chapter 3, and as indicated by the research 
participants‟ experiences and interpretations of their own subjective female self and the 
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stages and processes of its development, that third option is the existence of an originary 
spirogenetic essence, its always (im)material aspects unitedly and equally shaping the 
persistingly whole, identical, recognizable, and thus knowable individual, sexuate and 
species form - the essentially (inter)subjective mindbody self - of every human being. Only 
by overlooking his ideas of pre-formed matter (e.g. „bronze‟) as having an intelligible 
order (or logos), and of essence as determinative of sexuate difference as well as sameness, 
could Aristotle conceive essence as a purely immaterial, male preserve, thereby granting 
wholly self-subsisting, developing form to man, and reducing real woman to de-formed, 
dis-ordered fluidity. But, in doing so, he denied both man and woman a sexed, spirogenetic 
essence and essentio-social self that, when free to grow and function in a wholly integrated 
way, permits clear intuitive (self-)perception, knowledge and expression, but when split, 
(sexually) fragmented and dis-integrated, may prevent mind from perceiving body, and 
both from enacting and actualizing their once wholly integrated form and functions.  
 
Plausibly, it is this spirogenetic conception of essence and essential selfhood that was 
evidenced in participants‟ experience and knowledge of their original, childhood self as a 
wholly unified, integrated, self-knowing, female, mindbody self, that, within the security 
and freedom of unconditional, intersubjective recognition and love, could fully express and 
act upon her intuitive thoughts, feelings, needs, interests and desires. But, with puberty, 
and the (externally imposed) sexual denigration and fragmentation of this spirogenetic self, 
came a splitting of mind/head from body that, far from the beatific vision of absolute truth, 
beauty, and goodness promised to transcendent Platonic man, brought a loss of self (-
knowledge) and a sense of disintegration, confusion, and alienation that reflects and 
refigures the Platonic/Aristotelian denial of a sexed spirogenetic essence, and the 
consequent mind/body dualism, as a pathogenic misconception of essence and essential 
selfhood. The ontological and social consequences of this misconception are made clear 
when Plato states: 
 
[J]ust that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on 
account of their weakness - I mean the female sex - has been left without legislation by 
the legislator, which is a great mistake…in proportion as woman‟s nature is inferior to 
that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the consequence of such neglect is more 
than twice as important. (Laws, Bk. VI) 
     
Of the men who came into the world, those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives 
may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second 
generation. (Timaeus, 90e) 
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Without an essential soul/mind, and thus having “a womanish and small intellect” 
(Republic, 469d), and without lawful regulation of their consequently uncontrolled 
impulses and appetites, women incite men to act lustfully, and are what men become if 
they do. Two millennia on, the effects of this phallocentric misconception of essence were 
experienced by participants as the effects of the (pubertal) shift in perception, and the 
real/conceptual deformation and fragmentation, of their essential female self. For, with the 
paternally/fraternally imposed deformation and denigration of her originally whole self, 
and a splitting of head/mind from (bad, shameful) sexual body, Gorgie became unable to 
see her self in the mirror, and insensitive of her breasts and sexual/reproductive body: 
     
    How did you see your breasts, like when they started to develop? 
    I didn‟t see them, that‟s the weird thing about it 
    when you looked in the mirror [in early adulthood]? 
    I couldn‟t see myself…‟cause I couldn‟t see my self other than what I was holding on  
    to as a ^kid. 
 
However, following the birth of her first child (Sunshine), and the development of a bond 
of unconditional recognition and love, Gorgie was suddenly able to see and experience her 
breasts, body and self for what they were, and for their real, self-defined, functional 
purpose:     
   
   [With maternity] how did your view of your own self, your own body, your sexual body,  
    how did --  
    -- My body all of a sudden became functional, like my breasts became functional, I was  
    breast-feeding .…that‟s what my breasts are for….I became comfortable with that.…my  
    breasts are for breastfeeding…they're no longer, they‟re not sexual, they‟re not there for  
    a man….they‟re there as a functional purpose, so I became very conscious of my breast 
    ….it made me feel good about the breast in that sense. 
 
In recognizing and loving Sunshine, and being recognized and loved as an essentially 
subjective self, Gorgie experienced a temporary reunification and reintegration of mind 
and body - that is, of her spirogenetic form and functioning - that allowed her to once again 
perceive and know her self for who she was, and for her own wholly self-defined 
female/maternal form and function; her body no longer reduced to a number of male-
defined, desired, used, abused, and thus shamefully erased sexual parts. Thus, in ignoring 
the possibility of a sexed spirogenetic essence, Aristotle may have metaphysically reified 
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and ratified the mythological and social positioning of man as sole essential subject, as 
well as seemingly presenting him with the empirical means to knowledge of universal 
forms from the perception of their material manifestations. But he did so at the inestimable 
cost of distorting the notion of essence, and the metaphysical and binary logical view of 
human and worldly existence that it underpins, thereby setting the ontological and 
linguistic foundations for the familial, social and discursive de(con)struction of the 
spirogenetic form/function of Western girls (and boys) since. For, through the works of 
Saint Augustine (and later, Thomas Aquinas), this misconception of essence was then 
implanted into the Christian scriptures, beliefs and rituals that, in the present day, and 
along with those of Māori mythology and culture, featured so prominently in the 
discursively imposed de-formation, demonization, and thus, the participants‟ hopefully 
ideal reconstructions of their essential sexual female self.  
 
This Platonic/Aristotelian denial of a spirogenetic essence determining individual, sexuate 
and species sameness and difference of form/function, and their conception of an 
immaterial essence or ousia that was the first cause and most perfect expression of man‟s 
substantial existence, growth and movement, meant that enduringly unified, recognized, 
loved subjective existence was no longer a given, but now had to be earned. Denied the 
wholly integrated, intersubjective expression and satisfaction of essential needs (for 
recognition, love, touch, nurturing), Platonic man‟s attainment of immortal subjective 
existence required the soul‟s separation from and transcendence of its now dis-integrated, 
untrustworthy bodily senses and lustful desires (to eat, drink and sexually submit), so that 
it might ascend to and become one with the absolute goodness, truth, and beauty of the 
world of perfect Forms. But, for Augustine, not only could man‟s soul ascend to perfect 
immortality; it could also be tempted into evil thoughts and deeds, and thus Fall and burn 
in the flaming fluidity of Hell. Thus, the attainment of goodness and immortality required 
more than the rational pursuit of perfection. It required the mind‟s receptive submission to 
the Word and will of the most perfect, omnipotent form of truth, goodness and beauty; that 
of the first and immutable essence, creator and prime mover of all that exists - the divine 
Father. For, in pleasing and obeying the will of God, Augustinian man received the fixed 
phallic form, power, language, knowledge and divine authority with which to appropriate, 
dominate, define, accumulate, consume, and ultimately transcend the feminine, bodily, 
material world. But, as told in Augustine‟s interpretation of the Genesis creation story, it 
was the woman, Eve, as the unbounded, potentially uncontrolled, sexually submissive 
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aspect of Adam‟s soul, that brought about his feminized fall from God‟s grace and into 
mortality and a possibly Hadean afterlife, by inciting his lust for Satan‟s forbidden „fruit‟. 
This act of transgression marked all women, their sexual female bodies, and specifically 
their vaginas, as the gateway of the devil; the source of evil (desire) that, unless controlled, 
punished, and purified, would be the death and eternal suffering of man‟s essential soul.  
 
In this way, Augustine, and later Aquinas (in his five proofs of the existence of God) laid 
the metaphysically reinforced religious foundation and justification for man‟s fear of and 
disgust for the (soulless) sexual female body, and for every Christian girl/woman‟s need to 
be appropriated, purified, and disciplined by her real, social or divine father/husband in 
order to be redeemed, to be defined as the pure, good material aspect of his God-like 
essence, and thus, to exist in others‟ and her own eyes. This need for paternal 
appropriation, punishment, redemption and definition of the „Eve-il‟ woman has therefore 
presented divine justification and authorization for the rape, torture, mutilation, and even 
murder of countless numbers of women throughout Judeo-Christian history; an 
authorization now reified in the many biblical texts that give paternal sanction to the rape 
of daughters, particularly as a suitably heterosexual sublimation of men‟s forbidden 
hom(m)osexual desires:  
 
Behold, here is my daughter a maiden, and his concubine; them I will bring out now, and 
humble ye them, and do with them what seemeth good unto you: but unto this man do not 
so vile a thing. But the men would not hearken to him: so the man took his concubine, 
and brought her forth unto them; and they knew her, and abused her all the night until the 
morning: and when the day began to spring, they let her go. (Judges 19, 24-25) 
 
Having been repeatedly gang-raped with the permission of the father and her husband, the 
concubine was then drawn and quartered by the latter, as punishment for her sexual „sin‟: 
 
And when he was come into his house, he took a knife, and laid hold on his concubine, 
and divided her, together with her bones, into twelve pieces, and sent her into all the 
coasts of Israel. (ibid. 29) 
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                               Figure 34:              Dealing to „Eve-il‟ Desires              (Lewie) 
 
It is this dual metaphysical and religious conception of the good, virginally pure (veiled) 
woman as the immanent aspect or properties of man‟s essence, and on the other, dark side 
of the coin, the deformed, demonically sexual woman that is the lustful downfall and 
demise of that essence, that, reified and transmitted through the ages in biblical and 
philosophical texts, was inscribed on the female mind and body of participants such as 
Gina, Lewie, Gorgie and Gwen, through the rules, rituals and proscriptions of firstly their 
real fathers, and secondly, their priestly and Godly fathers. For Gina, that inscription came 
down to her through the ecclesiastical „churching‟ or postnatal purification of her mother‟s 
impure sexual/reproductive body, and thus, through her parents‟ perception of all things 
sexual, and particularly her female body, as dirty and bad. Passed on to her daughter, and 
etched even more deeply by Mormon teachings and rituals, that inscription saw Lewie, 
following her first sexual experience, splitting mind/head from body, and sexual body into 
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fragments, as feelings of impurity, guilt, badness and shame overcame her. Thus, once 
inscribed, this reconception (of the Eve-il woman) compelled participants to draw, quarter, 
and cast off their own sexual female self/body, in the hope of retaining or regaining the 
paternal recognition, love, appropriation, definition, and protection they‟d once had as 
„Daddy‟s little girl‟.  
 
But this dualistically split (Western) religious and philosophical misconception of essence, 
and therefore of woman, was not something new or different to Gorgie, or to her cousin 
Fleur. Through their grandmother‟s Māori whakapapa (genealogy), and the mythologically 
based socio-cultural customs, traditions and teachings received from her and their parents, 
both girls experienced within their family setting the objectification, demonization, and 
thus, the punitive (sexual and other) domination and abuse by fathers or brothers that was 
reified within, and divinely authorized and inscribed by Māori mythological narratives, in a 
way that closely aligned itself with the biblical scriptures informing Pākeha culture. For 
Māori spiritual beliefs also saw the human essence as purely spiritual, the wairoa (spirit) 
being possessed only by men, with women serving as the receptacle and maternal nurturer 
of the earthly existence of that spirit, but also as the cause of its demise. Reflecting the 
dualistic biblical conception of woman, the female sex was seen as the (good) material 
source, but also the (evil) destroyer of men‟s phallically generated and protected existence, 
as recounted in the writings of ethnologists Elsdon Best and William Goldie: 
 
The wairua (spirit) of a child is, according to several of my authorities, implanted by the 
male parent during coition… in a general sense a male is tapu and a female is noa, or 
common, i.e., void of tapu (Best, 1906, p. 3) 
     
The whare o aitua means the female procreative organs (tara, tore, &c.), and is also 
applied to Mother Earth, because her children (man) die and are taken back to her bosom 
- i.e., buried; also because of the mysterious primal curse of sex - female - which is 
ancient beyond compare…All troubles, misfortune, sickness, come from the whare o 
aitua (whence man enters the world) - i.e., from the female sex…The ure tane (penis), 
the sacerdotal term for which is tawhito („the ancient one‟), is another whare o te ora, or 
representative of life. The tawhito is the salvation of man: it gives mana
 
to his karakia 
and saves him from sickness and death. A man clasped his penis while repeating karakia 
to ward off magic spells. The tara wahine, or female genital organs, were…the cause of 
death entering the world (Goldie, 1904, p. 6) 
 
As Best further explains, the “mysterious primal curse of sex” to which Goldie refers is 
woman‟s inception of evil into the earthly world. Thus, similarly overseen and organized 
by a male spirit God, Io, the Māori story of the creation and fall of man can be seen to echo 
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that of Adam and Eve. For, where Eve (as his inferior, passively sexual, female aspect) 
tempts the God-like, immortal Adam to lust after the satanic serpent/phallus, thus causing 
his fall into feminized mortality, in the Māori Creation story, it is Hineahuone, created and 
taken as his wife (and thus inferior, passively sexual, female aspect) by Tāne, god of the 
forests, that, tickled and tempted by the evil phallic eel, entices Tāne (personified as the 
phallic Tiki) to follow:  
 
[O]ne day when the woman was bathing, an eel came round her body, and, with his tail, 
so excited the woman that there was awakened in her the sexual desire. She then went to 
seek Tiki, and succeeded in exciting him to an equal extent, hence there came to them the 
Knowledge. This act was viewed as a most serious hara (misdemeanour, sin), hence Tiki, 
knowing that the eel had caused the woman to lead him astray, resolved to take 
vengeance (1923, p. 56) 
 
Lest it be thought that Hineahuone‟s sin was merely to tempt Tiki/Tāne to be sexual with 
her, Best makes clear that it was Tāne‟s prior phallic exploration of the whare o te ora, the 
non-vaginal orifices of the female body, that initially created the (submissive) desire that 
resulted in his ultimate Fall into sin and mortality:   
 
Now, when Tane found woman he was ignorant of the laws of procreation and of 
copulation, hence he mistook the purpose of the ears, nostrils, &c. Now, if Tane had not 
interfered with the whare o te ora, death would never have approached man; he would 
have retained life for ever (1905, p. 155) 
 
Having brought sin and death into the world, it was Hineahuone and Tāne‟s daughter, 
Hinetitama, who, on learning that she had been taken and violated by her own father, was 
forced through shame and disgust to flee the earthly world, thus becoming goddess and 
keeper of the underworld. In this way, woman and her menstruating vagina came to be 
seen as the gateway to and from earthly existence of both good and evil spirits, the evil 
atua kahu or eel/lizard-like spirits being able to penetrate and possess man, thus bringing 
(feminized) sickness, madness and/or death.
92
 It is this orally and discursively promulgated 
belief that only recently led to the banning of pregnant or menstruating women from 
attending an exhibition of Māori taonga or sacred artefacts at the Te Papa museum in 
Wellington; a ban that Donna Awatere-Huata attributed to the traditional Māori fear of 
                                                 
92
 Best (1923) views the Christian and Māori narratives of the genesis, fall (and rise) of Man to have a shared 
origin in ancient Indian (Hindu) myths (i.e. Indra and the serpent Vrtra). This origin may also link them 
with the Australian aboriginal dreamtime myths of the Rainbow serpent/snake that penetrates, purifies and 
initiates/rebirths boys into manhood in the Julunggul ritual.   
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“those unclean women”, and to “woman being demonized just for being woman”.93 And it 
is this Māori mythological and religious conception of essence/spirit as an immaterial male 
preserve, and thus, of woman as its good/evil material aspects, that, along with its Pākeha 
counterpart, found contemporary expression in, and provided sacred justification for, the 
inter-tribal gifting of Fleur and Gorgie‟s great-great grandmother, a prized puhi princess.94 
Or, on the other side of the coin, for the disapproval, punishment, (incestuous and other) 
violation and degradation of their mothers‟ and their own „evil‟ sexual female bodies, 
whether by father or brother. Thus, for Fleur and Gorgie (as for Gina, Lewie and the other 
participants), the only way to escape the shame and psychic death of their ancestors 
Hineahuone/Eve and Hinetitama was to slough off their sexual womanly self/body and 
strive to once again become, in their father‟s eyes, the good, visibly restrained, attractive, 
pleasing girl. In doing so, their minds and bodies made manifest the next stage in the 
historical misconception of essence: Descartes‟ splitting of the Platonic notion of essence 
into two distinct (immaterial and material) entities, thus permitting the independent 
definition and existence of the rational (ultimately male) mind, and the natural (female) 
body of the transcendent, all-knowing (male) subject.   
 
Ostensibly with the aim of creating a metaphysical and logical framework that would 
remove knowledge of the physical world from the exclusive transcendent realm of divine 
revelation and make it accessible to all rationally disciplined, detached, scientific minds, 
Descartes divided the Platonic/Augustinian notion of essence, attributing a whole 
immaterial essence to the conscious mind of man, and essential material properties to the 
(female) physical world of human and animal bodies. Thus, according to Cartesian 
metaphysics, the unfettered physical (female) body was a naturally determined, 
instinctively driven, insensible „machine‟, its tamed, observed, ordered nature known as 
simply the sum of its (spatial) mechanical parts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93
 These quotes are from an interview with the former MP on the current affairs programme Marae   
    Investigates: http://www.voxy.co.nz/national/marae-investigates-interviews-donna-awatere-huata-and-   
    mamae-takerei/5/67800 
94
 A Puhi was the first-born daughter of a chief, treasured and protected for her beauty, courage and virginal   
    purity (Te Awekotuku, 1991, p. 95). 
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        Figure 35:                              Descartes‟ Ideal Woman                                     (Lewie) 
 
 
For Descartes‟ epistemic purposes, the best body was a dead body, that, having been 
(femininely) subdued, manipulated, and dissected, yielded its essential properties to the 
rational mind of the detached, objective scientific observer, thus confirming or denying his 
a priori intuited and deduced hypotheses, and thereby arming him with the knowledge with 
which to tame, control and utilize the natural world. Thus, in so definitively separating and 
differentiating man‟s immaterial mind from his material body, Descartes not only divided 
and thus further distorted the Platonic/Aristotelian misconception of essence into a wholly 
evolving, ultimately male, immaterial form, and a still opposingly defined number of 
(femininely) fixed, material, parts, but, in doing so, created a metaphysical and logical 
safety-net to prevent the fall of man into the fiery, feminized abyss of demonically 
uncontrolled, unsatisfiable desire. For, separated from, able to exist without, and able to 
know, control and destroy his natural body, the ultimately transcendent mind/head need no 
longer fear his most forbidden desire; the desire (inherited from Adam/Tāne) for the 
Demonic phallus. On this understanding, Descartes would appear to have done what 
Tāne/Maui failed to do: to regain man‟s lost immortality, by not just perpetuating the 
Platonic logic of male homophobia, but, at a deeper, metaphysical level, bifurcating its 
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conception of essence, thereby removing the fear and possibility of fatally de-forming 
feminization. It is this Cartesian bifurcated (mis)conception of essence that, in 
contemporary times, was inscribed upon and thus further divided the already 
philosophically and religiously split, fragmented sexual minds and bodies of the 
participants. A division that was clearly manifest, for example, in Gina and Kerry‟s 
ongoing experience of a depersonalising separation of mind/head and body, the conscious 
self observing from above or outside the insensible physical body and its movements; and 
manifest also in their subsequent conception of that sexual female body as a “trolley” or a 
“vehicle” on which to transport their brain or mind. Similarly, this Cartesian division was 
manifested in Miss P and Fleur‟s reconception of their sexual body as a “machine” for 
man‟s use, and as a numbed “robot”. In thus coming to conceive and perceive their sexual 
female body through Platonic/Augustinian/Cartesian eyes as a number of more or less 
imperfect (potentially uncontrollably) mechanical parts, participants strove to conceal or 
erase the natural sexual parts that were seen as the cause/curse of the „Eve-il‟ female, and 
to hastily rebuild that body as a perfectly pleasing, femininely restrained object. In being 
constantly reconceived and reshaped according to feminine ideals defined and judged 
through the eyes and in relation to the needs (to control), (forbidden) desires, and interests 
of the Cartesian male mind, and later the Lockean empiricist and Kantian idealist minds, 
this essential feminine object gradually dematerialized until it became little more than a 
figment of the modern male subject‟s imagination and language.  
 
This metaphysical dematerialization of the Cartesian mechanical essence, and thus of the 
essentially defined feminine object/body, began with Locke‟s empiricist refiguring of 
Descartes‟ real, knowable essence as, at its root, an unobservable and thus unknowable 
atomic/corpuscular matrix, the only knowable essence of physical bodies being that 
perceived, synthesized and nominally defined by, and as an idea within, the observing, 
scientific mind. It was this Lockean shifting of the form and definition of essence away 
from real, material bodies and into the perceiving mind and abstract ideas of the conscious 
male subject that found contemporary expression in the participants‟ endeavours to 
reconceive and reconstruct their real (sinfully) sexual female self/body as a perfect 
(prophylactic) object of paternal perception, conception and definition; a wholly unified 
image of an ideal, sexually attractive body, and visibly restrained (or better, absent) bodily 
functions. When, as adolescents, Sunshine and Lewie saw in the mirror only imperfect 
eyebrows or nose, or unsightly legs or breasts, and set about remodelling these parts into a 
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perfect artificial form that might win parental approval and love, they can be seen as 
reflecting the Lockean reduction of the whole, knowable essence/form of a physical object 
to its male-conceived, related and defined idea, the real-ly defective sexual female 
body/parts fading (or pushed) into the realm of the unknowable. 
 
This dematerialization of the Cartesian material essence into an idea or concept constructed 
by and within the male mind continued with Kant‟s transference of the logical laws and 
(spatio-temporal) categories that Aristotle had applied to real substantial beings into that 
mind, where, from a mass of disordered sense perceptions, it determinately synthesized 
and defined the essentially whole phenomenal form of correspondingly real (but 
unknowable) physical bodies (or things-in-themselves). For Kant, external objects did not 
imprint their nominal properties on the human mind (as Locke thought), but were 
perceived and known to exist only if they correlated to the intuitively and logically 
constructed - and thus universally definable and knowable - objects contained within the 
consciously subjective mind of phenomenal man. On this basis, Kant was now able to 
construct, define, and thus know the essentially fixed, phenomenal form and properties of 
woman, a form based on the objectifying perceptions, conceptions, and intuitive 
understandings of the male mind. And, although Kant attributes a mind to (noumenal) 
woman, because she is inevitably ruled by (and reduced to) naturally immoral and 
uncontrollable bodily senses and appetites, she is excluded from categorically constitutive 
subjectivity, and must be and remain an intuitively and logically constructed and defined 
object or appearance within the mind, and thus, under the conceptual and physical 
ownership and control, of man. But, with Husserl‟s uniting of real things-in-themselves 
with their phenomenal representations, and his subsequent projection of these intentionally 
constructed (feminine) objects out of the conscious (male) mind and into an outer, 
transcendently ideal world posited as the only true, knowable reality, this dematerializing 
reconception of woman/essence as appearance was given to appear - and thus further 
misconceived - as real. In this way, the essential form and existence of real, (demonically) 
natural woman became reduced to an inchoate, inexplicable mass of sense data, awaiting 
formal construction and organization by, within, and according to the desires, intentions 
and logic of, the phenomenal male mind. It was this phenomenological reconception of the 
Cartesian/Lockean essence and essential form as a male-mind-constructed, defined, 
projected, and thus seemingly real appearance that found contemporary expression in 
Lewie‟s concept and figure of the Doll Girl - the mindless, hollow, plastic assemblage of 
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perfectly perky breasts and manoeuvrable female body parts, chastely devoid of „dirty‟, 
„smutty‟, „evil‟ female genitalia. As modern man‟s idea of the perfect girl/woman, the Doll 
Girl exemplifies the traditional ideals of sexually objectified, passively subservient 
femininity that were parentally, socially and discursively imposed upon, and pursued by, 
the participants‟ mothers and foremothers. Ideals that required an ever slim, beautiful, 
youthful, sexually attractive, but also chastely self-restrained appearance, and a pleasing 
and compliant willingness to reshape - to add to, or subtract from - one‟s apparently real 
artificial form as these ideals altered across time, place, culture and class. Thus, the Doll 
Girl is the Freudian false, repressively reconstructed, projected, screened image or 
phantasy of feminine perfection.  
 
 
                           
                            Figure 36:   Living Doll   („Gonna lock her up in a trunk…‟)   (Lewie) 
  
Created as a figment of the male imagination, desire and intention, this projectively re-
materializing feminine essence/form subsequently gained a further measure of real, 
objectively defined and known existence when Wittgenstein reconceived the idealists‟ 
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phenomenal world, not as a mind-dependent construct, but as an external world of real 
objects, the existence and essential properties of which are determined by their place 
within an underlying logical structure shared with, and revealed by, language. The 
transcendent Wittgensteinian subject uses the logical rules, words and definitions learnt 
from and shared with other male subjects to construct, know, limit and control this object-
filled world, that, because it admits of no whole essences or physical beings, is simply a 
male-constructed, -related world of textualized “mirror images” or language objects. This 
linguistic reconception of phenomenal essences and objects therefore sees the perfect Doll 
Girl transformed from a subjectively and logically constructed and projected mind body, 
into an objectively and logically constructed, named language body that is now a 
communally knowable and exchangeable aggregate of purely relational properties. Reified 
and universalized within language, this purely nominal, relational essence of femininity 
was now able to be inter-generationally, socially and discursively transmitted and 
inscribed; its contemporary inscription onto the (defective, demonic) sexual bodies of the 
participants and their foremothers resulting in their reconstruction of a hopefully perfect, 
paternally pleasing, prophylactic form.  
 
For the participants‟ mothers and foremothers, attainment of the linguistically and socially 
prescribed ideal feminine form that marked them as perfect, or at least good, and therefore 
lovable, meant attainment of, and inscription with, the male-defined properties and 
identities of the passive, subservient, attractive „daughter‟, „wife‟, and „mother‟. Thus, 
whether it was the perfectly and immutably beautiful Doll Girl that Lewie‟s mother and 
grandmother strove to be, or the perfectly and obsessively clean, always orderly housewife 
that Kerry‟s mother had to be, or the subservient „neck‟ that Gwen wished to be, thus, like 
her mother, providing indispensable and unwavering support for her husband as the (God) 
„head‟, these names and identities relationally reconstructed and defined these women, 
giving them an enduring - albeit false, male-dependent - form and existence. When Kripke 
then anchors the essential properties of this phenomenally conceived, linguistically reified 
and reconstructed feminine form to a real, fixed, material, microstructural essence, he 
completes the essentialists‟ trail of misconceptions of the notion of essence, by adding an 
element of naturalistic determinacy to what has shown itself to be a mind-conceived, 
objectified apparition; an ever-changing artifice constructed and controlled as the 
sublimation of the submissive will of the ultimately transcendent male subject. It is this 
apparently real, naturally determinate essence, as traditionally employed to reify and 
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justify men‟s conception (and oppression) of women as inferior, irrational, evil, and thus 
needing to be subjugated and purified, that, inscribed on the participants‟ sexually 
developing bodies, brought their uniform rejection of the traditional ideals and identities of 
passive, submissive femininity.      
 
Born into and constructed by a familial and social world further shaped and changed, 
firstly by (liberal) feminist theory and activism, and secondly, by postmodern thought and 
culture, the sexually objectified, domesticated Kripkean woman that participants saw in 
their (fore)mothers was something they would not - and in fact could not - become. Not 
that the participants did not also strive to slough off and escape their pejoratively natural, 
sexual female bodies by psychically and physically reducing and reconstituting them as a 
desensitized collation of hopefully ideal feminine parts. They did: the flat-chested 
adolescent Jean risking humiliating exposure for social approval of her fake, padded 
breastline; the similarly flat-chested Gorgie taking the cheaper but more risky option of 
two raw potatoes; the abused, shamed Cilla scrubbing her legs red-raw to erase her dirty 
sexual female self/body and become again the pure, good daughter; and the pubescent 
Sunshine refashioning herself as Madonna‟s „Material Girl‟ in order to win parental and 
peer recognition, love and approval. But there was a marked difference between the ideal 
feminine form pursued by their mothers, and that pursued by the participants. Where the 
former prescribed a beautiful, passively submissive object of male construction, 
ownership, control and exchange, reduced to and valued for her appearance and use, the 
latter prescribed not just a pretty face, but also a head, with a brain and mind that, in these 
post-feminist, postmodern times, was not just expected, but compelled to successfully 
imitate the (perfect) androgynous form and functions of the boyishly re-embodied male 
subject. In Lewie‟s words and images, the contemporary girl was expected to turn herself 
into not just the Doll Girl, but also the Hare Girl - the pretend prophylactic self that 
constantly, frenetically, and obsessively strives to achieve and maintain the paternally 
imposed ideals of boyishly subjectified form and function. Ideals that demand not only 
slender, self-restrained beauty and a playful sexual attractiveness, but also self-motivated 
intelligence, autonomy, achievement, and a fit, muscularly defined, androgynous form that 
signals the (masculine) self-disciplined, desensitized, spiritual transcendence and 
(feminine) restraint of vulgarly natural (potentially voracious) appetites and desires.  
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                                Figure 37:           Maenadic Hare Girl              (Lewie) 
   
In thus rejecting traditional feminine ideals and striving to reconstruct their sexually 
fragmented self/body according to contemporary ideals and identities of boyishly 
subjectified form and function, the participants‟ reconstructed pretend prophylactic self can 
be understood as reflecting and expressing both liberal feminist and correlated male 
poststructuralist reconceptions of the Lockean/Kripkean bifurcated (mis)conception of 
essence.   
 
When Simone De Beauvoir implored traditionally subjugated, objectified women to escape 
their „Othering‟ by transcending their naturally determined sexual/reproductive bodies and 
functions, and thus, like men, constructing and attaining active, self-directed subjectivity, 
she was rejecting the notion and existence of an original, natural (genetic) essence that 
fixedly determines the essential properties and nature of woman. For De Beauvoir, woman 
was made, not born, and where she had historically been socially and discursively 
constructed as passively immanent, irrational, female object or „Other‟, she could and 
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should now reconstruct herself as transcendently active, rational subject. With the 
absorption of this egalitarian view of woman (as a social construct) into the broader socio-
linguistic and discursive orders and their (dualized) concepts, images, and definitions of 
womanhood, the feminine ideals inscribed upon and expected of girls/women changed, 
requiring their rejection of the traditionally objectifying qualities that the participants saw 
in their foremothers. It was no longer desirable that they be constructed as the perfectly 
attractive, submissive daughter, wife and mother, but rather, as the perfectly attractive, 
subjectively self-directed, self-disciplined sportswoman, ballerina, nurse, artist or 
academic, and wife and mother. Hence the participants‟ idealized reconception and re-
formation of their pejoratively sexual female self/body as not just a trolley or a collection 
of desensitized, mechanized parts, but as a “head”, a “mind”, an “essence”, and/or an 
“intellect” atop and transported by that trolley, identified only by the various uniforms, 
labels and identities that adorned it.  
 
However, while the modern girl/woman was striving to overcome her sexual female 
embodiment and gain access to transcendent (male) subjectivities and identities, anti-
essentialist male philosophers such as Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault were seeking to 
reunite the transcendentally pure but isolated, epistemically confused essentialist subject 
with his feared, alienated „Other‟, the (potentially uncontrollably) desiring feminine body. 
And they did so by reclaiming for themselves the material essence and 
(real/ideal/linguistic) essential properties historically ascribed to woman by essentialist 
philosophers from Descartes to Kripke. Thus, in „becoming woman‟, the Derridean 
„Dionysian‟ male subject and the Foucauldian „dandy‟ (or „metrosexual‟) reclaim their 
bodies and the metaphysical right to be material and immaterial, active and passive, 
masculine and feminine, rational and emotional. But, in doing so, they deny real women 
any material or immaterial definition or existence whatsoever. For, released from the 
Lockean model of a microstructural essence that fixes and determines the phenomenally 
perceived and defined properties of (feminine) bodies/objects, Derrida and Foucault 
assume for the natural, organic (male) body a material essence or persistingly whole 
(phallic) form, the growth and development of which enables its regulatory construction 
into femininely embodied, enlightened subjectivity. Denied this essentially whole, self-
manifesting form, „woman‟ and her natural sexual female body/parts are reconceived as 
the pure, fluidly unconstructible, undecidable (material/maternal) source, the phallic 
(metaphorical) properties, and the (sexual) demise of the postmodern male subject. It is 
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this poststructurally modified notion of essence that, inscribed onto participants‟ sexually 
developing female bodies, brings them face-to-face with the subjective unconstructibility 
and thus (im)material non-existence promised by looming womanhood, leaving them no 
existential choice but to pursue and attain the ideals, and thus achieve the perfect, boyishly 
imitative (phallic) form required for construction into (limited) subjectivity. Is it any 
wonder then, that Jean or Gwen saw their reconstructed pretend self as tomboyish, or that 
Gorgie imagined her ideal self as the ever-boyish Peter Pan, or that Lewie imagined and 
physically recreated herself as the boyish Victorian chimney-sweep, or that Cilla covered 
her sexual femaleness with full-length, boyish sports uniforms (of soft-ballers and 
cricketers), or that Kerry, Jean and Gina saw their subjective adult selves as a 
(disembodied/masculine) intellect, or that Gwen encased her female self in the armour of 
God? For only a boy not only has, but also retains, the perfectly whole (and thus 
constructible) material form. And is it any wonder that, being unable to gain access to 
these boyishly imitative forms of subjective definition, recognition and existence (because 
unable to escape one‟s „Eve-il‟ sexual female self), the (ED) participants may have felt 
compelled to withdraw from the socio-symbolic world, and to reconstruct their own 
desexualized, defeminized, boyishly or childishly perfect form and function, in order to 
ensure their ongoing (recognized, loved) subjective existence?   
 
As one contemporary manifestation of this prophylactic withdrawal and self-adjudicated 
punishment, purification and reconstruction of the perfect form, anorexia (or other eating 
disorder) is the very visible and most desperate expression of the poststructuralist denial of 
a material essence and essentially whole, constructible form - and thus, of a 
sociolinguistically and self-cultivated subjectivity - to woman. For what united the eating 
disordered participants was the perceived or actual inability to escape what they had learnt 
to see as their dirty, imperfect, bad, shameful, sexual female self/body, and thus attain the 
perfect (boyish) form (of appearance and achievement) that would win the approval of, and 
thus be granted (albeit limited) subjective existence, recognition and love by, their 
real/social/divine father. Trapped within her badness, the anorexic/bulimic girl had no 
option but to use food, exercise, razors and/or drugs to starve, cut, erase, punish, purify, 
and thus make good again (or destroy), her real - but monstrously de-formed, demonic, 
fragmented - sexual female body, and thus, self. 
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     Figure 38:                                                                                                               (Kayla) 
 
In thus reshaping the perfect prophylactic form for her self, the anorexic/bulimic/orthorexic 
participant became the very real, very isolated, but also hopeful manifestation of the 
postmodern male‟s further (mis)conception of essence. Denied an immaterial or material 
essence, the anorexic girl/woman strove to escape what Nietzsche saw as man‟s „bitch 
Sensuality‟; what Derrida saw as the „abyss‟ of non-existence; what Lacan saw as the 
„empty set‟, the „not all‟; what Sartre saw as „holes‟ and „slime‟; and what Foucault (via 
allegiance to his ideal man, Baudelaire) saw as naturally uncultivable, sexually 
uncontrolled, and therefore vulgar, horrible and disgusting. That is, she strove to escape 
her real sexual female self, and particularly her natural womanly body, the essence-less, 
formless non-existence of which is the condition of postmodern boy/man‟s exclusive 
construction into fluidly embodied, but ultimately transcendent subjectivity, as well as 
being the cause of his (perforated, feminized) destruction.  
 
However, even when the ED participant managed to repressively escape her real, bad 
sexual self by creating and maintaining some sense and concept of her self as a purified, 
re-formed, and therefore a good, lovable, socially acceptable and constructible self, her 
return to the outer world of phallic subjectivities and identities did not bring an escape 
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from the (dis)order, but rather, its transformation. For the anorexic/bulimic rituals of self-
denial, -discipline, -purification, and -protection that desexualized, defeminized, and thus 
recreated the perfectly constructible form were simply replaced with other less drastic, 
more socially acceptable obsessive-compulsive rituals (of cleaning, dieting, nail-biting, 
working) and/or other disorders (depression, alcohol) that expressed and maintained the 
repressive purification and re-formation of the real sexual self; a re-formation demanded of 
all the participants as the condition for social and discursive (re)construction into a 
(limited) range of boyish subjectivities and identities. In this way, the participants made 
manifest the murderous consequences of the poststructuralist misconception of essence, 
and the model of subjective mal-development that it underpins.       
 
In recognizing an originary material essence (or logos), possessed only by boys/men, this 
poststructuralist model conceives the development of (rational/aesthetic) subjectivity as the 
social and self-construction of the essentially whole, phallically formed, male body from a 
natural, fluidly female state of (potentially uncontrollable) animal instincts and drives, to 
an ideal (but still embodied) state of self-directed masculine subjectivity; the latter 
conceived by Irigaray (2008) as a self-cultivated, inspirited state of autonomously self-
limiting, sensibly transcendent, subjective existence. Thus, for the Baudelairean dandy, as 
for his contemporary, the metrosexual man, fully actualized masculine subjectivity 
required the visible and stylishly feminine restraint of otherwise immoderate bodily 
appetites and desires. This means that, even though the essentially formed, natural body 
and the cultivated spirit/mind become reunited in the postmodern (heterosexual, male) 
subject, they exist in a still hierarchical relation that requires the priorly existing (fluidly 
female) body to be and remain subdued and submissive to its cultivated, destructively 
creative (masculine) mind. Hence, when the participants gained access to social/discursive 
construction into boyishly subjectified identities (as sportsperson, academic, rural delivery 
operator, nurse, health care planner, landscaper, accounting secretary, bank clerk, artist or 
salesperson), they imitated and personified a masculine head/mind constantly subjugating, 
erasing, femininely reconstructing and re-inscribing its natural body into a unified, 
controlled, boyishly androgynous form. A form valued and admired for its cultivated, 
forever youthful appearance, and its exhibition of self-control of fearful, potentially 
demonic appetites and desires. In doing so, they imitated and thus validated the 
postmodern male subject‟s reclamation of the feminine, and of the fluidly pluralized (but 
still hierarchical) embodiment and expression of difference that it permits. This 
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reclamation of feminine embodiment is currently manifesting, for example, in the 
femininely heterosexual form of the (male) „metrosexual‟; in the increasing (hetero-) 
expression of „man-love‟ or „bromance‟; in the encouragement of boys/men to show 
affection/emotion; in their boyishly feminine styles of dress, bodily adornment and care 
(with male model Pejic epitomizing this femininity); in the surgical, chemical, and textual 
reinscription of various aspects of their embodied subjectivity (e.g. Michael Jackson; the 
shaved, tattooed body of All Blacks pin-up Sonny Bill Williams; and „Brotox‟); in their 
increasing preference for anal sex (McBride & Fortenberry, 2010); and in taking on (and 
valorizing) the role of the chef, the house-husband, or the typist who (like the Dionysian 
warrior) constantly de- and re-constructs his material self/world with the text flowing from 
his „stylish‟ phallic keyboard. And, as Lewie and Sunshine observed, the contemporary 
girl/woman‟s boyishly subjectified, femininely restrained (but potentially bacchanalian) 
embodiment is currently finding expression in the plethora of surgical/chemical procedures 
that tighten, lighten, darken, reshape, remove and replace undesirable female body parts in 
the hope of gaining and retaining the perfectly slim, boyish form; in the phenomenon of the 
“ladette” - the young, successful professional who, after dark, becomes as loud, drunk and 
unruly, and as (ab)usive of her own sexual female body as the lads;
95
 in the social 
acceptance and prevalence of performative lesbianism (especially in hetero-porn);
96
 and in 
the male expectation that „normal‟ hetero-sex can be ever more violent and degrading of 
the sexual female body, and the girl/woman who owns that body will not just permit, but 
want it. Or, as Lewie tells it, 
 
    every boy watches….pornography these days, every single one of them, I‟ve never met one  
    that doesn‟t….they look at how they behave sexually in pornography which is outrageous 
    ….and then they act in that way, in their own sexual ways where they‟re very very, dominant  
    and rough with the females -- 
    -- Violent 
    Violent, yeah, like so many females I‟ve heard about, have complained that they don‟t enjoy  
    sexual activity because it‟s just…not pleasing for them at all, because….the boys can be so  
    violent and they can hurt them a lot, and they don‟t feel they can tell them that it hurts. 
 
With the real, natural sexual female body/parts now signifying only de-formed, 
demonically uncontrolled desire and non-existence, could it be that, for postmodern man, 
                                                 
95
The contemporary phenomenon of the "ladette" is recognized and explored in the Australian 60 Minutes 
TV documentary (2008) Girls Will Be Boys. See http://video.au.msn.com/watch/video/girls-will-be-
boys/x1etmro. Also Jackson (2006), Lads and Ladettes in School: Gender and a Fear of Failure. 
96
 See Chivers, Rieger, Latty & Bailey (2004). Also, Taylor (2003) suggests that men‟s enjoyment of lesbian  
   porn offers homophobic confirmation of their heterosexuality. See:  
   http://www.salon.com/sex/feature/2003/08/27/lesbo.  
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sex has become the ever more violent means to punish and subdue that which so clearly 
represents - and thus relieves - his own feared, fatal, but inescapable desire to submit? 
  
In striving to reconstruct and maintain the perfect, boyishly subjectified, prophylactic self, 
Lewie, Gina, Gorgie, Sunshine and others offered up their real, numbed, discarded sexual 
female body/parts as a means to an approved and accepted social or marital identity, while 
their (detached) head/mind everyday pursued the ideals required to (re)gain and maintain 
access to phallic subjectivities and identities. This pursuit was driven - to the point of 
obsession - by the fear of failure and consequent subjective non-existence, and by the 
deeper and enduring feelings of loss, emptiness, turmoil, grubbiness, and disconnection 
from their real self, and others. For, what is required in order that postmodern man alone 
be cultivated into fully embodied, perfectly divine subjectivity, and in order that 
postmodern woman daily and successfully imitate that subjectivity, is that both turn on, 
castrate/destroy, and reconstruct a childishly pure, re-veiled version of the real sexual 
woman - a version that, as Derrida says, she knows to be fake, but also seductively 
attractive to men (1979, p. 362). A re-virginalized version valued because it too keeps the 
Derridean metrosexual man at a safe distance from the nihilistic abyss awaiting his own 
penetrated, castrated feminization. Meanwhile, on pain of her own subjective and symbolic 
death, postmodern girl/woman cannot stop pursuing and attaining her daily dose of 
goodness (that is, of boyishly perfect form), and thus, the recognition, approval, and 
phallic/eucharistic blessings of the real, social, transcendent, or inner father. But as 
Sunshine said (and as Lewie and other participants echoed), all she really wanted was to 
find and be seen and known again as the essentially whole, unconditionally loved person 
that she was as a child:  
 
    Probably the best person to ask about how anyone would see ourselves without being  
    fragmented is to ask children….[they] look at you as a whole person…. when „T‟ sees  
    me he looks in my face…. he loves you for who you are. 
 
For Lewie, it was about being a woman who was perceived, known and loved, 
 
    [as a] person, because that‟s what we are, we‟re people, we‟re not an age, or a gender or  
    whatever, or a race, or a species, we‟re a person…we‟re an existence, we‟re an essence,  
    we are an ego. 
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a wish echoed by Rose, the key figure in the documentary Girls will be Boys (2008), who, 
despite striving to be the best, funniest, most hard-drinking, loud-mouthed, violent ladette 
in town, seen and accepted as one of the boys, and “beating men at their own game”, 
reveals in the last moments of the interview:
97
  
 
    D‟you know what? I guess, like this is personal for me…since I was a kid, I‟ve always  
    wanted…society‟s validation that I‟m okay…you know…I want to throw it out there…  
    „n say this is me…and I‟m telling you, I‟m not who I want to be…I‟m not okay…I need  
    some help.   
 
 
But this original essence and essential self - the real me - that Rose and my participants 
long for is not an enduringly formed material body that develops and is socio-linguistically 
cultivated into divinely inspired, autonomously self-limiting, adult subjectivity as 
Nietzsche, Derrida, Foucault and Irigaray have theorized. Nor is it a perfectly formed 
immaterial soul that, trapped within a sinfully and voraciously desiring, deceitfully sensing 
body, yearns for immortal transcendence of its immanent existence as Plato, Aristotle, 
Augustine and Descartes theorized. Rather, it is consciously experienced, then later 
remembered, very occasionally experienced, and/or secretly yearned, as an originally and 
persistingly whole, unified spirogenetic essence and essentially subjective female self or 
“person”, born, enduringly existing, and essentio-socially constructed within an unbroken 
maternal (and paternal) bond of unconditional, intersubjective recognition and love. In this 
case, the sexual female, womanly self and her sexuality become, as Lewie says, simply an 
extension and further expression of that essence, and that bond, rather than the real and 
perceived result and symbol of their loss:  
 
    Yeah, it‟s an expression almost, like with art and dance or music….it‟s often like an  
    expression of feelings or emotions or whatever, why can‟t sexuality be seen as just an  
    extension and an expression and a part of us rather than, this….other thing completely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97
 See page 307 for the footnote reference to this documentary. 
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                            Figure 39:                      The „Other‟ Thing                        (Lewie) 
 
 
Blinded to and separated from their essentially whole, but metaphysically, familialy, 
socially and discursively denied, deformed and demonized spirogenetic selves, these 
contemporary, boyishly subjectified, phallically identified daughters follow their mothers, 
grandmothers, and foremothers - whether Pākeha or Māori, whether real, religious, 
mythological or philosophical - in longing and waiting to be reunited with, allowed to 
represent, and unconditionally and intersubjectively recognized and loved for, their 
currently symbolically non-existent, yet subterraneously sub-sisting, essential sexual 
female self. 
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                        Figure 40:                  Barely Hopefully Sub-Sisting                   (Lewie) 
 
Until this occurs, their subjective existence remains a masquerade; a succession of phallic 
male-defined, dissimulated identities that alienate and desensitize them to their once 
essentially integrated bodies, feelings, desires and intuitions, that therefore robotically 
disconnect them from others, and that, fearing loss of those identities, compel them to 
surreptitiously maintain, or completely withdraw into, a self-punishing, purifying, 
desexualizing, childish „re-formation‟ of that self. A perfect, lovable re-formation that 
today, as in medieval and Victorian times, may be most visibly, and most murderously 
manifesting in the mind, body and spirit of the anorexic/bulimic/orthorexic/obese girl and 
woman. 
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It appears, then, that Epicurus was speaking truly when he surmised that a correct 
metaphysics brings inner peace and tranquillity, an incorrect one, inner turmoil. For it 
seems that Plato and Aristotle may have misconceived the notion of essence as a purely 
immaterial, male-possessed entity, thereby creating the foundation for over two millennia 
of further misconceptions that have, in turn, distorted our metaphysical, logical, and 
linguistic representations of reality in ways that are currently, and under the conditions 
outlined in Chapter 6, resulting in the occurrence of eating and associated disorders in girls 
and women. On this basis, it seems that the solution to these (dis)orders would be a 
reconception of essence that, based on my research findings, would figure it as an 
originally and inextricably immaterial and material, or spirogenetic entity, possessed by 
male and female, and operating at individual, sexuate, and species levels to determine, 
(inter-)textually construct, and motivate the whole form, function, growth and development 
of every human being; an essence that can therefore be seen and known as a source of 
fixity and fluidity, sameness and difference, unity and plurality. To reconceive essence in 
this way would then permit a reconfiguring of the metaphysical, logical and linguistic 
models of human and worldly existence that it underpins.  
 
The recognition of a spirogenetic essence as the first cause of the existence, enduring form, 
function, and growth of human (and non-human) beings means that the process of 
development of the individual can no longer be seen as an ascent from a natural (female) 
state of fluidly chaotic material drives and „animal‟ instincts to a transcendently embodied 
or disembodied (male) state of Logically enformed, ordered, (seemingly) self-directed 
subjectivity. Instead, consciously embodied, enformed, related subjectivity is always 
already present at (and before) birth, its growth and development simply an unfolding and 
a flourishing of that subjectivity, its autonomous and wholly integrated expression 
fostered, shaped and realized within enduring familial/social bonds of unconditional 
intersubjective recognition and love. And, because this spirogenetic essence determines not 
just the enduring sameness, but also the enduring difference in (whole) individual, sexuate, 
and species form, function and growth, the Aristotelian logic that structures and defines the 
nature and categories of essential (ousiatic) being must be refigured so that the primary 
relation is not „subject-object‟, but „subject-subject‟, the „other‟ subject being (recognized 
as) essentially same as, and/or different to, oneself. In this case, any subsequent form of 
definition and representation of an individual must be based upon (mutual) recognition of 
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his/her spirogenetically whole, self-known and -defined, subjective form and function, if it 
is to truly and authentically represent that individual. With this refounding of Aristotelian 
logic, the previously impure, fluidly chaotic realm of “buzzing, booming confusion” (Frye, 
1996, p. 1000) that was Aristotelian man‟s demonically unbounded, abyssal, female realm 
of all things „not-man‟, suddenly transforms from a fearfully “infinite, undifferentiated 
plenum” (ibid.) into a real world of essentially whole, recognizably and reassuringly same 
- but also infinitely and interestingly different - forms of life. Because these forms are no 
longer seen as pure fluidity, or purely immaterial, or the perceived properties of mutely 
objectified bodies, but are originally, subjectively spirogenetic, their essential form (and 
function) need no longer be rationally or divinely intuited by a Platonic/Cartesian subject, 
or empirically intuited by an Aristotelian subject, or a priori synthesized by the mind of the 
Kantian/Husserlian subject, to be real-ly or phenomenally known. Rather, this persisting, 
actualizing form is known, (categorically) defined, and revealed to other subjects by the 
subjective being that enduringly possesses, experiences, remembers, and most intimately 
knows it, thereby allowing others to real-ly and intersubjectively perceive and know that 
essential nature of the person-in-him/herself. On this basis, the Platonically divided 
definitions of the real and nominal (or linguistic) essences of living beings become 
reunited, in that the real, self-experienced, self-defined, spirogenetic essence of every 
individual can and must provide the conceptual form or template for any nominally 
constructed definition of the essential nature and qualities of that individual. That is, the 
subjective, logic-based definition of the essential form/function of an individual (and its 
kind) gives the basic definition of its name. With this correspondence of the real and 
nominal essences of living beings, the term „woman‟ is irrevocably reunited with its real 
spirogenetically formed, subjective referent, or that which the participants knew and 
referred to as the „real me‟; that is, their essential (sexual) female self.   
 
This reinstatement of woman as a wholly self-subsisting, self-defined subject within our 
metaphysical, logical and linguistic systems of representation means that pubescent girls 
(and their fathers) need no longer fear, demonize, fragment, reject, reconstruct, and control 
their sexually developing selves in the way that the participants and their foremothers were 
compelled to do. Rather, sexual development becomes simply a further unfolding and 
expression, within unbroken personal and social bonds of unconditional recognition, love 
and acceptance, of the whole, spirogenetically integrated female self; an unfolding that 
Gorgie began to experience later in life, as she set out to recover, reconstitute, know, and 
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subjectively express - and then received unconditional, intersubjective recognition and love 
for - her real female self. As the research findings show, this recovery, involving a re-
establishing of the bonds of love and attunement with her daughter Sunshine, flourished 
during the (extended) interview process, as the very exploration of the subjectively 
experienced stages, processes, and events in the (de)construction of selfhood seemingly 
assisted in the recovery and intersubjective expression of her original, essentially whole 
female self. As Gorgie described the gradual repossession and reconstitution of this 
spirogenetic self, or „real me‟: 
 
    I‟ve taken ownership back of my body….I don‟t feel that any part of my body has to be…a  
    display for someone else to get an idea of who I am, or get an image of what they think I am   
    ….I want people to look at my eyes, I want people to look into me now. 
 
    When I say „look at my face‟, I mean look at what I‟ve got to say, ok…when I used to hide  
    my self, it was because I didn‟t feel I had anything to say. Now it‟s like „look at me, look at  
    my eyes, look that I‟m a sincere person, look at my emotions, look at my authentic self….and  
    if tears roll into my eyes, it‟s because this is who I am…. I‟m out there just representing my  
    self now, and….I just want to represent my self as I truly am. 
 
In this way, Gorgie echoes the longing expressed by each and every participant: that, as 
woman, she be recognized, loved and represented, not for how she looks or what she 
achieves, but simply for who she essentially and truly is; for the form, functions, thoughts, 
desires, emotions, and feelings of her spirogenetically whole, subjective, sexual female 
self; a subjective reformation that would resurrect and regenerate not just woman, but also 
man.  
 
For, to metaphysically reconceive and symbolically represent woman in this way would be 
to obviate the need for boys to separate from and objectify the mother/woman, thereby 
breaking the bond of unconditional love and turning to their real, social, and/or 
transcendent Fathers to compete for disciplinary love and approval, submissive receipt of 
the divine (eucharistic) Phallus, and entry into phallic subjectivity. It would therefore 
release supposedly autonomous, rationally, aesthetically and divinely transcendent, but 
constantly tormented Platonic/Augustinian/Cartesian/Derridean man from his historical 
state of forbidden, repressed, reviled, and philosophically, theologically, and aesthetically 
sublimated desire; that is, from the submissive passion that he necessarily projects onto - 
and therefore piercingly punishes, destroys, and chastely replaces - the „Eve-il‟ woman and 
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the Fallen, feminized man, in order to cultivate, protect, and ultimately immortalize, his 
own phallic form and existence.  
 
 
        
Figure 41:              Demonic Passions                                       (La Face Cachée des Fesses [Pochon, 2009]) 
 
 
Released from dependence upon the Father‟s pedagogical love, recognition and 
forgiveness, the mind and body of male and female subjects would be free to reunite in a 
way that now reveals the essence of their unity. It is unconditional intra- and inter-
subjective love that seemingly inspires, binds, motivates, and interrelates the mindbody of 
every essentially spirogenetic self, and that is the basis for its fully integrated, 
harmoniously related existence, (sexual) development, and actualization, but that, if 
denied, brings more or less fragmented, disordered, discontented, melancholic existence. It 
is perhaps, then, within a metaphysics based upon the recognition of sexed spirogenetic 
essences and unconditionally, intra/inter-subjectively loved, attuned, essential selves, that 
we may glimpse that long sought Epicurean state of inner peace, tranquillity and „ease‟; a 
possibility further fired by Irigaray‟s (2002) insight that „The wisdom of love is perhaps 
the first meaning of the word „philosophy”. 
 
                                            
 
                                      ********************************** 
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